GROSSINGER

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

BRANDON GROSSINGER, :

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 26-CV-2039

:

GOOGLE LLC, et al., :

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM

BEETLESTONE, C.J. JULY 29, 2026

In a prior Memorandum and Order, the Court dismissed the complaint filed by Brandon

Grossinger asserting claims against Google LLC and Stephen D. Watson in his official capacity

as Bucks County Court Administrator. Grossinger v. Google LLC, No. 26-2039, 2026 WL

1662759 (E.D. Pa. June 9, 2026). The claims under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities

Act (“ADA”) against Google were dismissed with prejudice but the Court granted Grossinger

leave to amend his ADA Title II and constitutional claims asserted against Watson based on a

denial of access to the court. Id. at *9-10. Grossinger has now returned with an Amended

Complaint (ECF No. 27).1 Because Grossinger fails to allege the “actual injury” element of both

his ADA and constitutional access to courts claims, and any failure to accommodate claim under

the ADA is also not plausible, the case will be dismissed.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS2

1 Grossinger filed two versions of his Amended Complaint on the same day (ECF Nos. 26

& 27.) The second one contains exhibits that were not included with the first version. The Court

deems the second-filed version to be the operative pleading.

2 The factual allegations set forth in this Memorandum are taken from the Amended

Complaint (ECF No. 27) and attached exhibits. The Court adopts the sequential pagination

assigned to all pleadings by the CM/ECF docketing system.

Grossinger asserts he is disabled by reason of Post-Treatment Lyme Disease Syndrome.

(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 11-13.) He was “involved” in state court proceedings in the Bucks County

courts including a case before a Magisterial District Court and related Court of Common Pleas

filings. (Id. ¶ 14.) He received a written communication signed by Defendant Watson

instructing him “not to refile certain paperwork with the Prothonotary or Clerk of Courts, not to

fax or email corrected papers to Court Administration, and to return the entire corrected

application directly to Court Administration either in person or by mail.” (Id. ¶ 15.) He asserts

that these instructions “created a substantial disability-related barrier because, during the relevant

period, [he] was experiencing disability-related neurological symptoms, had limited ability to

travel, and relied on written electronic communication and assistive technology to understand

and respond to court-related requirements.” (Id. ¶ 16.) On June 15, 2026, he “sent Court

Administration a written ADA accommodation request describing [his] neurological flare and

asking for accessible clarification concerning the filing and communication instructions.” (Id. ¶

17.) Court Administration responded that it did not understand Grossinger’s request, stating that

“Court Administration and the Court’s ADA Coordinator could not extend court-mandated

deadlines [and also stating that Grossinger] had been permitted to e-file pleadings while warning

that emailing documents was not filing them.” (Id. ¶ 18; pgs. 10, 19-20, 27-28.) Grossinger

responded that the mailed instructions “appeared to conflict with the later electronic statement

that e-filing was permitted.” (Id. ¶ 19; pg. 25.) He alleges that Watson had actual or

constructive notice of his “disability-related communication needs” but despite this notice “did

not provide a clear accessible answer identifying which procedure controlled, did not identify the

official issuing the contradictory instructions, and did not provide an effective accommodation

path for [him] to understand and protect his court access rights.” (Id. ¶¶ 20-21; pgs. 26-27.)

Grossinger asserts that, notwithstanding the directive to submit documents via mail or in

person and not “re-file through the Prothonotary” or fax or email corrected documents, he

received an unsigned “electronic communication” several days later stating that he could use the

e-filing system. (Id. ¶ 22.) When he attempted to find out who sent the message, he did not

receive “a clear response identifying the issuing official or reconciling the conflicting

instructions.” (Id.) Apparently, earlier filings he sent through the e-filing system were accepted

but later returned to him for correction due to alleged errors. (Id.) Grossinger claims that the

allegedly contradictory instructions and “lack of clear responses to his disability-related

accommodation requests,” impaired his ability to understand filing requirements, protect his

rights, and “obtain meaningful access to the courts while proceeding pro se with documented

disabilities.” (Id.) Combined with problems he was having with Google and IBM cloud

accounts that were the basis of his now dismissed Title III ADA claims, Grossinger asserts the

instructions “increased the risk that [he] would miss court communications, misunderstand filing

procedures, or lose the ability to preserve legal rights.” (Id. ¶¶ 24, 26.) The alleged barriers also

“contributed to adverse procedural consequences including inability to respond effectively to

court requirements and increased risk of default, dismissal, or loss of rights in pending matters.”

(Id. ¶ 27.)

Based on these facts, Grossinger asserts a claim under Title II of the ADA against

Watson in his official capacity as Buck County Court Administrator, claiming his policies or

practices denied him meaningful access to court services. (Id. ¶¶ 32-33.) This denial, he claims,

was by reason of his disability because the communication barriers and failure to clarify

accessible procedures disproportionately affected his neurological limitations and

accommodation needs. (Id. ¶ 34.) As a result, he “suffered injury including loss of meaningful

court access, inability to respond effectively to court requirements, and related damages.” (Id. ¶

35.) Grossinger asserts a First Amendment denial of access to courts claim via 42 U.S.C. § 1983

based on the same facts. (Id. ¶¶ 37-42.) He seeks a declaration that his rights have been violated

and injunctive relief requiring Watson to provide clear and effective ADA accommodation

procedures and to preserve all records.3 (Id. at 8.)

Appended to the Amended Complaint are documents concerning Grossinger’s ADA

accommodation request to the Bucks County Court Administrator. In a letter dated February 18,

2026, that office noted that Grossinger had requested “written confirmation of an accessible

filing method (including email submission if necessary), a reasonable extension of any active

deadlines while accommodation and record-related issues are being resolved, and email-only

communication as an accommodation.” (Id. at pg. 32.) The letter provides that “e-filing is an

approved filing method” and the author is “not permitted to alter statutory filing deadlines, his

request to use email “had already been addressed,” and the author was not permitted to waive

filing fees – rather Grossinger had to file a petition to proceed in forma pauperis. (Id.) The

author concluded that the court did not fail to accommodate his disability and gave him

instructions to appeal that determination with Defendant Watson. (Id.) Grossinger filed an

appeal asserting, somewhat confusingly, that his grievance was initially filed because the e-filing

3 Declaratory relief is unavailable to adjudicate past conduct, so Grossinger’s request for

this declaratory relief is improper. See Corliss v. O’Brien, 200 F. App’x 80, 84 (3d Cir. 2006)

(per curiam) (“Declaratory judgment is inappropriate solely to adjudicate past conduct” and is

also not “meant simply to proclaim that one party is liable to another.”); see also Andela v.

Admin. Office of U.S. Courts, 569 F. App’x 80, 83 (3d Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (“Declaratory

judgments are meant to define the legal rights and obligations of the parties in the anticipation of

some future conduct.”). A declaratory judgment is also not “meant simply to proclaim that one

party is liable to another.” Corliss, 200 F. App’x at 84 (per curiam); see also Taggart v. Saltz,

No. 20-3574, 2021 WL 1191628, at *2 (3d Cir. Mar. 30, 2021) (per curiam) (“A declaratory

judgment is available to define the legal rights of the parties, not to adjudicate past conduct

where there is no threat of continuing harm.”).

portal demanded a fee he could not pay as an indigent litigant. Yet, he claimed, it processed his

February 18 filing with regard to an order to show cause without charge, and he took issue with

the court “simultaneously find[ing] that no ADA violation occurred while processing the exact

filing that was blocked by the fee barrier.” (Id. at 35, 38, 41.) He also complained about his

grievance being bifurcated between the Court Administrator and the Prothonotary (id. at 44), that

the e-filing portal displays only partial records (id. at 47), and that it took 87 days from when he

made an accommodation request to get the response (id. at 47).4

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because the Court has granted Grossinger leave to proceed in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires the Court to dismiss the Amended Complaint if it fails to state a

claim. Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the

same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),

see Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the Court to

determine whether the Amended Complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,

to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(quotations omitted); Talley v. Wetzel, 15 F.4th 275, 286 n.7 (3d Cir. 2021). Although this

“plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’” it demands “more than a sheer

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 566 (2007)). At this early stage of the litigation, the Court will accept

4 Grossinger does not allege in his Amended Complaint any facts that the bifurcation,

partial display of records, or the delay in determining his accommodation request were

themselves an ADA violation. “While courts may consider exhibits attached to a complaint

when considering whether dismissal is appropriate, a plaintiff does not automatically incorporate

into [his] complaint every fact asserted in such attachments.” Hymer v. Kross, No. 23-2374,

2024 WL 3026781, at *2 (3d Cir. June 17, 2024) (citing cases).

the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint as true, draw all reasonable inferences in

Grossinger’s favor, and ask only whether the Amended Complaint contains facts sufficient to

state a plausible claim. Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021), abrogation on

other grounds recognized by Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th 197 (3d Cir. 2024). Conclusory

allegations do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

The Court construes pro se allegations liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir.

2021). However, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support

a claim.” Id. (quoting Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013)). An

unrepresented litigant “cannot flout procedural rules — they must abide by the same rules that

apply to all other litigants.” Id. (quoting Mala, 704 F.3d at 245); see also Doe v. Allegheny Cnty.

Hous. Auth., No. 23-1105, 2024 WL 379959, at *3 (3d Cir. Feb. 1, 2024) (per curiam) (“While a

court must liberally construe the allegations and ‘apply the applicable law, irrespective of

whether the pro se litigant mentioned it b[y] name,’ Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir.

2002), this does not require the court to act as an advocate to identify any possible claim that the

facts alleged could potentially support.”).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Access to Court Claims

In the Court’s prior decision, Grossinger’s First Amendment access to courts claim was

determined to be implausible because he failed to allege he suffered an actual injury.

Grossinger, 2026 WL 1662759 at *10 (setting forth the elements of the claim and finding that

“[w]hile he described actions by Watson that may have obstructed his filing papers in state court,

he does not describe the underlying cause of action in any way. It is incumbent upon Grossinger

to describe the underlying claim or defense, explain how it is nonfrivolous, and identify a

remedy he cannot receive in that underlying suit.”). To satisfy the actual injury element, i.e., that

he suffered a lost arguable claim, Grossinger was required to describe the claim in his Amended

Complaint “well enough to show that it is ‘more than mere hope,’ and must describe the ‘lost

remedy.’” Id. (quoting Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205-06 (3d Cir. 2008).

In his Amended Complaint, Grossinger states only that was “involved” in state court

proceedings in the Bucks County courts, including a case before a Magisterial District Court and

related Court of Common Pleas filings. (Id. ¶ 14.) He asserts that Watson’s actions “increased

the risk that [he] would miss court communications, misunderstand filing procedures, or lose the

ability to preserve legal rights” (id. ¶¶ 24, 26), and that the alleged barriers also “contributed to

adverse procedural consequences including inability to respond effectively to court requirements

and increased risk of default, dismissal, or loss of rights in pending matters.” (Id. ¶ 27.) He does

not, however, describe the case or cases in any more detail, including whether he was an actual

party - rather than merely “involved,” and the nature of the claims or defenses, or explain how

the claims or defenses were arguable. As the Court has explained, the underlying cause of

action, whether anticipated or lost, is an element of the First Amendment access to courts claim

that must be described with sufficient specificity to satisfy Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. Grossinger, 2026 WL 1662759, at *10. Merely alluding to a case in which he was

“involved” fails to meet this pleading requirement. Further, he does not describe with any

specificity what deadlines, if any, he missed or how his legal rights were, in fact, affected.

Accordingly, the First Amendment access to court claim will be dismissed.5

5 While not an issue that has been extensively litigated, court have held that the

requirement of an actual injury also applies to an access to courts claim under the ADA. See

McCauley v. Georgia, 466 F. App’x 832, 837 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (“Even accepting the

allegations in McCauley’s complaint as true, she fails to state an access to the courts claim

because she did not allege actual injury. . . . Thus, . . . she has not . . . stated an access to the

B. Failure to Accommodate Claim

While Grossinger primarily frames his claims under the access to courts rubric, any

independent ADA claim based on a failure to accommodate his disability is also not plausible.

While not entirely clear, he may be attempting to assert a failure to accommodate claim because

he received allegedly contradictory instructions about how he could file documents. He

mentions that certain documents were returned to him because they were incorrect and he was

instructed not to fax or email them, but to return the papers in person or by mail. (Am. Comp. ¶

15.) When he complained and sent a written accommodation request, the Court Administration

responded that (1) the official could not extend court-mandated deadlines and (2) Grossinger had

been permitted to e-file pleadings.6 (Id. ¶ 18; pgs. 10, 19-20, 27-28.) Grossinger’s failure to

accommodate claim appear to be based on his allegation that the original mailed instructions

“appeared to conflict with the later electronic statement that e-filing was permitted.” (Id. ¶ 19;

pg. 25.) He alleges that Watson had actual or constructive notice of his “disability-related

communication needs” but despite this notice “did not provide a clear accessible answer

identifying which procedure controlled, did not identify the official issuing the contradictory

court claim under the ADA.”); Jones v. Kalinjia, No. 23-186, 2024 WL 3951988, at *9 (C.D.

Cal. Mar. 5, 2024) (holding that plaintiff’s access to courts claims under both the First

Amendment and the ADA failed because he did not allege the defendant’s actions hindered his

efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous legal claim), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL

3952551 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2024); Keitt v. NYS Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, No. 11-

855, 2015 WL 2383687, at *23 (W.D.N.Y. May 19, 2015) (citing McCauley and holding that

prisoner’s failure to identify any specific lawsuit or claim that was hindered by defendants’

alleged conduct, which rendered his First Amendment access claim implausible, also made his

ADA Title II claim not plausible). In any event, as described next, Grossinger’s ADA Title II

claims are not plausible for additional reasons.

6 Grossinger does not allege in the Amended Complaint that he asked for extension of

time as an accommodation, only that he sought an accommodation of “accessible clarification

concerning the filing and communication instructions.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 17.)

instructions, and did not provide an effective accommodation path for [him] to understand and

protect his court access rights.” (Id. ¶¶ 20-21; pgs. 26-27.)

Title II of the ADA requires public entities to provide, in all of their programs, services,

and activities, a reasonable accommodation to qualified individuals with disabilities. Furgess v.

Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 933 F.3d 285, 288-89 (3d Cir. 2019). To state a plausible claim under the

ADA, a plaintiff “must allege that he is a qualified individual with a disability, who was

precluded from participating in a program, service, or activity, or otherwise was subject to

discrimination, by reason of his disability.” Id. The element of discrimination by reason of

disability can be met if a defendant failed to provide the plaintiff with reasonable

accommodations for a disability. Montanez v. Price, 154 F.4th 127, 148 (3d Cir. 2025) (citing

Haberle v. Troxell, 885 F.3d 170, 181 (3d Cir. 2018)). “The duty to accommodate is triggered

when a disabled person’s need for an accommodation becomes known, either because (1) he

requests an accommodation or (2) his disability and concomitant need for an accommodation are

open and apparent.” Id. (citations omitted).

Grossinger’s allegations fail to state a plausible failure to accommodate claim.

Grossinger’s subjective confusion notwithstanding, he concedes that he was accommodated in

his request not to have to travel to deliver or mail documents since the court officials permitted

him to e-file his documents. Other than his assertion that documents were initially returned to

him – possibly because he improperly used email to originally send them (see Am. Compl. ¶ 22)

– he does not allege that he was actually prevented from using the court’s e-filing system as an

accommodation to his disability. See Selene v. Legislature of Idaho, 514 F. Supp. 3d 1243,

1256-58 (D. Idaho 2021) (explaining that plaintiff cannot prevail under Title II of the ADA

where a reasonable accommodation was provided to the plaintiff); Gueltzau v. Warehime, No.

24-430, 2026 WL 595912, at *4 (D. Neb. Mar. 3, 2026) (holding that email filings were not

reasonably necessary where plaintiff was permitted to submit filings by other means including

mail); Hiramanek v. California Jud. Council, No. 15-4377, 2016 WL 6427870, at *2 (N.D. Cal.

Oct. 31, 2016) (“Nor has plaintiff explained how defendants’ existing filing mechanisms are

insufficient to accommodate his alleged disabilities.”), aff’d sub nom. Hiramanek v. Jud. Council

of California, 754 F. App’x 580 (9th Cir. 2019). The allegations that he did not receive a clear

answer when he tried to determining who sent the instruction or whether Defendant Watson

authorized it, allegedly impairing his ability to understand filing requirements (Am. Compl. ¶

22), does not plausibly allege he was denied the requested accommodation of e-filing. Finally,

his allegation that the confusion “contributed to adverse procedural consequences including the

inability to respond effectively to court requirements and increased risk of default, dismissal, or

loss of rights in pending matters” (id. ¶ 27), is both conclusory and speculative since he fails to

identify any actual instance, rather than merely an “increased risk,” of a negative consequence

happening due to lack of an accommodation.

IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Amended Complaint will be dismissed on statutory screening

because Grossinger’s access to courts claims under the ADA and § 1983 and his failure to

accommodation claims, if any, are not plausible. The Court concludes that any further attempt at

amendment would be futile. See Jones v. Unknown D.O.C. Bus Driver & Transp. Crew, 944

F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 2019) (amendment by pro se litigant would be futile when litigant

“already had two chances to tell his story”); see also Gowans v. Axsom, No. 25-2070, 2025 WL

2848907, at *2 (3d Cir. Oct. 8, 2025) (per curiam) (affirming where district court instructed

plaintiff about the deficiencies in his complaint and gave leave to amend but the plaintiff’s

subsequent filing “did not heed the Court’s direction” (citing Krantz v. Prudential Invs. Fund

Mgmt. LLC, 305 F.3d 140, 144 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (“A District Court has discretion to

deny a plaintiff leave to amend where the plaintiff was put on notice as to the deficiencies in his

complaint, but chose not to resolve them.”))); Posey v. Klinefelter, No. 25-1428, 2025 WL

1937084, at *2 (3d Cir. July 15, 2025) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal where the “District

Court’s orders and the Magistrate Judge’s reports and recommendations all informed Posey as to

the ways in which the complaints were deficient and provided multiple opportunities to amend,

and yet Posey repeatedly failed to do so”). Accordingly, the dismissal will be with prejudice.

Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108, 110 (3d Cir. 2002). A final order of

dismissal will be entered separately. Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a).

BY THE COURT:

S/ WENDY BEETLESTONE

__________________________________

WENDY BEETLESTONE, C. J.