Castillo

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

ISABEL CASTILLO, individually and §

as next friend of N.C., a minor child, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

v. § Civil Action No. 3:26-CV-0658-X

§

IRVING INDEPENDENT SCHOOL §

DISTRICT, et al., §

§

Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiff Isabel Castillo’s (Castillo) motion for leave to file

a second amended complaint (Doc. 11), and a motion to dismiss Castillo’s first

amended complaint from Defendants Irving Independent School District (IISD),

Jessica Rodges (Rodges), and Maria Mendoza’s (Mendoza) (the individuals as the

“Individual Defendants”) (collectively, the “Defendants”). (Doc. 10). After reviewing

the record and applicable law, the Court DENIES the Motion for Leave, GRANTS

the Motion to Dismiss, and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Castillo’s claims.

I. Background

This case arises out of an alleged sexual assault committed against a

ten-year-old student (N.C.) at Lively Elementary School, a campus within IISD.

In January 2024, Castillo alleges that another student (“Student A”) intentionally,

and without consent, touched N.C.’s genitals beneath her clothing while the two were

left unsupervised (the “incident”). N.C. then allegedly reported the incident to

Rodges, the music teacher in charge of the class the two students were in. Castillo

alleges that Rodges failed to take prompt and timely action in response to this report.

Castillo also alleges that N.C. informed Mendoza of the sexual assault later that same

day, but that Mendoza questioned N.C. in Student A’s presence and similarly failed

to act in a prompt and timely manner.

Castillo asserts that the report to Rodges and Mendoza was routed through

campus reporting channels to those with authority to implement corrective action,

but that IISD did not do so in an effective, adequate, prompt, or timely manner. In

the following days and weeks, Castillo alleges that N.C. experienced verbal taunts

related to the incident as well as feelings of fear and humiliation. N.C. then allegedly

suffered an impairment in access to educational opportunities. When Castillo learned

of the alleged January incident and subsequent inadequate IISD response, she sent

a formal Notice of Claim to IISD in June 2024, as well as a complaint to the Texas

Education Agency Special Investigations Unit.

Castillo initially brought suit for various federal claims against IISD and for

various state tort claims against both IISD and the Individual Defendants.1

Defendants moved to dismiss the original complaint.2 Castillo then filed an amended

complaint asserting only federal claims against IISD, Rodges, and Mendoza.3

Because the amended complaint became the operative pleading, the Court denied the

1 Doc. 1-1.

2 Doc. 4.

3 Doc. 7.

motion to dismiss as moot.4 Defendants then filed a new motion to dismiss, which is

now before the Court.5 Following the filing of the Motion to Dismiss, Castillo moved

for leave to file a second amended complaint, which is also before the Court.6

II. Legal Standards

A. Leave to Amend

While Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) “provides that such leave shall be

freely given when justice so requires . . . it is by no means automatic.”7 The Court

has discretion over whether to grant or deny leave to amend, and it “may consider

such factors as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant,

repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue

prejudice to the opposing party, and futility of amendment.”8 “The Court is not

required to grant leave to amend where doing so would encourage dilatory or abusive

tactics, such as requesting amendment solely to force a defendant to file a new motion

to dismiss.”9

4 Doc. 8.

5 Doc. 10.

6 Doc. 11.

7 Wimm v. Jack Eckerd Corp., 3 F.3d 137, 139 (5th Cir. 1993) (cleaned up).

8 Id.

9 Gore v. Cedar Hill Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 3:15-CV-3963-M-BN, 2016 WL 4597513 (N.D. Tex.

July 26, 2016) (Horan, M. J.), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:15-CV-3963-M-BN, 2016 WL

4593515 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 2, 2016).

B. Failure to State a Claim

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a complaint must “state a claim upon

which relief can be granted.”10 The complaint must allege facts sufficient “to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”11 And there must be sufficient facts for

the Court to be able “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the misconduct alleged.”12 In its evaluation, the Court construes the complaint

liberally in favor of the plaintiff and accepts all well pled facts in the complaint as

true.13 Conclusory statements or legal conclusions are not credited.14

III. Analysis

A. Motion for Leave to Amend

Castillo requests leave to amend an already amended complaint, devoid of

substantive changes in factual allegations or in causes of action.15 The proposed

second amended complaint merely reorganizes language from the first amended

complaint into a different paragraph structure with near-identical language.16 And

many such instances of reorganization were apparently done hastily and unartfully,

given the numerous instances of mid-sentence paragraph breaks.17

10 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).

11 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

12 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

13 Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000).

14 See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

15 Compare Doc. 11-2, with Doc. 7.

16 Compare Doc. 11-2, with Doc. 7.

17 See Doc. 11-2 ¶¶ 12–13, 54–55, 70–71, 76–80, 99–100.

There is virtually no change in the substance of the facts alleged or the claims

asserted between the two complaints, which weighs toward the factor of “futility of

amendment.”18 Combined with numerous errors, this rehashed complaint does not

represent a good faith effort to “more precisely frame the issues for resolution.”19 The

Court thus finds the Motion for Leave to have a “dilatory motive” which will cause

“undue delay” if allowed to continue unchecked.20 The Plaintiff’s is “a bold strategy,”

but it does not “pay[] off” here.21 The Motion for Leave is DENIED.

B. Motion to Dismiss

Without leave to amend, Castillo’s first amended complaint remains the live

pleading.22 So the Court turns to the Motion to Dismiss to determine whether that

complaint pleads “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”23

i.Title IX Claim (against IISD)

There are two avenues for Title IX claims: (1) claims based on an institution’s

official policy of sex discrimination; and (2) claims based on discrimination where an

appropriate person has actual knowledge of the discrimination and responds with

18 Wimm, 3 F.3d at 139 (cleaned up).

19 Doc. 11 ¶ 9.

20 Wimm, 3 F.3d at 139 (cleaned up).

21 Dodgeball: A True Underdog Story (Rawson Marshall Thurber dir., 20th Century Fox 2004)

(“It’s a bold strategy, Cotton. Let’s see if it pays off for ‘em.”); see Doc. 12 at 2 (noting the “5 Ds of

Dodgeball”).

22 Doc. 7.

23 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

deliberate indifference.24 Under Title IX, a student-on-student sexual harassment

claim against a school district requires that:

(1) [The district] had actual knowledge of the harassment, (2) the

harasser was under the district’s control, (3) the harassment was based

on the victim’s sex, (4) the harassment was so severe, pervasive, and

objectively offensive that it effectively barred the victim’s access to an

educational opportunity or benefit, and (5) the district was deliberately

indifferent to the harassment.25

To properly state a claim of deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must allege that

the school district’s response, or lack thereof, was clearly unreasonable in light of

known circumstances—“so deficient as to itself constitute harassment”—or amounted

to an intentional choice rather than mere negligence or unreasonableness.26 This is

a “high bar.”27 The Supreme Court has noted that “[p]eer harassment, in particular,

is less likely to satisfy these requirements than is teacher-student harassment.”28

Here, taking Castillo’s allegations as true, IISD did not fail to take action.

Rather, it failed to take “prompt and appropriate action” that Castillo asserts would

have been “reasonably calculated,” “effective,” and “meaningful.”29 Moreover,

24 Poloceno v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 826 F. App’x 359, 362 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam)

(citing Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998)).

25 Sanches v. Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., 647 F.3d 156, 165 (5th Cir. 2011)

(cleaned up).

26 I.L. v. Hou. Indep. Sch. Dist., 776 F. App’x 839, 843 (5th Cir. 2019) (emphasis in original).

27 Sanches v. Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., 647 F.3d 156, 167 (5th Cir. 2011)

(cleaned up).

28 Davis Next Friend LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. Of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 653 (1999)

(cleaned up).

29 Doc. 7 ¶ 41.

Castillo only alleges one instance of sexual assault, followed by “continuing fear,

anxiety, nightmares, and verbal taunts related to the assault.”30

When considering a student-on-student harassment claim, the Supreme Court

has explained that “[i]t is not enough to show . . . that a student has been teased . . . or

called offensive names.”31 Therefore, the unspecified “verbal taunts” alleged in the

complaint are not enough to show continuing harassment toward which IISD was

deliberately indifferent. Further, the Fifth Circuit has held that “[s]chools are not

required to remedy the harassment or accede to a parent’s remedial demands . . . and

courts should refrain from second-guessing the disciplinary decisions made by school

administrators”32 so long as the “response is not clearly unreasonable in light of the

known circumstances.”33 Without specific factual allegations about how IISD

actually responded and why its actions were clearly unreasonable—as opposed to the

complaint’s general assertions that IISD did not do enough—the live complaint

doesn’t adequately plead deliberate indifference.

Additionally, because the complaint alleges a single instance of harassment,

without a specific factual allegation of IISD having prior notice, it does not rise to the

level of having “the systemic effect of denying the victim equal access to an

educational program or activity.”34 The assertion that “school personnel had received

30 Id. ¶ 26.

31 Davis, 526 U.S. at 652 (cleaned up).

32 Sanches, 647 F.3d at 167–68 (cleaned up).

33 Menzia v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 47 F.4th 354, 364 (5th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up).

34 See Davis, 526 U.S. at 652–53 (“[A]lthough, in theory, a single instance of sufficiently severe

one-on-one peer harassment could be said to have such an effect, we think it unlikely that Congress

would have thought such behavior sufficient to rise to this level in light of the inevitability of student

or were aware of prior concerns involving inappropriate touching and/or similar

misconduct by Student A” is conclusory and does not serve to establish notice by IISD

such that they were deliberately indifferent to the incident itself.35

Castillo’s Title IX claim is currently deficient for failing to allege that IISD

responded with deliberate indifference once it had actual notice of any specific case

of harassment. The Court GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss as to Castillo’s Title IX

student-on-student harassment claim.

ii. Monell Liability Claim (against IISD)

Municipal and county governments may be sued under section 1983 if they are

“alleged to have caused a constitutional tort through a policy statement, ordinance,

regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.”36

This municipal, or Monell, liability applies to school districts.37 To establish Monell

liability, a plaintiff “must plead facts that plausibly establish that (1) an official policy

(2) promulgated by the municipal policymaker (3) was the moving force behind the

violation of a constitutional right.”38

Official Policy

Castillo does not adequately plead the existence of an official policy for the

purposes of establishing Monell liability.

misconduct and the amount of litigation that would be invited by entertaining claims of official

indifference to a single instance of one-on-one peer harassment.”) (cleaned up).

35 Doc. 7 ¶ 33.

36 Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls, 614 F.3d 161, 166 (5th Cir. 2010) (cleaned up).

37 Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 454 (5th Cir. 1994).

38 St. Maron Props., L.L.C. v. City of Hou., 78 F.4th 754, 760 (5th Cir. 2023) (cleaned up).

There are three ways of defining an official custom or policy for the

purposes of Monell liability: 1. A policy statement, ordinance, regulation,

or decision that is officially adopted and promulgated by the

municipality’s lawmaking officers or by an official to whom the

lawmakers have delegated policy-making authority; or 2. A persistent,

widespread practice of city officials or employees, which, although not

authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common

and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents

municipal policy. Actual or constructive knowledge of such custom must

be attributable to the governing body of the municipality or to an official

to whom that body had delegated policy-making authority. 3. A single

decision may also constitute municipal policy in the rare circumstance

when the official or entity performing the specific act that forms the

basis of the section 1983 claim is the official or entity possessing final

policymaking authority.39

“Liability must rest on official policy, meaning the governmental entity’s

policy, not the policy of an individual official.”40 For the purposes of section 1983, a

policy is defined as “duly promulgated policy statements, ordinances or

regulations.”41 A custom is defined as “a persistent, widespread practice of City

officials or employees, which, although not authorized by officially adopted and

promulgated policy, is so common and well-settled as to constitute a custom that

fairly represents municipal policy.”42

Here, the complaint only alleges specific facts as to IISD’s response to the

incident, without any assertions related to other responses. This is insufficient to

39 Fareed v. City of Carrollton, No. 3:24-CV-3251-N, 2025 WL 1707957, at *2–3 (N.D. Tex. June

17, 2025 (Godbey, C.J.) (cleaned up).

40 Hoskins v. Kaufman Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 3:03-CV-0130-D, 2003 WL 21517830, at *6 (N.D.

Tex. June 30, 2003) (Fitzwater, J.) (citing Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 769 (5th Cir.

1984) (en banc)).

41 Piotrowski v. City of Hou., 237 F.3d 567, 579 (5th Cir. 2001).

42 Id. (quoting Webster v. City of Hou., 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc)).

establish a “persistent, widespread practice,” so Castillo fails on Monell’s first

prong.43

Policymaker

The chief policymaker for IISD is its Board of Trustees.44 However, Castillo is

not required to plead the identity of IISD’s policymaker. Instead, she must plead

with “more than speculation that any particular policymaker . . . knew about the

alleged custom.”45 The complaint falls short of this standard, stating in conclusory

terms that the IISD’s Board of Trustees “and/or one or more properly delegated final

policymakers for student-safety response, maintained, approved, knowingly

permitted, ratified, or were deliberately indifferent to the constitutionally deficient

policies, customs, and practices described herein.”46 Without more, the complaint

does not specifically allege any facts to establish that the Board of Trustees knew

about any policy or custom.

Moving Force

Castillo alleges IISD’s policies “were a moving force behind the violation of

N.C.’s rights under the Equal Protection Clause.”47 To plead a moving force, “a

43 Fareed, 2025 WL 1707957, at *2–3 (cleaned up).

44 TEX. EDUC. CODE §§ 11.151, 11.1511, 11.1513, 11.171.

45 Peña v. City of Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 613, 623 (5th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up).

46 Doc. 7 ¶ 51; see Doc. 7 ¶ 54 (“Alternatively and additionally, upon information and belief,

IISD’s final policymakers and/or properly delegated final policymakers were deliberately indifferent

to the obvious need for constitutionally adequate training, supervision, escalation protocols, and

protective-response measures for elementary-school staff confronted with reports of student-on-

student sexual assault, making the resulting violation of a female student’s equal-protection rights

highly predictable.”).

47 Doc. 7 ¶ 55.

plaintiff must show that the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of

culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action

and the deprivation of federal rights.”48 The “municipal decision” must “reflect[]

deliberate indifference to the risk that a violation of a particular constitutional or

statutory right will follow the decision.”49 The Fifth Circuit has made clear that this

is a “high standard.”50 “The connection must be more than a mere but for coupling

between cause and effect.”51 So “a showing of simple or even heightened negligence

will not suffice.”52

Castillo needs to plead a sufficient number of prior similar instances (of legally

inadequate investigations of student-on-student harassment) that the board was

aware of before this incident to show that it was essentially a board-approved IISD

custom to have legally inadequate investigations. Castillo’s allegations fail to meet

Monell’s demanding causation requirement. Even assuming there was an official

custom or policy promulgated by a final policymaker in relation to the incident,

Castillo has not sufficiently pled either that it was the moving force behind

subsequent constitutional violations or that it was the cause of the incident.

48 Valle v. City of Hou., 613 F.3d 536, 542 (5th Cir. 2010) (cleaned up).

49 Id.

50 Id.

51 Id. at 546 (cleaned up).

52 Id. at 542 (cleaned up).

Deliberate Indifference—Failure to Train

To make a claim of failure to provide proper training for Monell liability to

attach, a plaintiff must show “(1) the municipality’s training policy or procedure was

inadequate; (2) the inadequate training policy was a moving force in causing violation

of the plaintiff’s rights; and (3) the municipality was deliberately indifferent in

adopting its training policy.”53 “In order for liability to attach based on an inadequate

training claim, a plaintiff must allege with specificity how a particular training

program is defective.”54

The Fifth Circuit has “been wary of finding municipal liability” for failure to

train claims based on a single incident.55 “Absent proof of pattern, deliberate

indifference can still be inferred if the factfinder determines that the risk of

constitutional violations was or should have been an obvious or highly predictable

consequence of the alleged training inadequacy.”56 “For a violation to be highly

predictable, the municipality must have failed to train its employees concerning a

clear constitutional duty implicated in recurrent situations that a particular

employee is certain to face.”57 “Only where a failure to train reflects a deliberate or

conscious choice by a municipality . . . can a city be liable for such a failure under

§ 1983.”58

53 Id. at 544 (cleaned up).

54 Zarnow, 614 F.3d at 170 (cleaned up).

55 Burge v. St. Tammany Par., 336 F.3d 363, 373 (5th Cir. 2003) (cleaned up).

56 Littell v. Hou. Indep. Sch. Dist., 894 F.3d 616, 624 (5th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up).

57 Hutcheson v. Dall. Cnty., 994 F.3d 477, 482–83 (5th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up).

58 City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989) (cleaned up).

Because Castillo has not adequately pled a policy, pattern, or custom, or a

failure to train, the Court finds that she has failed to meet the standard to plead

Monell liability. Therefore, the Court GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss as to Castillo’s

Monell liability claim.

iii.Individual Liability Claim (against Rodges and Mendoza)

The Motion to Dismiss also alleges that qualified immunity bars Castillo’s

Equal Protection claims against Rodges and Mendoza. When a defendant raises

qualified immunity as a defense, the analysis changes and the burden shifts to the

plaintiff to show (1) the violation of a constitutional right, and (2) that the defendant’s

conduct was objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time

of the incident.59 “Therefore, unless existing precedent squarely governs the conduct

at issue, an official will be entitled to qualified immunity.”60 “The burden here is

heavy,” as a “right is clearly established only if preexisting precedent has placed the

constitutional question beyond debate.”61 That heavy burden is not met with citation

to general principles.62

Castillo contends that:

Rodges had actual notice of the reported sexual assault when N.C.

immediately reported that Student A had touched her private area

during class. Despite receiving that report, Rodges failed to take prompt

and effective action reasonably calculated to protect N.C., including

failing to secure immediate separation of the students, failing to obtain

59 See Connelly v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 484 F.3d 343, 346 (5th Cir. 2007).

60 Cope v. Cogdill, 3 F.4th 198, 204 (5th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up) (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen,

543 U.S. 194, 201 (2004) (per curiam)).

61 Harmon v. City of Arlington, 16 F.4th 1159, 1165 (5th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up)

(quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)).

62 See id. at 1165–66.

immediate administrative intervention, failing to ensure timely

notification to N.C.’s parent, and failing to initiate or ensure prompt

escalation of the report to officials able to protect N.C. and prevent

further harm.63

As to Mendoza, Castillo asserts that:

Mendoza likewise had actual notice of the reported assault when N.C.

reported the incident to her later that same day. Despite receiving that

report, Mendoza failed to take prompt and effective protective action

and instead questioned N.C. in the presence of Student A, thereby

further humiliating and traumatizing N.C. and failing to safeguard her

from continued fear, exposure, and hostile educational conditions.

Castillo cites Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee64 for the proposition

“that schoolchildren are protected against sex-based discrimination under the Equal

Protection Clause and that school officials may not, after actual notice of known sex-

based harm, respond with deliberate indifference in a manner that leaves the student

exposed to continuing injury and unequal educational conditions.”65 However, this

case did not reach the merits, and the facts alleged involved multiple incidents of

inappropriate sexual touching without mention of any “verbal taunts” as raised in

the complaint at issue here.66

While “it is not necessary that a previous case presenting identical facts exist

in order for a right to be clearly established,”67 courts still require that the

63 Doc. 7 ¶ 60.

64 555 U.S. 246, 257–58.

65 Doc. 13 ¶ 17.

66 See Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at 249–50.

67 Aguirre v. City of S.A., 995 F.3d 395, 415 (5th Cir. 2021).

“unlawfulness of the challenged conduct must be beyond debate,” especially when the

plaintiff fails to point to any case law that squarely governs the undisputed facts.68

Here, Castillo has failed to identify a single case that governs the specific

conduct at issue here. Because “[a]ctions and decisions by officials that are merely

inept, erroneous, ineffective, or negligent do not amount to deliberate indifference

and do not divest officials of qualified immunity,” there has been no assertion of the

violation of a clearly established right.69 Assuming without deciding that Castillo

could show that Rodges and Mendoza’s actions constituted unconstitutional

deliberate indifference in violation of section 1983, this is not an obvious case of

unlawful conduct “beyond debate.”70 Rodges and Mendoza are entitled to qualified

immunity as a matter of law.

IV. Dismissal without Prejudice

Next, the Court must consider whether dismissal should be with or without

prejudice. “District courts often afford plaintiffs at least one opportunity to cure

pleading deficiencies before dismissing a case, unless it is clear that the defects are

incurable or the plaintiffs advise the court that they are unwilling or unable to amend

in a manner that will avoid dismissal.”71 While Castillo has already amended her

complaint once as of right, she has not done so with the benefit of the Court

68 Estate of Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 330 (5th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up).

69 Pierce v. Hearne Indep. Sch. Dist., 600 F. App’x. 194, 198 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam).

70 Id. (cleaned up).

71 In re Am. Airlines, Inc., Privacy Litig., 370 F.Supp.2d 552, 567–68 (N.D. Tex. 2005)

(Fitzwater, J.) (cleaned up).

identifying the defects in her complaint. So the Court grants leave to file an amended

complaint no later than 28 days after this order.

V. Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court DENIES the Motion for Leave, GRANTS the Motion

to Dismiss, and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Castillo’s claims. The Court

also GRANTS Castillo leave to amend her complaint to cure its deficiencies within

28 days of the issuance of this Order. Castillo’s amended complaint is limited to

curing the deficiencies identified by the Court. Castillo cannot add new claims or

parties to the amended complaint.

IT ISSO ORDERED this 3rd day of August, 2026.

Lo,db STARR

UNITEDASTATES DISTRICT JUDGE

16