Hammond

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

KHALIL HAMMOND, et al., : CIVIL NO. 1:25-CV-00048

:

Plaintiffs, :

:

v. :

: (Magistrate Judge Carlson)

PENNSYLVANIA DEP’T OF :

CORRECTIONS, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction

This case is the latest in a line of recent challenges to the constitutionality of

prolonged solitary confinement of mentally ill inmates. Six individual inmates

initiated this suit, alleging they have been diagnosed with mental illnesses and that

the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and several of its officials have exposed

them to years-long solitary confinement, despite a growing consensus of legal and

medical precedent showing the substantial risk of harm of such conduct. The

complaint is framed as a putative class action case, thus in addition to asserting the

claims of the individual plaintiffs, these litigants also seek to certify this action as a

Class Action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.

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classes, and the circuitous path this case has already taken prior to being reassigned

to the undersigned on September 5, 2025, this case is still in its infancy. On this score,

the defendants have filed a series of motions to dismiss this case on the pleadings

alone, arguing that the plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted. In so moving, the defendants have cast a wide net, arguing for dismissal of

claims, classes, and relief which are simply not at issue at this early stage of the

litigation. Moreover, against the clearly defined precedent in this circuit which widely

endorses the view that constitutional claims may lie in this arena where mentally ill

inmates are subjected to prolonged solitary confinement, we find the plaintiffs have

cleared the procedural benchmarks to state a plausible claim for relief, which is all

that is required at this stage. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below, we will

deny the defendants’ motions to dismiss.

II. Factual Background

This case challenges the prolonged solitary confinement of six individuals,

Khalil Hammond, David Thompson, Antoine Walker, Muwsa Green, Tyrone

Leonard, and Malika Henderson, who are incarcerated within the Pennsylvania

Department of Corrections (DOC). Each of these individual plaintiffs alleges they

suffer from a mental health disorder and that they have been confined to a solitary

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five or more years. Because of this prolonged solitary confinement, the plaintiffs

allege their mental health has deteriorated to the point that they have attempted

suicide multiple times. Moreover, several of the defendants allege they have been

confined without any opportunity to challenge their placement.

Since the plaintiffs allege a putative class action, they have defined and

outlined several DOC policies and practices which will guide our assessment. At the

outset, since their causes of action, in part, rely upon their mental health designation,

the plaintiffs outline the DOC’s Mental Health/Intellectual Disability (MH/ID)

Roster which assigned a letter designation to every prisoner. (Doc. 29, ⁋⁋ 157-61).

According to the MH/ID, A and B Roster individuals have no need for treatment or

support from prison psychology staff. (Id., ⁋⁋ 158-59). Conversely, C and D-Roster

individuals are receiving psychological treatment; C-Roster individuals are currently

receiving treatment but are no currently diagnosed with a “serious mental illness”

(SMI) as defined by the DOC while D-Roster individuals are currently diagnosed

with an SMI, intellectual disability, or “credible functional impairment,” or were

found “guilty but mentally ill” in their criminal cases. (Id., ⁋⁋ 160-61). DOC policies

contemplate special requirements for D-Roster individuals in administrative custody

(AC) or disciplinary custody (DC), including at least 20 hours of out-of-cell time per

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units are not appropriate for individuals with severe mental illness because of the

substantial risk of harm such conditions pose for them. (Id., ⁋ 162). Moreover, the

plaintiffs allege that the DOC’s contracted psychiatric providers determine the

diagnoses and whether they are considered to be SMIs, often without proper

evaluation or explanation, causing roster statuses to be changed from D to C. (Id., ⁋

164, 166). The plaintiffs are all C-Roster individuals, who are receiving mental health

treatment but are not subject to the DOC’s special requirements for solitary

confinement, allowing them to be subjected to the most restrictive forms of solitary

confinement while also providing them fewer psychological services. (Id., ⁋ 165).

Furthermore, the plaintiffs allege that, as C Roster individuals, they are statistically

more likely to be placed in solitary confinement compared to the general population.

(Id., ⁋⁋ 167-68).

The plaintiffs also lay out the variety of solitary confinement units in the DOC

under the umbrella of Security Level 5 or SL5 housing units, including Restricted

Housing Unit (RHU), where individuals classified as being on either Disciplinary

Custody (DC) or Administrative Custody (AC) are housed, Restricted Release List

(RRL), and Intensive Management Unit (IMU). The plaintiffs allege that, as a general

practice individuals in SL5 units in the DOC are kept inside their cells for 21 to 24

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prison and with those outside the prison and in the property they can keep in their cell

and are not able to participate in confidential communications with mental health

staff. (Doc. 29, ⁋⁋ 81-90).

The plaintiffs take specific issue with the management and application of the

RRL, which they allege is a list of individuals who are subject to indefinite solitary

confinement. (Id., ⁋⁋ 104-28). On this score, the plaintiffs allege individuals on the

RRL are not provided with the reason for their placement on the RRL, their placement

and continuation on the RRL is not appealable, and, although their placement on the

RRL is subject to annual review, including a staff “vote sheet” and consideration of

a psychological evaluation, the standards and considerations used by the DOC in

conducting the annual reviews, if any, are unknown to those on the RRL and the

individuals on the RRL are not permitted to participate in the annual review process.

(Id.) They allege that final authority to remove or continue someone on the RRL rests

with Defendant Wenerowicz whose decision can only be overruled by Defendant

Harry. Moreover, individuals on the RRL are not informed of what they need to do

in order to be released from RRL and there are no known or identifiable criteria

individuals can fulfill in order to be removed from the RRL. (Id.)

Similarly, the plaintiffs highlight the IMU, a phased solitary confinement

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years to complete. (Id., ⁋⁋ 129-56). As individuals progress through the six phases,

privileges increase – for example, in phases 6 through 4, individuals are offered only

two hours of out-of-cell time per day, increasing to three hours per day in Phase 3 -

although the plaintiffs allege DOC often offers much less out-of-cell time than what

is stated in DOC policy. (Id.) Further, individuals are restrained for any out of cell

time for the first 21 months in IMU. (Id.) The plaintiffs allege individuals are

deprived of meaningful social and programmatic activities while in IMU, are

regularly restrained when offered opportunities for socialization, and that there are

no clear criteria for phase advancement and individuals can be set back a phase for

various, unspecified reasons. (Id.) According to the plaintiffs, Defendant

Wenerowicz has final approve to progress individuals to Phase 1 of the IMU. (Id.)

Overall, the plaintiffs allege the conditions in SL5 units are intolerable and

inhumane. According to the plaintiffs individuals are physically isolated in

windowless cells for 21 to 24 hours per day with a permanently illuminated

fluorescent light, making sleep difficult and disorienting their sense of time. (Id., ⁋⁋

169-82). Individuals incarcerated in solitary confinement units are not allowed

contact visitation, and visitation hours are significantly restricted making it difficult

for visitors, and they have no access to vocational, rehabilitative, or therapeutic

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plaintiffs allege that individuals in solitary confinement receive grossly inadequate

mental health treatment or none at all, with mental health staff infrequently speaking

to these individuals through the food slot or crack between the side of the cell door

for only a few seconds with no privacy, known as “drive-bys.” (Id., ⁋⁋ 197-206).

Moreover, these individuals are deprived of psychosocial rehabilitation services

which they allege are required as part of their treatment. (Id.) The plaintiffs allege

that the severely restrictive conditions in solitary confinement statistically increase

rates of self-harm, suicide attempts, and suicides and that the defendants are either

aware of the vastly disproportionate rates of self-injury, suicide attempts, and suicides

in solitary confinement units or have opted, with deliberate indifference, not to review

the data which is readily available to them.

Against this backdrop, the six individual plaintiffs in this case are each

classified as Roster C, thus they are currently to be receiving mental health treatment

but are not currently diagnosed with a “serious mental illness” (SMI) as defined by

the DOC and are thus not subject to any exceptions from the SL5 restrictions. Each

alleges that, despite their preexisting mental illness, they were subjected to prolonged

solitary confinement which exacerbated their mental illness. Specifically, Plaintiff

Khalil Hammond was diagnosed with depression, bipolar disorder, ADHD, and

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in solitary confinement for over a decade. (Doc. 29, ⁋⁋ 232-50). He is confined to his

cell for 22 or more hours every day and alleges that the extreme isolation and brutal

conditions of solitary confinement have caused his mental illness symptoms to

worsen, that he experiences trouble focusing, intrusive thoughts, memory problems,

and has attempted suicide eight times and inflicted self-harm on over 100 separate

occasions. (Id.) Hammond’s inability to complete the mandatory programming

prevents him from being eligible for parole. (Id.)

David Thompson was diagnosed with anxiety and depression at age twelve and

has been held in solitary confinement for approximately five of the six years he has

been in DOC custody. (Id., ⁋⁋ 251-84). He alleges he has been frequently placed in

solitary confinement and returned to general population without explanation and that,

as a result of his repeated placement in solitary confinement he experiences constant,

uncontrolled high-intensity anxiety and depression, and suicidal thoughts resulting in

three suicide attempts, including hanging himself with a bedsheet in December 2020.

(Id.)

Antoine Walker has been diagnosed with anxiety and has been in solitary

confinement for approximately six consecutive years on the RRL. (Id., ⁋⁋ 285-307).

He spends 22 hours each day confined in his cell and, as a result, has experienced

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difficulties, anger, auditory hallucinations, and suicidality, including attempting

suicide six times. (Id.) Walker alleges he has never been told the official reason for

his initial or continued placement on the RRL, has never had an annual RRL review

to his knowledge, and has never been given notice of what he must do to be removed

from the RRL. (Id.) Moreover, his continued placement on the RRL prevents him

from being able to be paroled despite him being past his parole minimum date. (Id.)

Muwsa Green has been diagnosed with schizophrenia, borderline intellectual

function disorder, and impulse control disorder. (Id., ⁋⁋ 308-32). He has spent more

than ten cumulative years in solitary confinement since his incarceration in 2008,

including a consecutive span of solitary confinement from 2009 to 2015. (Id.) He

was, at one time, designated Roster D and provided more out-of-cell time and access

to structured activities but, without explanation, in 2020, his status was changed to

Roster C after the removal of his schizophrenia diagnosis despite him being

diagnosed withs schizophrenia since childhood. (Id.) He has been on DC status in the

RHU since October 2023 where he is not permitted to make phone calls, have contact

visits, send emails on the tablet, or have possession of his tablet, radio, or television.

(Id.) His request for a mental health evaluation and release from solitary at a

December 2023 PRC hearing was denied. (Id.) As a result of his placement in solitary

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memory problems, auditory hallucinations, heightened anxiety, inability to

concentrate, feelings of being stigmatized, emotional lability, and depression, and has

attempted suicide eight times. (Id.)

Tyrone Leonard has been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and antisocial

personality disorder and has spent approximately five years in solitary confinement

since being incarcerated in 2016. (Doc. 29, ⁋⁋ 333-52). As a result of his repeated

placement in solitary confinement, he had experienced increased anxiety, mood

swings, difficulty with anger, and suicidal thoughts and has attempted suicide three

times while in solitary confinement, including twice in 2023. (Id.) He also alleges

that, after each period in the RHU, he is more prone to angry outbursts and difficulty

staying calm. (Id.)

Malika Henderson has been diagnosed with mood disorder, anxiety,

intermittent explosive disorder, ADHD, antisocial personality disorder, and PTSD.

(Doc. 29, ⁋⁋ 353-76). Since being incarcerated in the DOC in 2015, she has spent a

cumulative six years in solitary confinement and received more than 100

misconducts. (Id.) She has been in solitary confinement consecutively for more than

twenty-one months. (Id.) She alleges she spends 20-21 hours per day in her cell and

all 48 hours on the weekend and all of her out-of-cell time consists of placement in

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As a result of her placement on solitary confinement, Henderson’s anxiety and

suicidality have severely worsened and she has attempted suicide on more than ten

occasions while in solitary confinement. (Id.)

III. Procedural History

On these facts, in March 2024 the plaintiffs initiated this case in the Eastern

District of Pennsylvania as a single cause of action. (Doc. 1). Their initial complaint

sought relief both for themselves and on behalf of three overlapping categories of

individuals held in solitary confinement in the DOC: (1) individuals in solitary

confinement who have mental illness, (2) individuals held in solitary confinement for

prolonged periods of time, and (3) individuals on RRL and/or in the IMU. (Id., ⁋⁋

369-75). This case was then divided into three separate actions in the Eastern District

of Pennsylvania, the instant case, Hammond, was narrowed to focus solely on

individuals with mental illness in solitary confinement; a new action Henderson v.

Harry, 1:25-CV-00049, was filed focusing on prolonged solitary confinement; and

another new action, Walker v. Harry, 1:25-CV-00050, was filed focusing on the RRL

and IMU.

After being transferred to the Middle District, the case was again consolidated

for the purposes of discovery and pretrial motions. (Doc. 63). Thus, we view these

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amended complaint submitted by the plaintiffs on May 29, 2024. (Doc. 29).

In this amended complaint, the plaintiffs assert causes of action under the

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution as well as

violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act

of 1973 (RA). Specifically, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants violated the

Eighth Amendment through their deliberate indifference to the serious risk of harm

posed by their prolonged solitary confinement as individuals with mental illness.

They also allege that their initial and continued placement on the RRL without notice

of the reasons or any meaningful review violated their Procedural Due Process rights

under the Fourteenth Amendment. Further, the plaintiffs allege that they were placed

in solitary confinement both because of the manifestations of their mental

impairments and without appropriate accommodations for their mental impairments

in violation of the ADA and that they failed to reasonably accommodate their

psychiatric disabilities in DOC programs, activities, and services in violation of the

RA. They have asserted these claims against the Pennsylvania Department of

Corrections (DOC) and five institutional defendants at the DOC: Secretary of

Corrections Laurel Harry, Acting Secretary of Corrections from September 2021

until January 2023 George Little, Executive Deputy Secretary for Institutional

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for Office of Reentry for the DOC, Lucas Malishchak, and Director of Psychology

for the DOC, Brian Schneider. Broadly speaking, the plaintiffs impute liability on the

defendants by arguing that they are aware of the serious risks and harms presented

by prolonged indefinite solitary confinement of individuals with psychiatric

disabilities but approved of and oversaw policies which continued these harmful

practices and directly oversaw the placement of these individuals in solitary

confinement.

In addition to asserting these claims on their own behalf, the plaintiffs have

framed their complaint as a putative class action case, which seeks to invoke these

constitutional and statutory protections on behalf of seven distinct classes of

incarcerated individuals which they allege are directly affected by these policies.

They seek declaratory, injunctive, compensatory, punitive, and nominal relief for

these violations and seek class certification pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 23.

Against this circuitous procedural past and in anticipation of a potentially

complex future, the defendants have moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Despite this case having been consolidated

in this Court, the defendants have filed three separate motions and supporting briefs,

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turn the plaintiffs have, conveniently, filed one brief in opposition which addresses

the arguments raised in all three motions to dismiss. In our view, the overlapping

claims in these three complaints are thoroughly addressed by the amended complaint

filed in the instant action, which we treat as the operative pleading in this case. Thus,

we too address these three motions simultaneously.

After consideration of the pleadings and multitude arguments made by the

defendants, we will decline the defendants’ invitation to put the cart before the horse

in this case. Indeed, many of the arguments advanced by the defendants in their

motions would require us to look far beyond the pleadings and address issues of class

certification and DOC policy which are simply not appropriate on a motion to

dismiss. To the contrary, given existing case law the plaintiffs have articulated their

claims sufficiently to raise a plausible right to relief on their causes of action.

Accordingly, for the reasons that follow, the defendants’ motions to dismiss, (Docs.

74, 76, 78), will be denied.

IV. Discussion

A. Motion to Dismiss – Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. It is proper for

the court to dismiss a complaint in accordance with Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules

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be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). With respect to this benchmark standard for the

legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit has aptly noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal

court, stating that:

Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in

recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), continuing with our

opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir.

2008)], and culminating recently with the Supreme Court’s decision in

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, BU.S.B, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), pleading standards

have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more

heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the

possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).

In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all

reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, Inc.,

20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court “need not credit a complaint’s

bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v.

Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court

need not “assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not

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Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action, a

plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which “requires more than

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions

will not do.” Id., at 555. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief

above the speculative level.” Id.

In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has

underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon which

relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to dismiss,

a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than

conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 679. According to the

Supreme Court, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported

by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id., at 678. Rather, in conducting a

review of the adequacy of a complaint, the Supreme Court has advised trial courts

that they must:

[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than

conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal

conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be

supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual

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whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.

Id., at 679.

Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain

more than mere legal labels and conclusions; it must recite factual allegations

sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere

speculation. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated:

[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state

a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the

factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District

Court must accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but

may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then

determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to

show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” In other words,

a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief.

A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts.

Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.

As the court of appeals has observed:

The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the “plausibility” standard for

overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The

plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege “enough facts to

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard

when the factual pleadings “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,

129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955).

This standard requires showing “more than a sheer possibility that a

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A complaint which pleads facts

“merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, [ ] “stops short of the

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Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied,

132 S. Ct. 1861 (2012).

In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-

step analysis:

First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead

to state a claim.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should

identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions,

are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 1950. Finally, “where

there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their

veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an

entitlement for relief.”

Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal,

129 S. Ct. at 1950).

In considering a motion to dismiss, the court generally relies on the complaint,

attached exhibits, and matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263,

268 (3d Cir. 2007). The court may also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s]

that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims

are based on the [attached] documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White

Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover, “documents whose

contents are alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but

which are not physically attached to the pleading, may be considered.” Pryor v. Nat’l

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Lines, Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that “[a]lthough a

district court may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings, a document

integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be considered without

converting the motion to dismiss in one for summary judgment”). However, the court

may not rely on other parts of the record in determining a motion to dismiss, or when

determining whether a proposed amended complaint is futile because it fails to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien &

Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).

B. The Motions to Dismiss Will Be Denied.

From the outside, this case appears complex, involving various classes, claims,

and iterations of a much simpler and straightforward proposition: the claim that the

prolonged solitary confinement of mentally ill inmates is unconstitutional. The

defendants in this case have attempted to utilize this case’s circuitous path in arguing

for dismissal, filing three separate motions to dismiss what is now a single

consolidated complaint, arguing that various purported classes should be dismissed

before they are even certified, and presenting a host of largely inapplicable procedural

arguments. Moreover, the defendants argue for dismissal on the parsed-out elements

of the plaintiffs’ claims when our view of this case at this stage, without the benefit

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assertion that these mentally ill inmates have spent five or more years in solitary

confinement in violation of their constitutional rights and rights under the ADA and

RA. On this straightforward assertion, the plaintiffs have met their threshold burden

of stating a colorable claim for each of the alleged causes of actions.

1. The Constitutional Confines of Solitary Confinement

In this case, it is not only the substance of these constitutional claims which

require a robust understanding of the current landscape of constitutional precedent as

it relates to solitary confinement but also the issue of whether these institutional

defendants were deliberately indifferent to a known risk and ignored well-settled law

with regard to the potentially constitutionally violative nature of the actions they are

alleged to have engaged in in confining the plaintiffs to SL5 status for prolonged

periods. For this reason, we find it prudent to first discuss the current precedent to

which we are bound on this issue.

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that,

“[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and

unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. This constitutional

protection against cruel and unusual punishment has long been extended by the courts

to claims like those made here, challenging an inmate's conditions of confinement.

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challenge to conditions of confinement, we must determine if prison officials acted

with ‘deliberate indifference’ to the inmate's health. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

825, 837 (1994). In this setting, the Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments

inconsistent with “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing

society.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). Conditions of prison

confinement violate the Eighth Amendment when they “deprive inmates of the

minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,

347 (1981).

Over the past four decades, the evolving standards of decency which mark the

progress of our maturing society have led to a more informed view regarding the

harms inflicted upon inmates by prolonged solitary confinement, particularly when

prison officials are dealing with inmates who they know suffer from mental illness.

Initially, in 1988, the Court of Appeals suggested that extended solitary confinement

of death row inmates, standing alone, did not violate the Eighth Amendment. Peterkin

v. Jeffes, 855 F.2d 1021, 1028-29 (3d Cir. 1988). This holding in Peterkin, however,

has not withstood the test of time. Rather, the courts have come to a more mature and

informed understanding of the harms caused by prolonged solitary confinement,

particularly as it relates to mentally ill inmates.

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Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209 (3d Cir. 2017). In Palakovic, the appellate court

was presented with an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim lodged

by the parents of a deceased prisoner, who had suffered from mental illness and had

committed suicide while held in solitary confinement for protracted periods of time.

Id. at 224. Thus, the allegations in Palakovic closely parallel those made here;

namely, an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim premised upon the

prolonged solitary confinement of a mentally ill inmate.

The Court of Appeals held that these allegations stated an Eighth Amendment

claim and in doing so:

[A]cknowledge[d] the robust body of legal and scientific authority

recognizing the devastating mental health consequences caused by

long-term isolation in solitary confinement. In our recent decision,

Williams v. Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections,

848 F.3d 549 (3d Cir. 2017), we observed a growing consensus—with

roots going back a century—that conditions like those to which [the

mentally ill inmate] repeatedly was subjected can cause severe and

traumatic psychological damage, including anxiety, panic, paranoia,

depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, psychosis, and even a

disintegration of the basic sense of self identity. Id. at 566–67. And the

damage does not stop at mental harm: “Physical harm can also result.

Studies have documented high rates of suicide and self-mutilation

amongst inmates who have been subjected to solitary confinement.

These behaviors are believed to be maladaptive mechanisms for dealing

with the psychological suffering that comes from isolation.” Id. at 567–

68 (citations omitted).

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concluded that, “[c]onsidering these factual allegations in light of the increasingly

obvious reality that extended stays in solitary confinement can cause serious damage

to mental health, we view these allegations as more than sufficient to state a plausible

claim that [the mentally ill inmate] experienced inhumane conditions of confinement

to which the prison officials . . . were deliberately indifferent.” Id. at 226. Thus, by

2017, the Third Circuit had clearly found that an Eighth Amendment conditions of

confinement claim may lie when a mentally ill inmate is held in solitary confinement

for prolonged periods of time.

The Third Circuit reaffirmed and extended this principle to solitary

confinement conditions of confinement claims by state death row inmates in Porter

v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 974 F.3d 431, 441 (3d Cir. 2020). Finding that such

extended solitary confinement rose to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation,

the Court of Appeals emphasized that:

It is well established in both case law and scientific and medical

research that prolonged solitary confinement poses a substantial risk of

serious psychological and physical harm:

A comprehensive meta-analysis of the existing literature

on solitary confinement within and beyond the criminal

justice setting found that “[t]he empirical record compels

an unmistakable conclusion: this experience is

psychologically painful, can be traumatic and harmful, and

puts many of those who have been subjected to it at risk of

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examination of a representative sample of sensory

deprivation studies, the researchers found that virtually

everyone exposed to such conditions is affected in some

way. They further explained that “[t]here is not a single

study of solitary confinement wherein non-voluntary

confinement that lasted for longer than 10 days failed to

result in negative psychological effects.” And as another

researcher elaborated, “all [individuals subjected to

solitary confinement] will ... experience a degree of

stupor, difficulties with thinking and concentration,

obsessional thinking, agitation, irritability, and difficulty

tolerating external stimuli.”

Anxiety and panic are common side effects. Depression,

post-traumatic stress disorder, psychosis, hallucinations,

paranoia, claustrophobia, and suicidal ideation are also

frequent results. Additional studies included in the

aforementioned meta-analysis further “underscored the

importance of social contact for the creation and

maintenance of ‘self.’ ” In other words, in the absence of

interaction with others, an individual's very identity is at

risk of disintegration.

...

As if psychological damage was not enough, the impact of

the deprivation does not always stop there. Physical harm

can also result. Studies have documented high rates of

suicide and self-mutilation amongst inmates who have

been subjected to solitary confinement. These behaviors

are believed to be maladaptive mechanisms for dealing

with the psychological suffering that comes from

isolation. In addition, the lack of opportunity for free

movement is associated with more general physical

deterioration. The constellations of symptoms include

dangerous weight loss, hypertension, and heart

abnormalities, as well as the aggravation of pre-existing

medical problems.

24

original); see also Brief of Amici Curiae Professors and Practitioners of

Psychiatry, Psychology, and Medicine at 1 (“[S]olitary confinement

causes substantial harm to prisoners’ mental and physical health. For

prisoners subject to extreme lengths of solitary confinement, such as

Appellant Porter here, such harm is inevitable.”).

We have repeatedly recognized the severe effects of prolonged solitary

confinement, as have our sister circuits and Justices of the Supreme

Court. See Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 144 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting

that a special assistant to the Secretary of the Pennsylvania DOC would

be concerned about the psychological damage to an inmate after only

90 days of solitary confinement); Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209,

225 (3d Cir. 2017) (acknowledging the “robust body of legal and

scientific authority recognizing the devastating mental health

consequences caused by long-term isolation in solitary confinement”);

Porter v. Clarke, 923 F.3d 348, 355–56 (4th Cir. 2019) (holding that

conditions on Virginia's death row violated the Eighth Amendment and

noting that “[i]n recent years, advances in our understanding of

psychology and new empirical methods have allowed researchers to

characterize and quantify the nature and severity of the adverse

psychological effects attributable to prolonged placement of inmates in

isolated conditions”); Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. 257, 135 S. Ct. 2187,

2210, 192 L.Ed.2d 323 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[R]esearch

still confirms what this Court suggested over a century ago: Years on

end of near-total isolation exact a terrible price.”); Glossip v. Gross,

576 U.S. 863, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2765, 192 L.Ed.2d 761 (2015) (Breyer,

J., dissenting) (reviewing literature and stating that “it is well

documented that such prolonged solitary confinement produces

numerous deleterious harms”).

Porter at 441–43.

This recognition by the Third Circuit that prolonged solitary confinement

causes a substantial risk of harm that can rise to a constitutional violation was

reaffirmed most recently in Williams v. Sec’y Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., 117 F.4th

25

Ed. 2d 8 (2025). In Williams, the court of appeals vacated a district court’s grant of

summary judgment on both the Eighth Amendment and ADA claims. In addition to

reaffirming the view that the prolonged use of solitary confinement on mentally ill

individuals can violate the Eighth Amendment and the ADA, the court of appeals in

Williams also concluded that individuals with a known history of serious mental

illness have a clearly established right not to be subjected to prolonged solitary

confinement without penological justification. As the Third Circuit explained:

It is well established that prison officials may not act with “deliberate

indifference” to a person's health or safety, and that we may infer the

existence of this subjective state of mind from the fact that the risk of

harm at issue is obvious, though ignored. Further, this Court has long

held that in assessing the conditions of segregated housing units, the

“touchstone is the health of ... inmate[s],” including their mental health.

Undoubtedly, holding a prisoner with a known preexisting serious

mental illness in solitary confinement for a protracted period without

penological justification would result in “unnecessary and wanton

infliction of pain.” This violation is so obvious that the Supreme Court

and Third Circuit cases gave respondents fair notice that this treatment

of Williams was unlawful.

Our precedents leave no room for doubt that individuals with a known

history of serious mental illness have a clearly established right not to

be subjected to prolonged solitary confinement without penological

justification, regardless of their sentence. In Young, one of the many

cases the DOJ report relied upon, we held that the district court had

erred by granting summary judgment to the defendants on Young's

Eighth Amendment claims because Young had raised a material dispute

as to the conditions of his solitary confinement. In so doing, we clarified

that when evaluating Eighth Amendment allegations concerning

26

Further, we explained that “[t]he duration and conditions of segregated

confinement cannot be ignored in deciding whether such confinement

meets constitutional standards.” Highly relevant to this analysis is that

prisons may not punish in a way that “threatens the physical and mental

health of prisoners.” Indeed, after recognizing that segregated detention

cannot be “foul, inhuman or totally without penological justification,”

we explained that Young's preexisting physical illness made his solitary

confinement even more inhumane, just as Williams' preexisting mental

illness did here.

Williams v. Sec'y Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 117 F.4th 503, 517–18 (3d Cir. 2024),

cert. denied sub nom. Wetzel v. Williams, 146 S. Ct. 91, 223 L. Ed. 2d 8 (2025). The

court of appeals concluded that the Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of

Corrections was not entitled to qualified immunity because prior Supreme Court and

Third Circuit precedent, as well as a comprehensive 2014 DOJ report warning the

Secretary that the DOC’s practices of knowingly holding seriously mentally ill

prisoners in solitary confinement for extended periods of time was cruel and unusual,

made this violation so obvious that prison officials had fair warning that the conduct

was unconstitutional. Id.

2. The Plaintiffs Have Stated An Eighth Amendment Claim.

Against this constitutional backdrop in which the Third Circuit court of appeals

has concluded it is clearly established that mentally ill prisoners have a right to be

free from prolonged solitary confinement, the plaintiffs argue that the defendants in

this case have violated their constitutional rights under the Eighth Amendment to the

27

placing and maintaining them in solitary confinement for prolonged periods despite

their mental illness.

Judged against these legal benchmarks, the motion to dismiss should be

denied.1 The defendants first argue that, on its face, the plaintiffs’ Eight Amendment

claims fail because “[i]t is simply not facially unconstitutional to house an inmate in

the RHU for three years, cumulative or consecutive,” where they are not alleging

1 We only briefly address the defendants’ assertion that the doctrine of res judicata

is an absolute legal bar to the plaintiffs’ pursuit of their constitutional claims.

According to the defendants, identical claims to those raised here were litigated and

settled in a 2013 case, Disability Rights Network of Pennsylvania v. John Wetzel, et

al., 13-CV-0635 (M.D. Pa., March 11, 2013). The res judicata doctrine precludes

relitigation of certain issues and, “prevents parties from relitigating an issue that has

already been actually litigated,” but requires the satisfaction of certain elements: “(1)

the issue sought to be precluded [is] the same as that involved in the prior action; (2)

that issue [was] actually litigated; (3) it [was] determined by a final and valid

judgment; and (4) the determination [was] essential to the prior judgment.”

McFadden v. United States, No. 3:14-CV-1166, 2014 WL 6633251, at *5 (M.D. Pa.

Nov. 21, 2014) (citing Peloro v. United States, 488 F.3d 163, 174-5 (3d Cir. 2007)).

While it surely would be convenient for the defendants if no party were ever able to

challenge the conditions of their solitary confinement following the settlement and

reform of the DOC’s mental health system in 2013, we are simply not willing to state

as a matter of law that the reforms addressed all of the concerns identified by the

plaintiffs. Quite the contrary, viewing the complaint in the light most favorable to the

plaintiffs it appears many of the problems with these prison policies persist. Indeed,

resolution of this case under res judicata is particularly inappropriate on the pleadings

alone, since there are many issues of fact that have yet to be developed. Accordingly,

we will decline the defendants’ invitation to dismiss this case under the doctrine of

res judicata.

28

reasonable safety. They also argue that the plaintiffs’ claims fail as applied because

they have not alleged a denial of life’s basic necessities since “conditions in

restrictive housing in Pennsylvania prisons do not, in and of themselves, violate the

Eighth Amendment,” lack of social contact or meaningful out of cell time has not

been recognized as a human need, and that their allegations that they were denied

mental healthcare amount to a mere disagreement with their treatment.2 (Doc. 79, at

17) (quoting Bacon v. Luzerne Cnty., No. 3:23-CV-1699, 2024 WL 1837217 (M.D.

Pa. Apr. 26, 2024). Thus, the defendants attack the first prong of the Eighth

Amendment analysis, arguing that solitary confinement alone simply does not pose a

substantial risk of harm to inmates.

2 The defendants’ argument that the plaintiffs have failed to allege denial of mental

healthcare fails where what the plaintiffs allege clearly amounts to a denial of mental

healthcare – including that inmates in solitary confinement are not able to participate

in confidential communications with mental health staff, (Doc. 29, ⁋ 90), and the

infrequent “drive by” visits by mental health staff occur with staff members standing

outside the cell and speaking with incarcerated individuals through the foot slot or

the crack between the side of the cell door and frame for a few seconds. (Id., ⁋⁋ 197-

206). Clearly, this allegation is more than a disagreement with the mental health

services but amounts to a deprivation of such services altogether. With our review

cabined and confined by the well-pleaded allegations set forth in the complaint, these

averments suffice to state a claim. The question of what the evidence may ultimately

show must await another day.

29

in this circuit concluding that “[i]t is well established in both case law and scientific

and medical research that prolonged solitary confinement poses a substantial risk of

serious psychological and physical harm.” Porter at 441–43. At the outset, the fact

that this court has found that the conditions in solitary confinement in Pennsylvania

prisons alone do not violate the Eighth Amendment is inapposite where the plaintiffs

allege a much more precise violation which has been recognized by the Third Circuit

– that the prolonged solitary confinement of mentally ill individuals can be

considered cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Indeed, the

deep and mature understanding of the potentially devastating psychological and

physical effects of extended solitary confinement has been repeatedly voiced by the

Court of Appeals since 2017.3 Thus, “it is well-established in our Circuit that . . .

3 Moreover, at this juncture since each of the plaintiffs has alleged they have been

diagnosed with a mental illness and have been subjected to years-long solitary

confinement, it is not necessary to address the defendants’ argument that the

prolonged solitary confinement of inmates without mental illness would necessarily

fail under the Eighth Amendment. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that cases have

recognized an Eighth Amendment claim in the context of prolonged solitary

confinement of individuals with mental health issues because this prolonged solitary

confinement exacerbates their mental health issues. It seems only a small step to say

that subjecting someone without mental health issues to prolonged solitary

confinement may complicate their mental health as well. Indeed, these two claims

involve the same core premise, recognized by a body of cases in the Third Circuit

acknowledging that years-long solitary confinement cause one’s mental state to

deteriorate. The only difference is the mental starting point of the person subjected to

30

Amendment test and may give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim, particularly

where . . . Defendants have failed to provide any meaningful penological

justification.” Id. at 451. See also Williams v. Sec'y Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 117

F.4th 503, 517–18 (3d Cir. 2024) (“Undoubtedly, holding a prisoner with a known

preexisting serious mental illness in solitary confinement for a protracted period

without penological justification would result in “unnecessary and wanton infliction

of pain.”). Here, the plaintiffs allege they have known preexisting serious mental

illness and have been housed in solitary confinement for five or more years.

Moreover, they allege there is no penological justification for their continued and

prolonged confinement, and, to the extent that the defendants could provide some

penological justification for the extended confinement of these individuals, that

determination is inappropriate at this stage which relies upon the pleadings alone and

resolves all questions in favor of the plaintiffs.

Moreover, the Third Circuit’s decision in Williams reaffirms the proposition

that prison officials are on notice that the type of conduct alleged by the plaintiffs

violates the Eighth Amendment. Indeed, the court of appeals stated that “[t]his

violation is so obvious that the Supreme Court and Third Circuit cases gave

the prolonged solitary confinement.

31

503 at 517–18. Here, the plaintiffs impute liability on the defendants by arguing that

these are aware of the serious risks and harms presented by prolonged indefinite

solitary confinement of individuals with psychiatric disabilities. Specifically, they

cite statements from the DOC’s own policies on Access to Mental Health Care which

recognize, “[t]he potential for suicide is greater if the individual is subjected to

pressures such as, but not limited to: . . . placement in RHU/SMU [and] any

movement to and from Level 5 Housing Unit[.]” (Doc. 1, ⁋ 55) (citing DOC Policy

13.8.1, Access to Mental Health Care, § 2(L)(1)(d), available at

https://www.cor.pa.gov/About%20Us/Documents/DOC%20Policies/13.08.01%20

Access%20to %20Mental%20Health%20Care.pdf.). They also cite the same 2014

Department of Justice findings letter cited in Williams, which was sent to then-

Secretary of the DOC and the superintendent of each DOC prison, including

Defendants Harry and Wenerowicz, stating, ““[t]he manner in which [the DOC]

subjects prisoners with [serious mental illness] to prolonged periods of solitary

confinement involves conditions that are often unjustifiably harsh and in which these

prisoners routinely have difficulty obtaining adequate mental health care” and

“results in serious harm.” (Doc. 1, ⁋ 58), and argue that all of the defendants are

aware of the DOJ’s findings letter. (Id., ⁋ 60). Moreover, the plaintiffs highlight a

32

solitary confinement can cause severe psychological damage, indicating that prison

officials should be aware that their policies are constitutionally violative. See e.g.

Porter v. Clarke, 923 F.3d 348, 361 (4th Cir. 2019), as amended (May 6, 2019)

(“Additionally, the extensive scholarly literature describing and quantifying the

adverse mental health effects of prolonged solitary confinement that has emerged in

recent years provides circumstantial evidence that the risk of such harm ‘was so

obvious that it had to have been known.’ As the district court correctly pointed out,

‘[g]iven [State D]efendants’ status as corrections professionals, it would defy logic

to suggest that they were unaware of the potential harm that the lack of human

interaction on death row could cause’”) (internal citations omitted).

Thus, the plaintiffs cite to the same caselaw and reports cited by the Williams

court in concluding it was obvious that “[o]ur precedents leave no room for doubt

that individuals with a known history of serious mental illness have a clearly

established right not to be subjected to prolonged solitary confinement without

penological justification, regardless of their sentence.” 117 F.4th 503 at 518. With

the allegations framed in this way, it is clear that the plaintiffs have sufficiently

alleged that the defendants knew of and were indifferent to the serious risks to their

health imposed by their prolonged solitary confinement.

33

bolsters the plaintiffs’ allegations that the supervisory defendants in this case were

personally involved in violating their rights. On this score, On this score,

To state a claim under section 1983, “a plaintiff must plead that each

Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual

actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. That is,

“a plaintiff must demonstrate a defendant's ‘personal involvement in

the alleged wrongs.’ ” Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at 222 (quoting Rode,

845 at 1207). “A plaintiff makes sufficient allegations of a defendant's

personal involvement by describing the defendant's participation in or

actual knowledge of and acquiescence in the wrongful conduct.” Id.

“Although a court can infer that a defendant had contemporaneous

knowledge of wrongful conduct from the circumstances surrounding a

case, the knowledge must be actual, not constructive.” Id.

Abu-Jamal v. Kerestes, No. 3:15-CV-967, 2018 WL 2166052, at *20–21 (M.D. Pa.

May 10, 2018), aff'd in part, appeal dismissed in part, 779 F. App'x 893 (3d Cir.

2019). The allegations in the complaint sufficiently state the personal involvement of

the defendants since they identify the defendants not only as the individuals who had

the power to place the plaintiffs in solitary confinement and oversee their prolonged

confinement but also as the individuals responsible for overseeing and approving the

solitary confinement policies and practices which they challenge, despite their

knowledge that these policies were harmful.4 See Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209,

4 This is equally true for the psychological supervisory defendants named by the

plaintiffs, Defendants Malishchak and Schneider. Indeed, the defendants’ argument

that the claims against these defendants are not based upon the same transaction or

34

supervisory defendants motion to dismiss where the plaintiffs had adequately pleaded

the personal involvement of the institutional defendants in the development and/or

enforcement of the challenged prison policy).

3. The Plaintiffs Have Also Stated a Claim For Violations of Procedural

Due Process.

In addition to alleging that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to a

serious risk to their mental health by placing them in solitary confinement for

prolonged periods, they also allege that they were denied due process under the

Fourteenth Amendment because they have not been provided the reasons for their

confinement or a meaningful opportunity to challenge their prolonged placement in

solitary confinement. For their part, the defendants argue that DC-ADM 802 provides

a constitutionally sufficient process regarding inmates’ placement and continuation

on the RRL.5

occurrence because the plaintiffs challenge the mental healthcare they were provided

while in the RHU misses the mark. The allegations against these defendants are based

upon their supervisory role in overseeing the treatment of the mental health patients

in the DOC as well as their hand in developing and applying the policies and

accommodations with regard to these inmates. At this juncture, this is sufficient to

state a claim against them.

5 The plaintiffs acknowledge they do not assert a liberty interest in qualifying for

parole but rather argue the disqualification from parole eligibility of inmates in

solitary confinement is one factor which contributes to the atypical hardship which

triggers due process. It is true that ineligibility for parole has been acknowledged by

35

determine whether the nature of the interest is one within the contemplation of the

‘liberty or property’ language of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Shoats v. Horn, 213

F.3d 140, 143 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972)). Once

we determine that a property or liberty interest asserted is protected by the Due

Process Clause, the question then becomes what process is due to protect

it. Id. (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).

When considering due process claims arising out of an inmate's RRL

designation, it is well settled that:

Procedural due process rights are [only] triggered by deprivation of a

legally cognizable liberty interest. For a prisoner, such a deprivation

occurs when the prison “imposes atypical and significant hardship on

the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin

v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418

(1995). In determining whether a protected liberty interest exists, the

court must consider: (1) the duration of the disciplinary confinement;

and (2) whether the conditions of confinement were significantly more

restrictive than those imposed upon other inmates

in solitary confinement. See id. at 468, 115 S.Ct. 2293; Shoats v. Horn,

213 F.3d 140, 144 (3d Cir.2000).

Huertas v. Sec'y Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 533 F. App'x 64, 66 (3d Cir. 2013).

Applying these benchmarks, it has been held that RRL placement or detention in

the Supreme Court as one component which, considered in conjunction with the

ordinary hardships experienced by inmates in solitary confinement, triggers due

process. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 223–24 (2005).

36

of atypical and significant hardships on inmates which trigger due process

protections. Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 654 (3d Cir. 2002) (seven months in

disciplinary confinement did not implicate a liberty interest); Torres v. Fauver, 292

F.3d 141, 151–52 (3d Cir. 2002) (disciplinary detention for fifteen days and

administrative segregation for 120 days did not implicate a protected liberty interest).

Although there is no firm standard stating exactly when confinement in

administrative custody becomes the type of atypical and significant hardship that

triggers a liberty interest, prolonged detention in RRL status implicates greater due

process concerns. Moreover, the Third Circuit has acknowledged that “conditions of

extreme social isolation,” like those alleged by the plaintiffs here, trigger due process

scrutiny. Williams v. Sec'y Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 848 F.3d 549, 560 (3d Cir.

2017). Specifically, the Third Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s due process

analysis in Wilkinson, in which the Court concluded that the type of restrictive

limitations imposed in solitary confinement, including limitations on almost all

human contact, the light being on 24 hours a day, limited exercise in a small indoor

room, when coupled with indefinite placement and the fact that placement

disqualifies an otherwise eligible inmate for parole consideration, imposes an atypical

37

545 U.S. at 223–24.

Here, the plaintiffs’ prolonged solitary confinement of five or more years is

clearly an atypical length of time “in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life,”

and subjects the plaintiffs to “conditions that differ significantly from ‘routine’ prison

conditions in Pennsylvania state institutions.” Shoats at 144. Moreover, the

conditions described by the plaintiffs largely mirror the conditions the Supreme Court

found to be atypical and significant in Wilkinson, including the indefinite nature of

their confinement as well as the fact that placement disqualifies these otherwise

eligible inmates for parole consideration. Against these benchmarks, the plaintiffs

clearly have stated a protected liberty interest requiring due process.

Having found that due process rights have been triggered, we next determine

whether the plaintiffs were afforded the minimum process due to them under the

constitution. As to what type of process is due in such circumstances, when

considering due process claims based upon allegations of prolonged confinement in

RRL status, the Third Circuit has held that “an ‘informal, nonadversary review’ at

which the prisoner has the opportunity to state his views, satisfies the requirements

of due process.” Shoats, 213 F.3d at 144 (8 years RRL detention). In this setting “the

periodic reviews conducted by the PRC . . . comport with the minimum constitutional

38

63 (3d Cir. 2014).

On this score, the defendants simply argue that DC-ADM 802, the process for

inmates confined to administrative custody, meets the due process standard

contemplated in Shoats. But, in our view, the constitutional sufficiency of the process

provided in DC-ADM 802 is not at issue at this juncture since the plaintiffs have

alleged that this policy is not being followed. Instead, setting aside the process laid

out in DC-ADM 802, which we do not need to summarize here, the plaintiffs allege

they have been denied the “essential requirements of due process . . . notice and an

opportunity to respond.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546

(1985). Indeed, according to the plaintiffs they are not provided with the reasons for

their initial or continued placement on the RRL or the opportunity to appeal the

decision and individuals on the RRL are denied participation in any meaningful way

in the process which could release them from solitary confinement. Specifically, they

allege that individuals such as themselves on the RRL are not provided with the

reason for their placement on the RRL, their placement and continuation on the RRL

is not appealable, and, although their placement on the RRL is subject to annual

review, including a staff “vote sheet” and consideration of a psychological

evaluation, the standards and considerations used by the DOC in conducting the

39

RRL are not permitted to participate in the annual review process. Moreover,

individuals on the RRL are not informed of what they need to do in order to be

released from RRL and there are no known or identifiable criteria individuals can

fulfill in order to be removed from the RRL. These allegations demonstrate that these

individuals have no meaningful notice of the reasons for their prolonged solitary

confinement nor any opportunity to respond, despite being subjected to atypical and

significant hardship. Accordingly, based solely upon the pleadings the plaintiffs have

sufficiently articulated a due process claim.

C. The Plaintiffs Have Stated a Claim Under the Americans With

Disabilities Act.

In addition to their claims of a constitutional dimension, the plaintiffs allege

that their prolonged solitary confinement violated the ADA and RA6 both because

they were not provided accommodations for their mental illness, while the disparate

treatment of D Roster individuals demonstrates that such accommodations are

6 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides broad prohibitions against

discrimination on the basis of disability and applies only to programs and activities

receiving federal financial assistance. Title II of the ADA extends these protections

to all state and local government programs and activities. The substantive provisions

of the statutes are similar and are to be interpreted consistently. Yeskey v. Com. Of

Pa. Dept. of Corrections, 118 F.3d 168, 170 (3d. Cir. 1997). Thus, our discussion of

the plaintiffs’ ADA claims also encompasses their Rehabilitation Act claims.

40

being placed in solitary confinement for the symptoms of these illnesses.

Title II of the ADA provides that “[n]o qualified individual with a disability

shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the

benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to

discrimination by such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Public entities under the ADA can

include state correctional institutions, see Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr. V. Yeskey,

524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998); Chisolm v. McManimon, 275 F.3d 315, 625 (3d Cir. 2001),

but not persons in their individual or official capacities. See Goodman v. Miceli, No.

CV 20-1259, 2021 WL 2117933, at *16 (W.D. Pa. May 3, 2021), report and

recommendation adopted, No. 2:20-CV-01259, 2021 WL 2115328 (W.D. Pa. May

25, 2021) (recognizing Third Circuit’s approval of other circuits holdings that

individuals are not liable under Titles I and II of the ADA but individuals may sue

for prospective injunctive relief against state officials acting in their official

capacities).

To state a claim for a violation of the ADA, a plaintiff must allege that they

were precluded from receiving a service because of an alleged disability. Id. at 16

(“[The plaintiff] cannot maintain an ADA claim without alleging any facts

41

disabilities”). Specifically:

To establish a violation of Title II of the ADA, an inmate must allege

that: (1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) he was either

excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of some public

entity's services, programs, or activities; and (3) such exclusion, denial

of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of his disability. See 42

U.S.C. § 12132.

Brown v. Deparlos, 492 F. App'x 211, 215 (3d Cir. 2012).

Further, in the prison context, “a prison's refusal to accommodate inmates’

disabilities in such fundamentals as mobility, hygiene, medical care, and virtually all

other prison programs represents a denial of the benefits of a prison's services,

programs, or activities.” Happel v. Bishop, No. 1:23-CV-13-SPB-RAL, 2024 WL

1508561, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 22, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, No.

CV 23-13, 2024 WL 1003902 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 8, 2024) (quoting Furgess v.

Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corrections, 933 F.3d 285, 290 (3d Cir. 2019). In Williams,

the Third Circuit recognized that an ADA claim may lie “where—viewing the facts

in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff]—the Secretary knew Williams had a

preexisting serious mental illness, was aware of the risk of prisoner safety, and failed

to act despite this knowledge.” Williams v. Sec'y Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 117

F.4th 503, 527 (3d Cir. 2024), cert. denied sub nom. Wetzel v. Williams, 146 S. Ct.

91, 223 L. Ed. 2d 8 (2025). The Third Circuit recognized that a plaintiff states a claim

42

‘take certain pro-active measures to avoid the discrimination proscribed by Title II

[of the ADA].’” Id. (quoting Chisolm v. McManimon, 275 F.3d 315, 325 (3d Cir.

2001)). Thus, the court of appeals recognized that the DOC had an obligation to make

reasonable modifications to their solitary confinement policies where modifications

were necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of his mental disability. On this

score, the Third Circuit stated:

Assuming that Williams had a known mental illness, the DOC had an

obligation to modify its practices to ameliorate the harms of prolonged

solitary confinement on Williams. The only way the DOC could avoid

this responsibility is by “demonstrat[ing] that making the modifications

would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or

activity.” The record is devoid of evidence that providing Williams with

accommodations would have fundamentally altered the DOC's

services, programs, or activities.

Williams v. Sec'y Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 117 F.4th 503, 529 (3d Cir. 2024),

cert. denied sub nom. Wetzel v. Williams, 146 S. Ct. 91, 223 L. Ed. 2d 8 (2025).

Here, the plaintiffs are all Roster C individuals with known mental illness who

were receiving treatment by the DOC. Moreover, they allege that the DOC failed to

provide accommodations which would account for, and not exacerbate, their mental

illness. This clearly states a claim under the interpretation of the ADA in Williams.

The defendants argue that the plaintiffs are not entitled to request certain levels of

confinement based upon their medical conditions and that the medical determinations

43

not arguing their medical impairments entitle them to a different level of confinement

but rather that the DOC failed to “modify its practices to ameliorate the harms of

prolonged solitary confinement,” on them as required under the ADA. This is

precisely the type of claim contemplated in Williams as cognizable under the ADA.

Moreover, the defendants’ argument that the plaintiffs were placed in solitary

confinement for disciplinary reasons, not by reason of their disability, does not

absolve the DOC of making reasonable accommodations to account for the plaintiffs’

mental illness in solitary confinement. Quite the contrary, as the plaintiffs point out,

when considering whether an institution has failed to make reasonable

accommodations under the ADA:

[T]he reason why [the plaintiffs were] housed in the RHU is irrelevant.

A prisoner's misconduct does not strip him of his right to reasonable

accommodations, and a prison's obligation to comply with the ADA

and the RA does not disappear when inmates are placed in a segregated

housing unit, regardless of the reason for which they are housed there.

Furgess, 933 F.3d 285 at 291. To the extent that the defendants advance this argument

to rebut the plaintiffs’ alternative ADA theory that they were placed in solitary

confinement because of the manifestations of their mental illnesses, while they

contend DOC policy explicitly bars the issuance of misconducts for the manifestation

of mental illness in the form of suicide attempts and self-injurious behavior, the

44

Moreover, the plaintiffs allege that these punitive measure were used in response to

behaviors that are expected from and consistent with their mental health conditions,

but not limited to suicide attempts and self-injurious behavior. Indeed, as the

plaintiffs point out, “courts in this circuit have found that subjecting a disabled inmate

to standard disciplinary procedures for actions that are manifestations of his or her

disability amounts to a failure to accommodate the inmate's disability.” McDonald-

Witherspoon v. City of Philadelphia, No. CV 17-1914, 2018 WL 4030702, at *10

(E.D. Pa. Aug. 23, 2018), aff'd, No. 21-1019, 2021 WL 6101246 (3d Cir. Dec. 21,

2021) (citing Parms v. Pa. Dep't of Corrs., Civ. A. No. 14-84, 2015 WL 1326323, at

*3 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 2015) (concluding that complaint alleging that plaintiff was

disciplined for failure “to move for meals or stand for count on time” when his

failures were due to his deafness stated a facially plausible claim for discrimination

on the basis of plaintiff's disability in violation of Title II of the ADA); Snider v.

Motter, Civ. A. No. 13-1226, 2016 WL 4154927, at *8 (M.D. Pa. June 2, 2016),

report and recommendation adopted, Civ. A. No. 13-1226, 2016 WL 4140728 (M.D.

Pa. Aug. 4, 2016) (recommending that complaint alleging that prison failed to

accommodate plaintiff's mental illness when it disciplined him for actions that “were

manifestations of his mental illness” and “punish[ed] him in the same way other non-

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violation of Title II of the ADA). Thus, on the facts alleged in the complaint, the

plaintiffs have stated a claim under the ADA and RA.7

D. The Defendants Are Not Entitled to Qualified Immunity At This

Time

The defendants also argue they are entitled to qualified immunity on the

plaintiffs’ constitutional claims since no reasonable official would have understood

they were violating their rights by continuing to confine the plaintiffs in restrictive

housing by virtue of their misconduct. Within their qualified immunity argument,

they make sweeping challenges to the prospective classes of plaintiffs, arguing that

their scope and overlap would be too expansive and because, on their face, certain

classes simply do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. At the outset, we

7 The defendants’ argument that the plaintiffs’ ADA claims should be dismissed

because their claims are more appropriately addressed under the Eighth Amendment

requires only brief consideration. Indeed, the defendants’ position implies that,

because the Eighth Amendment exists the ADA is effectively a nullity. Of course,

this is not how the more specific provision doctrine functions. Rather, the more

specific provision rule “states that if a constitutional claim is covered by a specific

constitutional provision . . . the claim must be analyzed under the standard appropriate

to that specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due process.” Pizarro v.

Wetzel, No. 3:20-CV-00511, 2021 WL 4860774, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 19, 2021)

(quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997)) (internal quotations

omitted). Thus, as the plaintiffs point out, this rule is applicable in the context of more

specific constitutional provision, and we decline to expand its application to erase

rights specifically defined by congressional statute.

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class which has not yet been certified.8 In the interest of the orderly management of

this case, our inquiry at this juncture relates only to the claims of the plaintiffs and

the arguments as to the appropriateness of the proposed classes must await the

certification stage.

As to the defendants’ arguments that they are entitled to qualified immunity on

the constitutional claims of the plaintiffs, “[q]ualified immunity shields government

officials from civil damages liability unless the official violated a statutory or

constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the challenged

conduct.” Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664, 132 S.Ct. 2088, 182 L.Ed.2d 985

(2012). A qualified immunity analysis involves two questions: whether the official

violated a statutory or constitutional right, and whether that right was clearly

established at the time of the challenged conduct. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731,

735, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011). Lower courts have the discretion to

decide which question to analyze first. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236, 129

S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009).

8 Similarly, we need not address the defendants’ other arguments regarding the

appropriateness of the putative classes for example, that they lack standing, are

already receiving the relief they request (D Roster), or are duplicative as these

arguments are more appropriately addressed at the class certification stage.

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challenged conduct, ‘[t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear’ that every

‘reasonable official would [have understood] that what he is doing violates that

right.’” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741, 131 S.Ct. 2074 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton,

483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)). The Supreme Court has

stated that this standard does not require a case directly on point, but requires that

“existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond

debate.” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741, 131 S.Ct. 2074. “When properly applied, [qualified

immunity] protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate

the law.” Id. at 743, 131 S.Ct. 2074 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341,

106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986)); see also Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042,

2044 (2015).

It is worth noting that the Third Circuit’s most recent holding in Williams

concludes that, taken as true, the constitutional rights the defendants allegedly

violated were clearly established. Indeed, as previously discussed, the Third Circuit

clearly stated “[o]ur precedents leave no room for doubt that individuals with a

known history of serious mental illness have a clearly established right not to be

subjected to prolonged solitary confinement without penological justification,

regardless of their sentence.” 117 F.4th 503 at 518. Thus, to the extent the plaintiffs

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defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Nonetheless, on the pleadings alone, we are mindful that, “the Third Circuit

has cautioned that it is generally unwise to venture into a qualified immunity analysis

at the pleading stage as it is necessary to develop the factual record in the vast

majority of cases.” Williams v. Papi, 30 F. Supp. 3d 306, 313 (M.D. Pa. 2014)

(quoting Newland v. Reehorst, 328 Fed.Appx. 788, 791 n. 3 (3d Cir.2009)) (internal

quotations omitted). Given the clear holding in Williams, it will be difficult for the

defendants to argue they are entitled to immunity on these Eighth Amendment claims.

Nonetheless, given the fact-specific nature of the qualified immunity inquiry, our

ultimate determination on this issue must await further development of the record.9

9 We do conclude, however, that the defendants’ argument that they are entitled to

qualified immunity on the plaintiffs’ ADA claims is without merit since the plaintiffs

seek damages only from the DOC itself and prospective relief from Defendant Harry

in her official capacity. Though it seems quite clear on the face of the complaint, to

the extent the defendants argue this was unclear from the pleadings, the plaintiffs

have clarified and conceded as much in the briefing. Thus, since qualified immunity

is only available to shield public officials from individual liability, it is not

appropriate to protect the DOC from liability or the prospective relief sought against

Defendant Harry in her official capacity. See Cruz v. Klemm, No. 3:25-CV-665, 2026

WL 116493, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 15, 2026) (quoting W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484,

499 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[T]he doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials acting

only in their individual capacities and does not apply to official capacity claims”));

Doe v. Se. Delco Sch. Dist., 140 F. Supp. 3d 396, 403 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (citing

Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (concluding qualified immunity is

not an available defense for a government official sued in his official capacity just as

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Injunctive Relief

Finally, the defendants seek dismissal of the plaintiffs’ demands for

prospective injunctive relief, citing the PLRA’s requirement that:

Prospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison conditions

shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the

Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs. The court shall not

grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court finds that such

relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct

the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means

necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right. The court shall

give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the

operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief.

18 U.S.C. § 3626. The defendants argue that the prospective relief sought by the

plaintiffs, in the form of an injunction against housing inmates in the RHU beyond

three years, is not the least intrusive means of correcting the alleged violations and

thus should be dismissed. For their part, the plaintiffs argue that these PLRA

requirements are not grounds for dismissal but rather guides for the court when, and

if addressing and granting injunctive relief becomes appropriate. We agree. At this

juncture, the plaintiffs are not requesting that the court rule on the injunction but

rather have included it as a demand for relief should their claims succeed on the

it would not constitute a defense for the government entity).

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injunctive relief is appropriate, such relief will have to be fashioned around the

PLRA’s precept that such relief be narrowly drawn. But at this early stage of the

litigation, the PLRA’s requirement on prospective relief has not yet been triggered.

See Williams v. Edwards, 87 F.3d 126, 133 (5th Cir. 1996) (“The district court has

fashioned no prospective relief and the provisions of the [PLRA] have yet to be

triggered in this case.”). Accordingly we will deny the defendants’ motion to dismiss

this claim of relief at this early stage. See Skelton v. New Jersey Dep't of Corr., No.

CV 19-18597 (RMB), 2020 WL 6376652, at *5 (D.N.J. Oct. 30, 2020) (citing

Geisinger Community Med. Ctr. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 794

F.3d 383, 391 (3d Cir. 2015) (Concluding plaintiff’s claims for prospective injunctive

relief under § 1983 were not barred by the PLRA since, “[b]y its plain language, the

statute does not require that a plaintiff must plead a narrowly tailored claim for

injunctive relief, but rather the statute expressly limits the court's power to grant or

approve the prospective relief requested”).

III. Conclusion

In closing, at this stage the plaintiffs have sufficiently articulated their claims

which allege the defendants violated their constitutional rights and the ADA by

subjecting them to prolonged solitary confinement. Moreover, on the pleadings alone

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Accordingly, we will deny the defendants’ motions to dismiss, (Docs. 74, 76, 78),

and allow these claims to move forward. An appropriate order follows.

S/ Martin C. Carlson

Martin C. Carlson

United States Magistrate Judge

DATED: August 6, 2026

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