The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
J.C.F.C. and M.R.P., individually,
and as parents and natural guardians
of J.C.F.C, a minor,
Plaintiffs,
v. Case No. 8:25-cv-1610-TPB-AAS
THE SCHOOL BOARD OF
MANATEE COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants.
______________________________________/
ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT
KAREN JOHNSON’S MOTION TO DISMISS
This matter is before the Court on “Defendant Karen Johnson’s Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint,” filed on May 11, 2026. (Doc. 48). Plaintiffs
J.C.F.C., M.R.P., and J.C.F.R. filed a response in opposition on May 29, 2026. (Doc.
52). After reviewing the motion, response, court file, and the record, the Court finds as
follows:
Background1
This case arises from incidents of child sexual abuse at Florine J. Abel
Elementary School that were perpetrated by paraprofessional Angel Rodriguez
Mercado, who has since been criminally charged with the underlying conduct. But
1 The Court accepts as true the facts alleged in the complaint for purposes of ruling on the
pending motion to dismiss. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (“[W]hen ruling on
a defendant’s motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations
contained in the complaint.”). The Court is not required to accept as true any legal
conclusions couched as factual allegations. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).
this is not the criminal case. Rather, this is a civil lawsuit – filed by J.C.F.R. (a minor)
and his parents J.C.F.C. and M.R.P. – against Defendants The School Board of
Manatee County, Karen Johnson (a teacher), and Samantha Webb (the school
principal).
Plaintiffs allege that over consecutive school years, two separate students
reported to Johnson that Rodriguez had touched them inappropriately. Johnson
allegedly accused a female student who made the first report of lying and warned her
that she would be sent to the principal’s office, but Johnson later told an administrator
(possibly Webb, according to Plaintiffs) about the report. The following year, a second
student reported Rodriguez touching him inappropriately, and Johnson allegedly did
nothing. Plaintiffs claim that Johnson also witnessed Rodriguez’s “escalating
grooming behaviors” and did nothing. Plaintiffs allege that Rodriguez sexually abused
J.C.F.R. beginning in January 2023, and continuing through November 2023.
On November 8, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against Defendants. On
February 17, 2026, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, asserting claims for:
violation of Title IX as to the School Board (Count I), negligence in failing to provide a
safe environment as to the School Board (Count II), negligence as to the School Board
(Count III), negligent hiring as to the School Board (Count IV), negligent retention as
to the School Board (Count V), parental damages for care and treatment of minor child
as to the School Board (Count VI), Fourteenth Amendment violation as to Johnson
(Count VII), parental damages for care and treatment of minor child as to Johnson
(Count VIII), Fourteenth Amendment violation as to Webb (Count IX), and parental
damages for care and treatment of minor child as to Webb (Count X). Johnson has
moved to dismiss the claims against her with prejudice.
Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint contain “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing the [plaintiff] is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a). While Rule 8(a) does not demand “detailed factual allegations,” it does
require “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007). In order to survive a motion to dismiss, factual allegations must be sufficient
“to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570.
When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, review is generally limited to the four
corners of the complaint. Rickman v. Precisionaire, Inc., 902 F. Supp. 232, 233 (M.D.
Fla. 1995). Furthermore, when reviewing a complaint for facial sufficiency, a court
“must accept [a] [p]laintiff’s well pleaded facts as true, and construe the [c]omplaint in
the light most favorable to the [p]laintiff.” Id. (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,
236 (1974)). “[A] motion to dismiss should concern only the complaint’s legal
sufficiency, and is not a procedure for resolving factual questions or addressing the
merits of the case.” Am. Int’l Specialty Lines Ins. Co. v. Mosaic Fertilizer, LLC, 8:09-
cv-1264-T-26TGW, 2009 WL 10671157, at *2 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (Lazzara, J.).
Analysis
In the motion to dismiss, Johnson argues that (1) Johnson, in her official
capacity, is not a person subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) Johnson is entitled
to qualified immunity; (3) Plaintiffs have failed to state any claims as to Count VII;
and (4) the derivative parental damages claim in Count VIII fails with Count VII.
Official Capacity Claims
As an initial matter, to the extent Counts VII and VIII assert claims against
Johnson in her official capacity, those claims are due to be dismissed. An official
capacity claim is, in all material respects, a claim against the governmental entity
itself. Because Plaintiffs have also sued the School Board of Manatee County, any
official capacity claims against Johnson are duplicative and will be dismissed. See
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985); Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d
764, 776 (11th Cir. 1991).
Individual Capacity Claims
The Court must also consider, however, whether Plaintiffs state any individual
capacity supervisory liability claims against Johnson under § 1983. Johnson asserts
qualified immunity. Because Plaintiffs do not dispute that Johnson was acting within
the scope of her discretionary authority as a classroom teacher at the time of the
events, the burden shifts to Plaintiffs to allege facts showing both (1) that Johnson
violated a constitutional right and (2) that the right was clearly established at the
time of the alleged misconduct. See Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1268 (11th Cir.
1999). Whether Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged a constitutional violation necessarily
turns on the standards governing supervisory liability under § 1983.
"It is well established in this Circuit that supervisory officials are not liable
under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates unless the supervisor
personally participates in the alleged constitutional violation or there is a causal
connection between the actions of the supervising official and the alleged
constitutional deprivation." Doe v. School Bd. of Broward County, Fla., 604 F.3d 1248,
1266 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The amended
complaint contains no allegation that Johnson personally participated in Rodriguez’s
alleged abuse of J.C.F.R. Accordingly, Plaintiffs must plausibly allege the requisite
causal connection between Johnson’s conduct and the alleged constitutional
deprivation.
Plaintiffs’ supervisory liability theory is insufficiently pleaded. The amended
complaint alleges in conclusory fashion that Johnson was "placed in charge of . . .
supervision of her paraprofessional, Rodriguez," but it pleads few factual allegations
describing the nature or scope of Johnson's supervisory authority over Rodriguez.
Plaintiffs do not allege facts plausibly showing what authority Johnson possessed with
respect to Rodriguez’s duties, whether she had authority to direct or restrict his
interactions with students, whether she could remove him from her classroom, or
otherwise explaining why Johnson qualifies as a supervisory official for purposes of §
1983. A bare allegation that Johnson "supervised" Rodriguez, without supporting
factual allegations, is insufficient to plausibly establish supervisory liability.
Next, although the amended complaint alleges that Johnson failed to act after
learning of Rodriguez’s alleged misconduct, it does not plausibly allege facts
establishing the causal connection necessary to impose supervisory liability under §
1983. The amended complaint contains few factual allegations plausibly explaining
how Johnson’s own conduct – as opposed to Rodriguez’s criminal acts or the alleged
institutional failures of others – was the cause of the constitutional deprivation alleged
by Plaintiffs.
Because the amended complaint does not plausibly allege facts establishing that
Johnson personally violated a clearly established right under the demanding
standards governing supervisory liability, Plaintiffs fail, at this stage, to overcome
Johnson’s assertion of qualified immunity.
The Court likewise concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to plausibly state an
equal protection claim in Count VII. The Equal Protection Clause “confers a federal
constitutional right to be free from sex discrimination.” Hill v. Cundiff, 797 F.3d 948,
976 (11th Cir. 2015). Moreover, a school official may violate the Equal Protection
Clause through deliberate indifference to sexual harassment or abuse where the
deliberate indifference itself amounts to intentional discrimination. See id.
To state an equal protection claim under § 1983 based on sex discrimination, a
plaintiff must plausibly allege that the defendant, acting under the color of state law,
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff because of sex, thereby depriving the
plaintiff of equal protection of the laws. See id. While the amended complaint
repeatedly characterizes Johnson’s alleged conduct as sex discrimination, it contains
no factual allegations plausibly supporting an inference that Johnson herself acted
with discriminatory intent or treated similarly situated students differently because of
sex. Although allegations of sexual abuse or harassment may, in appropriate
circumstances, support an equal protection claim, such allegations do not
automatically establish intentional discrimination by a supervisory official for
purposes of the Equal Protection Clause. Plaintiff has failed to allege plausible facts
that would permit or support the inference that Johnson acted as she did because of
the victims’ sex.2 As such, Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim is due to be dismissed.
Derivative Claims in Count VIII
Johnson argues that because Count VII must be dismissed, Count VIII
necessarily fails. Because Plaintiffs have failed to state a viable §1983 claim on behalf
of J.C.F.R. at this time, J.C.F.C.’s and M.R.P’s derivative claims also fail.
Conclusion
This case presents a very tragic and unfortunate situation. Plaintiffs have
chosen to pursue civil claims against persons and entities they believe are responsible,
such as Johnson, but the amended complaint does not presently contain sufficient
factual allegations to state a plausible claim for relief against Johnson under § 1983 or
to overcome her assertion of qualified immunity.
The Court cannot conclude at this time, however, that amendment would
necessarily be futile. The identified deficiencies concern the factual sufficiency of
Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding Johnson’s supervisory authority, personal
involvement, causal connection, and the constitutional theories asserted.
2 The Court notes that, according to the amended complaint, one reporting child was female,
and one reporting child was male. In addition, to the extent Plaintiffs allege that Johnson
witnessed certain ongoing “grooming behaviors” in paragraph 104, Plaintiffs fail to identify
the genders of any of the students involved. Although the involvement of both female and
male students would not, standing alone, necessarily defeat an equal protection claim as a
matter of law, it certainly undercuts an inference that Johnson acted or failed to act because of
the victims’ gender. Instead, it suggests that Johnson’s alleged inaction was directed towards
reports of alleged sexual abuse generally, rather than toward the reports of one gender or the
other. As discussed below, the Court will grant leave to amend, but Plaintiffs are strongly
encouraged to consider whether they can allege sufficient facts to support an equal protection
claim against Johnson consistent with Rule 11.
Consequently, the Court will permit leave to amend, if Plaintiffs may do so in good
faith.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
1. “Defendant Karen Johnson’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended
Complaint” (Doc. 48) is GRANTED IN PART, as set forth herein.
2. Plaintiffs’ amended complaint (Doc. 31) is DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE, with leave to amend.
3. Plaintiffs are directed to file a second amended complaint on or before
August 7, 2026. Even if Plaintiffs do not intend to replead any dismissed
claim, Plaintiffs shall file an amended complaint omitting the dismissed
claims and identifying the claims that remain so that there is a single
operative pleading. Failure to do so will result in this Order becoming a
final judgment.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, in Tampa, Florida, this 24th day of July,
2026.
AP. GAL.
TOMBARBER ss—s—s—S
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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