Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

LAKE CHARLES DIVISION

SOUTHWEST MATERIALS INC CASE NO. 2:24-CV-01441

JUDGE JAMES D. CAIN, JR.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE LEBLANC

MEMORANDUM RULING

Before the court is a Motion for Summary Judgment [doc. 28] filed by limitation

plaintiff Southwest Materials Inc. (“Southwest”). Claimant Gerald Miller opposes the

motion. Doc. 38. Claimant Louisiana Workers Compensation Corp. adopts Miller’s

opposition. Doc. 40.

I.

BACKGROUND

This limitation of liability suit arises from injuries suffered by Gerald Miller while

working on a materials barge owned and operated by Southwest on April 21, 2024, at the

Port Aggregates, Inc. (“PAI”) facility in Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana. Miller filed an

admiralty claim and third-party complaint against Southwest as his employer and PAI as

his borrowing employer, alleging that he was entitled to damages as a Jones Act seaman

injured aboard a vessel. Doc. 12. Limitation plaintiff Southwest now brings this motion for

summary judgment, asserting that Miller does not qualify as a Jones Act seaman and that

his claims for Jones Act negligence, unseaworthiness, maintenance and cure, and punitive

damages must be dismissed. Miller and the Louisiana Workers Compensation Corp.

oppose the motion. Docs. 38, 40.

II.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Under Rule 56(a), “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” The moving party is initially responsible for identifying

portions of pleadings and discovery that show the lack of a genuine issue of material fact.

Tubacex, Inc. v. M/V Risan, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995). He may meet his burden by

pointing out “the absence of evidence supporting the nonmoving party’s case.” Malacara

v. Garber, 353 F.3d 393, 404 (5th Cir. 2003). The non-moving party is then required to go

beyond the pleadings and show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). To this end he must submit

“significant probative evidence” in support of his claim. State Farm Life Ins. Co. v.

Gutterman, 896 F.2d 116, 118 (5th Cir. 1990). “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is

not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at

249 (citations omitted).

A court may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence in ruling on

a motion for summary judgment. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S.

133, 150 (2000). The court is also required to view all evidence in the light most favorable

to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Clift v.

Clift, 210 F.3d 268, 270 (5th Cir. 2000). Under this standard, a genuine issue of material

fact exists if a reasonable trier of fact could render a verdict for the nonmoving party.

Brumfield v. Hollins, 551 F.3d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 2008).

III.

LAW & APPLICATION

The Jones Act provides remedies in tort law for a seaman who is injured in the

course of his employment. Land-based maritime employees, on the other hand, are limited

to worker's compensation under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act

(“LHWCA”), 33 U.S.C. § 901, et seq. In re Two-J Ranch, Inc., 534 F.Supp.2d 671, 677

(W.D. La. 2008). The Jones Act and the LHWCA are mutually exclusive compensation

regimes. Harbor Tug and Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S. 548, 553 (1997).

To qualify as a seaman under the Jones Act a plaintiff must satisfy two requirements:

(1) his duties must contribute to the function of the vessel or the accomplishment of its

mission, and (2) he must have a connection to a vessel in navigation (or an identifiable

group of vessels) that is substantial both in duration and nature. Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis,

515 U.S. 347, 368 (1995). “To satisfy the first prong of the Chandris test, the claimant

need only show that he ‘do[es] the ship’s work.’” In re Endeavour Marine, Inc., 234 F.3d

287, 290 (5th Cir. 2000). This requirement is very broad. Id. The purpose of the second

prong is to “separate the sea-based maritime employees who are entitled to Jones Act

protection from those land-based workers who have only a transitory or sporadic

connection to a vessel in navigation, and therefore, whose employment does not regularly

expose them to the perils of the sea.” Id. The second “substantial connection” requirement

involves consideration of both the duration and nature of an individual's employment,

which is a much more involved inquiry. Id. As the Supreme Court has stated:

the total circumstances of an individual's employment must be weighed to

determine whether he had a sufficient relationship to the navigation of

vessels and the perils attendant thereon. The duration of a worker's

connection to a vessel and the nature of the worker's activities, taken

together, determine whether a maritime employee is a seaman because the

ultimate inquiry is whether the worker in question is a member of the vessel's

crew or simply a land-based employee who happens to be working on the

vessel at a given time.

Chandris, 515 U.S. at 370 (citation omitted). To establish a sufficient temporal connection

to meet the duration requirement, a plaintiff must show that he spends at least 30 percent

of his time in service of a vessel or an identifiable group of vessels. Roberts v. Cardinal

Services, Inc., 266 F.3d 368, 374–75 (5th Cir. 2001).

The U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently provided three additional factors

that this court must consider in determining whether the “substantial connection”

requirement has been met to qualify as a seaman and derive benefits under the Jones Act.

Sanchez v. Smart Fabricators of Texas, Inc., 997 F.3d 564 (5th Cir. 2021). The court

overruled its prior opinion in Naquin v. Elevating Boats, LLC, 744 F.3d 927 (5th Cir. 2014),

emphasizing that the “perils of sea” test is only a consideration and should not be the sole

or primary test. Id. at 573. Instead, courts must consider the following additional factors:

(1) Does the worker owe his allegiance to the vessel, rather than simply to a

shoreside employer?

(2) Is the work sea-based or does it involve seagoing activity? and

(3) (a) Is the worker's assignment to a vessel limited to performance of a

discrete task after which the worker's connection to the vessel ends, or (b)

Does the worker's assignment include sailing with the vessel from port to

port or location to location?

Id.

Miller pled that he “was working as a Jones Act seaman aboard the SMI-101, a

materials barge owned, operated, and/or controlled by [PAI] and/or [Southwest], at all

pertinent times hereto, which was a vessel in navigation.” Doc. 12, ¶ IV. Southwest

provides unloading services for barges carrying construction materials at distinct locations

in southwest Louisiana. Doc. 28, att. 3, pp. 31–33. It owns and operates three spud barges

to carry out its operation, the SMI-101, SMI-103, and the SMI 107. Id. at 13. Southwest

operates with a single crew, which receives instruction from land-based superintendent

Chad Alcock. Doc. 28, att. 4, p. 80. At the time of the accident, Miller worked for

Southwest as supervisor of this crew. Doc. 28, att. 4, pp. 35–36, 137–38.

The crew’s assignment to any of the three barges depends on the job and customer,

varying from day to day. Doc. 28, att. 3, pp. 31–35. The SMI-101 services PAI and Prairie

Construction, at Bayou d’Inde in Westlake, Louisiana, and occasionally out of PAI’s

facility in Mermentau, Louisiana. Id. at 32–35; doc. 28, att. 4, pp. 63–64. Regardless of

location, Southwest’s barges function as stationary, shoreside work platforms from which

material is transferred to land-based vehicles. Doc. 28, att. 3, pp. 48, 99; doc. 28, att. 4, pp.

62–63. They are spudded down about twenty-five feet from shore and remain stationary

during the unloading process. Doc. 28, att. 4, pp. 90–91, 183. The barges have no self-

propulsion, navigational lighting, rudder or steering controls, or crew quarters. Id. at 125.

The only motor aboard is a small combustion engineer to power the hopper equipment. Id.

When a Southwest barge is traveling a short distance between customer locations, portions

of the crew (including Miller) will regularly ride along on the barge. Id. at 127–28; doc.

28, att. 5, p. 38. The crew does no work during this time, however, and the barge instead

has its own deckhands to assist in navigation. Doc. 28, att. 5, pp. 39–40.

Upon arrival of the product barge, Miller’s crew directs its positioning by hand or

voice signal and then ties it off for unloading—but the product barges are propelled by

third parties with their own captains and crews. Id. at 72–74; doc. 128, att. 5, pp. 37–38.

Apart from telling the tug captain when the crew is ready to move or stop and how they

want the product positioned, Miller does not instruct the tug captain on how to navigate or

operate his vessel. Doc. 28, att. 4, pp. 114–15; doc. 28, att. 3, p. 70. However, the Southwest

crew uses its own ropes to tie up barges and moves product barges with a track hoe as they

are emptied. Doc. 38, att. 6, pp. 48–49. Miller described his crew’s core function at any job

site as getting product unloaded. Doc. 28, att. 4, p. 111. At the end of each shift, he leaves

the barge and drives home. Id. at 93. He has never slept aboard the Southwest barges, which

do not contain sleeping quarters. Id. at 142–43.

Miller was injured on April 21, 2024. He arrived at the worksite around 6:00 that

morning and inspected the barge to make sure it was ready to begin work. Doc. 28, att. 4,

pp. 94, 155, 253. About fifteen minutes later, while walking on the deck, he tripped on

hydraulic hoses that ran along the deck surface. Id. at 180, 219–20. Miller points to

evidence that the SMI-101 was poorly maintained, with numerous waste holes in the

decking. Doc. 38, att. 3, pp. 20, 40. Miller also emphasizes that only one of the two spuds

on the SMI-101 was operational at the time of his accident, meaning that the barge was

poorly secured and would rock back and forth when it was meant to be stationary. See doc.

38, att. 1, pp. 281–83; doc. 38, att. 6, pp. 19–21.

The facts in this matter are similar to three recent cases rejecting Jones Act status

under Chandris and Sanchez. In Meaux v. Cooper Consolidated, LLC, the plaintiff worked

as a flagger and utility man as borrowed employee of Cooper, which loads and unloads

vessels moored in the Mississippi River. The court initially granted summary judgment on

seaman status, taking note of the “separation from the safety of land, even if not all that

far, taken together with the fact that all of Meaux’s work was performed aboard vessels

midstream in a dangerous river[.]” Meaux v. Cooper Consol., LLC, 545 F.Supp.3d 383,

388 (E.D. La. 2021) (ASHE, J.). After a bench trial, however, the court reconsidered its

ruling and determined that Meaux was not a seaman. Meaux v. Cooper Consol., LLC, 601

F.Supp.3d 38, 42 (E.D. La. 2022). Even though Meaux’s work was done midstream, the

court determined, boarding a crew boat and performing longshore work near or around

water did not qualify as seagoing activity under Sanchez. Id. at 54. “Otherwise, scores of

maritime workers would be transformed into Jones Act seamen who the law currently does

not recognize as such.” Id.

In Rutherford v. Pontchartrain Materials Corp., LLC, 732 F.Supp.3d 536 (E.D. La.

2024) (ASHE, J.), the defendant owned and operated three spud barges that it used in

conjunction with material handling. Id. at 539. During unloading, its barges were spudded

down or tied to shore and connected to land by a gangplank. Id. For short trips Pontchartrain

employees also occasionally rode on the spud barges. Id. The plaintiff was a loader, who

was primarily assigned to one of the spud barges. Id. During unloading, he would work on

the third-party-owned material barges to signal crane operators or move materials with a

front-end loader. Id. He also assisted in moving the material barge, including tying it to the

shore. Id. at 540. He was injured while aboard one of the material barges, when he was

knocked into the water by the bucket of an excavator. Id. Judge Ashe granted summary

judgment for the defendant on seaman status, finding that the matter “[did] not present as

close of a call as did Meaux.” Id. at 546. To this end he noted that Rutherford “nearly

always worked on vessels that were only a gangplank away from shore,” that the material

barges were almost always located near shore during his work, and that “he never worked

on any vessel while it was in motion.” Id.

Meanwhile, in Bouton v. Manson Construction Company, 705 F.Supp.3d 622 (W.D.

La. 2023) (JOSEPH, J.), the plaintiff worked as a laborer on a spudded-down platform at a

dock demolition and construction project. Id. at 626. He contended that he also worked

aboard several vessels owned or leased by Manson, and that his duties included piloting a

skiff, traveling with a transport barge, and other vessel-related tasks. Id. The court rejected

the notion that Bouton owed his allegiance to a vessel, however. It observed that he was

not assigned to any particular vessel and “only occasionally boarded a tugboat to move the

position of the barges . . . [;] these tasks were part and parcel with [his] discrete job

responsibilities in assisting with the demolition of the old dock.” Id. at 633. It further

concluded that Bouton’s work was not seagoing, because his duties on the barges were

accomplished while they were spudded down or tied off close to shore. Id. at 628.

In contrast, Miller relies on Cole v. Oceaneering International, 681 F.Supp.3d 658

(E.D. La. 2023). There the court reconsidered its prior ruling and granted summary

judgment to a crane operator, finding that he established a sufficient connection to his

vessel to qualify as a seaman. Id. As the court noted, however, and in contrast to Miller,

Cole worked aboard a vessel in navigation (operating in the Gulf of America) and slept

aboard that vessel. Id. at 687. Defendant did not challenge Cole’s assertion that his work

was sea-based, as he assisted with the vessel’s projects including “underwater salvage

operations, platform and stub removal, remotely operated underwater vehicle and diving

support services, pipeline riser and subsea work, platform jacket repairs and other offshore

subsea and surface inspection, maintenance, repair, and installation operations.” Id.

Furthermore, Cole slept aboard the vessel for the entirety of its hitches. Id. at 574.

Accordingly, he made a much stronger case under all three of the Sanchez factors.

As these cases illustrate, it is usually the nature of the work rather than the proximity

to water that separates a seaman from a longshoreman. Under Chandris, as explained

above, the claimant must show that (1) his duties must contribute to the function of the

vessel or the accomplishment of its mission, and (2) he must have a connection to a vessel

in navigation (or an identifiable group of vessels) that is substantial both in duration and

nature. 515 U.S. at 368 (1995). Under the first prong, a vessel includes “any watercraft

practically capable of maritime transportation, regardless of its primary purpose or state of

transit at a particular time.” Stewart v. Dutra Const. Co., 543 U.S. 481, 497 (2005).

Accordingly, a spud barge that is still moved regularly (even if only over short distances)

qualifies as a vessel. Ducote v. V. Keeler & Co., Inc., 953 F.2d 1000, 1004 (5th Cir. 1992).

The court focuses its inquiry on the substantial prong, under which it must consider:

(1) Does the worker owe his allegiance to the vessel, rather than simply to a

shoreside employer?

(2) Is the work sea-based or does it involve seagoing activity? and

(3) (a) Is the worker's assignment to a vessel limited to performance of a

discrete task after which the worker's connection to the vessel ends, or (b)

Does the worker's assignment include sailing with the vessel from port to

port or location to location?

Sanchez, 997 F.3d at 573.

Here, as in Rutherford, Miller is not a Jones Act seaman even if he satisfies the other

prongs because he does not engage in sea-based or seagoing activity. 732 F.Supp.3d at 546.

Although he was sometimes transported on the barge, his actual work was accomplished

while it was stationary. His evidence that the barge was not as securely spudded as it could

have been, and that the platform would shift slightly with wind or currents, cannot convert

a platform to a vessel in navigation. His duties aboard that structure, which related chiefly

to unloading moored material barges, were “decidedly not sea-based.” Bouton, 705

F.Supp.3d at 633. While Miller took a limited role in positioning the materials barge, this

was only done in service of unloading the vessels—the role of a longshoreman, not a

seaman. As the courts emphasized in Rutherford and Bouton, Miller remained a short

distance from shore. And as in these cases and Meaux, he did not sleep aboard the vessel.

Accordingly, the vessel served as a stationary platform during the time Miller was actually

working aboard it and its involvement in this matter does not transform Miller into a

seaman.

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Motion for Summary Judgment [doc. 28] will be

GRANTED and Miller’s claims for Jones Act negligence, unseaworthiness, maintenance

and cure, and punitive damages will be dismissed.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Chambers on the 14th da August, 2026.

JAMES D. CAIN, JR. .

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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