Bohinski

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MANUEL A. SANTANA DEL

ROSARIO,

Petitioner, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-cv-01973

v. (SAPORITO, J.)

J. BOHINSKI,

Respondent.

MEMORANDUM

Manuel A. Santana del Rosario, incarcerated at SCI-Dallas, has

filed a petition for writ of pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Because he did not exhaust state court remedies as to any of the claims

in the petition and has not established cause for a federal court to review

these procedurally defaulted claims, the petition will be dismissed.

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On October 26, 2022, in the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill

County, a jury convicted Rosario of two counts of aggravated assault and

three related offenses. Rosario was sentenced to seven to 15 years’

incarceration. , No. CP-54-CR-0000320-2022

(Schuylkill Cty. Ct. Com. Pl.). As summarized by the trial court and

adopted by the Pennsylvania Superior Court on appeal, the case involved

a dispute between Rosario and Edwin Candelario, to whom Rosario owed

money, at Rosario’s home:

Upon their entry into the home, [Rosario] placed $50.00

on a table for Candelario to retrieve. Candelario picked

up the money and he and his girlfriend left the home.

However, [Rosario] followed Candelario and his

girlfriend to their vehicle where he made a comment to

Candelario’s girlfriend which annoyed Candelario. The

latter told [Rosario] that if he needed to say something

it should be said to Candelario. [Rosario] then asked

Candelario to come back into his home so they could

finish talking.

Candelario agreed, and he and his girlfriend re-entered

[Rosario’s] home, whereupon [Rosario] pulled out a

gun, stuck it in Candelario’s face, grabbed Candelario

by the neck, and told him to sit down. Candelario sat

on a couch, with his girlfriend sitting next to him.

[Rosario] sat in a chair directly in front of Candelario

with the gun in his hand. Candelario asked [Rosario]

what the problem was, and why [Rosario] had a gun

pointed at him. Candelario told [Rosario] that they

could just forget “about this,” and that “this never

happened.”

[Rosario] responded in Spanish, “Rat,” and told

Candelario to get on his knees. Candelario got on his

knees on the floor. [Rosario] then told Candelario to put

his hands on his head, which he did. Candelario was

then hit on the head by [Rosario], and he fell toward

his girlfriend’s lap. As Candelario was trying to return

to his original position, [Rosario] threw a punch at

Candelario’s face with his fist. Candelario blocked the

punch, got up and hurried to the front door of the

premises in an effort to exit the house. Candelario

found that the front door was locked. As Candelario

was trying to unlock the door, he was shot once in the

arm and once in [the] area of the rib cage by [Rosario].

. . .

Investigating police officers who examined the scene of

the shooting identified bullet strikes to the inside of the

door to [Rosario’s] home, and interviewed [Rosario] and

his wife who had been present at the time of the

shooting. [Rosario] admitted at trial that he had shot

Candelario, and that he had ordered Candelario to get

on his knees at gunpoint. However, [Rosario] claimed

that he would not have shot Candelario if [Candelario]

had allowed [Rosario] to search him for weapons, [if

Candelario] had not hit [Rosario] as he was getting up

from the floor when [Rosario] had the gun pointed at

Candelario, or if Candelario had not reached toward

his pocket as he was trying to get out of the front door.

No evidence produced at trial indicated that

Candelario possessed any weapon the day of the

shooting.

, No. 1737 MDA 2022, 2023 WL 8666645, at *1-

2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2023). On direct appeal, Rosario raised three issues:

1. Did the Commonwealth fail to establish sufficient

evidence to support a conviction for the charge of

aggravated assault?

2. Did the court err by imposing an aggravated range

sentence without considering the mitigating

circumstances raised in the pre-sentence report and by

[Rosario]?

3. Did the charges of recklessly endangering arise from

the same event as the aggravated assault for

sentencing purposes and should a separate sentence

not have been imposed?

at *2. The Superior Court affirmed Rosario’s conviction on December

15, 2023, and the record does not indicate that he sought review by the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

Rosario then filed a petition seeking collateral relief under

Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). (Doc. 9-3). The

court appointed counsel for Rosario, and counsel filed an amended

petition limited to the question of whether a statement Rosario made to

police was voluntary. The trial court denied the petition on July 12, 2024.

Rosario appealed to the Superior Court, attempting to raise the following

issues:

1. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

call character witnesses during [Rosario’s] trial?

2. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

file a pretrial motion seeking to suppress [Rosario’s]

pre-arrest confession?

, No. 1074 MDA 2024, 2025 WL 1952577, at *2-

4 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2025).1 The court determined that both issues had been

1 While his PCRA appeal was pending before the Superior Court,

Rosario filed a habeas petition in this court, which was dismissed without

prejudice because it was a “mixed” petition presenting both exhausted

(continued on next page)

waived because Rosario had failed to adequately explain or develop them

and affirmed on that basis on July 16, 2025. . at 5-6.

When the Court received this petition2 on October

20, 2025, Rosario’s petition for allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court remained pending as to his PCRA petition. The

respondent sought dismissal for Rosario’s failure to exhaust his claims.

(Doc. 9). However, on January 26, 2026, while this habeas petition was

pending, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied review of Rosario’s

PCRA petition. , 353 A.3d 543 (Pa. 2026).

A. Habeas Claims Presented

Rosario asserts the following grounds for relief3:

and unexhausted claims. , No. 3:24-cv-01814

(M.D. Pa., filed Oct. 22, 2024).

2 Contemporaneously with this case, Rosario also filed a civil rights

complaint in which he sought release from state custody premised on his

allegedly wrongful conviction. The assigned magistrate judge has

recommended dismissal of that complaint. , No.

3:25-cv-01982 (M.D. Pa.).

3 After filing this petition, Rosario submitted a series of additional

filings that allude to a wide variety of perceived issues with his criminal

case. (Docs. 7, 11, 12, 14, 15). Although we have reviewed and

considered these filings, Rosario is not permitted to use them to add new

claims to his petition on a rolling basis. His grounds for relief are limited

(continued on next page)

• (1) “Police violation of right, improperly search without

warrant suppress evidence and intechnical [sic] filed and improper

complaint”;

• (2) “Admissibility of criminal record and impeachment by evidence

of a criminal conviction involved dishonesty”;

• (3) “Lack of character evidence”;

• (4) “Due process malicious prosecution conspiracy allegation, hate

crime from police department, claim bias against me intentionally.”

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A federal court may not grant relief on habeas claims previously

adjudicated on the merits in state court unless that adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In drafting this statute, Congress “plainly sought to

ensure a level of ‘deference to the determinations of state courts,’

to those properly pled in the petition. , No. 3:14-CV-

00418, 2017 WL 7360427, at *15 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 11, 2017), report and

recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 701857 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 2018); Rule

2(c), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 (“The petition must . . . specify all the grounds

for relief.”).

provided those determinations did not conflict with federal law or apply

federal law in an unreasonable way.” , 529 U.S. 362,

386 (2000); , 712 F.3d 837, 846 (3d. Cir. 2013).

Consequently, “state-court judgments must be upheld unless, after the

closest examination of the state-court judgment, a federal court is firmly

convinced that a federal constitutional right has been violated.” ,

529 U.S. at 387. “A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the

relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law

erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be

[objectively] unreasonable.” at 411; , 712 F.3d at 846.

Moreover, any factual findings by the state trial and appellate courts are

presumed to be correct, and the petitioner bears the burden of rebutting

that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(e)(1); , 134 S. Ct. 10, 15 (2013); , 712 F.3d at 846.

Subject to limited exceptions, the petitioner must first exhaust all

claims in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b),(c). A state prisoner “must

give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional

issues by invoking one complete round of the state’s established appellate

review procedures.” , 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). A

claim has been exhausted when it has been “fairly presented” to the state

court, meaning that it has been addressed on the merits.

, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971). The petitioner bears the burden of

proving exhaustion of all available state remedies. ,

404 F.3d 700, 725 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing , 987 F.2d 984,

987 (3d Cir. 1993)).

“When a claim is not exhausted because it has not been ‘fairly

presented’ to the state courts, but state procedural rules bar the applicant

from seeking further relief in state courts, the exhaustion requirement is

satisfied because there is ‘an absence of available State corrective

process.’” , 172 F.3d 255, 261 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing

§ 2254(b)). In that case, the court can consider the petition only if the

petitioner shows “cause and prejudice” for the default or that a

“fundamental miscarriage of justice” will result if the court does not

consider the merits. , 501 U.S. 722, 724 (2012).

“Cause and prejudice” means that (1) “some objective factor external to

the defense impeded counsel’s effort to comply with the State’s procedural

rule,” and (2) the errors at trial worked to the defendant’s “actual and

substantial disadvantage, infecting [the] entire trial with error of

constitutional dimensions.” , 477 U.S. 478, 488, 494

(1986) (quotation and emphasis removed). A fundamental miscarriage of

justice is a constitutional error that has “probably resulted in the

conviction of one who is actually innocent.” , 513 U.S. 298,

327 (1995).

III. DISCUSSION

A. “Motion for Discovery” (Doc. 13)

As a preliminary matter, Rosario requests that the respondent be

ordered to produce “all discovery material,” trial court transcripts,

minute entries, exhibits, and “investigative reports” from his criminal

case. (Doc. 13).

A party can be authorized to conduct discovery in a habeas case for

“good cause.” Rule 6(a), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. Good cause exists

“where specific allegations before the court show reason to believe that

the petitioner may, if the facts are fully developed, be able to

demonstrate” entitlement to relief. , 520 U.S. 899, 908-

09 (1997) (quoting , 394 U.S. 286, 300 (1969)). As

described below, Rosario has not presented “specific allegations”

suggesting his entitlement to relief, nor does he explain how the items he

is requesting would support his claims. Further, the Court would be

unable to consider “discovery material” or “investigative reports” that are

not already in the state court record. , 596 U.S. 366,

(2022); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). Accordingly, this motion will be denied.

B. Ground 1

Rosario’s first ground for relief is difficult to parse, but he describes

it as follows:

The police in the interrogation we have a language

barrier. Also I was in disturb[ed] psychological

condition to relate what happened. And made improper

search without warrant . . . [illegible] . . . exculpatory

evidence that proved my [ ] victim was the first

aggressor with investigation and reversible

error and hate crime too[k] place in my case[.]

(Doc. 1 at 6). Rosario does not clearly explain how these circumstances

resulted in a decision that violated federal law or relied on an

unreasonable determination of the facts, nor were any of these potential

claims exhausted in the state courts.

Rosario may have intended to assert a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel, based on trial counsel’s failure to file a motion to

suppress the statement Rosario gave to police. Rosario pursued this claim

in his counseled PCRA petition, arguing in part that he had not fully

understood the situation because an interpreter had not been present.

The PCRA court rejected the claim, finding that warnings were

given to Rosario in both English and Spanish; that Rosario adequately

understood English; that Rosario had not presented any evidence that

his statement to police was involuntary; and that Rosario had not

explained how this allegedly involuntary statement differed in substance

from his own, voluntary testimony on the same topics at trial. No.

24-cv-01814, (Doc. 2-1 at 2-10).4 On appeal, the Superior Court deemed

the issue waived, because Rosario’s argument on appeal consisted of a

“boilerplate discussion . . . with no supporting argument or legal

authority.” 2025 WL 1952577, at *6. Rosario identifies no error in these

findings by the state courts.

Because the Superior Court deemed the issue waived for Rosario’s

failure to develop it, the claim is procedurally defaulted and a federal

habeas court cannot review it. , 594 F. App’x 756,

758-59 (3d Cir. 2014); , No. 3:21-CV-

4 We occasionally refer to the record of Rosario’s prior petition, Case

No. 24-cv-01814 (M.D. Pa., filed Oct. 15, 2024), because it contains a

fuller record of the state court proceedings.

0978, 2024 WL 3540990, at *16 (M.D. Pa. July 25, 2024). In his discussion

of this claim, Rosario asserts that his direct appeal counsel “never

talk[ed] to [him] and le[ft him] in the dark” (Doc. 1 at 6), but vague

allegations of error by his direct appeal counsel would not establish cause

and prejudice as to a claim he raised in a PCRA petition. , ,

, 794 F.3d 401, 404-06 (3d Cir. 2015). Accordingly, Rosario is not

entitled to habeas relief on this ground.

C. Ground 2

Rosario’s second claim, liberally construed, is that evidence of the

victim’s criminal record and “dishonesty or false statement[s]” should

have been introduced to “prove the . . . violent propensities of the victim

to show that the victim was in fact the aggressor.” (Doc. 1 at 7-8).

Rosario does not say whether he claims attorney error for failure to

introduce such evidence or challenges a decision of the trial court to

exclude it. Regardless, this claim is also unexhausted. It was not among

the issues presented to the Superior Court on direct or collateral appeal.

For the reasons described in relation to Ground 1, , Rosario has not

shown cause and prejudice for the Court to examine this procedurally

defaulted claim.5

D. Ground 3

In his third ground, Rosario contends that trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to introduce testimony from his “pastor and church

member[s]” that would have spoken to his “good and loving character.” In

his traverse, he lists the names and phone numbers of six individuals he

claims could have been witnesses. (Doc. 11 at 5). This claim was

deemed waived by the PCRA court for Rosario’s failure to properly assert

and develop the claim.6 On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed, adopting

the reasoning of the PCRA court:

With respect to the issue of trial counsel’s alleged

5 Although these issues were not raised in the counseled PCRA

petition, it appears that Rosario sought to make an argument about the

victim’s criminal record through a motion he filed just before the

PCRA hearing. At the hearing, Rosario’s appointed counsel acknowledged

the motion. Counsel explained that he would not be presenting evidence

on that issue because he believed any such claim was without merit,

based on the victim’s own testimony about his criminal history at trial.

No. 24-cv-01814, (Doc. 15-1 at 532-33, 810-813). This forecloses any

claim that procedural default could be excused based on any alleged

ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel. , 566 U.S. 1 (2012).

6 The record does not clearly explain why the PCRA court addressed

this claim, given that it was not raised in Rosario’s PCRA petition

or the counseled amended petition, nor explicitly discussed at the PCRA

hearing. However, this ambiguity does not change the result.

ineffectiveness in failing to present character witness

testimony, it is noted that at the June 19, 2024 [PCRA]

hearing, [PCRA] counsel initially informed the court

that he was only pursuing the suppression issue, and,

at the end of the hearing posed no objection to the

court’s having considered all other issues waived.

Further, at the aforesaid hearing, [Appellant]

presented no evidence in support of his current

character witness complaint. Consequently, the issue

has been waived. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (issue not raised in

trial court waived, and cannot be raised first time on

appeal).

As a result, it is not known who, if anyone, [Appellant]

could have presented at trial to offer such testimony, if

such person(s) would have been available and willing

to offer character testimony at trial, or if any such

alleged evidence would have qualified as character

evidence, and been admissible as such.

See 2025 WL 1952577, at *5 (record citations omitted). The state courts’

determination that the issue was waived for Rosario’s failure to develop

it in the trial court forecloses federal review of this claim.

, 495 F. App’x 200, 205 (3d Cir. 2012);

, No. 2:14-CV-1592, 2015 WL 1808640, at *2 (E.D.

Pa. Apr. 21, 2015).

We have considered whether procedural default could be excused

pursuant to , 566 U.S. 1 (2012), based on ineffectiveness

by PCRA counsel in pursuing this claim. This would require that the

underlying ineffective assistance of counsel claim had “some merit,” and

that PCRA counsel was himself ineffective under the standards described

in , 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

, 915 F.3d 928, 937 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing

, 566 U.S. at 9).

In this case, Rosario’s underlying ineffective assistance claim lacks

merit because he has not shown a “reasonable probability” that this

character evidence would have affected the outcome of the trial.

, 466 U.S. at 693-94. Rosario still has not described what,

specifically, he believes the witnesses would have said; shown that this

testimony would have been admissible; or substantiated his claims that

they were available and willing to testify. For the same reasons, Rosario

has not shown that PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue

this claim. A petitioner does not present a “substantial” ineffective

assistance claim by resting on general allegations that additional

witnesses could have testified to their “good character.”7

7 , , No. 3:20-CV-2118, 2023 WL 7170640, at

*5-6 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 31, 2023); , No. 21-CV-5667, 2023

WL 10409515, at *10 (E.D. Pa. May 30, 2023) (vague descriptions of

potential testimony about a defendant’s “reputation of peacefulness”

(continued on next page)

E. Ground 4

Rosario describes his fourth and final ground as follows:

The police depar[tment left] evidence behi[nd] like my

back broken door[. T]he suppress[ed] evidence and

impeachment for dishonesty or false statement of my

alleged victim offer of proof taking notice of plain

[error] rules. This case was entrapment and legal

protection of fundamental right[.] I am legal[ly

innocent].

(Doc. 1 at 10). None of the potential claims referenced in this description

were exhausted, and for the reasons described above, Rosario has not

established cause and prejudice to permit a federal habeas court to

address them. Although Rosario repeats his claim that his appellate

counsel “le[ft him] in the dark,” he has not explained how he was a victim

of “entrapment” or how any allegedly missing evidence would have

affected the outcome of the trial.

IV. CONCLUSION

Because none of Rosario’s asserted grounds for relief have been

presented in “one complete round of the state’s established appellate

would not excuse procedural default), report and recommendation

adopted, 2024 WL 1143485 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 2024); , No.

CIV.A. 12-623, 2013 WL 6047493, at *7 n.16 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 2013)

(“very general statements regarding [the defendant’s] character” would

not have affected the outcome of the trial).

review procedures,” , 526 U.S. at 845, his petition must be

dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. No certificate of

appealability will issue, because Rosario has not demonstrated a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, and jurists of

reason would not debate the dismissal of this case on procedural grounds.

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); , 529 U.S. 473, 478 (2000).

An appropriate order follows.

Dated: August 7, 2026

JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.

United States District Judge