Opinion

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8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 MICHAEL M. WARD, No. 2:25-CV-2827-DC-DMC

12 Plaintiff,

13 v. ORDER

14 MERCY MEDICAL CENTER, et al.,

15 Defendants.

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17 Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action. Pending before

18 the Court is Plaintiff’s original complaint. See ECF No. 1.

19 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by litigants who, as here, have

20 been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Under this

21 screening provision, the Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or

22 malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief

23 from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(A), (B).

24 Moreover, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3), this Court must dismiss an

25 action if the Court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Pursuant to Rule 12(h)(3),

26 the Court will also consider as a threshold matter whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction.

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1 Moreover, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a

2 “. . . short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.

3 Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See

4 McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)).

5 These rules are satisfied if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim

6 and the grounds upon which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996).

7 Because Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific

8 defendants which support the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this

9 standard. Additionally, it is impossible for the Court to conduct the screening required by law

10 when the allegations are vague and conclusory.

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12 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

13 Plaintiff files this action against two defendants: (1) Mercy Medical Center

14 Redding, and (2) Dr. Gregory Hartt. See ECF No. 1, pg. 2. Plaintiff alleges this Court’s

15 jurisdiction arises under federal question jurisdiction. See id. at 3. Plaintiff states this case

16 implicates 18 U.S.C. § 1518. Plaintiff additionally states this case falls under 28 U.S.C. §§

17 1346(b), 2671, and 2672. See id. at 4. Plaintiff also specifically references medical malpractice.

18 See id.

19 Plaintiff asserts Mercy Medical Center and Dr. Gregory Hartt engaged in

20 obstruction of justice by falsifying medical records. See id. at 5. Plaintiff alleges an unwritten

21 custom between Redding Police Department (which is not a defendant to this action) and Mercy

22 Medical Center. See id. The Court presumes this alleged custom to mean a custom of falsifying

23 medical records to conceal instances of excessive force.1 See id. Plaintiff attaches to the

24 complaint emails and medical records but does not include dates or additional facts regarding the

25 alleged incident. See id. at 7-68. Plaintiff writes that the amount in controversy is “$200,000-

26 $500,000 for negligence.” Id. at 5. It is unclear if Plaintiff was in custody, either as a pre-trial

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1 Plaintiff states, “Excessive force cover-up. ‘Unwritten between Redding’s Police

28 Dept. custom’ and Mercy. – Monell.” Id. at 5.

1 detainee or as an inmate incarcerated pursuant to a valid judgment of conviction, when the events

2 alleged in the complaint took place.

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4 II. DISCUSSION

5 Plaintiff’s complaint, as currently pleaded, is insufficient to state a claim.

6 Plaintiff’s claim for medical malpractice, as discussed below, is not a cognizable claim as it arises

7 under state law. Plaintiff’s claims of excessive force and obstruction of justice do not allege

8 sufficient factual allegations to support a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff will

9 be provided leave to amend his claims of excessive force and obstruction of justice.

10 A. Medical Malpractice

11 Plaintiff’s medical malpractice claim is based on a violation of state law. Plaintiff

12 does not allege facts that support such a claim because he has not stated facts to show that either

13 defendant acted below the applicable standard of medical care. Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff

14 asserts a claim for medical malpractice, the claim is not cognizable. The Court may, if Plaintiff is

15 able to successfully plead a federal claim, exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s

16 medical malpractice claim. The Court will make this determination upon the filing of an

17 amended complaint.

18 B. Excessive Force2

19 In determining whether the force used is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment,

20 the Court must balance “’the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth

21 Amendment interests’ against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.’” See Graham v.

22 Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989), quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 6 (1985). The Court

23 must determine whether the officers’ actions are objectively reasonable “in light of the facts and

24 circumstances then known to” the officer. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137 (1978).

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27 2 Due to the Court’s uncertainty regarding Plaintiff’s status as a pre-trial detainee or

prisoner, the Court has analyzed the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s pleading under both the Fourth and

28 Eighth Amendment.

1 The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the

2 prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel

3 and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan,

4 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “. . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts

5 of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102

6 (1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v.

7 Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with

8 “food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy,

9 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when

10 two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so serious such

11 that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2)

12 subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of

13 inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison

14 official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id.

15 As discussed above, Rule 8 requires a complaint contain a short and plain

16 statement of the claim. Plaintiff’s complaint refers to 62 pages of attached documents which

17 purportedly support the factual allegations against the defendants. This pleading method does not

18 satisfy the requirement of Rule 8(a) that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. To

19 the contrary, Plaintiff’s complaint would require the Court to comb through 62 pages of

20 documents in order to determine whether Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a claim of excessive

21 force upon which relief can be granted. The Court is unwilling to do this in part due to limited

22 judicial resources but also because it is for Plaintiff – not the Court – to formulate his claims in a

23 way that satisfies the rules.

24 Moreover, in the body of the complaint, which contains a single paragraph of

25 factual allegations, see ECF No. 1, pg. 5, Plaintiff includes no allegations which would establish a

26 causal link between either named defendant and a constitutional violation. To state a claim under

27 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual connection or link between the actions of the

28 named defendants and the alleged deprivations. See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S.

1 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the

2 deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act,

3 participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to

4 do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743

5 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of official

6 personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266,

7 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the plaintiff must set forth specific facts as to each individual

8 defendant’s causal role in the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d

9 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). Here, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts which would indicate

10 Defendants acted either unreasonably or with deliberate indifference.

11 The complaint will be dismissed with leave to amend to allow Plaintiff an

12 opportunity to re-allege his claims in light of the foregoing legal principles.

13 C. Obstruction of Justice

14 Plaintiff references 18 U.S.C. § 1518 and obstruction of justice. See ECF No. 1,

15 pgs. 4, 5. Section 1518 is a provision of the federal criminal statutes and does not provide for a

16 private civil cause of action. This defect is not curable through amendment.

17 D. Conspiracy

18 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) provides a private cause of action where two or more persons

19 conspire to obstruct justice by intimidating a party, witness, or juror. Here, Plaintiff has not

20 alleged any facts to suggest such a conspiracy. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) provides a private cause of

21 action for a conspiracy to deprive a person of their civil rights due to racial or other class-based

22 animus. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971). Here, Plaintiff has not alleged a

23 conspiracy based on racial or other class-based animus. Plaintiff will be provided leave to amend

24 to clarify his conspiracy claim.

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1 Il. CONCLUSION

2 Because it is possible that some of the deficiencies identified in this order may be

3 || cured by amending the complaint, Plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend. See Lopez v. Smith, 203

4 | F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiffis informed that, as a general rule, an

5 || amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258,

6 || 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Therefore, if Plaintiff amends the complaint, the Court cannot refer to the

7 || prior pleading in order to make Plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An

8 | amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id.

9 If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the

10 || conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiffs constitutional rights. See

11 | Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how

12 || each named defendant is involved and must set forth some affirmative link or connection between

13 || each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167

14 | (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

15 Finally, Plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the

16 || time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at

17 || 1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. Plaintiff is also warned that a complaint which fails to comply

18 || with Rule 8 may, in the Court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b).

19 || See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981).

20 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

21 1. Plaintiffs original complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; and

22 2. Plaintiff shall file a first amended complaint within 30 days of the date of

23 || service of this order.

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25 | Dated: July 10, 2026 Co

26 DENNIS M. COTA

07 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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