Garcia

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AMARILLO DIVISION

VINICIO J. GARCIA, §

TDCJ-CID No. 1828198 §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

v. § 2:25-CV-168-Z-BR

§

SGT. SLACK, et al., §

§

Defendants. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DISMISS COMPLAINT

Before the Court is the Complaint (ECF 3) filed by Plaintiff Vinicio J. Garcia (“Garcia”)

against various Defendants, alleging violations of his civil rights. Garcia filed this lawsuit pro se

while a prisoner in the Clements Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”). As

such, his lawsuit is subject to preliminary screening as provided by the Prison Litigation Reform

Act (“PLRA”). Pursuant to such screening and for the reasons stated below, the Magistrate Judge

recommends that Garcia’s Complaint be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A court must dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis by a prisoner against a

government entity or employee if the court determines that the complaint is frivolous or malicious,

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant

who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (2017); see also Section 1915A(b)

(applying section to any suit by a prisoner against certain governmental entities, regardless of

whether the prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis). When analyzing a prisoner’s complaint, the

court may consider reliable evidence such as the plaintiff’s allegations, responses to a

questionnaire, and authenticated prison records. Wilson v. Barrientos, 926 F.2d 480, 483-84 (5th

Cir. 1991); see also Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1999) (explaining that responses

to a questionnaire or testimony given during an evidentiary hearing are incorporated into the

plaintiff’s pleadings).

In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, the court accepts well-pleaded factual

allegations as true, but does not credit conclusory allegations or assertions that merely restate the

legal elements of a claim. Chhim v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 836 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 2016).

While courts hold pro se plaintiffs to a more lenient standard than attorneys when analyzing

complaints, such plaintiffs still must plead factual allegations that raise the right to relief above a

speculative level. Id. (citing Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002)).

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Factual Background.1

Garcia alleges that he has been harassed by prison officers for years for filing grievances.

(ECF 3 at 4). In what he claims is the latest round of harassment and retaliation, he contends that

Defendants Bryan J. Janow, Jesus A. Jimenez, Jose L. Torres, Traina L. Slack, Israel E. Barajas,

Courtney Jarman and William Miller kept him in a flooded cell for 120 days, including five days

of sewage flooding, and refused his repeated requests to move to another cell. (Id.; ECF 5 at 7).

He also complains that, solely to harass him, these Defendants placed a dangerous prisoner in his

cell. (ECF 3 at 4). In addition, these Defendants, on a weekly basis, allegedly refused to let him

leave the dayroom to use the bathroom. (ECF 5 at 4; ECF 10 at 2). Lastly, he complains that

Defendants Angelique Turner, Adam Gonzales, Ebenezer Olowomeye, William Jones, Stephanie

Patton and J. Back refused to address these issues after Garcia filed grievances about them, and

1These background facts are taken from Garcia’s Complaint (ECF 3), his supplement (ECF 5) and

questionnaire responses (ECF 10) and are presumed to be true for the purposes of screening.

that they ignored video evidence that substantiated Garcia’s claims. (ECF 3 at 4). He seeks

compensatory and punitive damages as a result of Defendants’ conduct.

B. Statute of Limitations.

Civil rights claims under Section 1983 are governed by the two-year statute of limitations

provided by Texas law. See Winfrey v. Rogers, 901 F.3d 483, 492 (5th Cir. 2018); TEX. CIV. PRAC.

& REM. CODE § 16.003(a). The two-year limitations period “begins to run once the plaintiff

becomes aware that he has suffered an injury or has sufficient information to know that he has

been injured.” Matter of Hoffman, 955 F.3d 440, 444 (5th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). A complaint

that is plainly untimely is subject to dismissal as legally frivolous. See Frame v. City of Arlington,

657 F.3d 215, 240 (5th Cir. 2011) (“a complaint may be subject to dismissal if its allegations

affirmatively demonstrate that the plaintiff's claims are barred by the statute of limitations and fail

to raise some basis for tolling”); Gartell v. Gaylor, 981 F.2d 254, 256 (5th Cir. 1993). When

reviewing a case brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 or 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court has a special

duty to examine the pleadings and thus may raise the limitations defense sua sponte. Rogers v.

Ikpo, No. 4:24-2842, 2025 WL 1476549 (S.D. Tex. May 22, 2025) (citing LeBouef v. Island

Operating Co., Inc., 342 F. App’x 983, 984 & n.1 (5th Cir. 2009)).

Here, Garcia signed his complaint on July 23, 2025. (ECF 3 at 5). The two-year statute of

limitations thus bars all claims that accrued before July 23, 2023. Because all of Garcia’s claims

other than the flooding cell appear to have occurred in 2022 and early 2023, such claims are time-

barred and should be dismissed. However, out of an abundance of caution due to Garcia’s pro se

status, the Court has evaluated his claims on their merits and determined that he failed to state a

constitutional violation even if his claims were timely.

C. Retaliation.

Garcia alleges that Defendants retaliated against him in the above-described ways because

he filed numerous grievances. A valid retaliation claim requires a plaintiff to allege that: (1) he

exercised a specific constitutional right; (2) the defendant intended to retaliate against him because

he exercised that right; (3) he experienced a retaliatory adverse act; and (4) the adverse act would

not have occurred but for a retaliatory motive. Welsh v. Cammack, No. 23-10961, 2024 WL

3649583 at *5 (5th Cir. 2024) (citing Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324-25 (5th Cir. 1999)).

Conclusory allegations, including a prisoner’s personal belief that he is the victim of retaliation,

are insufficient to support a claim for retaliation. Jones, 188 F.3d at 325 (citing Johnson v.

Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 299, 310 (5th Cir. 1997). Instead, “[t]he inmate must produce direct evidence

of motivation or, the more probable scenario, allege a chronology of events from which retaliation

may plausibly be inferred.’” Haddix v. Kerss, 203 F. App’x 551, 554 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting

Woods, 60 F.3d at 1166). In evaluating such claims, the Fifth Circuit has cautioned that “prisoners’

claims of retaliation are regarded with skepticism” and should be “carefully scrutinized by the

courts.” Adeleke v. Fleckenstein, 385 F. App’x 386, 387 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Woods, 60 F.3d at

1166).

At the outset, the Court notes that filing a grievance can qualify as constitutionally

protected activity. Gonzales v. Gross, 779 F. App’x 227, 230 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (quoting

Brown v. Taylor, 911 F.3d 235, 245 (5th Cir. 2018)). A prisoner “does not have a right to file a

frivolous grievance, [however,] and a frivolous grievance” regarding matters that do not implicate

the prisoner’s constitutional rights cannot form the basis of a Section 1983 retaliation claim.

Mitchell v. Miller-Roach, No. 3:10-CV-1762-K-BK, 2011 WL 2273509, at *3 (N.D. Tex. May 17,

2011), R. & R. adopted by 2011 WL 2292247 (N.D. Tex. June 8, 2011).

Consequently, courts have rejected prisoners’ retaliation claims where the subject matter

of the grievance was not related to a federally-protected constitutional right. See, e.g., Lee v.

Richland Par. Det. Ctr.,483 F. App’x 904, 905-06 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal

of detainee’s retaliation claim because the grievances (which did not directly implicate a

constitutional right) “were frivolous” and therefore could “not comprise the basis of a retaliation

claim”); Bernard v. Brannigan, No. 2:05CV0014, 2005 WL 1422153, at *2 (N.D. Tex. June 14,

2005) (reasoning that, because prisoner “does not have a federally-protected constitutional right to

the enforcement of prison dress codes for the guards,” a grievance “on the issue will not support a

claim of retaliation”); Brown v. Craven, No. 2:03-CV-0048, 2003 WL 22511356, at *3 (N.D. Tex.

Nov. 5, 2003) (dismissing retaliation claim where prisoner alleged that defendant retaliated after

he threatened to write a grievance against defendant for turning off his television, noting that

prisoner’s “threat to file a clearly frivolous grievance against defendant ... does not [even] rise to

the level ... of unprotected ‘secondary litigation activity’ ”), aff’d 106 F. App’x 257 (5th Cir. 2004).

In this case, Garcia has not provided copies of the grievances that he claims motivated

Defendants’ retaliation; however, his Complaint, supplement and questionnaire responses describe

the general contents of the grievances. (See ECF 5 at 1). As shown below, none of the grievances

alleges a constitutional violation; accordingly, his retaliation claim fails and should be dismissed.2

D. Conditions of Confinement.

Garcia alleges that Defendants Jimenez, Janow, Slack, Torres, Barajas, Miller and Jarman

are responsible for holding him in unconstitutional conditions of confinement. As shown below,

he fails to state a claim against these Defendants.

2In addition, Garcia provides no allegations indicating direct evidence of retaliatory motive, nor does he

allege a chronology of events from which retaliation may plausibly be inferred. Woods, 60 F.3d at 1166.

1. Potentially Dangerous Cellmate.

Garcia alleges that these Defendants repeatedly moved a potentially dangerous inmate into

his cell in 2022. Garcia was warned by other inmates that the cellmate was dangerous, and the

cellmate claimed to be a Satan worshipper who “made strange sounds.” (ECF 10 at 19). Garcia

claims that these Defendants failed to protect him from potential harm by refusing to remove the

cellmate. Although this claim is barred by limitations, it also fails on the merits.

Prison officials have a constitutional duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands

of their fellow inmates. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1994); see also Horton v.

Cockrell, 70 F.3d 397, 400-02 (5th Cir. 1995). Pursuant to Farmer, an inmate “must show that he

is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm” and that prison officials

were deliberately indifferent to the inmate’s safety. Id. at 834. The Eighth Amendment standard

enunciated in Farmer applies to a prisoner’s claim that prison officials failed to protect him from

harm inflicted by other inmates. However, only deliberate indifference, “an unnecessary and

wanton infliction of pain or acts repugnant to the conscience of mankind,” constitutes conduct

proscribed by the Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). “Deliberate

indifference” means that a prison official is liable “only if he knows that the inmates face a

substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to

abate it.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847-48.

Garcia admits that he suffered no physical injury as a result of these Defendants’ purported

failure to protect him. He alleges only that the cellmate stole his antiperspirant and underwear in

2022. (ECF 10 at 24-25). In a failure to protect claim, a physical injury is required to demonstrate

a constitutional violation. See Walzier v. McMullen, 333 F. App’x 848, 851 (5th Cir. 2009)

(upholding summary judgment in favor of the defendants where there was no proof of harm to the

plaintiff from other inmates and, “[a]bsent a showing that other inmates harmed [the plaintiff],

there is no factual basis for a failure to protect claim”); Castellano v. Treon, 79 F. App’x 6, 7 (5th

Cir. 2003) (inmate’s failure-to-protect claim fails because “he concedes that he suffered no actual

physical injury resulting from the prison officials’ purported failure to protect”). Because Garcia

suffered no physical injury, he cannot state a constitutional violation for Defendants’ failure to

protect him from his cellmate. This claim should be dismissed as frivolous.

2. Flooding and sewage.

Garcia alleges that he was left in a cell for 120 days that had a leaking pipe chase behind

the toilet. The water would build up along the back of the cell until it reached the shower drain.

Garcia used his towel to move as much water as he could to the drain so that he could step onto

his bed without splashing through water. (ECF 10 at 6). Occasionally, however, the water got deep

enough that it would get “in the boots” and worms would appear. (Id.). For five days, his toilet

backed up and his cell was flooded with sewage to an unspecified degree, but a plumber solved

the sewage problem. (ECF 5 at 7).

“[T]he Eighth Amendment may afford protection against conditions of confinement which

constitute health threats but not against those which cause mere discomfort or inconvenience.”

Wilson v. Lynaugh, 878 F.2d 846, 849 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 969 (1989) (citation

omitted). Prison officials have certain duties under the Eighth Amendment, but these duties are

only to provide prisoners with “humane conditions of confinement,” including “adequate food,

clothing, shelter, and medical care....” Woods v. Edwards, 51 F.3d 577, 581 n.10 (5th Cir. 1995)

(quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832). There is no static test to determine whether conditions of

confinement are cruel and unusual, but punishment rises to the level of a constitutional violation

if the conditions are “‘so serious as to deprive [plaintiff] of the minimal measure of life’s

necessities.’” Alexander v. Tippah County, 351 F.3d 626, 630 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Woods, 51

F.3d at 581).

Considering the “totality of the circumstances,” Garcia’s claims do not rise to the level of

a constitutional violation. McCord v. Maggio, 910 F.2d 1248 (5th Cir. 1990). Garcia has not

identified any “basic human need” which he was denied for an unreasonable period of time. See

Woods, 51 F.3d at 581. A cell with a leaking pipe, without more, does not rise to the level of a

constitutional violation. See Cotton v. Taylor, 176 F.3d 479, 1999 WL 155652, at *2 (5th Cir.

1999) (per curiam) (unpublished) (conditions of confinement violated Eighth Amendment where

plaintiffs testified that, due to leaking roofs, “there was so much water on the floor at times that

the electrical receptacles would spark and smoke and that they feared electrocution.”). The

conditions alleged by Garcia, while unpleasant, do not rise to a level of seriousness constituting a

constitutional violation.

Garcia also fails to identify a specific injury he sustained as a result of the water on the

floor, beyond general discomfort. He states that, although he slipped on the wet floor once, he was

not hurt. (ECF 10 at 7). A plaintiff must demonstrate not only that he was exposed to a substantial

risk of serious harm, but also that he actually suffered some harm that was more than de minimis.

Alexander, 351 F.3d at 630-31. Garcia fails to meet this standard; as a result, this claim should be

dismissed as frivolous.

3. Bathroom Trips.

Garcia next alleges that these Defendants refused his requests to let him go to the bathroom

while he was in the dayroom, which did not have a toilet. (ECF 5 at 4). He was in the dayroom

anywhere from two to six hours at a time. (ECF 10 at 1). He states that he “experienced pain and

stress for no reason other than retaliation.” (ECF 5 at 4). Eventually, when he was not given access

to a bathroom, he began to urinate out a hole in the back door that led to the caged recreation area.

(ECF 10 at 2).

The continued refusal to provide an inmate necessary access to a bathroom for a significant

period of time could rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation, but a single or temporary

deprivation of toilet access does not generally give rise to an actionable constitutional claim.

Beckendorf v. Fleischman, No. 21-1357, 2025 WL 842970 *4 (E.D. La. Mar. 18, 2025) and cases

cited therein.3 Further, the inmate still must show that the denial of access involved indifference

to a substantial risk of serious harm to his health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.

In Vacca v. Scott, 119 F. App’x 678 (5th Cir. 2005), the Fifth Circuit considered the

repeated denial of an inmate’s request for access to a bathroom that resulted in the inmate soiling

himself. The court found no constitutional violation because the inmate did not allege an actual

“risk to his present and future health.” Vacca, 119 F. App’x at 679. Here, Garcia alleges his access

to a bathroom was limited only while he was in the dayroom, and, even while there, he found a

place to relieve himself. He does not allege that he was forced to soil himself or that he was injured

by his inability to visit a bathroom on these occasions. See, e.g., Mendoza v. Atwell, No. 20-cv-42,

2020 WL 8514099, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Sep. 21, 2020) (defendant’s actions were reprehensible in

denying plaintiff access to the restroom, which resulted in plaintiff soiling himself, but plaintiff

3See Tyree v. Brooks, 2009 WL 2232455, at *2 (W.D. Va. July 24, 2009) (holding that “denial of bathroom

privileges for just over five hours while being transported between prisons is not a denial of a minimal

measure of life’s necessities.”); Smith v. Boyd, 2012 WL 3230646, at *9 (M.D. Ala. July 5, 2012) (holding

the Eighth Amendment not violated when an inmate was denied access to restroom for several hours while

a search was being conducted, inasmuch as no injury was suffered); Rouse v. Caruso, 2011 WL 918327, at

*12 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 18, 2011) (court found that denial of bathroom privileges for six to eight hours did

not violate Eighth Amendment); Hernandez v. Battaglia, 673 F. Supp. 2d 673, 677 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (denial

of bathroom break during three to five hour period of cell shakedown did not state Eighth Amendment

claim); Owens v. Padilla, 2008 WL 3916068, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2008) (confinement in prison

barbershop for six hours without access to bathroom did not state Eighth Amendment claim); Trevino v.

Jones, 2007 WL 710213, at *8 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 6, 2007) (use of restrooms only twice during eight-hour

period does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment).

failed to allege an Eighth Amendment violation where there were no allegations of physical

injury); Decker v. Dumbar, 633 F. Supp. 2d 317, 341-42 (E.D. Tex. 2008) (inmate who urinated

on himself after being denied access to a restroom did not suffer more than de minimis physical

injury); Davis v. Holtzclaw, 2:16-cv-221, 2016 WL 1706936 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 14, 2016) (collecting

cases). Garcia admits that he suffered no physical injury or risk to his present or future health.4 At

most, he alleges temporary discomfort based on the restrictions imposed. (See ECF 10 at 2). Thus,

Garcia fails to allege a constitutional violation.

4. Housing Complaints.

Lastly, Garcia alleges that he was denied the ability to refuse a cool bed by unspecified

Defendants. (ECF 5 at 4, 9). He does not state which Defendant, if any, did not allow him to refuse

a cool bed, other than to state that Gonzales asked him to fill out a form. (Id.). Garcia does not

state a constitutional violation against either Gonzales. Prisoners do not have a constitutional right

to choose where they are housed. See McKnight v. MTC, No. 3:15-cv-1647, 2015 WL 7730995, at

*3 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 9, 2015) (“It is well-settled that prisoners do not have a constitutional right to

choose their place of confinement, security classification, housing assignment, and cellmate.”)

(citing Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245 (1983)). This claim should be dismissed as

frivolous.

E. Grievances.

Garcia next complains that, in 2022 and 2023, Gonzales, Olomoweye, Back, Patton and

Turner failed to respond properly to his grievances at both Step 1 and Step 2. (ECF 10 at 20-21,

25-28). In short, Garcia’s allegations against this group of Defendants amount to nothing more

4Garcia also alleges that Slack placed him in a holding cell on November 15, 2023, for several hours and

he was unable to go to the bathroom while there. He claims that he was in pain from being unable to urinate

but again alleges no resulting physical injury. (ECF 10 at 14).

than a claim that they did not resolve Garcia’s grievances to his satisfaction. “Prisoners do not

have a federally protected liberty interest in having these grievances resolved to [their] satisfaction,

and an alleged § 1983 due process violation for failure to investigate grievances is indisputably

meritless.” Hill v. Walker, 718 F. App’x 243, 250 (5th Cir. 2018) (internal quotations omitted).

The Fifth Circuit has stated that an alleged violation of a prisoner’s due process rights resulting

from prison grievance procedures is a “legally nonexistent interest.” Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d

371, 374 (5th Cir. 2005). Further, even an intentional cover-up does not amount to a constitutional

violation. See Cunningham v. de la Vaga, 131 F.3d 141 (5th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (“Regarding

Cunningham’s contention that the defendants conspired to cover up the attack …, Cunningham

has not shown that the defendants violated any constitutionally protected right.”). Accordingly,

assuming the truth of Garcia’s Complaint, his allegations against these Defendants regarding their

improper handling of his grievances fail to state a claim even if the allegations are not barred by

limitations. This claim should be dismissed as frivolous.

F. Access to Court.

Garcia alleges that Jarman denied him access to the courts by refusing to let him out of his

cell to visit the law library. (ECF 10 at 16-17, 27).5 The right of access to the courts requires that

inmates be allowed a reasonably adequate opportunity to file non-frivolous cases challenging their

convictions and the conditions of their confinement. Jones, 188 F.3d at 325. A plaintiff must show

that an “actionable claim [involving a challenge to a sentence or conditions of confinement] which

he desired to bring has been lost or rejected, or that the presentation of such a claim is currently

being prevented ....” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 356 (1996); see also Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d

5Garcia also alleges that Jarman refused to open his cell door when she opened other doors in April 2023.

(ECF 10 at 27). Such claim, without more, does not state a constitutional violation.

1322, 1328 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that, to state a sufficient claim of denial of access to the courts,

plaintiff must demonstrate that his position as a litigant was prejudiced as a direct result of the

denial of access).

The “injury requirement is not satisfied by just any type of frustrated legal claim.” Lewis,

518 U.S. at 354. Rather, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the lack of access has prevented him

from filing, or caused him to lose, a pending case that attacks either his conviction or seeks “to

vindicate ‘basic constitutional rights’” in a civil rights action under Section 1983. Id. at 353-54

(quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974)). As the right of access to the courts is not

a “freestanding right,” he must demonstrate actual injury resulting from the alleged denial of

access. Id. at 351. Without a showing of an actual injury, plaintiffs lack standing to pursue claimed

denials of access to courts. Id. at 349. Garcia fails to meet this standard. He does not assert that the

inability to leave his cell prevented him from filing a lawsuit. Nor does he state that any pending

lawsuits were dismissed as a result of the conduct of which he complains. In short, he has not

shown that his ability to pursue a nonfrivolous or arguable legal claim was hindered by Jarman.

Accordingly, Garcia has failed to state a plausible claim that he was denied access to the courts

and his claim should be dismissed as frivolous.

G. Access to Religious Services.

Garcia alleges that Jarman failed to open his cell door to allow him to attend church services

and that such action violated his First Amendment right to freely exercise his religion. (ECF 10 at

14-16). He does not know the dates or how often he was denied access to services, but knows that

he was denied the ability to attend a church service on August 31, 2022 and February 21, 2023.

(ECF 10 at 16, 25). His Step 2 grievance on the issue was returned to him on February 13, 2024.

(ECF 5 at 11). At best, Garcia alleges that he was sporadically denied access to religious services

by Jarman and other unnamed guards. (ECF 10 at 15).

The First Amendment provides that Congress shall make no law respecting the

establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. U.S. CONST., AMEND I. While

prisoners retain their First Amendment rights, including the right to free exercise of religion and

limited rights to free speech, they only retain those rights that “are not inconsistent with [their]

status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.” Pell

v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974).

However, “these [First Amendment] rights must be exercised with due regard for the

‘inordinately difficult undertaking’ that is modern prison administration.” Thornburgh v. Abbott,

490 U.S. 401, 407 (1989). “Accordingly, prisoners and their correspondents enjoy the protections

of the First Amendment except to the extent that prison regulations curtailing those protections are

‘reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.’” Prison Legal News v. Livingston, 683

F.3d 201, 214 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 404); Brewer v. Wilkinson, 3 F.3d

816, 820-21, 825-26 (5th Cir. 1993). Garcia, however, admits that Jarman was not acting in

accordance with TDCJ policy and that applicable policy is in line with the U.S. Constitution. (ECF

10 at 16).

Further, he does not allege that Jarman prevented him from practicing his religion; instead,

she simply prevented him from worshiping with others on a sporadic basis. The Fifth Circuit has

held single incidents of missing religious services are generally not treated as First Amendment

violations. See, e.g., Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1126 (5th Cir. 1986) (fact that inmate

could not attend all of the religious services he wanted and was occasionally prevented by

circumstances from attending services did not amount to a constitutional violation); Williams v.

Bragg, 537 F. App’x 468 (5th Cir. 2013) (cancellation of several Muslim services for security

reasons did not violate prisoner’s rights under the First Amendment or substantially burden his

right of free exercise under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act); Houlihan v. Moyihan, No.

87-C-3779, 1989 WL 75459 (N.D. Ill. June 27, 1989) (“A prisoner who occasionally is kept from

attending church is not denied a reasonable opportunity to practice his religion so long as he is

accorded regular access to religious services.”). Garcia’s First Amendment claim fails and should

be dismissed as frivolous.

H. Leave to Amend.

Ordinarily, a pro se plaintiff should be granted leave to amend his complaint prior to

dismissal. Brewster, 587 F.3d at 767-68. The district court is not required to allow such an

opportunity, though, if the prisoner’s claims are clearly frivolous, Eason, 14 F.3d at 9, or if the

prisoner has pleaded his best case in the current complaint. Mendoza-Tarango v. Flores, 982 F.3d

395, 402 (5th Cir. 2020). Garcia has fully responded to the Court’s questionnaire and has clearly

stated his best case. Under these circumstances, the Court concludes that granting leave to amend

would be futile and cause needless delay.6

III. RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons stated above, the Magistrate Judge concludes that Garcia’s claims should

be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

IV. INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE

The United States District Clerk is directed to send a copy of this Findings, Conclusions

and Recommendation to each party by the most efficient means available.

IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.

6That notwithstanding, the 14-day objection period will permit Garcia the opportunity to proffer factual

and/or legal bases, if any, to cure the deficiencies in his claims outlined herein.

ENTERED July 15, 2026.

LEE ANN RENO

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

* NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT *

Any party may object to these proposed findings, conclusions and recommendation. In the

event parties wish to object, they are hereby NOTIFIED that the deadline for filing objections is

fourteen (14) days from the date of filing as indicated by the “entered” date directly above the

signature line. Service is complete upon mailing, Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C), or transmission by

electronic means, Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(E). Any objections must be filed on or before the

fourteenth (14th) day after this recommendation is filed as indicated by the “entered” date. See 28

U.S.C. § 636(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d).

Any such objections shall be made in a written pleading entitled “Objections to the

Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation.” Objecting parties shall file the written objections

with the United States District Clerk and serve a copy of such objections on all other parties. A

party’s failure to timely file written objections shall bar an aggrieved party, except upon grounds

of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings, legal

conclusions, and recommendation set forth by the Magistrate Judge and accepted by the district

court. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (Sth Cir. 1996) (en banc),

superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), as recognized in ACS Recovery

Servs., Inc. v. Griffin, 676 F.3d 512, 521 n.5 (Sth Cir. 2012); Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 275,

276-77 (Sth Cir. 1988).

15