Opinion

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10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

11 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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13 SAN DIEGO COASTKEEPER, et al., Case No.: 3:25-cv-00532-CAB-AHG

14 Plaintiffs,

ORDER DENYING JOINT MOTION

15 v. TO DISMISS AND ENTER

CONSENT DECREE

16 SEAWORLD PARKS &

ENTERTAINMENT, INC, et al.,

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[Doc. No. 36]

Defendants.

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20 Before the Court is the parties’ joint motion to have the Court dismiss the Complaint,

21 [Doc. No. 1 (“Complaint”)], and First Amended Complaint, [Doc. No. 24], with prejudice,

22 enter a consent decree, and retain jurisdiction. [Doc. No. 36.] For the reasons below, the

23 Court DENIES the joint motion without prejudice.

24 I. BACKGROUND

25 On December 15, 2025, Plaintiff Coastal Environmental Rights Foundation and

26 Plaintiff San Diego Coastkeeper (together, “Plaintiffs”) filed this action against Defendant

27 Seaworld Parks & Entertainment, Inc. and Defendant Sea World LLC (together,

28 “Defendants”) under the citizen suit enforcement provision of the Federal Water Pollution

1 Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq, and the imminent and substantial endangerment

2 provision of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972. [See Doc.

3 No. 24 (“Amended Complaint”) at 2.] Defendants manage and operate the SeaWorld

4 Facility, which is an aquatic amusement park that houses various marine animals in exhibit

5 pools and aquaria, located within Mission Bay Park in San Diego, California. [Id. at 3, 6.]

6 Plaintiffs allege that for up to 150 nights a year, SeaWorld’s fireworks displays discharge

7 waste and contaminants into Mission Bay. [Id. at 3.] Plaintiffs further allege that the solid

8 waste and effluent from Defendants’ park and fireworks displays regularly exceed

9 acceptable levels set by Defendants’ various environmental permits. [Id. at 3–6, 8–10.]

10 On January 23, 2026, Defendants filed an answer to the Amended Complaint. [Doc.

11 No. 26.] On May 13, 2026, the parties filed a notice of settlement. [Doc. No. 34.] On July

12 10, 2026, the parties filed the joint motion now before the Court. [Doc. No. 36.]

13 II. LEGAL STANDARD

14 A consent judgment, unlike a stipulated dismissal pursuant to a settlement

15 agreement, is a final judgment on the merits. While the remedy for breach of a settlement

16 agreement is a new contract action, a consent judgment keeps the issuing court involved

17 by allowing parties to enforce their agreement through contempt proceedings. See

18 Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 381 (1994) (“[I]f the parties’

19 obligation to comply with the terms of the settlement agreement had been made part of the

20 [court’s] order . . . [then] a breach of the agreement would be a violation of the order, and

21 ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the agreement would therefore exist.”); see also Wyatt v.

22 Cnty. of Butte, No. 2:06-CV-1003 GEB-JFM, 2007 WL 3340947, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 9,

23 2007) (“The parties to a consent decree expect and achieve a continuing basis of

24 jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the resolution of their case in the court entering the

25 order.” (emphasis omitted)). Because a consent judgment requires the Court to expend

26 time and resources to supervise a private settlement agreement, in choosing whether to

27 issue such a judgment, district courts must ensure that the “proposed consent judgment . . .

28 is fair, reasonable and equitable and does not violate the law or public policy.” Sierra

1 Club, Inc. v. Elec. Controls Design, Inc., 909 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1990). Moreover,

2 “[c]onsent decrees entered in federal court must be directed to protecting federal

3 interests”—in other words, they “must further the objectives of the law upon which the

4 complaint was based.” Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 437 (2004).

5 III. DISCUSSION

6 The parties have not addressed the legal standard for a consent judgment or stated

7 why one is necessary here. Nor have they addressed why a stipulated motion to dismiss

8 would be insufficient. “Unlike a stipulated dismissal, which parties may take as of right,

9 litigants [seek]ing . . . a consent judgment must argue why the judgment should issue, and

10 cannot expect the court unreflectively to endorse their agreement with the full authority of

11 the federal judiciary.” Touchstone Life Essentials, Inc. v. Healed LLC, No. 24-cv-03386-

12 PAB, 2025 WL 345299, at *2 (D. Colo. Jan. 30, 2025); see also Metro. Life Ins. Co. v.

13 Hanni, No. 1:17-CV-80-TLS, 2017 WL 6805318, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 14, 2017) (“[A

14 consent] judgment cannot just be stipulated by the parties. Rather, it may be . . . granted

15 by the Court if it is consistent with the law, does not harm third parties, and is an appropriate

16 use of judicial resources.”). “[D]istrict courts do not simply ‘rubber stamp’ litigants’

17 proposed consent decrees.” Nutramax Lab’ys. Inc. v. Abumayyaleh Bros LLC, No. 1:24-

18 cv-01047-SEB-MKK, 2025 WL 107670, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 15, 2025).

19 Moreover, the proposed consent judgment raises other issues. For one, it makes

20 reference to a “Fireworks Permit” defined as Order No. R9-2022-0002, NPDES Permit No.

21 CAG999002, but the Fireworks Permit is not attached to the proposed consent, and the

22 proposed consent does not incorporate the Fireworks Permit by reference. [Doc. No. 34-

23 1.] The Court cannot enforce a consent when it does not have all the information to do so.

24 Second, the record before the Court is minimal; Defendants filed only an answer to the

25 Amended Complaint before the parties reached a settlement. Because of that, “there has

26 been no meaningful showing that the Plaintiff’s [ ] claims are colorable” beyond the

27 standard for pleading a claim, “much less significant enough to warrant . . . judicial

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1 ||supervision of this matter.” Funimation Ent. v. Timmons, No. 13-cv-00533-MSK-MJW,

2 ||}2014 WL 6873061, at *1 (D. Colo. Oct. 24, 2014).

3 IV. CONCLUSION

4 “The district court should not enter a consent decree whenever it strikes two parties’

5 || fancy, nor can the parties simply stipulate to the entry of a consent decree.” Duncanson v.

6 || Wnc of Cincinnati LLC, No. 1-16-CV-00788-SEB-DML, 2020 WL 4043175, at *1 (S.D.

7 July 17, 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). The parties failed to demonstrate

8 continued oversight of their settlement “is an appropriate commitment of the court’s

9 || limited resources.” Kasper v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 814 F.2d 332, 338 (7th Cir.

10 1987). For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the parties’ joint motion without

11 ||prejudice. [Doc. No. 36.] The parties may file a renewed motion that addresses the

12 standards for the entry of a consent decree or a stipulated dismissal pursuant to Rule 41.

13 Itis SO ORDERED.

14 || Dated: July 24, 2026 OB

'° Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo

16 United States District Judge

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