HEATROK

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

FLEX A. HEATROK;,!

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 26-6446 (MAS) (JBD)

OPINION

FATHOM BORG, et al,

Defendants.

SHIPP, District Judge

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Flex Heatrok’s (“Plaintiff”) civil complaint

(ECF No. 1) and application to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 1-1.) Having reviewed the

application, the Court finds that in forma pauperis status is warranted in this matter, and Plaintiff's

application is therefore granted. Because the application shall be granted, the Court is required to

screen Plaintiff's complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and dismiss any claim that is

frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or secks relief from an immune defendant. For

the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's claims against the New Jersey Department of Corrections

(“NIDOC”) and Northern State Prison (“NSP”) shall be dismissed with prejudice, and Plaintiff's

complaint shall in all other respects be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted.

' In the caption of this matter, the Clerk of the Court has listed Plaintiff's name as Hector A.

Heatrok. All of the documents Plaintiff has submitted, however, list his name as Flex A. Heatrok.

(See ECF No. 1; ECF No. 1-1; ECF No. 1-2.) The Court will therefore direct the Clerk of the

Court to amend the caption of this matter to list Plaintiff's name as Flex A. Heatrok in accordance

with Plaintiff's filings.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a convicted state prisoner currently serving a lengthy prison sentence. (ECF

No. | at 2-8.) In August 2025, Plaintiff was housed at NSP. (/d. at 6.) Plaintiff was subsequently

transferred to Bayside State Prison. (/d. at 6-7.) Frustrated regarding some lost property, Plaintiff

had “run-ins” with various other prisoners and prison staff, resulting in a prison disciplinary charge

and a 90-day restorative housing unit (“RHO”) sanction issued on September 26, 2025. (/d. at 7.)

Plaintiff was then placed back in the RHU at NSP. Ud.) According to Plaintiff, prisoners are

usually given an opportunity to request a prison placement after an RHU stint, but he was not given

this opportunity. (/d.) Instead, after Plaintiff received another institutional infraction, he received

another 120-day RHU placement on December 4, 2026. (id) When this term neared completion,

Plaintiff again sought to have some say in his next prison placement, but was again denied the

opportunity to make such a request. ({@.) On March 26, 2026, after Plaintiff was found guilty of

another prison infraction, he received another 120-day RHU placement, which was reduced to 30

days on appeal. (/d.) Plaintiff complained when he was not released from the RHU as of April

26, 2026, and was told that he would not be released until May 24, 2026, when the cumulative

total of his RHU placements had been completed. (/d. at 7-8.) Plaintiff believes that he is being

punished with a 61-day RHU placement rather than the 30 days imposed following his disciplinary

appeal. Plaintiff believes that he is therefore being placed into the RHU beyond the time set by

his disciplinary findings, and that the failure to let him choose a prison placement following the

RHU placement amounts to a denial of either his Eighth Amendment or Due Process rights.

Correspondence Plaintiff filed with his complaint, however, more clearly explains why

Plaintiff was not scheduled to leave the RHU until late May. That correspondence recounts

Plaintiff's three imposed RHU sanctions of 90, 120, and 30 days issued on September 26, 2025,

December 3, 2025, and March 23, 2026, respectively, (ECF No, 1-1 at 10.) The correspondence

further explains that “RHU sanctions are consecutive unless stated otherwise” and that, accounting

for the consecutive terms, Plaintiff was not slated for release from the RHU until May 24, 2026.

(id.) Given the cumulative nature of RHU terms, Plaintiff's September 2025 90-day term did not

expire until December 25, 2026, at which point his 120-day term from December 4 began to run.

That term thereafter expired on April 24, 2026, at which point the final 30 day term began,

ultimately expiring on May 24, 2026. The facts thus do not support Plaintiff's assertion that he

has been held beyond his 30-day term, only that this term was cumulatively added onto his prior

unexpired RHU placement terms.

Il. LEGAL STANDARD

Because Plaintiff shall be granted in forma pauperis status, the Court is required to screen

his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Pursuant to the statute, this Court must sua

sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. “The

legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(BYii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Allah vy.

Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 Gd Cir. 2000)).

In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a

district court is required to accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all

reasonable inferences from those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Phillips

v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 Gd Cir. 2008), but need not accept as true legal

conclusions couched as factual allegations. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). A

complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations” to survive a motion to dismiss, but must

contain “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint “that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do,’” and a complaint will not “suffice” if it

provides only “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” /d. (quoting Bell

Atl. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 557 (2007)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint

must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.” Jd. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570), “A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Jd (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A

complaint that provides facts “merely consistent with” the defendant’s liability “stops short of the

line between possibility and plausibility” and will not survive review under Rule 12(b)(6). Jd.

(quoting Twombly, 555 U.S. at 557). While pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed in

conducting such an analysis, pro se litigants must still “allege sufficient facts in their complaints

to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir, 2013).

il. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff seeks to raise Eighth Amendment or Due Process claims against the

Administrator, Assistant Superintendent, and classification supervisor of NSP premised on being

held beyond his sanction term in the RHU and on being denied his placement of choice following

his RHU term. Plaintiff also raises these claims, however, against the NJDOC and NSP. The

NJDOC and NSP, however, are arms of the state, are not subject to suit in a federal civil rights

proceeding and are, in any event, entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Christ the King

Manor, Inc. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 730 F.3d 291, 318 Gd Cir. 2013);

Walker v. Beard, 244 F. App’x 439, 440-41 (3d Cir. 2007); Grabow v. S. State Corr. Facility, 726

F, Supp. 537, 538-39 (D.N.J, 1989), Plaintiff's claims against the NIDOC and NSP must therefore

be dismissed with prejudice at this time.

Turning to Plaintiff's RHU placement claim, Plaintiff contends that he has been held

beyond his imposed RHU sanction term in the RHU. Even assuming that being held over such a

term in the RHU could support a claim for relief, ef Sandin vy, Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)

(prison placements only give rise to constitutional claims when they represent an “atypical and

significant hardship” on the inmate in relation to the “ordinary incidents of prison life”), Plaintiff's

claim of being detained in the RHU beyond his assigned term is factually mistaken. As the prison’s

calculation indicates, and as Plaintiff admits in his complaint, Plaintiff received 90-day, 120-day,

and 30-day RHU terms, with the first term beginning on September 26, 2025. As outlined above,

when accounting for those three separate terms running consecutively, Plaintiff's terms did not

expire until May 24, 2026, the date provided by the prison and the date on which Plaintiff appears

to have ended his RHU stay. Plaintiff was thus not over-detained in the RHU or held there longer

than required by his disciplinary infractions; instead, the prison’s calculation is in line with the

terms Plaintiff admits were imposed upon him as disciplinary sanctions. Plaintiff thus fails to state

a claim for relief to the extent he contends that he was over-held in the RHU because that appears

to be factually incorrect based on the facts Plaintiff asserts.

In his remaining claim, Plaintiff seeks to raise an Eighth Amendment or Due Process claim

based on the failure of the prison administrator, assistant superintendent, and classification

supervisor to allow him input into his next prison placement, which Plaintiff asserts prisoners are

regularly provided. A prisoner, however, has no federal right to any specific prison placement,

nor to a prison placement of his choice. See, e.g., Ruffin v. Superintendent Retreat SCI, 689 F.

App’x 112, 114 (3d Cir. 2017) (“it is well-established that prisoners have no constitutional right

to placement in any particular prison, custody classification, or housing assignment”). As Plaintiff

has no right to any specific placement or a placement of his choice, the alleged failure of

Defendants to consult his preferences in making his placement decisions did not violate his Eighth

Amendment or Due Process rights. Plaintiffs claims based on this classification decision must

therefore be dismissed without prejudice at this time for failure to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons expressed above, Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF

No. 1) is GRANTED; Plaintiff's claims against the NJDOC and NSP are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE; and Plaintiff's complaint (ECF No. 1) is in all other respects DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. An order

consistent with this Opinion will be entered.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE