Morris

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

RANDALL MORRIS, §

ID # 15141-010, §

Plaintiff, §

§

v. § No. 3:24-CV-3148-X-BW

§

LAUREN HOWARD, et al., §

Defendants. § Referred to U.S. Magistrate Judge1

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Before the Court is the Verified Complaint (Dkt. No. 3), received on

December 13, 2024, and supplemented by the filing received on April 22, 2025.

Based on the relevant filings and applicable law, the Court should DISMISS the

complaint, as supplemented, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A.

I. INTRODUCTION

Randall Morris, a federal prisoner currently incarcerated by the Federal

Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) at the Federal Correctional Institution, Seagoville (“FCI

Seagoville”), filed this civil action against Supervisor of Education (“SOE”) Lauren

Howard at FCI Seagoville, the warden of FCI Seagoville, and two BOP directors in

connection with his conditions of confinement and for constitutional deprivations.

(See id. at 1.) His “complaint centers on unreasonable, arbitrary, and extreme

restrictions regarding the use of the BOP typewriters and the use of the Inmate

1 By Special Order No. 3-251, this pro se case has been referred to the undersigned

magistrate judge for case management. (See Dkt. No. 1.)

Trustfund Photocopy Machine.” (Id.) According to Morris, “[t]hese egregious

restrictions conflict with the First Amendment as well as specific BOP Program

Statements that authorize all inmates to create, duplicate, and share original literary

works[.]” (Id.) He states that he “does not seek a monetary award,” but he seeks

injunctive and declaratory relief, costs, attorney’s fees, and “any other appropriate

relief.” (Id. at 1, 9.)

The Court granted Morris’s subsequent request to supplement his complaint.

(See Dkt. Nos. 10, 13.) Morris supplemented his complaint with additional factual

allegations to support his original claims, to support a “reasonable accommodation

ADA/RA foundation” stemming from the denial of his accommodation requests for

unrestricted access to the typewriters and the copy machine to accommodate

physical impairments of his writing hand, and to support a claim of retaliation. (Dkt.

No. 10 at 2 (capitalization altered); see also id. at 2-6.)

II. PRELIMINARY SCREENING

Morris is a federal prisoner who has been permitted to proceed in forma

pauperis (“IFP”) in this action. (See Dkt. No. 6.) As a prisoner seeking redress from

officers of a governmental entity, his complaint is subject to preliminary screening

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. See Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d 578, 579-80 (5th Cir. 1998).

Because Morris is proceeding IFP, the complaint also is subject to screening under

§ 1915(e)(2). Both § 1915A(b) and § 1915(e)(2)(B) provide for sua sponte dismissal of

a complaint, or any part of it, if the Court finds it is frivolous or malicious, fails to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a

defendant who is immune from such relief.

A frivolous complaint lacks any arguable basis, either in fact or in law, for the

wrong alleged. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A complaint has no

arguable basis in fact if it rests upon clearly fanciful or baseless factual contentions,

and similarly lacks an arguable basis in law if it embraces indisputably meritless legal

theories. See id. at 327; Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 373 (5th Cir. 2005). When

analyzing a prisoner’s complaint, the court may consider reliable evidence such as

the plaintiff’s allegations, responses to a questionnaire, and authenticated prison

records. See Wilson v. Barrientos, 926 F.2d 480, 483-84 (5th Cir. 1991).

In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, the Court accepts well-pleaded

factual allegations as true, but it does not credit conclusory allegations or assertions

that merely restate the legal elements of a claim. Chhim v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 836

F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 2016). While courts hold pro se plaintiffs to a more lenient

standard when analyzing complaints, such plaintiffs must nevertheless plead factual

allegations that raise the right to relief above a speculative level. Id. (citing Taylor v.

Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002)).

III. ANALYSIS

Because Morris seeks relief in this action from federal officers for violation of

his constitutional rights, his claims are fairly interpreted as arising under Bivens v. Six

Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971). See

Montgomery v. Deitelbaum, No. 3:09-CV-2407-M-BH, 2010 WL 582146, at *2 (N.D.

Tex. Feb. 18, 2010). In the supplement to his complaint, Morris also implicates

claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended (“ADA”),

and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“RA”). (See Dkt. No. 10 at 2-4.) Morris does

not specify in either his complaint or his supplement whether he is suing Defendants

in their official or individual capacities. The Court therefore will address the claims

against Defendants in both their official and individual capacities.

A. Bivens

Morris alleges that various policies and restrictions imposed at FCI Seagoville

by SOE Howard regarding inmate usage of the BOP typewriters and photocopier

violate his First Amendment rights and BOP regulations and Program Statements

§ 1315.07 and § 5350.27. (See Dkt. No. 3 at 1-4, 29-36.) He also appears to allege

that SOE Howard has retaliated against him because of personal resentment, literary

works Morris has published, his use of the BOP’s administrative grievance process,

and his filing of this action. (See id. at 7; Dkt. No. 10 at 4-5.) Morris states that the

other three Defendants—FCI Seagoville’s warden, the BOP South Central Regional

Director, and the BOP Central Office Director—successively have “superior

authority over the actions of subordinates,” and as such could have granted his

requests for “general inmate use of the typewriters and the Inmate Trustfund

Photocopy Machine.” (Dkt. No. 3 at 6-7.)

Assuming for purposes of this recommendation that Morris seeks relief in this

action that is available under Bivens in the first instance, the Court must determine if

his claims against Defendants properly arise under Bivens. See Evans v. Ball, 168 F.3d

856, 863 n.10 (5th Cir. 1999) (“A Bivens action is analogous to an action under

§ 1983—the only difference being that § 1983 applies to constitutional violations by

state, rather than federal, officials.”), abrogated on other grounds by Castellano v. Fragozo,

352 F.3d 939, 948-49 (5th Cir. 2003).

1. Official Capacity

Claims against federal employees in their official capacities are merely another

way of pleading an action against the entity or agency of which the individual

defendant is an agent. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-67 (1985). Bivens

only provides a remedy for victims of constitutional violations by government

officers in their individual capacities; it does not provide for a cause of action against

a federal agency or the United States. Affiliated Pro. Home Health Care Agency v.

Shalala, 164 F.3d 282, 286 (5th Cir. 1999); FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 484-86

(1994). This is because the purpose of a Bivens action is to deter a federal officer from

violating a person’s constitutional rights. Meyer, 510 U.S. at 485; Corr. Servs. Corp. v.

Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70 (2001). Accordingly, because any Bivens claims against

Defendants in their official capacities amount to claims against the BOP, the Court

should dismiss such claims with prejudice as frivolous and for failure to state a claim.

2. Individual Capacity

In Bivens, the United States Supreme Court created a cause of action under the

Fourth Amendment where federal agents allegedly “manacled” the plaintiff “in front

of his wife and children, and threatened to arrest the entire family”; “searched the

apartment from stem to stern”; and took him to a federal courthouse where he was

“interrogated, booked, and subjected to a visual strip search.” Bivens, 403 U.S. at

389. “Over the next decade, the Supreme Court recognized two other causes of

action against federal officers: (1) for gender discrimination against a former

congressional staffer in violation of the Fifth Amendment, see Davis v. Passman, 442

U.S. 228 (1979); and (2) for a failure to provide an asthmatic prisoner with adequate

medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment, see Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14

(1980).” Bolden v. FBOP, No. 1:24-CV-00270, 2024 WL 4182123, at *1 (W.D. La.

Aug. 13, 2024), rec. adopted, 2024 WL 4181793 (W.D. La. Sept. 12, 2024). “Since

then, the Supreme Court has not once extended the Bivens remedy, and it has

declined to do so at least a dozen times.” Id. (citing Looper v. Jones, No. 22-40579,

2023 WL 5814910, at *1 (5th Cir. Sept. 8, 2023)).

As recently as June 30, 2025, the Supreme Court expressly declined to extend

Bivens. See Goldey v. Fields, 606 U.S. 942 (2025). The Supreme Court “has repeatedly

emphasized that recognizing a cause of action under Bivens is a disfavored judicial

activity.” Id. at 944 (quoting Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 492 (2022)) (cleaned up);

see also Ziglar v. Abassi, 582 U.S. 120, 135 (2017) (same). “[C]reating a cause of action

is a legislative endeavor.” Egbert, 596 U.S. at 491. “So today, ‘Bivens claims

generally are limited to the circumstances’ of Bivens, Davis, and Carlson.” Looper,

2023 WL 5814910, at *1.

“When analyzing a proposed Bivens claim, a court must consider: (1) whether

the case presents a new context; and (2) if so, whether there are any alternative

remedies or special factors indicating that judges are ‘at least arguably less equipped

than Congress’ to create a damages remedy.” Bolden, 2024 WL 4182123, at *2

(citing Egbert, 596 U.S. at 492). A proposed Bivens claim is “new” if the case is

different in any meaningful way from Bivens, Davis, or Carlson. See Abbasi, 582 U.S.

at 139. “Virtually everything else is a ‘new context’” and the “understanding of a

‘new context’ is broad . . . because even a modest extension of the Bivens trilogy is

still an extension.” Oliva v. Nivar, 973 F.3d 438, 442 (5th Cir. 2020) (citations and

internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, Morris’s claims of constitutional deprivation under the First

Amendment based on the conditions of his confinement as they relate to his access

and usage of the typewriters and photocopier at FCI Seagoville and his retaliation

claim—which also appears to be premised on First Amendment rights—are a far cry

from and differ in meaningful ways from the issues in the three cases recognizing an

implied cause of action under Bivens. As such, they clearly attempt to present new

Bivens contexts.2

2 None of the three cases recognizing an implied cause of action under Bivens

involved any alleged First Amendment deprivations. Notably, the Fifth Circuit has

declined to extend Bivens to First Amendment retaliation claims, and in so doing, it

underscored “the fact that the Supreme Court has not only never recognized a Bivens cause

of action under the First Amendment, but also once rejected a First Amendment retaliation

Bivens claim for federal employees.” Watkins v. Three Admin. Remedy Coordinators of BOP,

998 F.3d 682, 686 (5th Cir. 2021) (internal citations omitted).

Because the claims each arise in a new Bivens context, the next step is to

determine “whether there are ‘special factors’ indicating that the Judiciary is at least

arguably less equipped than Congress to weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a

damages action to proceed.” Goldey, 606 U.S. at 944 (internal quotation marks

omitted). The salient “special factor” in this case is whether “there are alternative

remedial structures in place [because] that alone, like any special factor, is reason

enough to limit the power of the Judiciary to infer a new Bivens cause of action.”

Egbert, 596 U.S. at 493 (internal quotation marks omitted). “The existence of such

alternative remedial procedures counsels against allowing Bivens suits even if such

procedures are not as effective as an individual damages remedy.” Goldey, 606 U.S.

at 944-45 (quoting Egbert, 596 U.S. at 498) (cleaned up); see also Oliva, 973 F.3d at

444 (“[T]he alternative relief necessary to limit Bivens need not provide the exact

same kind of relief Bivens would.”). The focus of this inquiry “is on the availability of

an alternative remedy and not ultimate success.” Dudley v. United States, No. 4:19-

CV-317-O, 2020 WL 532338, at *8 n.3 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 3, 2020) (emphasis in

original).

The existence of the BOP’s Administrative Remedy Program demonstrates

that there is an alternative remedial structure in place; to the extent a federal prisoner

sustains injuries during incarceration, the Federal Torts Claims Act also provides an

avenue to relief. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.10(a) (enabling “inmate[s] to seek formal

review of an issue relating to any aspect of his/her own confinement.”); Watkins v.

Carter, No. 20-40234, 2021 WL 4533206, at *2 (5th Cir. Oct. 4, 2021) (unpublished).

Additionally, “the separation of powers is another special factor weighing against

extending Bivens because Congress has had the occasion to consider prisoner rights,

but has not legislated to extend the reach of Bivens.” Bush v. Watson, No. 1:18-CV-

595, 2022 WL 2072227, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2022) (citing Watkins, 998 F.3d at

685-86); see also Oliva, 973 F.3d at 444 (“This ‘silence of Congress is relevant’ to the

special-factors inquiry.”). These special factors counsel against the extension of

Bivens here. See Watkins, 2021 WL 4533206, at *2. Because Morris’s First

Amendment-based claims regarding his conditions of confinement and retaliation

present new contexts under Bivens, the Court should dismiss them with prejudice.3

B. ADA and RA

In the supplement to his complaint, Morris asserts factual allegations

purporting to support a “Reasonable Accommodation ADA/RA foundation.” (Dkt.

No. 10 at 2.) Morris states that physical impairments of his writing hand “are a

3 As the Court has noted, Morris complains that SOE Howard’s typewriter and

photocopier policies at FCI Seagoville also conflict with BOP regulations and Program

Statements § 1315.07 and § 5350.27. (See Dkt. No. 3 at 1-4.) To the extent his claims are

premised on such alleged violations, independent of his First Amendment allegations, “a

failure to follow BOP policies and procedures as set forth in various program statements

does not, in and of itself, state a constitutional violation.” Mickle v. O’Connell, No. 1:22-CV-

02498 SEC P, 2023 WL 2534511, at *5 (W.D. La. Feb. 27, 2023) (citing, among others,

Myers v. Klevenhagen, 97 F.3d 91, 94 (5th Cir. 1996)), rec. adopted, 2023 WL 2527969 (W.D.

La. Mar. 15, 2023); see also Hood v. Warden, FCI Beaumont Low, No. 1:16-CV-400, 2016 WL

7477615, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2016) (“A violation of prison regulations, without more,

does not constitute a violation of the Constitution.”), rec. adopted, 2016 WL 7469813 (E.D.

Tex. Dec. 28, 2016). Morris therefore fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted,

and the Court should dismiss with prejudice any claims premised on the alleged violation of

BOP regulations and program statements.

direct source of [his] inability to write by hand,” and he alleges that, “[c]omplete or

partial, the inability to write by hand substantially limits [his] ability to communicate

and/or learn – a major life activity.” (Id.) He requested “access to the copy machine

and typewriters as a ‘reasonable accommodation’ for [his] disability, earmarking it

for the ADA/RA[.]” (Id. (emphasis omitted).) Defendants have denied his

accommodation requests. (See id. at 2-4.) To the extent his supplement and

allegations can be liberally construed to allege claims under the ADA and the RA,

the undersigned addresses them.

1. ADA

The ADA prohibits “discrimination against disabled individuals in major

areas of public life, among them employment (Title I of the Act), public services

(Title II), and public accommodations (Title III).” PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S.

661, 675 (2001) (footnotes omitted). Because Morris alleges that he is being denied

the reasonable accommodation of general or unrestricted “access to the copy

machine and typewriters” at FCI Seagoville, any ADA claims appear to implicate

Title II of the ADA. (Dkt. No. 10 at 2 (emphasis omitted).) Title II of the ADA

provides:

Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual

with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from

participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or

activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any

such entity.

42 U.S.C. § 12132. The definition of a “public entity” for purposes of the ADA does

not include the federal government, however. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1). Title II of

the ADA therefore does not apply to the federal government, of which the BOP is a

part. See Chamberlain v. Chandler, 344 F. App’x 911, 913 (5th Cir. 2009) (affirming

dismissal of prisoner’s “ADA claims against the defendants on the basis that the

ADA is not applicable to the federal government.”).

As the undersigned has explained, claims against federal employees in their

official capacities are claims against the federal entities or agencies of which they are

a part, which in this case is the BOP. See Graham, 473 U.S. at 165-67. Because Title

II of the ADA does not apply to the BOP, of which Defendants are employees, any

ADA claims against Defendants in their official capacities are frivolous and fail to

state a claim.

The Fifth Circuit also has “recognized that the ADA does not permit public

employees to be sued in their individual capacities.” Herndon v. Bureau of Prisons, No.

4:20-CV-1129-P, 2021 WL 3036950, at *4 (N.D. Tex. July 19, 2021) (citing cases).

Accordingly, because the ADA does not provide for relief against individuals, any

ADA claims against Defendants in their individual capacities are frivolous and fail to

state a claim.

Morris’s claims under the ADA against Defendants, to the extent asserted,

lack an arguable basis in law and fact. The Court therefore should dismiss any such

claims with prejudice.

2. RA

Although Morris does not specify any statutory provision of the RA on which

he relies in the supplement to his complaint, § 794(a) of the RA “provides that no

qualified individual with a disability shall be excluded from participation in, denied

benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving

Federal financial assistance, or activity conducted by any Executive agency.”

Herndon, 2021 WL 3036950, at *4; see also 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). In addition to

prohibiting disability-based discrimination, the RA “impose[s] upon public entities

an affirmative obligation to make reasonable accommodations for disabled

individuals.” Smith v. Harris Cnty., Tex., 956 F.3d 311, 317 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted). “An accommodation is reasonable if it does

not impose undue financial hardship or administrative burdens or fundamentally

alter the nature of the service, program or activity.” Id. (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted). To prevail on a claim under the RA for failure to

accommodate, “a plaintiff must prove: (1) he is a qualified individual with a

disability; (2) the disability and its consequential limitations were known by the

covered entity; and (3) the entity failed to make reasonable accommodations.” Ball

v. LeBlanc, 792 F.3d 584, 596 n. 9 (5th Cir. 2015).

Here, as with Bivens and the ADA, claims against Defendants in their official

capacities under the RA are claims against the BOP. See Graham, 473 U.S. at 165-67;

Herndon, 2021 WL 3036950, at *4. The RA applies to federal agencies, including the

BOP. See, e.g., Pacheco v. Stearns, No. 1:22-CV-00148-BU, 2025 WL 1675816, at *7

(N.D. Tex. May 22, 2025). That notwithstanding, even if the Court assumes

arguendo that the typewriter and copier policies at FCI Seagoville of which Morris

complains qualify as a program or activity for purposes of the RA, and that Morris is

a qualified individual with a disability under the RA, he fails to state a claim.

Morris fails to allege any facts or provide any evidence showing that his

requested accommodation of unrestricted or general access to the typewriters and

copier at FCI Seagoville is reasonable, i.e., “does not impose undue financial

hardship or administrative burdens or fundamentally alter the nature of the service,

program or activity.” Smith, 956 F.3d at 317. Even if he had provided such facts

and evidence, his pleadings fail to show that he has exhausted his available remedies

as to any RA claim against the BOP. Although Morris alleges facts to support

potential exhaustion of RA claims through the BOP’s administrative grievance

process, he has not shown that he has exhausted such claims through the

Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”) administrative process applicable “to all allegations

of discrimination on the basis of handicap in programs or activities conducted by [the

DOJ],” of which the BOP is a part.4 28 C.F.R. § 39.170(a); see also Chamberlain, 344

F. App’x at 913 (“The Bureau of Prisons is an agency of the Department of Justice,

4 Although the Fifth Circuit has not directly addressed the issue, other courts have

“reached the same conclusion: The DOJ’s administrative process [under 28 C.F.R. § 39170]

is an available remedy that applies to federal prisoners who bring claims under the

Rehabilitation Act.” Barrett v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 19-CV-3250, 2022 WL 93504, at *5

(N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 2022) (citing cases and stating that it has found no case law concluding

the contrary); see also Williams v. Carvajal, 63 F.4th 279, 289 (4th Cir. 2023) (agreeing “with

the vast majority of courts that find the [Prisoner Litigation Reform Act] PLRA requires

exhaustion of both the BOP’s ARP and the EEO process for federal inmates alleging

violations of the Rehabilitation Act.”). The Court finds these authorities persuasive and,

absent contrary binding authority, agrees that the PLRA requires exhaustion of the BOP’s

administrative remedy process and the DOJ’s administrative process for disability-based

claims by federal inmates under the RA.

which is within the executive branch of the government.”). Indeed, Morris’s

pleadings and exhibits appear to indicate that he has not even initiated the DOJ’s

administrative process under 28 C.F.R. § 39.170(d). (See Dkt. No. 3 at 96-139; Dkt.

No. 10 at 2-4.) Based on Morris’s deficient allegations and failure to exhaust, the

Court should dismiss any RA claims against the BOP, to the extent alleged, without

prejudice for failure to state a claim.

To the extent Morris alleges claims under the RA against Defendants in their

individual capacities, the Fifth Circuit has recognized that an individual may not be

sued in his or her individual capacity under the RA. See Lollar v. Baker, 196 F.3d 603,

609 (5th Cir. 1999); Herndon, 2021 WL 3036950, at *5. Accordingly, any claims

against Defendants in their individual capacities under the RA lack an arguable basis

in law or fact, and the Court should dismiss them with prejudice.

IV. LEAVE TO AMEND

Ordinarily, “a pro se litigant should be offered an opportunity to amend his

complaint before it is dismissed.” Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767-68 (5th Cir.

2009). Leave to amend is not necessary, however, when the plaintiff has already

pled his best case. See Wiggins v. La. State Univ.—Health Care Servs. Div., 710 F. App’x

625, 627 (5th Cir. 2017). When a court “outlines in its opinion the deficiencies of the

plaintiff’s complaint and the plaintiff nevertheless cannot . . . amend to satisfy the

relevant pleading standard, the court can then dismiss the complaint with the

assurance that plaintiff has been shown all the deference he is due.” Miller v. United

States Gov’t, No. 3:22-CV-2694-M-BH, 2023 WL 5281045, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 4,

2023) (cleaned up and citations omitted), rec. adopted, 2023 WL 5282440 (N.D. Tex.

Aug. 15, 2023).

Here, Morris has amended his complaint with a supplement asserting

additional factual allegations and claims, and he has filed over 200 pages of exhibits

in support of his claims. In light of the bases of dismissal of Morris’s claims and

based on the most deferential review of Morris’s complaint, supplement, and

exhibits, it is unlikely that, given the opportunity, Morris can allege viable legal

claims against Defendants consistent with the facts of this case. Because it appears

Morris has alleged his best case and any amendment would fail to state a claim for

the same reasons discussed, the Court concludes that granting leave to amend would

be futile and cause needless delay.5

V. RECOMMENDATION

The Court should DISMISS the Verified Complaint (Dkt. No. 3), received on

December 13, 2024 and supplemented by the filing received on April 22, 2025, under

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b) as frivolous and for failure to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted. The Court should count this dismissal as a

“strike” or “prior occasion” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).6

5 Even so, the 14-day objection period will permit Morris the opportunity to proffer

factual or legal bases, if any, to cure the deficiencies in his claims outlined herein.

6 Section 1915(g), which is commonly known as the “three-strikes” provision,

provides:

SO RECOMMENDED on July 15, 2026.

BRIA cKAY

UNI STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT

A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the

manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and

recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being

served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIv. P. 72(b). To be specific,

an objection must identify the finding or recommendation to which objection is

made, state the basis for the objection, and indicate the place in the magistrate

judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An

objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the

magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the

agerieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the

magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon

grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415,

1417 (5th Cir. 1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)

(extending the time to file objections to 14 days).

In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil

action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior

occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or

appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that

it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a clatm upon which relief may be

granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical

injury.

16