The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
MARK KIRKLAND,
Plaintiff,
v. No. 4:26-cv-00015-P
TIM O’HARE, ET AL.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
Before the Court are: (1) Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration of
Memorandum Opinion and Order (ECF Nos. 21, 23); and (2) Defendants’
Supplemental Briefing Regarding Stay and Administrative Closure
(ECF No. 27). Having considered the filings and relevant law, the Court
will GRANT the Motion to Reconsider, GRANT in part Defendant
O’Hare’s Motion to Dismiss, and STAY the remaining claims for the
reasons detailed below.
BACKGROUND
On December 9, 2025, Plaintiff attended an open meeting of the
Tarrant County Commissioners Court (“Commissioners Court”), which
is the governing body for Defendant Tarrant County. ECF No. 1 at 4–6.
Plaintiff registered to speak during the public comment period
associated with agenda item F1. ECF No. 1 at 6. Defendant Tim O’Hare
(“Judge O’Hare”), County Judge of the Commissioners Court, briefly
shushed applause from the audience following the previous speaker’s
remarks on agenda item F1. TARRANTCOUNTYTX, Commissioners Court:
December 9th 2025, at 02:00:25 (YouTube, Dec. 9,
2022), https://www.youtube.com/live/QeM8cmlSbZk?si=yXznLXvxsk5k
BWzS&t=7231.
After Judge O’Hare called Plaintiff to begin, Plaintiff began by
remarking, “Lord, I live in America where people cannot clap. That is
insane to me.” TARRANTCOUNTYTX, Commissioners Court: December 9th
2025, at 02:00:32–02:00:41. Judge O’Hare stopped Plaintiff, telling him,
“Your time is done. Sit down. Go. It’s not commentary on how we run
the court. Your comments are limited to this item. Take a seat, you’re
not talking on this one.” Id. at. 02:00:41–02:00:56.
According to Plaintiff, the Rules of Decorum ban “personal attacks,
impertinent, profane, obscene, or slanderous remarks” and any “actions
of approval or disapproval from the audience, such as . . . clapping . . .
except that orderly clapping during the Proclamations, Resolutions, and
Presentations section of the agenda is permissible.” See ECF No. 1 at 6–
7 (omissions in original).
Plaintiff filed his Complaint against Tarrant County and Judge
O’Hare on January 7, 2026. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff sues Judge O’Hare in
both his personal and official capacities. ECF No. 1 at 2. The complaint,
in short, alleges that Defendants deprived him of his First Amendment
right to free speech by cutting short his speaking time at the December
9, 2025, Commissioners Court meeting. ECF No. 1 at 9–14. Plaintiff
raises 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims for alleged constitutional violations
against both Defendants and asserts Monell liability claims against
Tarrant County. ECF No. 1 at 9–14. Plaintiff also raises claims under
the Texas Constitution and mentions Texas Government Code
§ 551.007(e). ECF No. 1 at 12–14. Plaintiff prays for punitive damages
and attorney’s fees as relief. ECF No. 1 at 16. On March 6, 2026, Judge
O’Hare filed his Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 7. Tarrant County filed its
Motion to Dismiss the same day. ECF No. 8.
On July 13, 2026, this Court denied both motions. ECF No. 21.
Shortly thereafter, Defendants moved the Court to reconsider its denial
of the motions to dismiss because, among other things, the Court did not
address Judge O’Hare’s asserted defense of qualified immunity. ECF
No. 23 at 3–4. Plaintiff opposes this argument, and the others raised by
Defendants.1 ECF No. 26 at 1 (“There is nothing to reconsider.”). On
1The Court is extremely disturbed by the language and tone used in Plaintiff’s
filings, both to the Court and towards opposing counsel. Plaintiff’s counsel has already
failed to comply with Local Rule 83.10 and is dangerously close to violating his
obligations under Dondi Properties Corporation v. Commerce Savings & Loan
Association, 121 F.R.D. 284 (N.D. Tex. 1988). Should such behavior persist in new
July 17, 2026, the parties briefed the issue of whether the litigation
should continue while a closely related case involving similar facts, legal
issues, and parties awaits review by the Fifth Circuit. ECF Nos. 27, 28;
Grisham v. O’Hare, No. 26-10335 (5th Cir. filed April 14, 2026).
Defendants urge the Court to “stay and administratively close this case
pending the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s
upcoming review of a related companion case,” ECF No. 27 at 1, and
Plaintiff opposes this position by arguing that Defendants have not met
their burden, ECF No. 28 at 2. Now that both issues have been fully
briefed, the Motion to Reconsider is ripe for review and the issue of
staying the case has been fully briefed.
LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b)
Under Rule 54(b), any order which “adjudicates fewer than all the
claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties . . . may
be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all
the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities.” FED. R. CIV. P.
54(b). Rule 54(b) permits the Court to “reconsider and reverse its
decision for any reason it deems sufficient, even in the absence of new
evidence or an intervening change in or clarification of the substantive
law.” Austin v. Kroger Tex., L.P., 864 F.3d 326, 336 (5th Cir. 2017)
(quoting Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167,
185 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b)), abrogated on other
grounds, Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 n.14 (5th Cir.
1994) (en banc). The flexibility of Rule 54(b) reflects the “inherent
power” of district courts to afford relief from interlocutory orders “as
justice requires.” Id. at 337 (quoting Cobell v. Jewell, 802 F.3d 12, 25–
26 (D.C. Cir. 2015)).
B. The Court’s Authority to Stay
Like district courts’ power to afford relief under Rule 54(b), district
courts also have a similar “inherent power” to “control the disposition of
the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for
filings, the Court will sanction counsel without further notice, up to and including
forbidding him from practice in the Northern District.
counsel, and for litigants.” Kerns v. Dickson, No. 25-40349, 2026 WL
396358, at *9 (5th Cir. Feb. 12, 2026) (quoting United States v. Colomb,
419 F.3d 292, 299 (5th Cir. 2005)); Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248,
254 (1936). Incidental to this power is the power to stay proceedings.
Landis, 299 U.S. at 254. However, despite trial courts’ “wide
discretionary power to stay proceedings,” such stays cannot be
“immoderate or of an indefinite duration.” In re Ramu Corp., 903 F.2d
312, 318 (5th Cir. 1990) (quoting McKnight v. Blanchard, 667 F.2d 477,
479 (5th Cir.1982)).
While it is true that only in rare cases should a litigant be compelled
to stand aside while a litigant in another cause settles a rule of law,
“[c]onsiderations such as these” are not “limitations upon power” but
rather “counsels of moderation.” Id. Accordingly, a court is within its
discretion to grant a stay when a related case is pending before a court
of appeals with substantially similar issues. Landis, 299 U.S. at 254
(“[W]e find ourselves unable to assent to the suggestion that . . . the
parties to the two causes must be shown to be the same and the issues
identical.”). In determining whether a stay is proper, courts must
“consider the interests of the parties and potential conservation of
judicial resources.” Greco v. Nat’l Football League, 116 F. Supp. 3d 744,
761 (N.D. Tex. 2015); Landis, 299 U.S. at 254–55 (calling for trial courts
to “weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance”).
ANALYSIS
The Court will first examine the Motion to Reconsider. The Court
will then turn to the portion of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss pertaining
to Judge O’Hare’s qualified immunity. Lastly, the Court will determine
whether a stay is warranted under the circumstances.
A. The Court will reconsider Judge O’Hare’s qualified
immunity.
Because qualified immunity deals with “immunity from suit” rather
than “mere defense to liability,” it presents “threshold questions” that
must be “resolved as early in the proceedings as possible.” Wertenbroch
v. Hardeman, 178 F.4th 186, 190 (5th Cir. 2026) (quoting Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 237 (2009) and Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 279,
284 (5th Cir. 1994)).
Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Reconsider to
consider only Judge O’Hare’s qualified immunity defense to Plaintiff’s
First Amendment claim.
B. Plaintiff fails to overcome Judge O’Hare’s qualified
immunity.
Plaintiff fails to show that Judge O’Hare’s actions were objectively
unreasonable in light of clearly established law. He does not cite case
law that “squarely governs” the facts in this case or analyze the
reasonableness of O’Hare’s actions beyond conclusory assertions in his
complaint. Garcia v. Blevins, 957 F.3d 596, 600 (5th Cir. 2020).
“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials
‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
The qualified immunity inquiry involves two prongs that the Court
must answer affirmatively before an official is subject to liability: (1)
whether the facts alleged constitute a violation of a constitutional right
and (2) whether the right at issue was “clearly established” at the time
of defendant’s alleged misconduct. Id. at 232. The second prong is “better
understood as two separate inquiries: whether the allegedly violated
constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the incident;
and, if so, whether the conduct of the defendants was objectively
unreasonable in light of that then clearly established law.” Hanks v.
Rogers, 853 F.3d 738, 744 (5th Cir. 2017) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
At the pleading stage, the plaintiff carries the burden to identify facts
which, if proven, defeats the claim of immunity. Waller v. Hanlon, 922
F.3d 590, 599 (5th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). District courts have
discretion to decide which qualified immunity prong should be analyzed
first “in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.”
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.
Here, Plaintiff does not plausibly allege that Judge O’Hare’s actions
were objectively unreasonable in light of specific, clearly established
law. Thus, he cannot overcome Judge O’Hare’s qualified immunity.
First, however, the Court must analyze whether the forum is a limited
public forum.
1. The County Commissioners meeting is a limited public forum.
The standards applied in determining “whether a State has
unconstitutionally excluded a private speaker from use of a public forum
depend on the nature of the forum.” Good News Club v. Milford Cent.
Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001) (citing Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors
of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)). There are three categories of
forums: “(1) traditional and designated public forums; (2) limited public
forums; and (3) nonpublic forums.” Fairchild v. Liberty Indep. Sch. Dist.,
597 F.3d 747, 757–58 (5th Cir. 2010).
A limited public forum provides for “public expression of particular
kinds or by particular groups.” Id. at 758 (quotation omitted). Public
meetings of city councils and other public bodies are generally limited
public forums “for the limited time and topic of the meeting.” Id. at 759
(quotation omitted); see Heaney v. Roberts, 147 F. Supp. 3d 600 (E.D. La.
2015), aff’d in part, dismissed in part, 846 F.3d 795 (5th Cir. 2017) (city
council meeting); Fairchild, 597 F.3d at 759 (school board meeting).
Such meetings follow a set agenda and provide limited public comment
time connected with specific agenda items. See Fairchild, 597 F.3d at
759.
Here, the County Commissioners meeting “fits the hornbook
definition of a limited—not designated—public forum.” Id. at 759.2 The
2 Confusingly, Plaintiff seems to concede this point in his complaint, then
both concedes and disputes it in his brief. Compare ECF No. 1 at 11 (“Plaintiff
has a First Amendment right to express himself on matters of public concern
in a limited public forum . . . such as a County Commissioners Court Meeting.”)
and ECF No. 12 at 3 (“Defendant argues that the Tarrant County
Commissioners Court is a limited public forum . . . Plaintiff does not dispute
County Commissioners meeting here is much like the meetings in
Heaney and Fairchild. It followed a set agenda and included designated,
limited time for comments about specific agenda items. It is a limited
public forum because it is a limited space that allows public expression
“for the limited time and topic of the meeting.” Fairchild, 597 F.3d at
759.
2. Plaintiff does not point to clearly established law that squarely
governs the facts at hand.
Even if Plaintiff properly alleged that Judge O’Hare’s actions
violated a constitutional right, Plaintiff fails to point to clearly
established law supporting such a right.
To overcome qualified immunity, the plaintiff must show that the
alleged right was clearly established based on existing precedent that
“squarely governs the specific facts at issue.” Garcia, 957 F.3d at 600.
To be clearly established, the existing precedent must have “placed the
statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,
563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). This demanding standard protects “all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” District of
Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475
U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
The plaintiff must allege the constitutional violation “with specificity
and granularity.” Morrow v. Meachum, 917 F.3d 870, 875 (5th Cir.
2019). Generally, this means the plaintiff must identify “a case in which
an officer acting under similar circumstances was held to have violated
the [Constitution], and . . . explain[] why the case clearly proscribed the
conduct of that individual officer.” Joseph ex rel. Est. of Joseph v.
Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 345 (5th Cir. 2020). The plaintiff bears this
burden because the plaintiff “bears the burden to demonstrate the
inapplicability of the qualified immunity defense.” Biggers v. Massingill,
No. 4:23-CV-00359-P, 2026 WL 1346923, at *11 n.7 (N.D. Tex. May 14,
2026) (citing Ramirez v. Guadarrama, 3 F.4th 129, 133 (5th Cir. 2021)).
this argument”) with ECF No. 12 at 4 (“Plaintiff disputes that the forum is a
‘limited public forum’ anyway based on the rules of decorum”).
Thus, a plaintiff does not overcome qualified immunity by citing
“[b]road general propositions.” Cope v. Cogdill, 3 F.4th 198, 205 (5th Cir.
2021). This Court recently addressed this issue in Biggers v. Massingill,
another limited public forum case. No. 4:23-CV-00359-P, 2026 WL
1346923, at *10–12 (N.D. Tex. May 14, 2026). There, a county judge
stopped a speaker for alleged decorum violations during public comment
at a public meeting. Id. at *7–10. The plaintiff argued the alleged
violations were a pretext for viewpoint discrimination. Id. at *10. But
the plaintiff only cited cases supporting “general principles of free
speech and limited public forums,” which did not provide enough
“factual similarity” to “squarely govern the case at hand.” Id. at *11.
Thus, this Court held that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the clearly
established prong. Id. at *12.
Here, as in Biggers, the relevant inquiry is whether “a reasonable
presiding officer would recognize that removing a speaker for an alleged
decorum violation clearly runs afoul of the First Amendment when
invocation of the rule was mere pretext to viewpoint discrimination.” Id.
at *10. And like the plaintiff in Biggers, Plaintiff identifies no authority
of factual similarity that would squarely govern that inquiry, but merely
cites general principles of free speech.
Plaintiff cites the following cases to support the “clearly established”
prong: Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451
(1987); R.A.V. v City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1991). ECF No. 1 at 16
n.17. These cases cannot possess the required specificity to be clearly
established law because all four predate the Supreme Court’s
development of limited public forum jurisprudence in Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995), and Good
News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98 (2001). Further, none
of these cases involve public comment periods related to specific agenda
items at public meetings. Thus, Plaintiff’s cases are not “clearly
established” law because they lack the required specificity.
Further, Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations—that the Rules of
Decorum are so flagrantly unconstitutional that any person of
reasonable prudence would be bound to see their flaws—cannot carry
the day. See ECF No. 1 at 8. Thus, Plaintiff fails to state a claim that a
reasonable official would have been on notice of “clearly established” law
here. None of Plaintiff’s cited case law addresses the contours of First
Amendment rights in a limited public forum and Plaintiff fails to draw
the required analogy to Judge O’Hare’s actions.
3. Plaintiff fails to show that Judge O’Hare’s conduct was objectively
unreasonable.
Even if Plaintiff met his burden to point to “clearly established” law,
Plaintiff still fails to show that Plaintiff’s conduct was objectively
unreasonable in light of that law.
“Qualified immunity gives government officials breathing room to
make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal questions.”
Al–Kidd, 563 U.S. at 744. It “applies regardless of whether the
government official’s error is ‘a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a
mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact.’” Pearson, 555 U.S. at
231 (quoting Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 567 (2004) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting)).
Here, Plaintiff does not present facts showing that O’Hare’s conduct
was unreasonable beyond his conclusory assertions that Judge O’Hare
knew his rules or his actions were unconstitutional. See ECF No. 1 at 8.
Such conclusory assertions will not do. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to
overcome Judge O’Hare’s qualified immunity. Even assuming all facts
in his complaint are true, Plaintiff fails to show that Judge O’Hare’s
actions were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law.
He does not cite sufficiently specific case law or analyze the
reasonableness of Judge O’Hare’s actions beyond conclusory assertions
in his complaint.
In sum, Plaintiff fails to show that Judge O’Hare’s actions were
objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law governing
limited public forums. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to meet its burden to
overcome Judge O’Hare’s qualified immunity and Judge O’Hare retains
his “immunity from suit.” Wertenbroch, 178 F.4th at 190; Pearson, 555
U.S. at 237; Boyd, 31 F.3d at 284.
C. The Court will stay the remaining claims pending the parallel
litigation to conserve judicial resources.
The Court is persuaded to invoke its “inherent power” to
“control . . . its docket with economy of time and effort” for all apprised
parties by temporarily staying the matter. Kerns, 2026 WL 396358, at
*9; Landis, 299 U.S. at 254. The related case before the Fifth Circuit is
substantially similar in posture and involves the constitutionality of
precisely the same county rules of decorum. See Grisham v. O’Hare, No.
26-10335 (5th Cir. filed April 14, 2026). Recognizing its “wide
discretionary power to stay proceedings,” the Court is wary that it must
not grant a stay of an “immoderate or of an indefinite duration.” In re
Ramu Corp., 903 F.2d at 318. In “consider[ing] the interests of the
parties and potential conservation of judicial resources,” four factors
convince the Court to temporarily stay the case. Greco, 116 F. Supp. 3d
at 761; Landis, 299 U.S. at 254–55.
First, Plaintiff is not prejudiced because the evidence is cemented
electronically. Defendant argues that the “operative facts” of both cases
are “fixed, undisputed, and preserved” because the videos, transcripts,
and official minutes of the Commissioners Court meetings are safely in
the record. ECF No. 27 at 4. The Court agrees. Plaintiff makes no
suggestions to the contrary.
Second, Plaintiff is probably right that an open-ended stay would be
“immoderate” in the sense Landis condemns. ECF No. 28 at 3 (quoting
Landis, 299 U.S. at 257). Therefore, to prevent any potential prejudice
to Plaintiff and to ensure the stay is “[]moderate,” the stay will remain
in effect only until the Fifth Circuit announces its decision, at which
point the parties will have seven days to motion the Court to reopen the
matter. Such an administrative closure prevents the “unknown and
potentially lengthy duration” Plaintiff fears. ECF No. 28 at 3.
Third, unlike Plaintiff, Defendant will be prejudiced because the
costs and consequences of discovery weigh greater on him and Tarrant
County than on Plaintiff. Permitting litigation to proceed in the parallel
matters would impose duplicative costs on Defendant, draining public
funds two-fold in matters Tarrant County did not choose to be a part of.
The same cannot be said of Plaintiff. While the parallel case was
initiated by Plaintiff's counsel, who represents himself in that matter,
Plaintiff Kirkland is not a party to the matter. Defendant Judge O’Hare
is, in his official capacity. Allowing the litigation to proceed forces Judge
O’Hare and Tarrant County to bear the costs of litigation in two
proceedings, neither of which they chose to initiate.
Fourth, judicial resources would be saved by staying the matter
because it would avoid not only the duplication of efforts, but also the
complete waste of effort if the Fifth Circuit invalidates the rules of
decorum. The Fifth Circuit’s decision could shift the future of this
litigation entirely, if not eliminate it altogether.
Accordingly, the Court finds it prudent to exercise its “inherent
power” to “control the disposition of the causes on its docket with
economy of time and effort.” Kerns, 2026 WL 396358, at *9. “[T]he
interests of the parties and potential conservation of judicial resources”
persuade the Court to stay the case until the Fifth Circuit renders its
decision in the companion case. Greco, 116 F. Supp. 3d at 761; Landis,
299 U.S. at 254-55.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to
Reconsider, GRANTS in part Defendant O’Hare’s Motion to Dismiss as
to Plaintiff's First Amendment claim, and hereby STAYS the remaining
claims. The Court ORDERS the Parties to file a motion to reopen the
case within seven days of a decision from the Fifth Circuit.
Accordingly, the Court DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to
ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSE the above-captioned case.
SO ORDERED on this 6th day of August 2026.
Mark T. Pittman
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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