Olupitan

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

MARTINA O. OLUPITAN, MHA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. CIV-24-349-G

)

STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel. )

THE BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE )

UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA )

et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

Now before the Court is Plaintiff Martina O. Olupitan, MHA’s “Objection to the

Courts Order [Dkt. 76]” (Doc. No. 81). Defendants1 have responded (Doc. No. 100) and

Plaintiff has replied (Doc. No. 103).

I. Background

Plaintiff, appearing pro se, commenced this action in April 2024, bringing federal

and state-law claims against nine defendants. See Compl. (Doc. No. 1). Defendants moved

to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims. See Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. No. 25). On April 1, 2025,

following briefing on the Motion, the Court granted Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as to

Plaintiff’s federal claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s

state-law claims. See Olupitan v. Okla. ex rel. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., No. CIV-

1 Defendants are: State of Oklahoma ex rel. The Board of Regents of the University of

Oklahoma; Michael J. Smith, PharmD; Gary Raskob, PhD; Valerie Williams, PhD; Laura

Stuemky, MD; Ashley Cheyney, PhD; Andrei Belousov, PhD; Katherine O’Neal, PharmD;

and Lori Klimkowski.

24-349-G, 2025 WL 980949, at *7 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 1, 2025), appeal docketed, No. 25-

6055 (10th Cir. Apr. 14, 2025). The Court entered Judgment dismissing this matter without

prejudice the following day. See J. (Doc. No. 51).

On April 7, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Alter Judgment (Doc. No. 52), asking

the Court to reconsider the Judgment of dismissal. Following briefing, the Court denied

Plaintiff’s Motion, finding that Plaintiff had not shown that the Court’s entry of judgment

constituted clear error or manifest injustice. See Order of Feb. 26, 2026 (the “Rule 59(e)

Order”) (Doc. No. 76) at 3-6 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)).

II. Plaintiff’s Objection

Liberally construed, Plaintiff’s Objection seeks reconsideration of the Rule 59(e)

Order, which itself denied reconsideration of the Judgment, pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. “Rule 60(b) allows a court to ‘relieve a party or its legal

representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding,’ for certain enumerated

reasons.” Waetzig v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 145 F.4th 1279, 1282 (10th Cir.

2025) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)).

As relevant here, the Rule prescribes: “On motion and just terms, the court may

relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for” “any . . . reason that

justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is “difficult to attain,”

“extraordinary,” and “may only be granted in exceptional circumstances.” Davis v. Kan.

Dep’t of Corr., 507 F.3d 1246, 1248 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted);

see also Cashner v. Freedom Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d 572, 580 (10th Cir. 1996) (explaining

that relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is appropriate “when circumstances are so unusual or

compelling that extraordinary relief is warranted” “or when it offends justice to deny such

relief” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

In her Objection, Plaintiff argues that she was subjected to “continuing prejudice”

based upon her “ethnic group and pro se status.” Pl.’s Obj. at 2-9. Specifically, Plaintiff

alleges that the Court in this matter has “not take[n] action and/or recognize[d] municipal

liability as [it] has for other litigants,” instead “continu[ing] to allow a manifest of injustice

in prejudicing [its] rulings and exercising discriminatory conduct as to recent case laws

filed and/or applied in the Western District of Oklahoma.” Id. at 5.

As support, Plaintiff cites to other cases in this Court, relying upon the content and

timing of rulings in various lawsuits to show that she has been subjected to unfavorable

decisions and delays “without reasonable cause.” Id.; see id. at 2-4, 5-7. Proceedings in

other cases, none of which are factually related to this matter, do not reasonably identify

any “exceptional circumstances” or offense to justice with respect to the Court’s Rule 59(e)

Order, however. Nor does the fact that the Court granted Defendants’ request to stay

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment pending disposition of Defendants’ motion to

dismiss. See Pl.’s Obj. at 7-9; Order of July 23, 2024 (Doc. No. 31).

To the extent that Plaintiff now objects that the undersigned should have recused

himself from this matter, or should do so now, the Court rejects this contention. “Any . . .

judge . . . of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his

impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). Accordingly, “a judge

has a continuing duty to recuse before, during, or, in some circumstances, after a

proceeding, if the judge concludes that sufficient factual grounds exist to cause an objective

observer reasonably to question the judge’s impartiality.” United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d

985, 992 (10th Cir. 1993). “The test . . . is whether a reasonable person, knowing all the

relevant facts, would harbor doubts about the judge’s impartiality.” Id. at 993 (internal

quotation marks omitted). “The standard is purely objective.” Id. Matters that “will not

ordinarily satisfy the requirements for disqualification under § 455(a)” include “[r]umor,

speculation, beliefs, conclusions, innuendo, suspicion, opinion, and similar non-factual

matters,” and “prior rulings in the proceeding, or another proceeding, solely because they

were adverse.” Id. at 993-94.

Plaintiff’s emphasis on unrelated or unfavorable rulings does not establish a factual

basis for an objective person to reasonably doubt or question the impartiality of the

undersigned. Cf. Cooley, 1 F.3d at 994 (“[T]here is as much obligation for a judge not to

recuse when there is no occasion for him to do so as there is for him to do so when there

is.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). A recusal motion is not a proper “avenue to attack

adverse rulings” made against a litigant. Glass v. Pfeffer, 849 F.2d 1261, 1228 (10th Cir.

1988); accord Cooley, 1 F.3d at 994. And it is well established that “[d]elays or omissions

by a judge . . . are not grounds for disqualification.” Aspinall v. United States, 984 F.2d

355, 357 (10th Cir. 1993).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s request for relief under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 60(b)(6) is DENIED. Plaintiff’s Objection (Doc. No. 81) is OVERRULED.

The Clerk of Court is directed to supplement the appellate record in accordance with

Tenth Circuit Rule 3.2(B).

IT IS SO ORDERED this 14th day of August, 2026.

CHARLES B.GOODWIN

United States District Judge