Eads

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

JOSEPH EADS, Case No. 1:24-cv-225

Plaintiff,

McFarland, J.

vs. Bowman, M.J.

NURSE KINSWORTHY, et al.,

Defendant.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This civil action is now before the Court on Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment (Doc. 61) and the parties’ responsive memoranda. (Docs. 74, 75). For the

reasons explained below, Defendant’s motion is well-taken and should be granted.

I. Background and Undisputed Facts

Plaintiff, a federal pretrial detainee at the Butler County Jail during the events at

issue, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that jail medic Timothy

Kinsworthy violated his constitutional rights by (1) sexually assaulting him during a

rectal/hemorrhoid examination, (2) acting with deliberate indifference to his serious

medical needs, and (3) providing deficient medical care that also supports a state-law

medical malpractice claim. (See Doc. 3).

Following initial screening, the Court permitted Plaintiff to proceed on constitutional

claims under the Eighth and/or Fourteenth Amendments against Defendant Kinsworthy

based on the alleged sexual assault and medical care, and on a related state-law claim.

The record contains the following facts:

Plaintiff was housed at the Butler County Jail as a pretrial detainee from August

2023 until January 5, 2024. (Doc.59, Ex. 3 at 12; Doc. 58 at 15-16).

On December 27, 2023, Plaintiff submitted a sick-call request complaining of

swelling and pain, and jail medical staff responded that day after housing-unit officers

reported Plaintiff's complaints about hemorrhoids or intestinal prolapse. (Doc. 59, Craft

Aff. Ex. 1, Ex. 3 at 20.; Doc. 58, Eads Dep. Ex. 1). Plaintiff was placed on the sick call list

on December 27, 2023, to be seen during sick call rounds on December 28, 2023. Plaintiff

also requested three grievance forms on December 27, 2023. (Doc.58, Eads Dep at 60-

61; Doc. 59, Craft Aff. Ex. 1).

On December 28, 2023, Plaintiff was seen during sick call by paramedic Jeff Blair,

who documented Plaintiff's complaint of a large protruding hemorrhoid and provided

hemorrhoid cream. (Doc. 58, Eads Dep. Exs.2, 3).

On December 29, 2023, Plaintiff submitted another sick-call request stating that

he was in pain and bleeding from his rectum and could not use the restroom, and Medical

Supervisor Fisher placed him on the sick-call list at 9:30 a.m. (Doc. 58, Eads Dep. Ex. 4).

At approximately 9:55 a.m. that morning, Defendant Kinsworthy, a

paramedic/firefighter at Butler County Jail, was called to Plaintiff's housing unit for a

complaint of rectal bleeding associated with hemorrhoids. (Doc. 58, Eads Dep. Ex. 5).

According to Kinsworthy's affidavit and contemporaneous charting, Plaintiff walked

normally, was not in distress, and had no visible blood on his person or clothing. (Doc.

59, Kinsworthy Aff. ¶ 8, 14; Doc. 58, Eads Dep. Ex. 5).

Kinsworthy first proposed examining Plaintiff in the pod's multi-purpose room, but

after Plaintiff voiced privacy concerns because others might see him through the

windows, Kinsworthy asked whether Plaintiff preferred to be examined in his cell, and

Plaintiff agreed. (Doc. 59, Kinsworthy Aff. pp. 1-2).

In the cell, Kinsworthy instructed Plaintiff to lower his pants and underwear so the

affected area could be visually examined. (Doc. 59, Kinsworthy Aff. pp 1-3).

The contemporaneous medical record reflects that Kinsworthy observed no blood

on Plaintiff's body, pants, or underwear, did not observe profuse bleeding, and requested

stool softener and further monitoring. (Doc. 59, Kinsworthy Aff., pp2-3). Defendant

Kinsworthy’s affidavit states he did physically touch Plaintiff and only visually observed

Plaintiff’s rectal area. Kinsworthy Aff. Id. at ¶ 14-17. Due to the lack of blood, Defendant

Kinsworthy requested a stool softener be provided to Plaintiff and for his condition to be

further monitored. Id. at ¶ 18. Defendant Kinsworthy informed Plaintiff of this course of

treatment and left the pod shortly thereafter. Id. Defendant Kinsworthy documented his

examination and encounter with Plaintiff on the BCJ’s medical charting system, and

requested additional review of Plaintiff’s condition, consistent with the information relayed

to Plaintiff. Id. at ¶ 19.

Plaintiff testified that he filed a grievance against Defendant Kinsworthy about 20

minutes after he left the pod. (Doc. 58, Eads dep. at p. 92). The grievance stated that

Defendant Kinsworthy “sent [him] to [his] room on the pod” which made him

uncomfortable because “everyone was watching me.” (Doc. 58, Eads Dep. Ex. 6). The

grievance further stated that Kinsworthy told him “all you gotta do is push them back in

there thin that’s when he push his finger in my ass pushing my guts back in, He hurt me

there was so much pane.” (Doc. 58, Ex.6).

The record further shows that the Butler County Sheriff's Office conducted criminal

and internal investigations. (Doc. 59, Craft Aff., p. 1). On December 30, 2023, Plaintiff was

interviewed by Detective Chris Morris with the Butler County Sheriff’s Office. (Doc. 56,

Eads Interview).

Plaintiff was transported on December 30, 2023 to Kettering Health Hamilton,

where he was examined by a SANE nurse and physician and underwent a sexual assault

exam and rape kit. (Doc. 59, Craft Aff. Ex. 2; Doc. 59, Ex. 1 at p. 23). The medical records

list the reason for visit as “reported sexual assault” and “hemorrhoids,” but the physical

exam and subsequent DNA testing revealed no evidence of sexual assault and no DNA

foreign to Plaintiff. (Doc. 58, Eads Dep. Ex. 7).

Inmates Tu-Shawn Hunt and Deonte Johnson each provided written statements at

Plaintiff’s request. However, during recorded interviews with Detective Morris both

witnesses stated that they did not actually observe Defendant insert fingers into Plaintiff’s

rectum or otherwise physically contact him. Hunt Interview, Doc. 56, 3:30-35. Johnson

expressly explained that his written account was based on Plaintiff’s description rather

than personal observation. (Doc. 56, Johnson Interview, 5:05-12).

An internal investigation was also conducted by Sergeant Ryan Hensley of the

BCSO investigations division beginning on January 2, 2024. Both Detective Morris and

Sergeant Hensley concluded that there was no evidence to substantiate Plaintiff’s

allegation of sexual assault and that Defendant Kinsworthy had not engaged in

misconduct.

Defendant now moves for summary judgment under Rule 56, arguing that the

summary-judgment record does not support any constitutional or state-law claim and that

he is entitled to qualified immunity. (Doc. 61). Plaintiff ultimately filed a 110-page

memorandum in opposition after prior extension requests had been denied. (Doc.71).

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s response was untimely and grossly over the applicable

page limits.

The undersigned agrees that Plaintiff's opposition was filed after the Court had

denied further extensions and that the memorandum far exceeds the ordinary page

limitation imposed by Local Rule 7.2. The Court also denied requests to extend the

summary-judgment response deadline on October 31, 2025 and December 9, 2025, yet

Plaintiff later filed a 110-page opposition without leave of Court on December 15, 2025.

(See Doc. 70, 73, 74).

A pro se litigant is not excused from compliance with readily understandable

procedural rules or court-imposed deadlines. However, given the Sixth Circuits “strong

preference for trials on the merits,” and because Defendant has addressed the substance

of Plaintiff's filing in reply, the response will be considered. However, even considering

Plaintiff's arguments and evidentiary references liberally in light of his pro se status, the

undersigned finds that Defendant’s motion is well-taken and should still be granted on the

merits.

III. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment is proper

“if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” A dispute is “genuine” when “the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202

(1986). A court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the

nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587,

106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The moving party has the burden of showing an

absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 325, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

Once the moving party has met its burden of production, the nonmoving party

cannot rest on the pleadings but must present significant probative evidence in support

of his case to defeat the motion for summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49,

106 S.Ct. 2505. The mere scintilla of evidence to support the nonmoving party's position

will be insufficient; the evidence must be sufficient for a jury to reasonably find in favor of

the nonmoving party. Id. at 252, 106 S. Ct. 2505.

B. Defendant’s motion for Summary Judgment is well-taken

Defendants contend that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because

Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege any viable claim for liability under the Eighth and/or

Fourteenth Amendment, or any state law theory. As such, Defendant argues that he is

entitled to qualified immunity. The undersigned agrees.

1. Fourteenth Amendment

As noted above, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Kinsworthy violated his constitutional

rights by sexually assaulting him while examining his hemorrhoids while in the Butler

County Jail. Because Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the time of the events, any claim

for constitutionally inadequate medical care arises under the Fourteenth Amendment

rather than the Eighth Amendment. See Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 472 (6th Cir.

2013) (“the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment bars excessive

force against convicted persons” and the Fourth Amendment applies to free citizens, but

“[w]hen a citizen does not fall clearly within either category—e.g., pretrial detainees—the

Fourteenth Amendment's more generally applicable Due Process Clause governs to bar

a governmental official's excessive use of force.”).

To succeed on this claim, Plaintiff must produce evidence that he had a sufficiently

serious medical need and that Defendant acted deliberately and recklessly in the face of

an unjustifiably high risk of harm that was known or so obvious it should have been known.

See Trozzi v. Lake Cnty., Ohio, 29 F.4th 745, 757–58 (6th Cir. 2022); Brawner v. Scott

Cnty., 14 F.4th 585, 591 (6th Cir. 2021). A sufficiently serious medical need is one that

has been “diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious

that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.

Helphenstine v. Lewis Cnty., 60 F.4th 305, 317-18 (6th Cir. 2023). Even viewing the record

favorably to Plaintiff, Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to

this claim.

The record shows that Plaintiff's complaints were repeatedly addressed by jail

medical staff over a brief period. Notably, Defendant Kinsworthy examined Plaintiff on

December 29, 2023, less than an hour after Plaintiff made a sick-call request. See Eads

Dep. Exh. 5, Doc. 58-5, PageID # 620.

The record does not support a finding that Kinsworthy recklessly disregarded a

serious medical risk. Kinsworthy assessed Plaintiff, observed no visible bleeding or signs

of acute distress, documented the encounter, and requested stool softener and continued

monitoring. Id. Plaintiff argues that his hemorrhoids and bleeding required different or

more aggressive care, but disagreement with the chosen course of treatment does not

establish a constitutional violation. Woods, v. Aramark Correctional Services, et al., No.

22-CV-4420, 2025 WL 4956722, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 21, 2025); citing Rhinehart v. Scutt,

894 F.3d 721, 744 (6th Cir. 2018).

Defendant also cites authority holding that hemorrhoids and similar symptoms do

not satisfy the objective component of a deliberate-indifference claim, and nothing in

Plaintiff's opposition identifies evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude

otherwise on this record. See Mallory v. Bolton, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157809 at * 8

(W.D. Kent. Aug. 20, 2021) (finding plaintiff’s allegations of rectal bleeding for several

weeks that created a painful and uncomfortable condition did not satisfy the objective

component of a medical deliberate indifference claim).

Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's medical-

care/deliberate-indifference theory.

B. Sexual-assault claim

Plaintiff also contends that Kinsworthy sexually assaulted him during the

December 29 examination. As noted by Defendant Kinsworthy, the Sixth Circuit has held

that, regardless of pretrial status, any claim for sexual assault in a correctional setting is

properly analyzed under the Eighth Amendment. See Carnes v. Hall, 665 F. Supp. 3d 831,

843 (E.D. Ky. 2023); Rafferty v. Trumbull Cnty., 915 F.3d 1087, 1095 (6th Cir. 2019);, 2023

U.S. App. LEXIS 25579 at *5-6, (6th Cir. 2023). Under the Eighth Amendment, Plaintiff is

required to satisfy the objective and subjective component. See Rafferty, 915 F.3d at

1094. The objective component requires the pain inflicted to be “sufficiently serious.” Id.

However, the United States Supreme Court has noted that “not every malevolent touch

by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action.” Id., quoting Wilkins v. Gaddy,

559 U.S. 34, 37, 130 S. Ct. 1175, 175 L. Ed. 2d 995 (2010). The Eighth Amendment only

protects prisoners from conduct that is “repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Id.

Here, Defendant has produced evidence that no physical contact occurred during

his examination of Plaintiff. See Kinsworthy Aff. Namely, Kinsworthy swore that he

performed only a visual exam, his chart note is consistent with that account, and the

subsequent criminal and internal investigations found no evidence of misconduct. (Doc.

59, Kinsworthy Aff. pp. 1-2. See also Doc 58, Eads Dep. Ex. 7, Doc.59. Craft Aff.).

Next, the objective evidence undermines Plaintiff's accusation. Plaintiff was taken

to the hospital the next day for a sexual-assault examination and rape kit, and the

laboratory testing identified no foreign DNA profile. (Doc. 58, Eads Dep. Ex. 7). Moreover,

other officers did not see any contact and inmate Johnson's interview materially retreated

from his written statement by acknowledging that he did not actually see a finger inserted

and instead inferred what had happened after speaking with Plaintiff. (Doc 56, Warner

Interview; Johnson interview).

Notably, Plaintiff's own accounts materially shifted over time. In this regard,

Plaintiff gave inconsistent versions about the wording of Defendant's statements, the

length of the encounter, whether and when he protested, the position of officer Warner,

and what others could have seen or heard. (Doc. 58, Eads Dep at 92; Exs. 1, 2, 3, 6; Doc.

66, Eads interview).

Here, Plaintiff's allegation of sexual assault is unsupported by competent evidence

sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find that Kinsworthy intentionally touched Plaintiff

in a sexual manner, acted for a sexual purpose, or otherwise engaged in conduct that

was objectively serious and subjectively culpable under the governing constitutional

standards. Summary judgment therefore should be entered for Defendant on Plaintiff's

sexual-assault claim.

C. Fourteenth Amendment due-process/privacy theory

To the extent Plaintiff attempts to recast the same incident as a substantive due

process or privacy violation under the Fourteenth Amendment, such a claim fails as a

matter of law. As detailed above, the record does not support a finding that Defendant

engaged in conduct so brutal, inhumane, malicious, or conscience-shocking as to violate

substantive due process.

D. Qualified immunity

Defendant Kinsworthy also argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity protects government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar

as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818,

102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Qualified immunity not only insulates government

officials from individual liability for money damages, but from the burdens and expenses

of litigation and trial. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200–201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d

272 (2001).

The doctrine of qualified immunity is intended to balance the following competing

interests: “the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power

irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability

when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129

S.Ct. 808, 815, 172 L.Ed. 2d 565 (2009). Qualified immunity “‘gives ample room for

mistaken judgments’ by protecting ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly

violate the law.’” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589

(1991) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 343, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271,

(1986)). See also Dorsey v. Barber, 517 F.3d 389, 394 (6th Cir. 2008).

Qualified immunity applies regardless of whether the official's error was a mistake

of law or a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact.

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231, 129 S.Ct. 808. Here, Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity

in his individual capacity on the record presented because Plaintiff has failed to show that

he violated any clearly established constitutional right of which a reasonable person would

have known.

E. State-law claims

Because Plaintiff's federal claims should be dismissed, this court should also

decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any pendant state claims. 28 U.S.C. §

1367(c)(3); see Musson Theatrical v. Fed. Express Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1254-55 (6th Cir.

1996) (“When all federal claims are dismissed before trial, the balance of considerations

usually will point to dismissing the state law claims ...”).

VI. Conclusion

In light of the foregoing, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT Defendant Kinsworthy's

motion for summary judgment (Doc. 61) be GRANTED; all pending motions (Docs. 76,

77) be DENIED as MOOT; and judgment be entered in favor of Defendant Kinsworthy

on all claims asserted against him and this matter be CLOSED.

s/Stephanie K. Bowman

Stephanie K. Bowman

Chief United States Magistrate Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

JOSEPH EADS, Case No. 1:24-cv-225

Plaintiff,

McFarland, J.

vs. Bowman, M.J.

NURSE KINSWORTHY, et al.,

Defendant.

NOTICE

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written

objections to this Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS of

the filing date of this R&R. That period may be extended further by the Court on timely

motion by either side for an extension of time. All objections shall specify the portion(s) of

the R&R objected to, and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of

the objections. A party shall respond to an opponent’s objections within FOURTEEN (14)

DAYS after being served with a copy of those objections. Failure to make objections in

accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S.

140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).