The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JOSIAH LEE GOTTSCHALL, : Civ. No. 4:26-CV-1022
:
Plaintiff, :
:
v. :
: (Magistrate Judge Carlson)
:
ERIC LINDHARDT, et al., :
:
Defendants. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. Introduction
“All happy families are alike: each unhappy family is unhappy in its own
way.” Leo Tolstoy, Anna Karenina.
Tolstoy’s observations regarding the essential nature of domestic discord are
a fitting metaphor for the instant case, a pro se lawsuit brought by Josiah Gottschall,
a disappointed state court domestic relations litigant. Mr. Gottschall is plainly
unhappy in his own way as a result of domestic strife which has spilled over into the
state legal system. His unhappiness now manifests itself in a lawsuit brought against
virtually every other participant in this legal process. These defendants have now
moved to dismiss Gottschall’s complaint, (Docs. 7, 18, 21, 25, 33), and, while we
acknowledge the upset that has led Gottschall to file this case, the simple truth is that
he cannot assuage his unhappiness at the progress of the state court domestic
relations litigation through a federal civil rights lawsuit. Therefore, these motions to
dismiss will be granted.
II. Factual Background and Procedural History
This pro se case arises out of contentious domestic relations litigation in the
Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County. (Doc. 1). According to the plaintiff,
he has been embroiled in domestic custody and protection proceedings since January
of 2025. During the course of those proceedings, Gottschall has decried what he sees
as undue delays, judicial bias, counsel misconduct, and lapses in maintaining
confidentiality by all actors. (Id.)
Gottschall is plainly and clearly unhappy with the progress of this state court
litigation, and that unhappiness is manifested in his federal civil rights lawsuit.
Citing the general federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and a federal criminal
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 241, Gottschall brings Due Process, Equal Protection, First
Amendment and conspiracy claims against the defendants. The scope of Gottschall’s
ire is then clearly shown through the sweeping scope of the complaint which names
the presiding state judge, prothonotary, his own counsel, opposing counsel, a court
stenographer, numerous unnamed courthouse staff, and Lycoming County as
defendants. Gottschall’s displeasure with the progress of this litigation is further
underscored by his prayer for relief, which demands $4,000,000 in damages along
with sweeping injunctive relief that would, in effect, dictate the result of the state
court case. (Id.)
It is against this backdrop that the defendants have filed motions to dismiss
this complaint. (Docs. 7, 18, 21, 25, 33). These motions are now ripe for resolution.
As discussed below, Mr. Gottschall’s complaint encounters a cascading array of
legal obstacles which combine to defeat the plaintiff’s efforts to turn to this court to
cure his unhappiness with the progress of this state domestic relations litigation.
III. Discussion
A. Motion to Dismiss—Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. It is proper for
the court to dismiss a complaint in accordance with Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure only if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). With respect to this benchmark standard for
legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit has aptly noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal
court, stating that:
Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in
recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), continuing with our
opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir.
2008)], and culminating recently with the Supreme Court’s decision in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, BU.S.B, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), pleading standards
have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more
heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than
the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, Inc.,
20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court “need not credit a complaint’s
bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v.
Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court
need not “assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not
alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action, a
plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which “requires more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
actions will not do.” Id. at 555. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level.” Id.
In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has
underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon
which relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to
dismiss, a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no
more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 679.
According to the Supreme Court, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678. Rather,
in conducting a review of the adequacy of a complaint, the Supreme Court has
advised trial courts that they must:
[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than
conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal
conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be
supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine
whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.
Id. at 679.
Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain
more than mere legal labels and conclusions; it must recite factual allegations
sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere
speculation. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated:
[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First,
the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The
District Court must accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as
true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court
must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are
sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” In
other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff’s
entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement
with its facts.
Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.
As the Court of Appeals has observed:
The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the “plausibility” standard for
overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The
plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard
when the factual pleadings “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,
129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955).
This standard requires showing “more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A complaint which pleads facts
“merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, [ ] “stops short of the
line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement of relief.’ ”
Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 1861, 182 L.Ed.2d 644 (2012).
In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a
three-step analysis: “First, the court must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must
plead to state a claim.’ Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should identify
allegations that, ‘because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the
assumption of truth.’ Id. at 1950. Finally, ‘where there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they
plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.’ Id.” Santiago v. Warminster Twp.,
629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010).
In considering a motion to dismiss, the court generally relies on the complaint,
attached exhibits, and matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263,
268 (3d Cir. 2007). The court may also consider “undisputedly authentic
document[s] that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the
plaintiff’s claims are based on the [attached] documents.” Pension Benefit Guar.
Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover,
“documents whose contents are alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity no
party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading, may be
considered.” Pryor v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir.
2002); see also U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d382, 388 (3d Cir. 2002)
(holding that “[a]lthough a district court may not consider matters extraneous to the
pleadings, a document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be
considered without converting the motion to dismiss in one for summary
judgment”). However, the court may not rely on other parts of the record in
determining a motion to dismiss, or when determining whether a proposed amended
complaint is futile because it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).
It is against these legal guideposts that we assess the sufficiency of the
plaintiff’s claims.
B. The Motion to Dismiss Should Be Granted
In this case, the complaint lodged by Mr. Gottschall, while doubtless born of
deep unhappiness concerning the course of his state domestic relations litigation, is
profoundly flawed in multiple respects. The fatal deficiencies in this pleading, which
compel dismissal of the complaint, are addressed separately below.
1. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine Applies Here
At the outset, the plaintiff’s complaint inevitably invites us to review, re-
examine, and reverse various state court orders in a pending state domestic relations
case. This we cannot do. To the extent that the plaintiff urges us, in effect, to sit as a
state appellate court and vacate prior state court rulings, the complaint encounters an
insurmountable threshold legal obstacle. As we have explained in the past:
[W]e lack subject matter jurisdiction over the[se] issues . . . , which
necessarily invite a federal court to review, re-examine and reject state
court rulings in state domestic relations cases.
This we cannot do. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has spoken
to this issue and has announced a rule, the Rooker–Feldman doctrine,
which compels federal district courts to decline invitations to conduct
what amounts to appellate review of state trial court decisions. As
described by the Third Circuit:
That doctrine takes its name from the two Supreme Court cases
that gave rise to the doctrine. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263
U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923); District of
Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103
S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983). The doctrine is derived
from 28 U.S.C. § 1257 which states that “[f]inal judgments or
decrees rendered by the highest court of a state in which a
decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme
Court....”. See also Desi's Pizza, Inc. v. City of Wilkes Barre,
321 F.3d 411, 419 (3d Cir.2003). “Since Congress has never
conferred a similar power of review on the United States
District Courts, the Supreme Court has inferred that Congress
did not intend to empower District Courts to review state court
decisions.” Desi's Pizza, 321 F.3d at 419.
Gary v. Braddock Cemetery, 517 F.3d 195, 200 (3d Cir.2008).
Because federal district courts are not empowered by law to sit as
reviewing courts, reexamining state court decisions, “[t]he Rooker–
Feldman doctrine deprives a federal district court of jurisdiction in
some circumstances to review a state court adjudication.” Turner v.
Crawford Square Apartments III, LLP, 449 F.3d 542, 547 (3d
Cir.2006). Cases construing this jurisdictional limit on the power of
federal courts have quite appropriately:
[E]mphasized the narrow scope of the Rooker–Feldman
doctrine, holding that it “is confined to cases of the kind from
which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-
court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments rendered before the district court proceedings
commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of
those judgments.” [Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic
Industries Corp.], 544 U.S. at 284, 125 S.Ct. at 1521–22; see
also Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, ––––, 126 S.Ct. 1198,
1201, 163 L.Ed.2d 1059 (2006).
Id.
However, even within these narrowly drawn confines, it has been
consistently recognized that the Rooker–Feldman doctrine prevents
federal judges from considering civil rights lawsuits which seek to re-
examine state domestic relations court rulings that are presented “by
state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.”
Kwasnik v. Leblon, 228 F. App'x 238, 242 (3d Cir.2007). In such
instances, the federal courts have typically deferred to the state court
domestic relations decisions, and rebuffed efforts to use federal civil
rights laws to review, or reverse, those state court rulings. See, e.g.,
Marran v. Marran, 376 F.3d 143 (3d Cir.2004); Kwasnik 228 F. App'x
238, 242; Smith v. Department of Human Services, 198 F. App'x 227
(3d Cir.2006); Van Tassel v. Lawrence County Domestic Relations
Section, 659 F.Supp.2d 672, 690 (W.D.Pa.2009) aff'd sub nom. Van
Tassel v. Lawrence County Domestic Relations Sections, 390 F. App'x
201 (3d Cir.2010) (Rooker–Feldman doctrine operates as a
jurisdictional bar to plaintiff's claims if the injuries of which she
complains were caused by a state court judgment or ruling which was
entered against her); Buchanan v. Gay, 491 F.Supp.2d 483, 487
(D.Del.2007); Rose v. County of York, No. 05–5820, 2007 WL 136682
(E.D.Pa. Jan.12, 2007); Logan v. Lillie, 965 F.Supp. 695, 696
(E.D.Pa.1997) aff'd, 142 F.3d 428 (3d Cir.1998); Behr v. Snider, 900
F.Supp. 719, 721 (E.D.Pa.1995).
Rose v. York Cnty., No. 1:13-CV-2056, 2013 WL 4456220, at *3–4 (M.D. Pa. Aug.
1, 2013), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:13-CV-2056, 2013 WL
4434748 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 16, 2013).
Simply put, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine the plaintiff is not entitled to
relief which would necessarily imply the invalidity of at least some state court
orders. Gottschall cannot overcome this bar by asserting that the state court orders
he challenges are somehow void or illegitimate. The determination of the validity of
a state court order in a pending state case is a task for the state courts to decide. The
plaintiff cannot invite us to serve as some form of ad hoc state appellate court ruling
on the legitimacy of state court orders. Since this is precisely what the plaintiff urges
us to do in his pleading, this complaint fails as a matter of law and should be
dismissed.
2. The Younger Abstention Doctrine Also Applies Here.
Beyond inviting us to set aside orders previously entered in the state court
litigation, the plaintiff’s complaint also urges us to reach out prospectively insisting
that we should dictate the future course of the litigation by enjoining the state courts
from taking any further action that displeases the plaintiff in this domestic relations
litigation. To the extent that Gottschall invites us to enjoin future enforcement of
state court orders in a pending domestic relations case, this pro se pleading runs
afoul of another settled tenet of federal law, the Younger abstention doctrine.
The Younger abstention doctrine is inspired by basic considerations of comity
that are fundamental to our federal system of government. As defined by the courts:
“Younger abstention is a legal doctrine granting federal courts discretion to abstain
from exercising jurisdiction over a claim when resolution of that claim would
interfere with an ongoing state proceeding.” Kendall v. Russell, 572 F.3d 126, 130
(3d Cir. 2009) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971) (“[W]e have
concluded that the judgment of the District Court, enjoining appellant Younger from
prosecuting under these California statutes, must be reversed as a violation of the
national policy forbidding federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state court
proceedings except under special circumstances”)).
This doctrine, which is informed by principles of comity, is also guided by
these same principles in its application. As the Third Circuit has observed:
“A federal district court has discretion to abstain from exercising
jurisdiction over a particular claim where resolution of that claim in
federal court would offend principles of comity by interfering with an
ongoing state proceeding.” Addiction Specialists, Inc. v. Twp. of
Hampton, 411 F.3d 399, 408 (3d Cir.2005) (citing Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971)). As noted earlier,
the Younger doctrine allows a district court to abstain, but that
discretion can properly be exercised only when (1) there are ongoing
state proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings
implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford
an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims. Matusow v. Trans-
County Title Agency, LLC, 545 F.3d 241, 248 (3d Cir.2008).
Kendall, 572 F.3d at 131.
Once these three legal requirements for Younger abstention are met, the
decision to abstain rests in the sound discretion of the district court and will not be
disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. Lui v. Commission on Adult
Entertainment Establishments, 369 F.3d 319, 325 (3d Cir. 2004). Moreover,
applying these standards, federal courts frequently abstain from hearing matters
which necessarily interfere with on-going state cases. Lui, 369 F.3d 319; Zahl v.
Harper, 282 F.3d 204 (3d Cir.2002). Indeed, the Court of Appeals has expressly
applied Younger abstention to state court domestic relations litigation, holding that:
“This is precisely the type of case suited to Younger abstention, as the state
proceeding implicates the important state interest of preserving the state's judicial
system.” Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 671 (3d Cir.2010).
In this case, the plaintiff's pro se complaint reveals that all of the legal
prerequisites for Younger abstention are present. First, it is evident that there are
state proceedings in this case. Second, it is also apparent that those proceedings
afford the plaintiffs a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues raised in this
lawsuit in these state cases. See Sullivan v. Linebaugh, 362 F. App'x 248, 249–50
(3d Cir. 2010). Finally, it is clear that the state proceedings implicate important state
interests, since the state case involves domestic relations matters, an issue of
paramount importance to the state. See Lazaridis, 591 F.3d at 671. Since the legal
requirements for Younger abstention are fully met here, the decision to abstain rests
in the sound discretion of this Court. However, given the important state interest in
enforcement of its domestic relations rulings and recognizing that the state courts
are prepared to fully address the merits of these matters, we believe that the proper
exercise of this discretion weighs in favor of abstention and dismissal of this
complaint.
3. The Anti-Injunction Act Applies Here.
Additionally, as we have noted, in this pro se complaint Mr. Gottschall seeks
an extraordinary form of injunctive relief in that he invites us to enjoin pending state
court litigation and prescribe the manner in which the state courts must address his
concerns in the future. This prayer for relief encounters another immediate statutory
hurdle—the Anti-Injunction Act. As the court of appeals has aptly observed:
That statute reads as follows: “A court of the United States may not
grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except [1] as
expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or [2] where necessary in
aid of its jurisdiction, or [3] to protect or effectuate its judgments.” 28
U.S.C. § 2283.
The general rule is thus that “an injunction against execution or any
other proceeding to enforce a state judgment is forbidden as well as
one against the prosecution of state litigation to obtain a judgment.”
Jos. L. Muscarelle, Inc. v. Cent. Iron Mfg. Co., 328 F.2d 791, 793 (3d
Cir. 1964). And while there are three statutorily prescribed
exceptions, those exceptions “are to be construed narrowly,” In re
Diet Drugs, 282 F.3d 220, 233 (3d Cir. 2002), the practical effect of
which is that the A-IA “prohibits most federal court injunctions
staying state court proceedings,” In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.
Sales Pracs. Litig., 314 F.3d 99, 103 (3d Cir. 2002).
Norton v. Adams, No. 25-2361, 2025 WL 2231797, at *2 (3d Cir. Aug. 1, 2025).
The United States Supreme Court has underscored for us the central role
which the Anti-Injunction Act plays in defining the comity owed to state courts in
our federal system, explaining that:
Any doubts as to the propriety of a federal injunction against state
court proceedings should be resolved in favor of permitting the state
courts to proceed in an orderly fashion to finally determine the
controversy. The explicit wording of § 2283 itself implies as much,
and the fundamental principle of a dual system of courts leads
inevitably to that conclusion.
Atl. Coast Line R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 297, 90 S. Ct.
1739, 1748, 26 L. Ed. 2d 234 (1970).
On occasion, litigants in state domestic relations cases have turned to the
federal courts seeking to enjoin these state proceedings. This litigation has taken
many different forms over time, but in light of the statutory and prudential limits set
on the exercise of federal courts when it comes to enjoining state domestic relations
proceedings, these efforts have routinely encountered the same fate, rejection by the
courts. Thus, a rising tide of caselaw has found that the Anti-Injunction Act bars
attempts to enjoin pending state domestic relations cases like these proceedings.1
Nonetheless, we are reminded that the Anti-Injunction Act should not be
applied in a reflexive or categorical fashion to bar state court injunctions. Norton v.
Adams, No. 25-2361, 2025 WL 2231797, at *3 (3d Cir. Aug. 1, 2025). Rather, we
must individually assess whether the plaintiffs’ claims fall within any of the three
narrowly construed statutory exceptions to the Act. Id. at *2. Having conducted this
individualized examination, we find that the plaintiff cannot avail himself of any of
these narrowly crafted exceptions to the rule forbidding federal injunctions of state
court proceedings.
At the outset, it is clear that the Act’s third exception—which allows this court
to enjoin state proceedings when necessary “to protect or effectuate its judgments”
28 U.S.C. § 2283—has no application in this case. This exception is plainly
inapposite since we have entered no judgments in favor of the plaintiff which need
protection through injunctive relief.
Likewise, upon reflection, the plaintiff cannot rely on the first narrow
exception to the Anti-Injunction Act which allows federal courts to enjoin state legal
1 Reid v. Luna, No. 23-CV-4818, 2023 WL 8720666, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 18, 2023);
Bonawitz v. Fosko, No. 3:CV-14-0783, 2014 WL 1745890, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 30,
2014); Steinbronn v. City of Philadelphia, No. CIV. A. 92-3744, 1992 WL 328923,
at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 27, 1992).
proceedings when expressly authorized by an Act of Congress. On this score, it bears
repeating that, essentially, the plaintiff invites us under the federal civil rights statute,
42 U.S.C. § 1983, to enjoin a state judge to rule in his favor in specific ways in his
case. As a § 1983 injunction targeting a state court, this claim is not “expressly
authorized by Act of Congress.” Quite the contrary, longstanding precedent, and the
plain language of § 1983 specifically caution against such injunctions.
In the first instance:
The Supreme Court long has recognized that judges are immune from
suit under section 1983 for monetary damages arising from their
judicial acts. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9, 112 S.Ct. 286, 287,
116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225–27, 108
S.Ct. 538, 543–44, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988); Stump v. Sparkman, 435
U.S. 349, 355–56, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 1104, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978).
Gallas v. Supreme Ct. of Pennsylvania, 211 F.3d 760, 768–69 (3d Cir. 2000).
Moreover, this longstanding judicial immunity from liability under § 1983 for
damages claims has also been extended by Congress to claims for injunctive relief
which target state judges. By its terms this seminal civil rights statute largely forbids
such claims, stating that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added).
In this case, notwithstanding the plaintiff’s sweeping allegations of systematic
abuse by the courts, Mr. Gottschall simply has not alleged well pleaded facts which
would support a finding that a declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory
relief is unavailable. Rather, it seems clear that the plaintiff has avenues of
declaratory relief available to him through the state court system. Therefore,
Gottschall has not made the exacting showing necessary to fall within this narrowly
construed exception to the Anti-Injunction Act.
Finally, it cannot be said in this case that the plaintiff may avail himself of the
final exception to the Anti-Injunction Act’s prohibition against enjoining state court
proceedings, an exception that allows federal courts to enjoin state cases where
necessary in aid of its jurisdiction. This exception is unavailable to the plaintiff
because—as discussed below—his legal claims fail on their merits for a host of
reasons.
4. The Plaintiff May Not Sue Private Attorneys Under § 1983.
Beyond these initial concerns, Gottschall’s federal civil rights complaint is
substantively flawed in yet another crucial respect. Stripped to its essence, the
plaintiff’s complaint attempts to bring federal civil rights claims against private
attorneys—including his own lawyer—for actions taken representing their clients in
some state domestic relations litigation. To the extent that the plaintiff seeks to sue
private attorneys and law firms alleging federal civil rights violations, he
fundamentally misconstrues the reach of the federal civil rights statute upon which
he relies, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
It is well established that § 1983 does not, by its own force, create new and
independent legal rights to damages in civil rights actions. Rather, § 1983 simply
serves as a vehicle for private parties to bring civil actions to vindicate violations of
separate and pre-existing legal rights otherwise guaranteed under the Constitution
and laws of the United States. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994); Graham
v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989). Therefore, any analysis of the legal
sufficiency of a cause of action under § 1983 must begin with an assessment of the
validity of the underlying constitutional and statutory claims advanced by the
plaintiff.
In this regard, it is also well settled that:
Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivations of federally protected
rights caused by persons acting under color of state law. The two
essential elements of a § 1983 action are: (1) whether the conduct
complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state
law; and (2) whether this conduct deprived a person of a federally
protected right. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981).
Boykin v. Bloomsburg Univ., 893 F.Supp. 409, 416 (M.D. Pa. 1995), aff’d, 91 F.3d
122 (3d Cir. 1996) (emphasis added). Thus, it is essential to any civil rights claim
brought under § 1983 that the plaintiff allege and prove that the defendants were
acting under color of law when that defendant allegedly violated the plaintiffs’
rights. To the extent that a complaint seeks to hold private parties liable for alleged
civil rights violations, it fails to state a valid cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
since the statute typically requires a showing that the defendants are state actors.
Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999).
This principle applies with particular force to civil rights plaintiffs, like
Gottschall, who may also invite the courts to consider lawsuits against private
attorneys for their roles representing clients in litigation. With respect to this state
action requirement, it is well settled that the conduct of an attorney representing a
client in a state case does not, by itself, rise to the level of state action entitling a
plaintiff to bring a federal civil rights action against counsel. See, e.g., West v.
Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 50 (1988); Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981); Pete
v. Metcalfe, 8 F.3d 214 (5th Cir. 1993). Therefore, to the extent that the complaint
seeks to sue private attorneys and law firms for federal civil rights violations arising
out of their role as counsel in state domestic relations litigation, these claims fail as
a matter of law and will be dismissed.
5. The Plaintiff May Not Use a Civil Case as a Vehicle for a
Criminal Prosecution.
In addition, this civil complaint cites a federal criminal statute. 18 U.S.C. §
241, and apparently invites us to either imply that this federal criminal statute gives
rise to an implied private right of action or asks us to engage in some form of criminal
inquest or proceedings in the context of this civil lawsuit.
This we may not do.
At the outset, Gottschall errs in generally implying a private right of action
based upon federal criminal statutes. Quite the contrary, in this regard:
The Court is guided by the general principle that courts are “reluctant
to infer a private right of action from a criminal prohibition alone,”
especially where the criminal statute is “bare” as to private
enforcement. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
511 U.S. 164, 190 (1994); see also Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83,
86 (1981) (holding that private citizens cannot compel criminal
prosecution). To this end, the Third Circuit has repeatedly held that
criminal statutes generally do not create private rights of action. See
Tezler v. Borough of Englewood Cliffs, 783 F. App'x 253, 257–58 (3d
Cir. 2019); Timm v. Wells Fargo Bank, 701 F. App'x 171, 175 (3d Cir.
2017); Coleman v. Academy Bus, LLC, 858 F. App'x 584, 585 (3d Cir.
2021); see also Caterbone v. Lancaster City Bureau of Police, Civil
Action No. 18-CV-2710, 2018 WL 3549266 at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 24,
2018) (“Criminal statutes do not generally provide a basis for a litigant's
civil claims, and this Court lacks the authority to initiate criminal
proceedings.”).
Miller v. Nelling, No. CV 22-3329-KSM, 2023 WL 2743564, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Mar.
31, 2023).
Nor can the plaintiff convert this civil case into a vehicle for instigating a
criminal prosecution of others. Rather, it is well established that decisions regarding
the filing of criminal charges are the prerogative of the executive branch of
government, are consigned to the sound discretion of prosecutors, and under the
separation of powers doctrine are not subject to judicial fiat. Indeed, it has long been
recognized that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is a matter, “particularly ill-
suited to judicial review.” Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607, 105 S.Ct.
1524, 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985). Recognizing this fact, courts have long held that a
civil rights plaintiff may not seek relief in civil litigation in the form of an order
directing the criminal prosecution of some third parties, finding that civil plaintiffs
lack standing to make such claims and concluding that such relief simply is
unavailable in a civil lawsuit. See, e.g., Ostrowski v. Mehltretter, 20 F. App’x. 87,
90 (2d Cir.2001). See also Kim v. Romero, 877 F.2d 64, 1989 WL 67116 at *1 (9th
Cir. June 14, 1989) (affirming the dismissal of a suit against various prosecuting
authorities for their failure to bring charges against a sheriff for alleged battery);
McMinn v. Damiani, 765 F.2d 145, 1985 WL 13323 (6th Cir. May 3, 1985)
(affirming the dismissal for lack of standing a pro se civil rights case where plaintiff
had sued state prosecuting authorities for failing to investigate or prosecute claims
against various state judges and lawyers); Gessner v. Dep't of Corr., 3:14-CV-111,
2014 WL 972290 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2014); Snyder v. Aaron, CIV.A. 05B1602,
2006 WL 544466 (W.D.Pa. Mar.6, 2006).
Therefore, to the extent that the plaintiff attempts to either generally imply a
private right of action from a federal criminal statute or assert a right to pursue
criminal charges in the guise of a civil lawsuit, these claims also fail as a matter of
law and will be dismissed.
6. The Judge Named in the Complaint is Immune from Liability.
Additionally, Gottschall’s complaint sues a state court judge for judicial acts;
namely, presiding over the plaintiff’s state domestics relations case. This claim also
fails because the state court judge who presided over this domestic relations case is
immune from civil liability in this case. Thus, to the extent that the plaintiff seeks in
this complaint to hold this judge personally liable for civil rights violations, based
upon an alleged failure to act favorably in ruling upon a prior civil case, it is well
settled that the judge is individually cloaked with immunity from liability.
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that those officials
performing judicial, quasi-judicial, and prosecutorial functions in our adversarial
system must be entitled to some measure of protection from personal liability for
acts taken in their official capacities. In order to provide this degree of protection
from liability for judicial officials, the courts have held that judges, Mireless v.
Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 13 (1991); prosecutors, Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427
(1976); and those who perform adjudicative functions, Imbler, 424 U.S. at 423 n. 20
(grand jurors); Harper v. Jeffries, 808 F.2d 281, 284 (3d. Cir.1986) (parole board
adjudicators); are entitled to immunity from personal liability for actions they take
in our adversarial system of justice.
These longstanding common law immunities apply here and prevent
Gottschall from maintaining this civil action against the judge named in this
complaint since the judge is entitled to judicial immunity for his actions in these
prior proceedings and is absolutely immune from personal liability for any judicial
acts. See, e.g., Arsad v. Means, 365 F. App’x 327 (3d Cir.2010); Figueroa v.
Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435 (3d Cir. 2000). As we have explained when rejecting
similar efforts to impose personal civil rights liability on a judge, this immunity is
both broad and absolute:
“It is a well-settled principle of law that judges are generally ‘immune
from a suit for money damages.’ ” Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d
435, 440 (3d Cir.2000) (quoting Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9, 112
S.Ct. 286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991) (per curiam), and citing Randall v.
Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 536, 19 L.Ed. 285 (1868)). “The
doctrine of judicial immunity is founded upon the premise that a judge,
in performing his or her judicial duties, should be free to act upon his
or her convictions without threat of suit for damages.” Id. (citations
omitted). Therefore, “[a] judge is absolutely immune from liability for
his [or her] judicial acts even if his [or her] exercise of authority is
flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors,” Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978),
and “[j]udicial immunity cannot be overcome by allegations of bad
faith or malice” Goldhaber v. Higgins, 576 F.Supp.2d 694, 703
(W.D.Pa.2007). Such immunity can be overcome only where a judge's
acts are nonjudicial in nature, or where such actions, while judicial in
nature, are “taken in the complete absence of all
jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12.
Catanzaro v. Collins, CIV. A. 09–922, 2010 WL 1754765 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 27,
2010), aff'd, 447 F. App’x 397 (3d Cir. 2011). As the Third Circuit has further
explained, “[a] judicial officer in the performance of his or her duties has absolute
immunity from suit. Simply put, ‘[a] judge will not be deprived of immunity because
the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his
authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the ‘clear
absence of all jurisdiction.’” Kwasnik v. Leblon, 228 F. App’x 238, 243 (3d Cir.
2007) (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1978) (citations
omitted)). Since the gravamen of Gottschall’s complaint against this judge relates to
his judicial actions, the plaintiff’s claims against this judicial defendant fail as a
matter of law.
7. Courthouse Staff Are Also Entitled to Quasi-Judicial Immunity
In his complaint Gottschall also appears to level claims against courthouse
staff including the prothonotary, a stenographer, and other unnamed personnel.
These various claims, however, encounter yet another common legal obstacle. It is
well settled that courthouse staff are also cloaked in immunity for their quasi-judicial
functions. As we have noted in this regard:
[N]umerous courts have held that certain tasks performed by
prothonotaries and court clerks are shielded by quasi-judicial
immunity. See Marcedes v. Barrett, 453 F.2d 391 (3d Cir.1971)
(holding that a prothonotary who allegedly refused to send the plaintiff
a requested transcript was acting as a “quasi-judicial official”);
Lockhart, 411 F.2d at 460 (holding that a prothonotary who was acting
under court direction was immune from suit); Locke, 2008 WL
2096815, at *3 (holding that a prothonotary who determined that a
motion for reconsideration was not timely filed was performing a
discretionary function and was immune from suit); see also Denlinger,
2007 WL 4615960, at *3 (using “court clerks and prothonotaries” as
examples of individuals who may be entitled to quasi-judicial
immunity); O'Nembo, 2006 WL 3857487, at *2 (same); Hurst, No. 06-
146, 2006 WL 1328729, at *6 (D.Del. May 16, 2006) (same);
McKnight v. Baker, 415 F.Supp.2d 559, 563 (E.D.Pa.2006) (same).
Conklin v. Warrington Twp., No. CIV.A. 1:06-CV-2245, 2008 WL 2704629, at *9
(M.D. Pa. July 7, 2008). This quasi-judicial immunity is grounded upon and derived
from the immunity enjoyed by judges, and acknowledges that:
In certain circumstances, the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity
insulates from suit those public officials who “perform functions
closely associated with the judicial process.” Locke v. Caldwell, No.
07-2272, 2008 WL 2096812, at *3 (E.D.Pa. May 16, 2008) (quoting
Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 200, 106 S.Ct. 496, 88 L.Ed.2d
507 (1985)). The dispositive inquiry in determining whether to afford
an individual quasi-judicial immunity is “the nature of the function
performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it.” Tucker v.
I'Jama, 173 F. App'x 970, 971 (3d Cir.2006). In other words, quasi-
judicial immunity attaches when a “public official's role is ‘functionally
comparable’ to that of a judge,” Dotzel v. Ashbridge, 438 F.3d 320, 325
(3d Cir.2006) (quoting Hamilton v. Leavy, 322 F.3d 776, 785 (3d
Cir.2003)), or when a public official acts “pursuant to court directive,”
see Lockhart v. Hoenstine, 411 F.2d 455, 460 (3d Cir.1969) (basing the
aforementioned rule upon the “manifest unfairness of subjecting one to
suit as a consequence of action taken at the direction of officials over
whom the individual actor has no power or control”); see also
Alexander v. McMonagle, No. 99-1298, 1999 WL 1210844, at *1
(E.D.Pa. Dec.9, 1999) (“Quasi-judicial officers who act in accordance
with their duties or at the direction of a judicial officer are immune from
suit.”)
Id. at *8.
Therefore, to the extent that Gottschall is attempting to sue court staff for
performing ministerial functions, these tasks which are an integral part of the judicial
process are cloaked in quasi-judicial immunity.
8. Gottschall May Not Sue the County Court System
Gottschall also names Lycoming County ads a defendant and apparently seeks
to impute the actions of the Court of Common Pleas to the county itself. This claim
warrants only brief consideration. As we have observed in the past:
These state court agencies, . . ., are defined by statute as arms of the
state courts, and are institutions of state government. See, e.g., Walters
v. Washington County, No. 06–1355, 2009 WL 7936639 (W.D.Pa.
March 23, 2009); Van Tassel v. Lawrence County Domestics Relations
Section, No. 09–266, 2009 WL 3052411 (W.D.Pa. Sept.22, 2009).
Therefore, individual counties cannot be held liable for the actions of
state court judges, who are part of the unified state court system.
Since the courts are institutions of state government, this complaint
further runs afoul of basic constitutional rules limiting lawsuits against
state agencies and officials. As a matter of constitutional law, the
Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution provides that “[t]he Judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the ... States
....“, U.S. Const. Amend XI. By its terms, the Eleventh Amendment
strictly limits the power of federal courts to entertain cases brought by
citizens against the state and state agencies. Moreover, a suit brought
against an individual acting in his or her official capacity constitutes a
suit against the state and, therefore, also is barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109
S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989).
Pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, states, state agencies and state
officials who are sued in their official capacity are generally immune
from lawsuits in federal courts brought against them by citizens.
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134
L.Ed.2d 252 (1996). The constitutional protections afforded to the
states and the state court system under the Eleventh Amendment also
expressly apply to the state agencies that are integral parts of
Pennsylvania's unitary court system. These court officers and agencies
enjoy immunity from lawsuit under the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g.,
Walters v. Washington County, No. 06–1355, 2009 WL 7936639
(W.D.Pa. March 23, 2009); Van Tassel v. Lawrence County Domestics
Relations Section, No. 09–266, 2009 WL 3052411 (W.D.Pa. Sept.22,
2009). Absent an express waiver of the immunity established by the
Eleventh Amendment, all of these agencies, and their employees who
are sued in their official capacities, are absolutely immune from
lawsuits in federal court.
Rose v. York Cty., No. 1:13-CV-2056, 2013 WL 4456220, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 1,
2013), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:13-CV-2056, 2013 WL 4434748
(M.D. Pa. Aug. 16, 2013). Therefore, this claim fails for two reasons. First, the courts
are branches of state, not county, government. Second, as branches of state
government, the court system is immune from liability in federal court pursuant to
the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. Given this settled,
constitutionally rooted immunity Lycoming County will be dismissed as a
defendant.
9. Any Supplemental State Law Claims Should Be Dismissed.
While Gottschall’s complaint seems to rely upon federal claims which we find
fail as a matter of law, the dismissal of these federal claims dictates the appropriate
course we should follow in addressing the ancillary state law claims that the plaintiff
may wish to pursue.
In a case such as this, where the jurisdiction of the federal court was premised
on alleged federal claims which are found to be subject to dismissal at the outset of
litigation, the proper course generally is for “the court [to] decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff's state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)
(“The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim
under subsection (a) if- ... the district court has dismissed all claims over which it
has original jurisdiction.”); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966)
(holding that when federal causes of action are dismissed, federal courts should not
separately entertain pendent state claims).” Bronson v. White, No. 05-2150, 2007
WL 3033865, *13 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 2007) (Caputo, J.) (adopting report and
recommendation dismissing ancillary malpractice claim against dentist); see Ham v.
Greer, 269 F. App'x 149, 151 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing United Mine Workers, 383 U.S.
at 726 and Tully v. Mott Supermkts., Inc., 540 F.2d 187, 196 (3d Cir. 1976))
(“Because the District Court appropriately dismissed [the inmate's] Bivens claims,
no independent basis for federal jurisdiction remains”). As the Supreme Court has
aptly observed:
Needless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of
comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for
them a surer-footed reading of applicable law. Certainly, if the federal
claims are dismissed before trial, even though not insubstantial in a
jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed as well.
United Mine Workers, 383 U.S. at 726 (footnotes omitted).
The basic tenet that we should refrain from needlessly asserting jurisdiction
over what are essentially state law claims applies with particular force here where
we are asked to re-examine and potentially interfere with prior state court
proceedings in the field of domestic relations. We should approach such issues with
great caution given our lack of jurisdiction in this field since:
The domestic relations exception “divests the federal courts of power
to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees,” Ankenbrandt v.
Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703, 112 S.Ct. 2206, 119 L.Ed.2d 468 (1992),
because it has long been settled that “[t]he whole subject of the
domestic relations of husband and wife ... belongs to the laws of the
states, and not to the laws of the United States,” Ex parte Burrus, 136
U.S. 586, 593–94, 10 S.Ct. 850, 34 L.Ed. 500 (1890).
Daniels v. Cynkin, 34 F. Supp. 3d 433, 441 (D.N.J. 2014), aff'd, 597 F. App'x 704
(3d Cir. 2015).
Therefore, in the exercise of our discretion, we will decline to assert
supplemental jurisdiction over potential ancillary state law domestic relations claims
in this case where all potential federal claims brought before us fail as a matter of
law. See Payne v. Doe #1, No. 1:22-CV-1876, 2023 WL 3493315, at *5–6 (M.D.
Pa. Mar. 27, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:22-CV-1876, 2023
WL 3480895 (M.D. Pa. May 16, 2023).
10. The Complaint Will Be Dismissed Without Prejudice
While the complaint, as written, is deficient in numerous ways, we recognize
that in civil rights cases, pro se plaintiffs often should be afforded an opportunity to
amend a complaint before the complaint is dismissed in its entirety, see Fletcher-
Hardee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, 482 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 2007), unless
granting further leave to amend would be futile or result in undue delay. Alston v.
Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). In this case, the plaintiff’s complaint is,
on its face, flawed since these pro se pleadings do not contain sufficient factual
recitals to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Therefore, the complaint
will be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Nonetheless acting out of an abundance of caution, we will give the plaintiff leave
to amend this complaint in order to endeavor to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, provided he acts promptly.
An appropriate order follows.
S/Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge
DATED: August 5, 2026