Opinion

Tran

Court: District Court, N.D. Texas
Filed: Aug 10, 2026
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 44.1%

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

MAI-TRAM H TRAN, §

Plaintiff, §

VS. § Civil Action No. 3:25-CV-0538-D

CITY OF CARROLLTON, TEXAS, §

Defendant. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION

AND ORDER

In this discrimination action by plaintiff Mai-Tram H Tran (“Tran”) against defendant

the City of Carrollton, Texas (“the City”), the City moves for summary judgment and to

strike portions of Tran’s declaration and the entirety of the declaration of Lisa Ramsey

(“Detective Ramsey”). For the reasons that follow, the court grants in part and denies in part

as moot the City’s motion to strike, and grants the City’s motion for summary judgment.

Tran was employed by the City as a police officer in the Carrollton Police Department

(“Department”) from June 4, 2001 to October 3, 2023.1 In March and September 2021 Tran

suffered injuries in the line of duty, including a head injury that she avers caused post-

concussion syndrome and traumatic brain injury. The Department granted Tran injury leave

1In recounting the factual background, the court summarizes the evidence in the light

most favorable to Tran as the summary judgment nonmovant and draws all reasonable

inferences in her favor. See, e.g., Owens v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 541 F.Supp.2d 869,

870 n.1 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (Fitzwater, C.J.) (citing U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Safeguard Ins.

Co., 422 F.Supp.2d 698, 701 n.2 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (Fitzwater, J.)).

from September 28, 2021 to October 7, 2021.

Tran was thereafter released by a physician for light duty and accepted light duty

assignments from October 2021 to August 2022. Tran was initially assigned to work at the

Carrollton Police Department Jail, but after the former chief of the Department Derick Miller

(“Chief Miller”) approved an extension of her light duty, she accepted a front desk position

at the Department’s Criminal Investigations Division. These positions did not require Tran

to perform defense tactics.

The City again granted Tran leave from August 11, 2022 to June 6, 2023. Per Tran’s

request, the City extended that period of leave to October 6, 2023.

On October 25, 2022 Johann Van Beest, DC (“Dr. Van Beest”), a chiropractor, issued

a Report of Medical Evaluation that indicated that Tran had reached clinical Maximum

Medical Improvement (“MMI”).2 Shiu-Yueh Baxter, M.D. (“Dr. Baxter”), Tran’s physician,

signed the report and indicated that she agreed with Dr. Van Beest’s certification of MMI and

impairment rating.

On February 14, 2023 Tran met with Robert Arredondo (“Chief Arredondo”), the

chief of the Department. According to Chief Arredondo, Tran acknowledged the

determination that she had reached MMI and requested a full-time light duty desk position.

Chief Arredondo avers that he informed Tran that no such position was available, and that

2Tran does not dispute that, according to Resolution No. 3498 passed by the Carrollton

City Council, once an employee reaches MMI, she is no longer eligible for an extension of

leave for a line of duty injury.

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the Department offered light duty desk positions to police officers only as a temporary

accommodation to allow recovery from non-permanent injuries. He advised Tran that there

were civilian desk positions available with the City for which she could apply, but Tran

expressed that she was not interested in these positions because she wanted to maintain her

police officer salary.

On October 3, 2023 Dr. Baxter issued a Work Activity Status Report in which she

cleared Tran to return to work with the following restrictions: “no repetitive neck twisting,”

“[n]o running,” and “[n]o work at heights or on scaffolding.” D. App. (ECF No. 23) at 41.

On that same day the City terminated Tran. As a basis for her termination, the City noted

that Tran was certified to have reached MMI but remained unable to perform job-related

activities, such as neck twisting, running, and working on heights or scaffolding, which the

City maintained were minimum qualifications for the police officer position.

Tran then brought this lawsuit, in which she alleges that the City violated the

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. The City moves for

summary judgment, and also moves to strike portions of Tran’s summary judgment evidence.

Tran opposes the motions, which the court is deciding on the briefs, without oral argument.

Before reaching the merits of the City’s summary judgment motion, the court

considers the City’s motion to strike. The court addresses only the objections that it finds

meritorious and relevant to Tran’s summary judgment defense.

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The City objects under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1) to various portions of Tran’s

declaration that mention Detective Justin Ellis (“Detective Ellis”) and Detective Ramsey and

to Detective Ramsey’s declaration and its attachments.3

Rule 37(c)(1) provides, in pertinent part:

If a party fails to provide information or identify a witness as

required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to use that

information or witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a

hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was substantially justified

or is harmless.

“The district court has broad discretion in deciding whether a Rule 26(a) violation is

substantially justified or harmless.” Sea Side Villas II Horizontal Prop. Regime v. Single

Source Roofing Corp., 64 Fed. Appx. 367, 372 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Mid-Am. Tablewares,

Inc. v. Mogi Trading Co., 100 F.3d 1353, 1363 (7th Cir. 1996)).

In evaluating whether a violation of Rule 26 is harmless, the

court examines four factors: (1) the importance of the evidence;

(2) the prejudice to the opposing party of including the

evidence; (3) the possibility of curing such prejudice by granting

a continuance; and (4) the explanation for the party’s failure to

disclose.

Hoffman v. L & M Arts, 2013 WL 81578, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2013) (Fitzwater, C.J.)

(citing Librado v. M.S. Carriers, Inc., 2004 WL 1490304, at *11 (N.D. Tex. June 30, 2004)

(Fitzwater, J.)); accord, e.g., Viera v. Signature Contracting Servs., LLC, 2014 WL 2893208,

3These attachments are photographs and social media posts of Detective Ramsey.

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at *1 (N.D. Tex. June 26, 2014) (Horan, J.). “The court considers the four-factor test

holistically.” Hoffman, 2013 WL 81578, at *3 n.7 (quoting EEOC v. Serv. Temps, Inc., 2009

WL 3294863, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 13, 2009) (Fitzwater, C.J.), aff’d, 679 F.3d 323 (5th Cir.

2012)).

Tran’s summary judgment response refers to Detectives Ellis’ and Ramsey’s

experiences to support her contention that she can perform the essential functions of some

police officer positions. Detectives Ellis and Ramsey are therefore individuals likely to have

discoverable information, and Tran was required under Rule 26(a)(1)(A) to disclose their

identities. The City contends, and Tran does not dispute, that Tran failed to provide the City

Detectives Ellis’ and Ramsey’s identities at any point in her discovery. Accordingly, Tran

failed to satisfy her Rule 26 disclosure and discovery obligations with respect to these

detectives. Even if Tran did not initially anticipate Detectives Ellis’ and Ramsey’s relevance

to this lawsuit, she was required to supplement her initial disclosures when it became

apparent to her that she would rely on Detectives Ellis and Ramsey to support her claims.

See Fuller v. CIG Fin., LLC, 2023 WL 8482889, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 2023) (Fitzwater,

J.); In re Sambrano, 440 B.R. 702, 706 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2010) (discussing the requirement

to supplement initial disclosures).

Tran maintains that no such disclosure was required because Detectives Ellis and

Ramsey are rebuttal witnesses, and she designated them as such on her first amended witness

list. The court disagrees that this is a proper designation for the detectives. Tran references

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Detectives Ellis and Ramsey to support her prima facie cases for her ADA discriminatory

discharge and failure-to-accommodate claims, particularly her contentions that she was a

qualified individual under the ADA and that the City failed to explore transfer to a detective

position as a reasonable accommodation. Therefore, they are not rebuttal witnesses, and

Tran was required to disclose their identities. See McAfee v. Murray Ohio Mfg., Inc, 66 Fed.

Appx. 523 (5th Cir. 2003) (unpublished) (concluding that a witness who would testify in

support of the plaintiffs’ prima facie case was not a rebuttal witness).

Because Tran failed to timely disclose Detectives Ellis’ and Ramsey’s identities, the

court must next determine whether this failure was harmless or substantially justified. See

Sea Side Villas, 64 Fed. Appx. at 372.

Tran provides no explanation for her failure to disclose the identity of Detective Ellis

apart from her position that no such disclosure was required, an issue that the court has

already addressed. She also fails to address the importance of her testimony regarding

Detective Ellis (although the court assumes that such testimony is important to establishing

the prima facie cases of some of her ADA claims). Tran’s failure to disclose caused

prejudice to the City insofar as it was deprived of a fair opportunity to conduct discovery

regarding Detective Ellis or to depose him. See Fuller, 2023 WL 8482889, at *4. And

although granting a continuance “could ameliorate prejudice resulting from the untimeliness

of the . . . disclosure,” id., the court has already continued the trial setting sua sponte to

account for the instant summary judgment motion, and additional delay would increase costs

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to both parties. See Graham v. El Paso Cnty., 2022 WL 1112822, at *2-3 (W.D. Tex. Jan.

12, 2022). After considering the four harmlessness factors holistically, the court concludes

that Tran’s failure to disclose the identity of Detective Ellis is not harmless or substantially

justified.

The court’s analysis with respect to Detective Ramsey is largely similar, but Tran

represents that she did not know of Detective Ramsey until discovery had already closed.

Some “courts have held that a failure to disclose a witness or evidence is ‘substantially

justified’ under Rule 37(c) where the disclosing party had no knowledge of the person or

evidence until after the discovery deadline has passed.” Drechsel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,

2015 WL 7067793, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 2015) (Horan, J.) (citing In re Advanced

Modular Power Sys., Inc., 413 B.R. 643, 661 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009)). But supplemental

disclosures made past the discovery deadline are permitted “generally only when the

producing party has shown that it produced the information promptly after learning of it.”

Fuller, 2023 WL 8482889, at *3. Here, Tran’s first mention of Detective Ramsey came in

response to the City’s summary judgment motion. And Tran does not otherwise provide the

court information that would allow it to reasonably conclude that she produced Ramsey’s

identity shortly after learning of it.

Accordingly, the court grants the City’s motion to strike with respect to the portions

of Tran’s declaration that mention Detectives Ellis and Ramsey and to Detective Ramsey’s

declaration and its attachments.

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The City also objects to the portions of Tran’s declaration that mention alleged out-of-

court statements made by Assistant Police Chiefs Kevin McCoy and Paul Fritz (the

“Assistant Police Chiefs”) regarding the Department’s ability to make Tran’s desk role a

permanent modified assignment. The City contends that these statements constitute

inadmissible hearsay that does not qualify for a hearsay exception.

Fed. R. Evid. (“FRE”) 802 provides that hearsay—which generally constitutes out of

court statements introduced to prove the truth of the matter asserted, FRE 801(c)—is

inadmissible unless an exception applies. “When a party makes a proper objection to a

statement on hearsay grounds, the proponent must demonstrate by a preponderance of the

evidence that the statement either isn’t hearsay or qualifies for admission under an applicable

hearsay exception.” United States v. Lucas, 2022 WL 1290513, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 29,

2022); see also 30B Charles Alan Wright & Jeffrey Bellin, Federal Practice and Procedure

§ 6803 at 277 (2017).

Tran contends that the Assistant Police Chiefs’ statements constitute statements by

the City’s employee on a matter within the scope of that employment relationship. FRE

801(d)(2) provides that a statement is not hearsay when it “is offered against an opposing

party” and “was made by the party’s agent or employee on a matter within the scope of that

relationship and while it existed.” But for this provision to apply, the Assistant Police Chiefs

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must have had some role in the decision whether to make Tran’s desk role permanent. See

Staheli v. Univ. of Miss., 854 F.2d 121, 127 (5th Cir. 1988) (statement did not concern a

matter within the scope of declarant’s agency and was made in his “capacity as wiseacre

only”); Fairchild v. All Am. Check Cashing, Inc., 815 F.3d 959, 967 (5th Cir. 2016)

(“Fairchild failed to present any evidence that Lambert was involved in All American’s

decision to terminate her”).

Here, the City represents that the Assistant Police Chiefs have no authority to approve

a permanent modified assignment, and Tran has failed to adduce any evidence to support her

assertion to the contrary. The Assistant Police Chiefs’ job title is alone insufficient to

establish that matters of permanent accommodation were within their authority. See Staheli,

854 F.2d at 127 (citing Hill v. Speigel, Inc., 708 F.2d 233, 237 (6th Cir. 1983) (“The mere

fact that each of these men was a manager . . . is clearly insufficient to establish that matters

bearing upon Hill’s discharge were within the scope of their employment.”)). Because Tran,

as the proponent of the evidence, bears the burden of establishing that the alleged statements

are not hearsay, and she has failed to meet this burden, the court sustains the City’s objection.

Accordingly, the court grants in part the City’s motion to strike with respect to the

foregoing objections, and denies it in part as moot with respect to the objections that the court

has not addressed.

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III

The court now considers Tran’s motion for summary judgment, turning first to her

ADA discriminatory discharge claim.

When a party moves for summary judgment on a claim for which the opposing party

will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party can meet its summary judgment

obligation by pointing the court to the absence of admissible evidence to support the

opposing party’s claim. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Once the

moving party does so, the opposing party must go beyond her pleadings and designate

specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. See id. at 324; Little v. Liquid Air

Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (per curiam). An issue is genuine if the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in the opposing party’s favor.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The opposing party’s failure to

produce proof as to any essential element of a claim renders all other facts immaterial. See

Trugreen Landcare, L.L.C. v. Scott, 512 F.Supp.2d 613, 623 (N.D. Tex. 2007) (Fitzwater,

J.) (citation omitted). Summary judgment is mandatory if the opposing party fails to meet

this burden. Little, 37 F.3d at 1076.

The ADA mandates that “[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified

individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,

advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other

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terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). To prevail on this

claim, Tran must present direct or circumstantial evidence that her disability was a

motivating factor for the City’s adverse employment actions. See, e.g., Seaman v. CSPH,

Inc., 179 F.3d 297, 300 (5th Cir. 1999).

When a plaintiff does not present direct evidence of discrimination, the court applies

the modified McDonnell Douglas approach. Id. at 300 (holding that McDonnell Douglas

framework, which is used in Title VII cases, applies to ADA cases when only circumstantial

evidence of discrimination is offered). As modified, the McDonnell Douglas framework

consists of three stages. First, Tran must establish a prima facie case of discrimination,

which “creates a presumption that [the City] unlawfully discriminated against [her].” Tex.

Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981). To establish a prima facie case

of discrimination based on a disability under the ADA, Tran must show that (1) she suffers

from a disability or is regarded as disabled; (2) she is qualified for the job despite the

disability; (3) she was subjected to an adverse employment action due to her disability; and

(4) she was replaced by a nondisabled person or treated less favorably than nondisabled

employees. See, e.g., Milton v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 707 F.3d 570, 573 (5th Cir. 2013)

(quoting Daigle v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 70 F.3d 394, 396 (5th Cir. 1995)).

Second, if Tran establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the City to

articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment actions taken against

her. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-07 (1993). The City’s burden

is one of production, not proof, and involves no credibility assessments. See, e.g., West v.

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Nabors Drilling USA, Inc., 330 F.3d 379, 385 (5th Cir. 2003).

Third, if the City meets its production burden, Tran must show that the legitimate

reasons proffered by the City “were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for

discrimination.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000)

(quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253); see also EEOC v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., 570 F.3d

606, 615 (5th Cir. 2009). Therefore, to survive summary judgment, Tran must “offer

sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact . . . that [the City’s] reason is not

true, but is instead a pretext for discrimination.” Rachid v. Jack In The Box, Inc., 376 F.3d

305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (describing standard

in context of age discrimination case).

“Although intermediate evidentiary burdens shift back and forth under this

framework, ‘[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant

intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.’”

Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143 (alteration in original) (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253).

The City contends that it is entitled to summary judgment because no reasonable jury

could find that Tran has satisfied the qualification element of her prima facie case. In support

of this contention, the City points to its job description for the position of police officer,

which indicates that physical apprehension and search of suspects is an essential job function.

The job description also details that the working conditions require that police officers

“perform[] a variety of physically demanding maneuvers and activities . . . , including

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running, walking, stooping, bending, rolling, crawling, climbing, jumping, lifting, carrying,

dragging, and safely operating assigned equipment and vehicles.” D. App. (ECF No. 23) at

38. Moreover, the City asserts that it is also bound by the physical fitness requirements set

by the Civil Service Commission in accordance with Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 143.022,

which include “running, twisting of body parts, and working on heights.” D. Br. (ECF No.

22) at 17. And it maintains that the record demonstrates that, at the time of her termination,

Tran was unable to perform these tasks, as evidenced by her October 3, 2023 medical

evaluation. The City also offers the affidavit of Chief Arredondo, in which he avers that the

“Department does not have any permanent full-time position that would not require a sworn

officer to meet physical requirements.” D. App. (ECF No. 23) at 6 ¶ 13.4

4Tran objects to portions of Chief Arredondo’s affidavit based on the best evidence

rule and for lack of foundation. The court overrules these objections. FRE 1002, or the best

evidence rule, applies “when a party wishes to prove the contents of an original writing,

recording, or photograph.” Zimmerman v. Gruma Corp., 2013 WL 3154118, at *8 (N.D.

Tex. June 21, 2013) (Lindsay, J.) (brackets and citation omitted). But the relevant

testimony—which pertains to the job requirements of police officers in the City of

Carrollton—is not testimony about an original writing, recording, or photograph. Rather, it

is testimony based on Chief Arredondo’s “personal knowledge,” “duties, and responsibilities

as Police Chief.” D. App. (ECF No. 23) at 3-4 ¶¶ 1,3; Zimmerman, 2013 WL 3154118, at

*8 (agreeing that the best evidence rule comes into play only when the terms of a writing are

being established, not when a witness’s testimony is based on personal knowledge). For the

same reason, Tran’s lack-of-foundation objections are meritless. See Luman v. Diaz, 2022

WL 4001234, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 1, 2022) (overruling lack of foundation objection

because board member testified about board rules based on personal knowledge). Even if

the court were to sustain Tran’s objections, its summary judgment decision would remain the

same because the City has proffered evidence other than Chief Arredondo’s affidavit that

substantiates its contentions regarding the essential functions of the police officer position.

And Tran, who would bear the burden of proof on this issue at trial, has failed to adduce facts

that create a genuine dispute of material fact.

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Relying on much of the same arguments and evidence, the City also maintains that,

even if Tran is able to establish her prima facie case, it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for discharging her: she was unable to perform the essential functions of a police

officer position, with or without accommodation. The City asserts that Tran cannot point to

admissible evidence that would enable a reasonable jury to find that this reason is a pretext

for discrimination.

Tran does not dispute that, at the time of her termination, she could not run, work on

heights or scaffolding, or twist her neck. But she contends that the evidence identified by the

City is not dispositive of the question whether such functions are essential to the role of

police officer. She maintains that other evidence in the record—including the City’s and

other police departments’ accommodations of other officers—creates a genuine dispute of

material fact as to whether these physical abilities are actually essential functions of all police

officer jobs. She identifies her accommodated desk role, the detective role, and the role of

Neighborhood Police Unit Officer, as police officer jobs for which the ability to perform

these physical activities is not an essential function, and she contends that, if the City had

transferred her one of these roles as an accommodation, she would have been able to perform

the essential functions.

The court considers first whether Tran has established a prima facie case for her

discriminatory discharge claim.

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The City has pointed to the absence of admissible evidence to support the second

element of Tran’s prima facie case: that she was qualified for the job of police officer. And

the City contends that Tran lacks sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material

fact as to this element because she would have been unable to perform the essential functions

of that job, with or without accommodation.

To avoid summary judgment, Tran must point to evidence that would allow a

reasonable jury to find “that either (1) [she] could perform the essential functions of the job

in spite of her disability, or, if she could not, (2) that a reasonable accommodation of her

disability would have enabled her to perform the essential functions of the job.” E.E.O.C.

v. LHC Grp., Inc., 773 F.3d 688, 697 (5th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up) (quoting Turco v. Hoechst

Celanese Corp., 101 F.3d 1090, 1093 (5th Cir. 1996)). “Under the ADA reassignment to a

different job may be a reasonable accommodation, but the plaintiff bears the burden of

proving that an available position exists that [s]he was qualified for and could, with

reasonable accommodations, perform.” Malagon v. Crescent Hotel & Resorts, 2017 WL

2536995, at *4 (N.D. Tex. June 12, 2017) (Fitzwater, J.) (cleaned up) (quoting Moss v.

Harris Cnty. Constable Precinct One, 851 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2017)).

Moreover, “[a]s a matter of law, it is an unreasonable accommodation for the

employer to have to exempt the employee from performance of an essential function of the

job.” Id. at *5 (quoting Jones v. Kerrville State Hosp., 142 F.3d 263, 265 (5th Cir. 1998) (per

curiam)). “A function is ‘essential’ if it bears ‘more than a marginal relationship’ to the

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employee’s job.” LHC Grp., 773 F.3d at 697 (citation omitted). In determining whether a

job function is essential, “[c]ourts owe deference to an employer’s position description . . .

[b]ut this deference is not absolute.” Id. at 697-98 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)). “The

inquiry into whether a particular function is essential initially focuses on whether the

employer actually requires employees in the position to perform the functions that the

employer asserts are essential.” Id. at 698 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).

The court holds that no reasonable jury could find that Tran was qualified for the role

of police officer, with or without reasonable accommodation.

In particular, Tran has failed to satisfy her burden of identifying evidence that creates

a genuine issue of material fact as to whether “an available position exists that [s]he was

qualified for and could, with reasonable accommodations, perform.” Malagon, 2017 WL

2536995, at *4. Although Tran avers, and the City does not dispute, that there was an open

detective position at the time of Tran’s termination, she points to no evidence that would

allow a reasonable jury to find that this position did not require her to run, work on heights

or scaffolding, or twist her neck. She points to portions of her and Detective Ramsey’s

declarations that demonstrate that Detectives Ellis and Ramsey were permitted to work in

detective roles despite being paralyzed and confined to wheelchairs. But even if this

evidence was admissible,5 Detectives Ellis and Ramsey were not employed by the Carrollton

5As the court has already explained, it sustains the City’s objections to this evidence.

See supra at § II(B). But even assuming arguendo that such evidence was admissible, the

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Police Department. Tran identifies no evidence with respect to the essential functions of the

open detective role in the Carrollton Police Department that would cause a reasonable jury

to question the accuracy of the City’s job description evidence or Chief Arredondo’s sworn

testimony that no permanent full-time police officer position existed that did not require an

officer to be capable of meeting the foregoing physical requirements.

Tran also seems to contend that the City could have transferred her to a permanent

light duty front desk position or to the Neighborhood Police Unit. With respect to the front

desk position, Tran has not pointed to admissible evidence that would allow a reasonable jury

to find that a full-time light duty front desk position that paid a police officer’s salary was

available in the Carrollton Police Department.6 To the contrary, Chief Arredondo averred

that no such position existed during his tenure. And the City “[was] not required to create

light duty jobs to accommodate [Tran].” Turco, 101 F.3d at 1094. With regard to any other

police officer position, such as the Neighborhood Police Unit position, Tran likewise fails

to point to admissible evidence “that would enable a reasonable jury to find that there was

a vacancy for which she was qualified.” See Esparza v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2013 WL

court’s summary judgment decision would remain the same.

6The court sustains the City’s objections to the portions of Tran’s declaration that

mention alleged out-of-court statements made by the Assistant Police Chiefs regarding the

Department’s ability to convert Tran’s desk role to a permanent modified assignment. See

supra at § II(B). But even if the court considered these alleged statements, its summary

judgment decision would not change. Tran has failed to adduce evidence regarding the

Assistant Police Chiefs’ authority to make such an accommodation, so their statements do

not create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether an open position existed for

which Tran could perform the essential functions.

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5208024, at *13 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 17, 2013) (Fitzwater, C.J.).7

Finally, Tran appears to suggest that there may have been other vacant police officer

positions for which she was qualified, but that she was unable to discover them because the

City failed to engage in the ADA-mandated interactive process. See LHC Grp., 773 F.3d at

703 n.6 (“[W]hether [an employer] engaged in the required interactive process, remain[s]

relevant to the qualification element of the discriminatory-termination analysis.”). But she

admits that the City never denied her modified light duty requests until she reached MMI,

and she does not dispute that Chief Arredondo met with her to discuss her request for transfer

to a full-time light duty desk position. Chief Arredondo’s denial of that request on the basis

that no such position existed is not equivalent to a refusal to engage in the interactive

process. See Turco, 101 F.3d at 1094; Roberts v. Mega Life & Health Ins. Co., 2005 WL

659026, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 22, 2005) (Lynn, J.) (“An employer is not required to provide

an employee with the precise accommodation she desires, but only one that is objectively

reasonable.”).

Moreover, Tran elected not to request transfer to another position, such as a detective

position, as an accommodation. Although an employee need not request a particular

7Tran points to deposition testimony from Chiefs Miller and Arredondo that indicates

that there were full-time employee vacancies in the Department during their tenures. But this

testimony would not enable a reasonable jury to find that these vacancies were positions for

which Tran was able to perform the essential functions. When prompted about variations in

the actual work of different police officer positions, Chief Miller, like Chief Arredondo,

maintained that all sworn police officers were expected to be able “to perform a minimum

job standard, which is codified in the job description.” P. App. (ECF No. 26-1) at 70:18-19.

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accommodation, she “cannot expect the employer to read [her] mind and know [she] secretly

wanted a particular accommodation and sue the employer for not providing it.” Morton v.

GTE N. Inc., 922 F. Supp. 1169, 1180 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (Solis, J.) (alterations in original)

(citation omitted), aff’d sub nom. Morton v. GTE Serv. Corp., 114 F.3d 1182 (5th Cir. 1997);

see also Loulseged v. Akzo Nobel Inc., 178 F.3d 731, 736 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[C]ourts have

held that an employer cannot be found to have violated the ADA when responsibility for the

breakdown of the informal, interactive process is traceable to the employee and not the

employer.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Because Tran has failed to identify sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of

material fact as to the qualification element of her prima facie case, the court grants summary

judgment as to her discriminatory discharge claim.8

Alternatively and independently, summary judgment is appropriate because no

reasonable jury could find that the City’s proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

discharging Tran—that she was unable to perform the essential functions of the position of

8Tran’s summary judgment response cites a number of out-of-circuit cases in which

district courts have denied summary judgment on claims involving similar contentions and

job description evidence. The court is not bound by these cases. Moreover, even assuming

arguendo that the evidence in the record regarding the day-to-day functions of police officers

was comparable to the records in the cases that Tran cites, in the Fifth Circuit, Tran must still

identify a vacant position to which the City could have transferred her. See Moss, 851 F.3d

at 418. As the court has already discussed, Tran has not adduced evidence that would enable

a reasonable jury to find that she can perform the essential functions of detective, the only

vacant position that she has identified.

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police officer—is pretextual.

A plaintiff can prove pretext “by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation

is false or ‘unworthy of credence.’” Jackson v. Cal-Western Packaging Corp., 602 F.3d 374,

378-79 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Laxton v. Gap Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 578 (5th Cir. 2003)).

Although generally “a plaintiff’s prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find

that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that

the employer unlawfully discriminated,” there are “instances where, although the plaintiff

has established a prima facie case and set forth sufficient evidence to reject the defendant’s

explanation, no rational factfinder could conclude that the action was discriminatory.”

Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148. “The ultimate question is whether the employer intentionally

discriminated, and proof that ‘the employer’s proffered reason is unpersuasive, or even

obviously contrived, does not necessarily establish that the plaintiff’s proffered reason . . .

is correct.’” Id. at 146-47 (quoting St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519

(1993)). “In other words, ‘[i]t is not enough . . . to disbelieve the employer; the factfinder

must believe the plaintiff’s explanation of intentional discrimination.’” Id. at 147 (alterations

and emphasis in original) (quoting St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 519). The plaintiff

might create “only a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer’s reason was untrue and

there [may be] abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence that no discrimination had

occurred.” Id. at 148. Thus it is “possible for a plaintiff’s evidence to permit a tenuous

inference of pretext and yet be insufficient to support a reasonable inference of

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discrimination.” West, 330 F.3d at 385 (quoting Crawford v. Formosa Plastics Corp., La.,

234 F.3d 899, 903 (5th Cir. 2000)); see also Rosenblatt v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 2007 WL 2187252,

at *12 (N.D. Tex. July 27, 2007) (Fitzwater, J.) (granting summary judgment where,

assuming fact issue on question of pretext existed, fact issue was “weak,” and there was no

evidence that employee’s age was ever considered in employer’s decision to terminate his

employment).

For the reasons stated above, Tran has failed to point to evidence in the record that

would enable a reasonable jury to find that the City’s explanation for terminating her is false

or unworthy of credence. Jackson, 602 F.3d at 378-79. But even assuming arguendo that

Tran had pointed to such evidence, no rational factfinder could find that her termination was

motivated by discrimination.9

9There is some uncertainty regarding whether the mixed-motive alternative applies to

Tran’s ADA-based claims. See Polak v. Sterilite Corp., 2021 WL 1753757, at *4 (N.D. Tex.

May 4, 2021) (Fitzwater, J.), aff’d, 2022 WL 457822 (5th Cir. Feb. 15, 2022) (per curiam).

But because Tran does not contend that the mixed-motive alternative applies to any of her

claims, the court need not consider it. See Plumlee v. City of Kennedale, 795 F.Supp.2d 556,

563 (N.D. Tex. 2011) (McBryde, J.). Even assuming arguendo that Tran had properly raised

this alternative and that it applies to her ADA-based claims, the City would still be entitled

to summary judgment on this element. Tran has adduced no evidence of discriminatory

animus or any other evidence that would enable a reasonable jury to find that the City would

not have taken the same action based solely on Tran’s inability to perform the essential

functions of the police officer position. See Bennett v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 936 F.Supp.2d

767, 781 n.11 (N.D. Tex. 2013) (Fitzwater, C.J.); Crouch v. J C Penney Corp., 337 Fed.

Appx. 399, 402 (5th Cir.2009) (per curiam) (“Under a mixed-motive framework [the

defendant-employer] can defend against liability by showing that it would have taken the

same action in the absence of any alleged discriminatory animus.”).

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Tran’s summary judgment response does not mention the word “pretext.” Nor does

she identify evidence of bias or discrimination. At most, Tran identifies officers in the

Carrollton Police Department who she avers have been permitted to work full-time in police

officer positions that do not require them to make arrests. But this evidence would not enable

a reasonable jury to find, with respect to Tran, that physical limitations were not the real

reason that she was terminated or that the real reason was instead discriminatory. See Bennett,

936 F.Supp.2d at 779. The record does not indicate that these officer have reached MMI and

have similar limitations to Tran. She avers that Officers Don Patin (“Officer Patin”) and

Bryce Anthony (“Officer Anthony”) are not required to perform the physical maneuvers

required to arrest suspects, but she states that this is because of their placement on the Brady

List, not due to any disability. Similarly, with respect to Officer Brian Schultz (“Officer

Schultz”), Tran admits that he was released to work without any physical restrictions. And

Tran’s summary judgment response provides little to no detail regarding the limitations of the

other officers that she contends were accommodated by the City. See id. at 780. (“Bennett

has not adduced evidence about the nature of the other officers’ medical conditions that would

enable a reasonable jury to find that DISD had allowed officers with comparable physical

restrictions to return to police officer positions.”). Therefore, the City’s alleged

accommodation or restriction of these officers would not allow a reasonable jury to find to be

pretextual Chief Arredondo’s testimony that all permanent full-time police officers must have

the physical capabilities outlined in the job description and that he must be free to reassign

any officers to patrol positions as needed. Accordingly, even if Tran could establish her prima

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facie case, the court would grant the City’s motion for summary judgment on her ADA

discriminatory discharge claim.

For similar reasons, the court grants summary judgment on Tran’s ADA failure-to-

accommodate claim.

A prima facie case for a failure-to-accommodate claim requires that a plaintiff show:

“(1) the employer is covered by the statute; (2) she is an individual with a disability; (3) she

can perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation; and

(4) the employer had notice of the disability and failed to provide accommodation.” Mzyk v.

Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist., 397 Fed. Appx. 13, 15 n.3 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). Although this

claim is distinct from Tran’s ADA discrimination claim, both require that Tran show that she

is a qualified individual for the position of police officer, with or without accommodation.

See, e.g., Comacho v. R+L Carriers Shared Servs., LLC, 2023 WL 5615468, at *2 (S.D. Tex.

Aug. 30, 2023). For the reasons that the court granted summary judgment on the qualification

element of Tran’s discriminatory discharge claim, see supra at § III(D), it holds that no

reasonable jury could find that Tran has satisfied this requirement with respect to her failure-

to-accommodate claim.

Accordingly, the court grants summary judgment dismissing Tran’s failure-to-

accommodate claim.

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The court now turns to Tran’s ADA retaliation claim.

To prevail on her retaliation claim, Tran must first establish a prima facie case by

showing that (1) she engaged in an activity protected by the ADA, (2) an adverse employment

action occurred, and (3) a causal link existed between the protected act and the adverse

employment action. Seaman, 179 F.3d at 301. Like her ADA discriminatory discharge claim,

her retaliation claim is subject to McDonnell Douglas burden shifting. Id. Therefore, once

Tran establishes a prima facie case, the City must adduce evidence of a legitimate, non-

retaliatory reason for the adverse employment action. Id. And if the City produces evidence

of such a reason, Tran must introduce sufficient evidence to enable a reasonable jury to find

that the proffered reason is pretextual. Id. Ultimately, she must prove that “but for” the

protected activity, the City’s adverse employment action would not have occurred. Id.

The City contends that no reasonable jury could conclude that Tran has established the

causation element of her prima facie case for retaliation. The court agrees. Although the

court recognizes that the requirement that a plaintiff show at the prima facie case stage a

“causal link” between a protected activity and an adverse employment action is “much less

stringent” than the “but for” causation that the trier of fact must find, see Montemayor v. City

of San Antonio, 276 F.3d 687, 692 (5th Cir. 2001); see also Khanna v. Park Place Motorcars

of Hous., Ltd., 2000 WL 1801850, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 6, 2000) (Fitzwater, J.)

- 24 -

(characterizing the prima facie case burden as “minimal”), neither Tran’s complaint nor her

summary judgment response indicates the protected activity in which she purports to have

engaged. In fact, her summary judgment response makes no reference to retaliation. The

court will assume that Tran’s retaliation claim relies on her request for accommodation. See

Tabatchnik v. Cont’l Airlines, 262 Fed. Appx. 674, 676 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam)

(“[M]aking a request for a reasonable accommodation under the ADA may constitute

engaging in a protected activity.”). Because the City has proffered evidence demonstrating

reasons for Tran’s termination that are entirely unrelated to her request for accommodation,

and because Tran does not point to any evidence that would enable a reasonable jury to find

that this request was the true or motivating reason behind her termination, the court grants

summary judgment on Tran’s retaliation claim. See Bennett, 936 F.Supp.2d at 783.

Alternatively and independently, the City is entitled to summary judgment because, for

the reasons the court has already explained in the context of Tran’s discriminatory discharge

claim, see supra at § III(E), Tran has failed to point to evidence that would enable a

reasonable jury to find that the City’s proffered legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for her

termination is pretextual.

The court considers next whether Tran has properly raised an independent ADA

harassment claim.

Tran’s complaint alleges that the City’s “conduct constitutes retaliation under the ADA

- 25 -

regarding the failure to provide reasonable accommodation, harassment, and wrongful

termination,” Compl. ¶ 23, and her prayer for relief mentions harassment once more. It is

unclear from these two vague allegations whether Tran’s intention is to assert a separate ADA

harassment claim. This is likely why neither the City’s nor Tran’s summary judgment

briefing mentions a harassment claim despite the City’s apparent intention to move for

summary judgment on all ADA claims.

The court concludes that Tran has failed to properly raise an independent ADA

harassment claim. Cf. Bennett, 936 F.Supp.2d at 781 (concluding that plaintiff failed to

properly raise an independent failure-to-accommodate claim); Whitaker v. FedEx Freight,

Inc., 899 F.Supp.2d 496, 498 n.4 (M.D. La. 2012) (“Without additional facts, a stray reference

to ‘harassment’ will not support a claim for hostile work environment.”). If anything, Tran

seems to have mentioned “harassment” to buttress her retaliation claim, not to raise an

independent claim. Cf. Callaghan v. Congemi, 1993 WL 114523, at *9 n.29 (E.D. La. Apr.

8, 1993) (similar). But even assuming arguendo that Tran has properly raised an ADA

harassment claim, the court would grant summary judgment as to this claim because Tran has

adduced no evidence that she was harassed based on her alleged disabilities, or that the City

knew of any harassment and failed to take remedial action. See Flowers v. S. Reg’l Physician

Servs. Inc., 247 F.3d 229, 235-36 (5th Cir. 2001) (stating the elements of an ADA harassment

claim).

- 26 -

VII

Finally, the court considers whether the City is entitled to summary judgment on Tran’s

Title VII claim.

Because Tran does not offer evidence of direct discrimination, her Title VII claim is

also analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. See Searcy v. TTEC

Servs. Corp., 2025 WL 1159999, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 21, 2025) (Fitzwater, J.). To establish

a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, Tran must show that

(1) [s]he is a member of a protected class, (2) [s]he was qualified

for the position at issue, (3) [s]he was the subject of an adverse

employment action, and (4) [s]he was treated less favorably . . .

than were other similarly situated employees who were not

members of the protected class, under nearly identical

circumstances.

Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Lee v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 574 F.3d 253, 259 (5th Cir.

2009)).

The City contends that Tran has failed to satisfy the requirement of a prima facie case

that she was treated less favorably than similarly situated individuals outside of her protected

classes. The court agrees.

“In disparate treatment cases, the plaintiff-employee must show ‘nearly identical’

circumstances for employees to be considered similarly situated.” Berquist v. Wash. Mut.

Bank, 500 F.3d 344, 353 (5th Cir. 2007). “A variety of factors are considered when

- 27 -

determining whether a comparator is similarly situated, including job responsibility,

experience, and qualifications.” Herster v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 887 F.3d

177, 185 (5th Cir. 2018).

Tran has identified non-Asian and non-female police officers in the Carrollton Police

Department who she avers were provided permanent police officer assignments that did not

require them to perform the physical maneuvers that she cannot perform. But she does not

point to specific facts regarding these individuals’ job experience, qualifications, or other

characteristics that would enable a reasonable jury to find that they are similarly situated to

her. As the court has already explained, Tran alleges that Officers Patin and Anthony are

restricted from making arrests due to their placement on the Brady List, not because of a

disability; Officer Schultz was released to work without any physical restrictions; and Tran’s

summary judgment response provides little to no detail regarding the circumstances under

which the other police officers whom she identifies received alleged accommodations.

Accordingly, because no reasonable jury could find that Tran has satisfied her burden

of demonstrating “nearly identical” circumstances with respect to any of the individuals whom

she has identified, Berquist, 500 F.3d at 353, the court grants summary judgment on her Title

VII claim.

Independently, and for the reasons explained in the context of Tran’s ADA

discriminatory discharge claim, see supra at § III(E), the City is entitled to summary judgment

because no reasonable jury could find that the City’s proffered reason for her termination is

- 28 -

pretextual. Moreover, Tran has not properly raised the mixed-motives alternative, see supra

note 8, but even assuming arguendo that she had, her summary judgment response points to

no evidence of discriminatory animus related to any Title VII protected category. Nor could

a reasonable jury otherwise find that the City would not have discharged Tran based solely

on her inability to perform the essential functions of the police officer position. See id.

Accordingly, the court grants summary judgment on Tran’s Title VII claim.

* * *

For the reasons explained, the court grants in part and denies in part as moot the City’s

motion to strike Tran’s summary judgment evidence, grants the City’s motion for summary

judgment, and dismisses this action with prejudice.

SO ORDERED.

August 10, 2026.

SENIOR JUDGE

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.