Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,

ALLSTATE FIRE AND CASUALTY

INSURANCE COMPANY, ALLSTATE REPORT AND

INDEMNITY COMPANY, AND RECOMMENDATION

ALLSTATE PROPERTY AND

CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, 25-CV-3240

(Merchant, J.)

Plaintiffs, (Marutollo, M.J.)

v.

GVA GROUP INC., ALEKSANDR AGEYEV,

JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 5 AND

ABC CORPORATIONS 1 THROUGH 5,

Defendants.

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JOSEPH A. MARUTOLLO, United States Magistrate Judge:

Plaintiffs Allstate Insurance Company, Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance Company,

Allstate Indemnity Company, and Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company

(collectively, “Plaintiffs”) bring this action against Defendants GVA Group Inc. (“GVA Group”)

and Aleksandr Ageyev (collectively, “Defaulting Defendants”), as well as John Does 1 through 5

and ABC Corporations 1 through 5 (collectively, “John Doe Defendants”), alleging an insurance

fraud scheme in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”),

18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq., as well as New York common law fraud and unjust enrichment claims.

See generally Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiffs also seek a declaratory judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 2201

regarding Plaintiffs’ obligation to pay Defaulting Defendants’ unpaid claims. See id.

Currently pending before this Court, on a referral from the Honorable Orelia E. Merchant,

United States District Judge, is Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment against Defaulting

Defendants. See Dkt. No. 27; Referral Order, dated Feb. 13, 2026. For the reasons set forth below,

the undersigned respectfully recommends that Plaintiffs’ motion be granted in part and denied in

part.1

I. Background

A. Factual Background

The following facts are taken from the Complaint (Dkt. No. 1), Plaintiffs’ default judgment

motion and the attachments thereto (Dkt. No. 27), and Plaintiffs’ submissions in response to

various Court orders (Dkt. Nos. 12-18, 20, 29, 30). The facts are assumed to be true for the

purposes of this motion. See Finkel v. Romanowicz, 577 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that

“[i]n light of [the defendant’s] default, a court is required to accept all of [the plaintiff’s] factual

allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor” (citation omitted)).

Plaintiffs—corporations organized under the laws of the State of Illinois and having their

principal places of business in Illinois—are “duly organized and licensed to engage in the writing

of automobile insurance policies in the State of New York and provide automobile insurance

coverage to their policyholders under and in accordance with New York State law.” Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶

62-67. Pursuant to New York’s Comprehensive Motor Vehicle Insurance Reparations Act (the

“No-Fault Law”), N.Y. Ins. Law § 5101, et seq., “Plaintiffs are required to pay, inter alia, for health

service expenses that are reasonably incurred as a result of injuries suffered by occupants of their

insured motor vehicles or pedestrians [(“Covered Persons”)], which arise from the use or operation

of such motor vehicles in the State of New York.” Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 19. “Covered Persons can also

assign these benefits to doctors and other properly licensed healthcare providers, including

1 Jessica Argento, a judicial intern who is a second-year law student at St. John’s University School of Law,

is gratefully acknowledged for her assistance in the research of this Report and Recommendation.

[durable medical equipment (“DME”)2] retailers, enabling them to bill insurance companies

directly for their services.” Id.

GVA Group—a New York corporation with its principal place of business in Brooklyn,

New York—is a retail DME supply company. Id. ¶ 69. GVA Group “bills for medical supplies

provided to, among others, individuals covered under the No-[F]ault Law.” Id. ¶ 79. “In exchange

for its services, GVA Group accepts assignments of benefits from Covered Persons covered under

the No-Fault Law and submits claims for payment to No-Fault insurance carriers, in general, and

to Plaintiffs, in particular.” Id. Ageyev is the “principal, officer, and/or director of GVA Group”

and “operated, managed, and/or controlled [GVA Group’s] activities.” Id. ¶ 68.3

In this action, Plaintiffs seek “to recover more than $53,000.00 that Defendants stole from

Plaintiffs through the submission of thousands of false and/or fraudulent insurance claims for

[DME] and/or orthotic devices.”4 Id. ¶ 2; see also Dkt. No. 27-15 (noting $53,256.23 as the total

payments made to GVA Group for which Plaintiffs seek to recover). Plaintiffs allege that

Defaulting Defendants—working with certain medical clinics that bill no-fault insurers for medical

services operating in the New York metropolitan area (“No-Fault Clinics”)—exploited the No-

2 Plaintiffs refer to “DME” generally as “equipment and/or supplies used for medical purposes by

individuals in their homes, including, among other things, cervical pillows, cervical traction units, cold/hot

water circulating pumps, EMS units, hot/cold packs, infrared heat lamps, lumbar cushions, [and]

mattresses.” Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 2.

3 Plaintiffs allege that “[o]n information and belief, John Does 1 through 5 are individuals that are unknown

to Plaintiffs, who conspired, participated, conducted, and assisted in the fraudulent and unlawful conduct

alleged herein.” Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 70. Plaintiffs also allege that ABC Corporations 1 through 5 “are additional

companies that are unknown to Plaintiffs that are owned, controlled, and operated by one or more of the

John Doe Defendants, which were used in connection with the kickback scheme with the Defendants

alleged herein to obtain referrals, prescriptions and/or Covered Persons in furtherance of the scheme.” Id.

¶ 71.

4 Per Plaintiffs, “‘orthotic devices’ generally refers to items that are used to support a weak or deformed

body member or to restrict or eliminate movement for medical purposes. Such items include, but are not

limited to, back braces, cervical collars, knee braces, shoulder braces and wrist braces.” Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 2.

Fault system by participating in illegal kickback or other financial compensation agreements. Dkt.

No. 1 ¶¶ 3-4. Plaintiffs argue that “unlicensed laypersons, rather than the healthcare professionals

working in the No-Fault Clinics, created and controlled the purported patient base at [the No-Fault]

Clinics, and directed fraudulent protocols used to maximize profits without regard to actual patient

care by exploiting the No-[F]ault Law and applicable Fee Schedule,” and in particular, through

“various deceptive billing tactics engineered to maximize the amount of reimbursement from

insurers, in general, and Plaintiffs, in particular.” Id. ¶ 120. Defaulting Defendants allegedly

engaged in these unlawful financial arrangements with the John Doe Defendants, allowing them

to submit hundreds of fraudulent charges for DME and/or orthotic devices. Id. ¶ 117.

Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that the No-Fault Clinics provided fraudulent prescriptions to

Defaulting Defendants that Ageyev, through GVA Group, in turn, “generated and submitted bills

to Plaintiffs.” Id. ¶ 11. The No-Fault Clinics purportedly engaged in the scheme in several ways,

including by:

(i) ensuring that their associated doctors and/or chiropractors (. . .“Health Care

Practitioners” or “HCPs”) prescribed large amounts of virtually identical DME

and/or orthotic devices to their patient population, pursuant to a predetermined

course of treatment irrespective of medical necessity, with the prescribed items

being dictated by GVA Group;

(ii) ensuring that the prescriptions were sufficiently generic so that the nature,

quality, and cost of any DME and/or orthotic device could not be verified based on

the description of the prescribed item alone; and/or

(iii) ensuring that the prescriptions were provided directly to GVA Group to ensure

that GVA Group could bill Plaintiffs to purportedly fill the prescription rather than

allow the possibility that the Covered Person may fill the prescription at a DME

retailer of their own choosing.

Id. ¶ 5; see also id. ¶¶ 134-36, 138-39 (further describing the role of the No-Fault Clinics in the

scheme, including “routinely provid[ing] GVA Group with generic, non-descript prescriptions for

certain Fee Schedule Items . . . , which GVA Group then used to unilaterally determine the DME

provided to Covered Persons in purported fulfillment of the general prescriptions, in order to bill

for the most expensive type of DME and/or orthotic device”) .

Using the fraudulent prescriptions received from the No-Fault Clinics, Ageyev—through

GVA Group—purportedly submitted bills to Plaintiffs that knowingly misrepresented the actual

amounts paid for DME and/or orthotic devices, as well as the cost, quality, and medical necessity

of the items purportedly provided and whether these items were reimbursable under the Fee

Schedule, which determines the maximum permissible reimbursement amount for which health

care providers may charge for services under the No-Fault Law. See id. ¶¶ 11-14, 16, 17, 50-53;

see also Dkt. No. 1-4 at 3-55 (representative sample of fraudulent billing for medical equipment

and/or services provided regardless of medical necessity), 7-14 (representative sample of unpaid

No-Fault claims).

The prescriptions from the No-Fault Clinics were allegedly sent to GVA Group directly,

without any involvement from the patients, who were often not given an option to use any other

DME retailer other than GVA Group. Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 124. DME and/or orthotic devices that GVA

Group purported to provide “seldom varied from patient-to-patient over a given period of time and

also did not change based on any differences in the Covered Person’s condition, age, complaints,

type of accident, or nature of alleged injury.” Id. ¶ 98. Plaintiffs allege that HCPs at the No-Fault

Clinics also routinely provided virtually identical DME and/or orthotic devices to two or more

patients who were involved in the same accident, where it is highly improbable that they would

require identical care. Id. ¶¶ 113-14. As a result of the fraudulent arrangements, Defaulting

Defendants “billed hundreds of thousands of dollars to Plaintiffs.” Id. ¶ 129.

5 Page citations are to the ECF-stamped pages unless otherwise noted.

Ageyev, through GVA Group, also routinely submitted fraudulent bills to Plaintiffs seeking

reimbursement for (i) “expensive custom-fabricated DME and/or orthotic devices, such as

shoulder and back braces, that were never provided;” (ii) “expensive DME and/or orthotic devices

that required a customized fitting that they never performed;” and/or (iii) “rates under expensive

fee schedule codes for DME and/or orthotic devices that GVA Group never actually provided.” Id.

¶ 147. Additionally, “GVA Group’s bills intentionally omitted the make, model, and manufacturer

of the DME and/or orthotic devices purportedly provided to Covered Persons in order to conceal

the fact that the DME and/or orthotic devices purportedly provided were inexpensive and of poor

quality, to the extent they were provided at all.” Id. ¶ 146; see also id. ¶ 182 (alleging that, when

GVA Group billed for cervical traction units under a certain code, it “falsely represented that they

provided expensive, medically necessary cervical traction units when in actuality they provided

cheap, inexpensive items that in many cases were replicas or knockoffs of trademarked items”).

“[T]o the extent that they provided any DME and/or orthotic devices at all, [Defendants] provided

Covered Persons with inferior, low-quality items, or items that directly contravened the treatment

plan indicated by the treating physicians, potentially compromising Covered Persons’ health.” Id.

¶ 54.

The New York No-Fault Law, regulations, and insurance policies require Plaintiffs to

process claims within thirty days of receipt of proof of claim. Id. ¶¶ 83, 229. In fulfilling this

obligation to promptly process claims, Plaintiffs relied on bills, documentation, and other

information mailed by Defaulting Defendants to Plaintiffs. Id. ¶ 84. According to Plaintiffs, due

to Defaulting Defendants’ material representations and efforts to conceal their fraud, Plaintiffs did

not discover their damages were attributable to the fraud scheme until in or about February 2024.

Id. ¶ 230. Plaintiffs ultimately incurred damages of more than $53,000.00 based upon the

fraudulent bill submissions. Id. ¶ 229.

B. Procedural Background

Plaintiffs filed the Complaint on June 10, 2025. Dkt. No. 1.

On July 30, 2025, Plaintiffs executed service on GVA Group via service on the New York

State Secretary of State. Dkt. No. 9.

As to Ageyev, Plaintiffs initially believed that Ageyev resided at 60 Oceana Drive West,

Apt. 6C, Brooklyn, New York 11235. Dkt. No. 12 at 2. Plaintiffs, however, were unable to locate

Ageyev at that address when attempting service. Id. Following a search for an alternative address

for Ageyev, Plaintiffs attempted service at 1133 East 35th Street, Apt. 4D, Brooklyn, New York

11210 (the “35th Street Address”)—which was the address listed on GVA Group’s license

applications—but Plaintiffs found that the apartment was vacant and were unable to locate Ageyev.

Id. Plaintiffs then attempted service at a third residential address, 1854 Ocean Avenue, Apt. 3F,

Brooklyn, New York 11230 (the “Ocean Avenue Address”), but were still unable to locate Ageyev

despite numerous attempts to effectuate service. Id. As Ageyev is the listed owner of GVA Group,

Plaintiffs identified the 35th Street Address as GVA Group’s listed address, but, as previously

mentioned, Plaintiffs found that the apartment was vacant. Id. Plaintiffs additionally identified

2167 East 21st Street, Suite 242, Brooklyn, New York 11229 (the “21st Street Address”) as another

address used by GVA Group. Id. The 21st Street Address, however, was found to be a private

mailbox store, not a retail business. Id.

On September 4, 2025, Plaintiffs requested an extension of time to effectuate service on

Ageyev and leave to serve Ageyev by alternative means; specifically, to effectuate service on

Ageyev by serving the law firm representing GVA Group, Ageyev’s corporation, in civil actions

before the New York City Civil Court and arbitrations through the American Arbitration

Association. Id. at 3; see also Dkt. No. 13. On September 5, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiffs’

motion and extended the deadline to serve Ageyev until October 6, 2025, and granted Plaintiffs

leave to serve “Ageyev through counsel for his corporation, Defendant GVA Group, Inc., through

the Law Offices of Hillary Blumenthal, 711-32nd Street, 2nd Floor Union City, New Jersey 07087

and through the Law Offices of Zara Javakov, Esq., 100 Livingston Street, 4th Floor, Brooklyn,

New York 11201.” Text Order, dated Sep. 5, 2025. The Court found that, pursuant to New York

Civil Practice Law and Rules (“C.P.L.R.”) § 308(5), Plaintiffs demonstrated the impracticability

of traditional service on Ageyev, and that service through counsel for GVA Group was reasonably

calculated to give actual notice to Ageyev. Id.

On September 25, 2025, Plaintiffs reported that the attempts to serve Ageyev via the Law

Offices of Hillary Blumenthal and the Law Offices of Zara Javakov were rejected by counsel. Dkt.

No. 15 at 1-2. Plaintiffs requested that Plaintiffs instead be permitted to effectuate service on

Ageyev by “(1) mailing the [Summons and Complaint] to Defendant Ageyev, care of the co-

defendant corporation he owns, Defendant GVA Group Inc., to the address on file with the [New

York Department of State, Division of Corporations (“NYDOS”)] for service of process,” which

is the 35th Street Address; and by “(2) mailing the same to Defendant Ageyev, care of GVA Group

Inc, to the address that appears to be a private mailbox store, which Defendant GVA Group Inc.

listed on its recent billings to Plaintiffs,” which is the 21st Street Address. Id. at 2.

On September 26, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ request, and also directed Plaintiffs

to serve Ageyev “by publication, as well as via any email address or social media account of his

in Plaintiffs’ possession or ascertainable with reasonable diligence.” Text Order, dated Sep. 26,

2025. The Court also directed Plaintiffs to “‘nail’ a copy of the summons and complaint to the

35th Street Address, and call any telephone numbers of Defendant Ageyev in Plaintiffs’ possession

or ascertainable with reasonable diligence and supply the case caption and number,” and to

“contact the other attorney stated to be representing Defendant Ageyev by Law Offices of Hillary

Blumenthal in [Dkt. No.] 15 and attempt to serve Defendant Ageyev through the same.” Id.

Additionally, the Court sua sponte extended the deadline to serve Ageyev until October 15, 2025.

Id.

On September 29, 2025, Plaintiffs reported on its efforts to comply with the September 26,

2025 Text Order, and requested additional time to effectuate service. Dkt. No. 16. On September

30, 2025, the Court extended the deadline to serve Ageyev until November 14, 2025, and directed

Plaintiffs to further email a copy of the Summons and Complaint to Oleg Rybak, Esq. of the

Ryback Firm PLLC and to also serve Ageyev by publication in accordance with C.P.L.R. § 316.

Text Order, dated Sep. 30, 2025.

On November 13, 2025, Plaintiffs reported that, pursuant to the Court’s prior orders,

Plaintiffs “(1) completed service by affix and mail at the 35th Street Address; (2) completed service

by mail to the 21st Street Address; (3) completed service by publication by publishing a notice and

summons once in each of four consecutive weeks in the Brooklyn Daily Eagle and the Canarsie

Courier; and (4) emailed a copy of the Summons and Complaint to Oleg Rybak.” Dkt. No. 18 at

1-2 (footnotes omitted). Plaintiffs also reported that they “attempted to email a copy of the

Summons and Complaint to Defendant Ageyev at aageyev@proton.me, the email address on

record with the New York City Department of Consumer and Workplace Protection (‘DCWP’)

associated with GVA Group Inc’s DCWP license; attempted to identify social media accounts for

Defendant Ageyev; and attempted to call Defendant Ageyev at two phone numbers found using

online telephone number search websites without success.” Id. at 2.

On December 4, 2025, Plaintiffs reported that Ageyev and GVA Group were in default.

Dkt. No. 20. On December 19, 2025, Plaintiffs sought entry of certificates of default against GVA

Group and Ageyev. Dkt Nos. 22, 23. The Clerk of the Court entered certificates of default against

GVA Group and Ageyev on December 22, 2025. Dkt. Nos. 24, 25.

On February 12, 2026, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion. Dkt. No. 27.

II. Service, Jurisdiction, and Venue

The Court “must . . . satisfy itself that it has subject matter and personal jurisdiction before

rendering judgment against defendants.” Dumolo v. Dumolo, No. 17-CV-7294 (KAM) (CLP),

2019 WL 1367751, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2019) (citing Covington Indus., Inc. v. Resintex A.G.,

629 F.2d 730, 732 (2d Cir. 1980) (“A judgment entered against parties not subject to the personal

jurisdiction of the rendering court is a nullity.”)).

A. Service of Process

“It is axiomatic that to obtain a default judgment against a defendant, the pleading must

have been properly served upon him.” Freedom Mortg. Corp. v. Monteleone, 628 F. Supp. 3d 455,

460 (E.D.N.Y. 2022) (adopting report and recommendation); see also Joe Hand Promotions, Inc.

v. Necessary Studios, Inc., No. 21-CV-5551 (LDH) (RER), 2022 WL 18858972, at *9 (E.D.N.Y.

Dec. 5, 2022) (quoting Happy Homes, LLC v. Jenerette-Snead, No. 15-CV-1788 (MKB) (RML),

2016 WL 6599826, at *3 n.10 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2016) (“Ineffective service-of-process is a ground

to deny a motion for default judgment.”)), report and recommendation adopted, Text Order, dated

Dec. 22, 2022.

Rule 4(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs service on a corporation,

partnership, or association, states that an entity “in a judicial district of the United States” must be

served, inter alia, “in the manner prescribed by Rule 4(e)(1) for serving an individual.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(A). Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part,

Unless federal law provides otherwise, an individual—other than a minor, an

incompetent person, or a person whose waiver has been filed—may be served in a

judicial district of the United States by:

(1) following state law for serving a summons in an action brought in courts

of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located or where

service is made; or

(2) doing any of the following:

(A) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the

individual personally;

(B) leaving a copy of each at the individual's dwelling or usual place

of abode with someone of suitable age and discretion who resides

there; or

(C) delivering a copy of each to an agent authorized by appointment

or by law to receive service of process.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e).

New York law permits service on a corporation by

[p]ersonally delivering to and leaving with the secretary of state or a deputy, or with

any person authorized by the secretary of state to receive such service, at the office

of the department of state in the city of Albany, duplicate copies of such process

together with the statutory fee, which fee shall be a taxable disbursement. Service

of process on such corporation shall be complete when the secretary of state is so

served.

N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 306(b)(1)(i); see also C.P.L.R. § 311(a)(1) (stating that personal service

upon a corporation may be made, inter alia, pursuant to section three hundred six or three hundred

seven of the business corporation law”); Logan v. World Luxury Cars, Inc., No. 15-CV-248 (ENV)

(PK), 2022 WL 2466834, at *405 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2022) (noting that “[w]hen the Secretary of

State is so served, service on a corporation is complete regardless of whether the corporation

receives the Summons and Complaint from the Secretary of State,” and recommending that such

service upon the Secretary of State was proper pursuant to Rule 4(h)(1) (citations omitted)), report

and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 156878 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2023).

Here, Plaintiffs served GVA Group on July 30, 2025 by delivering and leaving with an

authorized agent of the New York State Secretary of State, at the Office of the Department of State

in Albany, New York, two true copies of the Summons and Complaint, along with the statutory fee

of $40.00. Dkt. No. 9. Thus, GVA Group was properly served pursuant to N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law §

306(b)(1) and Rule 4(h)(1). See Vazquez Romero v. La Morenita Fruit Mkt. Corp., No. 23-CV-

6300 (OEM) (MMH), 2026 WL 687228, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2026) (noting that the method

of service on a corporation via delivery to the New York Secretary of State “complies with federal

and state procedural rules” (citations omitted)), report and recommendation adopted, Text Order,

dated Mar. 31, 2026.

Further, as to Ageyev, an individual, state law provides that service of process should first

be attempted under C.P.L.R. § 308(1), (2), and (4), which “provide for service by personal delivery,

delivery and mailing, and nailing and mailing, respectively.” Weber Cap. LLC v. Racaniello, 821

F. Supp. 3d 361, 382 (E.D.N.Y. 2026) (adopting report and recommendation) (citation omitted).

When service is “impracticable” under paragraphs (1), (2), and (4) of § 308, paragraph (5) permits

alternative service “in such manner as the court . . . directs.” C.P.L.R. § 308(5).

As discussed at length above, Plaintiffs made numerous attempts to serve Ageyev at several

residential and business addresses that Plaintiffs believed to belong to Ageyev. See Dkt. Nos. 12,

13. On September 4, 2025, Plaintiffs requested leave, pursuant to C.P.L.R. § 308(5), to serve

Ageyev through counsel representing Ageyev’s corporation, GVA Group, in collection actions and

arbitrations. See Dkt. No. 12 at 1, 3. The Court granted Plaintiffs’ request, finding that Plaintiffs

demonstrated the impracticability of serving Ageyev by other means and that service through

counsel for GVA Group is reasonably calculated to give actual notice of this action to Ageyev.

Text Order, dated Sep. 5, 2025. The Court also entered subsequent orders directing alternative

service. See Text Order, dated Sep. 26, 2025; Text Order, dated Sep. 30, 2025. Plaintiffs complied

with the Court’s orders regarding alternative service for Ageyev. At bottom, Plaintiffs (1) affixed

and mailed copies of the Summons and Complaint at the 35th Street Address; (2) mailed a copy of

the Summons and Complaint to the 21st Street Address; (3) published a notice and the Summons

once in each of four consecutive weeks in the Brooklyn Daily Eagle and the Canarsie Courier; and

(4) emailed a copy of the Summons and Complaint to collections counsel for GVA Group. Dkt.

No. 18 at 1-2. Alternative service, therefore, was appropriate and satisfied in the present action

for Ageyev.

Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Defaulting Defendants have

been properly served in compliance with Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Federal district courts have original subject matter jurisdiction over all civil actions “arising

under the . . . laws . . . of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The district courts also have

original jurisdiction over “all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or

value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between,” inter alia, “citizens of different

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Supplemental jurisdiction extends to state law claims that so relate

to the claims within the court’s original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or

controversy. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Claims form “part of the same case or controversy” when they

“derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.” City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522

U.S. 156, 165 (1997) (citing United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966)).

Claims derive from a common nucleus of operative fact when the facts underlying the claims

“substantially overlap[].” Achtman v. Kirby, McInerney & Squire, LLP, 464 F.3d 328, 335 (2d Cir.

2006) (quoting Lyndonville Sav. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Lussier, 211 F.3d 697, 704 (2d Cir. 2000)).

Here, this Court has federal question subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claim

arising under RICO, as this claim arises under federal law pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Further,

Plaintiffs assert that the Court has jurisdiction over the state law claims in this action because (1)

“the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs,

and is between citizens of different states,” and (2) the state claims form part of the same case or

controversy as the RICO claim, supporting supplemental jurisdiction. Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 73, 74.

As to diversity jurisdiction, the Complaint alleges that Plaintiffs are incorporated in Illinois

and their principal places of business are in Illinois. Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 62-65. Thus, they are citizens

of Illinois for diversity purposes. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). GVA Group is incorporated in New

York and has its principal place of business in New York. Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 69; Dkt. No. 27-6. Thus,

GVA Group is a citizen of New York. The Complaint alleges that Ageyev resides in New York.

Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 68. “‘An individual’s citizenship, within the meaning of the diversity statute, is

determined by his domicile,’ and residence or place of employment alone are ‘insufficient to

establish domicile for jurisdictional purposes.’” Lue v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., No. 21-892, 2022

WL 1146219, at *1 (2d Cir. Apr. 19, 2022) (quoting Van Buskirk v. United Grp. of Cos., Inc., 935

F.3d 49, 53-54 (2d Cir. 2019)). Because Plaintiffs alleged only where Ageyev resides, not where

he is domiciled or where he is a citizen, complete diversity has not been adequately alleged.6 See

Jacobs v. Pat. Enf’t Fund, Inc., 230 F.3d 565, 567 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that plaintiffs “failed

adequately to allege diversity in their original complaint” because “they had alleged only the

6 Indeed, Plaintiffs state that information obtained from the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles

indicated that Ageyev’s New York driver’s license expired in 2011. Dkt. No. 27-3 ¶ 53. This information

further supports an inference that Ageyev may not have been a citizen of New York when this action was

initiated.

residence, and not the citizenship (or domicile), of the parties”). And even if Plaintiffs had properly

alleged Ageyev’s citizenship for diversity jurisdiction purposes, it is not clear that an amount in

controversy over $75,000 has been properly alleged. The Complaint seeks compensatory damages

“in excess of $53,000” on Plaintiffs’ fraud and unjust enrichment claims. See Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 255,

259. Therefore, Plaintiffs have not properly invoked the Court’s diversity jurisdiction as to the

state law claims.

Nonetheless, Plaintiffs have demonstrated that the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over

the state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). See Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 74. The fraud and unjust

enrichment claims derive from a common nucleus of operative fact with the RICO claims; namely,

submission of the allegedly fraudulent claim forms and other documentation containing false

representations. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 240, 248-49, 257. Therefore, the state law claims form part of the

same case or controversy as the RICO claims such that the Court may exercise supplemental

jurisdiction. See Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Binns, No. 22-CV-1553 (NGG) (PK), 2024 WL 2112075,

at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2024) (recommending that the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over

plaintiffs’ common law fraud and unjust enrichment claims, where plaintiffs also brought civil

RICO and civil RICO conspiracy claims), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 1433278

(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2024); ABF Cap. Mgmt. v. Askin Cap. Mgmt., L.P., 957 F. Supp. 1308, 1322

(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that “[p]laintiffs’ state-law claims, which arise out of the same operative

facts as their federal RICO claim, fall within this Court’s supplemental jurisdiction”).

Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court exercise subject

matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims.

C. Personal Jurisdiction

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that “a court may raise

personal jurisdiction sua sponte when a defendant has failed to appear.” Sinoying Logistics Pte

Ltd. v. Yi Da Xin Trading Corp., 619 F.3d 207, 213 n.7 (2d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). District

courts within this Circuit have held that “[p]ersonal jurisdiction is ‘a necessary prerequisite to entry

of a default judgment.’” Burns v. Scott, 635 F. Supp. 3d 258, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (adopting report

and recommendation) (citation omitted). In an abundance of caution, the undersigned will analyze

personal jurisdiction.

To properly exercise personal jurisdiction, three requirements must be met. NLRB v.

Universal Smart Conts., LLC, 166 F.4th 304, 314 (2d Cir. 2026) (Sullivan, J.) (citations omitted).

First, “the plaintiff’s service of process upon the defendant must have been procedurally proper.”

Id. (citations omitted). Second, “there must be a statutory basis for personal jurisdiction that

renders such service of process effective.” Id. (citation omitted). Finally, “the district court’s

assertion of personal jurisdiction must otherwise ‘comport with constitutional due process

principles.’” Id. (citation omitted).

As to the first requirement, as explained above, the undersigned has already respectfully

recommended a finding that service on Defaulting Defendants was proper in this case. As to the

second requirement, the available statutory bases in federal courts are enumerated by Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 4(k). Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL (“Licci I”), 673 F.3d

50, 59 (2d Cir. 2012). Rule 4(k)(1)(A) provides that “[s]erving a summons . . . establishes personal

jurisdiction over a defendant . . . who is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction

in the state where the district court is located.” Licci I, 673 F.3d at 59 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.

4(k)(1)(A)). Accordingly, “[a] district court’s personal jurisdiction is determined by the law of the

state in which the court is located.” Id. (quoting Spiegel v. Schulmann, 604 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir.

2010)). Thus, the court should look to New York law in determining the availability of personal

jurisdiction over Defaulting Defendants.

“There are two types of personal jurisdiction: specific and general.” Monbo v. Nathan, 623

F. Supp. 3d 56, 133 (E.D.N.Y. 2022) (Brodie, C.J.) (citation omitted). “General jurisdiction

permits a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant regardless of whether the

underlying claim has a connection to the forum.” Id. (citation omitted). “Specific jurisdiction

requires a connection between the forum exercising jurisdiction over the defendant and the

underlying controversy that gave rise to the claim.” Id. (citation omitted). Under New York law,

courts exercise general jurisdiction pursuant to C.P.L.R. § 301, and specific jurisdiction pursuant

to § 302. See Monbo, 623 F. Supp. 3d at 133.

First, there is general jurisdiction over GVA Group. “CPLR § 301 permits courts to

exercise ‘such jurisdiction over persons, property, or status as might have been exercised

heretofore.’” Great Bowery, Inc. v. Royal Beauty Studio Inc., No. 25-CV-3627 (FB) (JAM), 2026

WL 1029641, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2026) (adopting report and recommendation). The general

jurisdiction of a corporate defendant is one in which “the corporation is fairly regarded as at home.”

Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011) (citation omitted).

“[E]xcept in a truly exceptional case, a corporate defendant may be treated as essentially at home

only where it is incorporated or maintains its principal place of business.” Great Bowery, 2026

WL 1029641, at *7 (quoting Monbo, 623 F. Supp. 3d at 136-37). Regarding general jurisdiction

for purposes of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court

has held that, “[w]ith respect to a corporation, the place of incorporation and principal place of

business are ‘paradig[m] . . . bases for general jurisdiction.’” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S.

117, 137 (2014) (citations omitted).

Here, as previously noted, GVA Group is a New York corporation with its principal place

of business in New York. Accordingly, the Court may exercise general jurisdiction over GVA

Group.

Second, as to Ageyev, as previously discussed, Plaintiffs have not set forth Ageyev’s

domicile, preventing the exercise of general jurisdiction as to him. The Supreme Court has held

that, “[f]or an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the

individual’s domicile.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, 564 U.S. at 924 (emphasis added)

(citation omitted). Domicile is different from residency, and one cannot infer one from the other.

See Reich v. Lopez, 858 F.3d 55, 63 (2d Cir. 2017) (holding that owning an apartment in New York

is insufficient to establish domicile for purposes of general jurisdiction and noting that “[o]ne may

have more than one residence in different parts of this country or the world, but a person may have

only one domicile” (citation omitted)); N. Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins. v. Pouncey, No. 3:23-

CV-137 (SVN), 2024 WL 4037005, at *6 (D. Conn. Sep. 3, 2024) (“[A] statement of residence,

unlike domicile, tells the court only where the parties are living and not of which state they are

citizens.’ A court may not and cannot simply infer the latter from the former.” (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted)), report and recommendation adopted, Dkt. No. 39 (D. Conn. Sep. 30,

2024). Because Plaintiffs have set forth insufficient allegations to demonstrate that Ageyev is

subject to the Court’s general personal jurisdiction, the undersigned turns to New York’s long-arm

statute to evaluate specific personal jurisdiction. See Gilead Scis., Inc. v. Safe Chain Sols., LLC,

No. 21-CV-4106 (AMD) (RER), 2022 WL 22947596, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 29, 2022) (“In

assessing whether personal jurisdiction is authorized, the court must look first to the long-arm

statute of the forum state.” (quoting Yak v. BiggerPockets, LLC, No. 20-3498, 2022 WL 67740, at

*1 (2d Cir. Jan. 7, 2022))).

C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1) provides that “a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any

non-domiciliary, or his executor or administrator, who in person or through an agent . . . transacts

any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state.”

Gilead Scis., 2022 WL 22947596, at *5 (quoting C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1)). Accordingly, two

requirements must be met to establish personal jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1): “(1) The defendant

must have transacted business within the state [or contracted anywhere to supply goods or services

in the state]; and (2) the claim asserted must arise from that business activity.” Id. at *6 (quoting

Eades v. Kennedy, P.C. L. Offs., 799 F.3d 161, 168 (2d Cir. 2015)); see also D & R Glob. Selections,

S.L. v. Bodega Olegario Falcon Pineiro, 78 N.E.3d 1172, 1175 (N.Y. 2017) (holding that courts

should conduct a “twofold jurisdictional inquiry” under C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1): “[f]irst, the

defendant must have purposefully availed itself of ‘the privilege of conducting activities within

the forum state’ by either transacting business in New York or contracting to supply goods or

services in New York,” and “[s]econd, the claim must arise from that business transaction or from

the contract to supply goods or services” (citation omitted)). “[P]roof of one transaction in New

York is sufficient to invoke jurisdiction, even though the defendant never enters New York, so long

as the defendant’s activities here were purposeful and there is a substantial relationship between

the transaction and the claim asserted.” Gilead Scis., 2022 WL 22947596, at *6 (quoting Chloé v.

Queen Bee of Beverly Hills, LLC, 616 F.3d 158, 170 (2d Cir. 2010)); see also New York v. Vayu,

Inc., 206 N.E.3d 1236, 1240 (N.Y. 2023) (“CPLR 302 is a single-act statute requiring but one

transaction—albeit a purposeful transaction—to confer jurisdiction in New York.” (citations

omitted)).

Here, the Court may exercise specific jurisdiction over Ageyev because he transacted

business in New York as the “principal, officer, and/or director of GVA Group,” a New York

corporation, and “operated, managed, and/or controlled [GVA Group’s] activities.” Dkt. No. 1 ¶

68. Furthermore, the Complaint alleges that Ageyev “incorporated, owned and/or controlled GVA

Group for the purpose of defrauding insurers, in general, and Plaintiffs, in particular.” Id. ¶ 106.

Ageyev’s conduct as “principal, officer, and/or director of GVA Group,” by which he engaged in

actions in New York in furtherance of the alleged scheme, gave rise to Plaintiffs’ claims. See id.

¶¶ 4-16. Thus, Plaintiffs’ claims arise from that business activity which Ageyev conducted in New

York.

Last, the Court must determine whether the exercise of specific jurisdiction comports with

federal constitutional requirements of due process. See Dow Jones & Co., Inc. v. Perplexity AI,

Inc., 797 F. Supp. 3d 305, 330-31 (S.D.N.Y. 2025). “Due process considerations require that the

defendant have certain minimum contacts with the forum state such that the maintenance of the

suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Id. at 330 (citation

omitted). First, a court evaluates whether a defendant has “sufficient minimum contacts” with the

forum, and second, whether, in light of various factors, the exercise of jurisdiction would “comport

with fair play and substantial justice.” Id. at 330-31 (citations omitted).

Regarding the minimum contacts, “[g]enerally, if a defendant meets the contacts

requirement under the long-arm statute, it also meets the minimum contacts requirements under

the constitutional analysis.” Id. at 331 (citing Am. Girl, LLC v. Zembrka, 118 F.4th 271, 279 (2d

Cir. 2024)). As discussed above, Ageyev meets the minimum contacts requirements under New

York’s long-arm statute, C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1), due to his various contacts with New York, and,

thus, Ageyev satisfies the minimum contacts requirements under the constitutional analysis.

As to fair play and substantial justice, the Court considers the following factors:

[i] the burden that the exercise of jurisdiction will impose on the defendant; [ii] the

interests of the forum state in adjudicating the case; [iii] the plaintiff’s interest in

obtaining convenient and effective relief; [iv] the interstate judicial system’s

interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of the controversy; and [v] the

shared interest of the states in furthering substantive social policies.

Dow Jones & Co., 797 F. Supp. 3d at 331 (citation omitted); see also Agric. Logistics LLC v.

Survival Transp. Inc., No. 22-CV-873 (MKB) (JMW), 2024 WL 4250354, at *8 (E.D.N.Y Aug. 7,

2024) (listing same factors), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 4116684 (E.D.N.Y.

Sep. 9, 2024).

As an initial matter, the Second Circuit recognized that it would be “rare” and “unusual”

for the exercise of specific jurisdiction to “offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial

justice” where a defendant transacted business in New York and the asserted claim arose from that

business activity under C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1). Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL

(“Licci II”), 732 F.3d 161, 170 (2d Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). Furthermore, Defaulting

Defendants cannot present any compelling case that would render jurisdiction unreasonable. See

Agric. Logistics, 2024 WL 4250354, at *8 (stating that, “given Defendants’ default, [the Court]

has not been provided, nor does it find, any reason why exercise of specific jurisdiction would be

unreasonable”).

In any event, the factors as to fair play and substantial justice weigh in favor of the exercise

of specific jurisdiction over Ageyev here. First, the burden of the Court’s jurisdiction on Ageyev

is low because he is a resident of New York. See Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 68; see also Agric. Logistics, 2024

WL 4250354, at *8 (noting that “the burden on Defendant, if any, to litigate here does not weigh

strongly in its favor because ‘the conveniences of modern communication and transportation ease

what would have been a serious burden only a few decades ago’” (citation omitted)).

Second, “New York has a strong interest in adjudicating cases involving alleged RICO

violations and fraud that occurred in New York, at least in part,” Khan Funds Mgmt. Am., Inc. v.

Nations Techs. Inc., No. 22-CV-5055 (ER), 2025 WL 1003964, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2025)

(citing Minnie Rose LLC v. Yu, 169 F. Supp. 3d 504, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)), and where the core

allegations are against a New York resident. Great W. Ins. Co. v. Graham, No. 18-CV-6249 (VSB),

2020 WL 3415026, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2020).

Third, Plaintiffs have a significant interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief. See

Henao v. Parts Auth., 557 F. Supp. 3d 490, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (“Plaintiffs have significant

interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, which would be inefficient if they are required

to sue Parts Authority in New York and Browne in a separate forum.”).

The final two factors are neutral because New York has an interest in the efficient resolution

of controversies which arise under federal law, and New York has a shared interest in further

developing the substantive social policies. See Dow Jones & Co., 797 F. Supp. 3d at 332. Thus,

due process considerations are satisfied because Ageyev has minimum contacts with New York

such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial

justice. See id. at 330-32.

Furthermore, “[w]hile courts ‘generally look first to the jurisdictional rules of the forum

state’ to determine personal jurisdiction, ‘the RICO statute contains a separate jurisdictional

provision.’” Gilead Scis., 2022 WL 22947596, at *10 (quoting Milton v. Wazed, No. 16-CV-4542

(MKB) (JO), 2018 WL 2074179, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2018)). Because Plaintiffs bring a RICO

claim against Ageyev (Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 231-45), the Court also looks to RICO’s jurisdictional

provision. “RICO’s jurisdictional provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a), ‘does not provide for nationwide

personal jurisdiction over every defendant in every civil RICO case, no matter where the defendant

is found,’” but, rather, it “grants personal jurisdiction over an initial defendant in a civil RICO case

to the district court for the district in which that person resides, has an agent, or transacts his or her

affairs.” Gilead Scis., 2022 WL 22947596, at *10 (quoting Pincione v. D’Alfonso, 506 F. App’x

22, 24 (2d Cir. 2012)); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a) (“Any civil action or proceeding under this

chapter against any person may be instituted in the district court of the United States for any district

in which such person resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs.”). “That is, personal

jurisdiction over the defendant requires the ‘minimum contacts’ test to be met for at least one

defendant.” City of New York v. Old Dominion Tobacco Co., Inc., No. 20-CV-5965 (ENV) (RER),

2023 WL 12027901, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2023) (first citing Elsevier Inc. v. W.H.P.R., Inc.,

692 F. Supp. 2d 297, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); and then citing PT United Can Co. v. Crown Cork &

Seal Co., 138 F.3d 65, 71 (2d Cir. 1998)); see also Corso v. Franz, No. 16-CV-2384 (FB) (SMG),

2018 WL 1513639, at *2 & n.1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2018) (noting that RICO permits the exercise

of personal jurisdiction where minimum contacts are established (citations omitted)). For the

reasons stated above, Plaintiffs have established Ageyev’s minimum contacts with New York, and,

thus, the Court has jurisdiction to consider the RICO claim against Ageyev. See, e.g., Gilead Scis.,

2022 WL 22947596, at *10 (explaining that “the Court has jurisdiction over the defendant under

Section 302(a)(1) and has jurisdiction for the same reasons under Section 1965(a)”); Old Dominion

Tobacco Co., 2023 WL 12027901, at *6 (holding that defendant established defendant’s minimum

contacts with New York and the court has jurisdiction over the RICO claim).

Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court may exercise

personal jurisdiction over Defaulting Defendants.

D. Venue

A civil action may be brought in “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events

or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). Here, venue is proper in

this District because Defaulting Defendants entered into arrangements with No-Fault Clinics in

this District, including in Kings County and Queens County, to execute the scheme to defraud. See

Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 4; see also id. ¶ 76 (stating that venue is proper because “the Eastern District of New

York is the district where a substantial amount of the activities forming the basis of the Complaint

occurred”).

Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends that venue is proper in this District.

III. Procedural Compliance with Federal Rules and Local Civil Rules

“A motion for default judgment will not be granted unless the party making the motion

adheres to all of the applicable procedural rules.” Annuity, Welfare & Apprenticeship Skill

Improvement & Safety Funds of Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs v. Allstate Mapping & Layout,

LLC, No. 22-CV-1831 (PKC) (TAM), 2023 WL 1475389, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2023) (quoting

Century Surety Co. v. Atweek, Inc., No. 16-CV-335 (ENV) (PK), 2018 WL 10466835, at *1

(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2018)). “Local rules have the force of law, as long as they do not conflict with a

rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, Congress, or the Constitution.” Contino v. United States,

535 F.3d 124, 126 (2d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).

Local Civil Rule 55.2 provides, in relevant part,

(a) In addition to following the applicable procedures in either (b) or (c) below, any

party seeking a default judgment must file:

(1) an affidavit or declaration showing that:

(A) the clerk has entered default under Local Civil Rule 55.1;

(B) the party seeking default judgment has complied with the

Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50a U.S.C. § 521; and

(C) the party against whom judgment is sought is not known to be a

minor or an incompetent person . . . . .

(2) if proceeding by motion, the papers required by Local Civil Rule 7.1,

including a memorandum of law, a proposed order detailing the proposed

judgment to be entered; and

(3) a certificate of service stating that all documents in support of the request

for default judgment, including the “Clerk’s Certificate of Default” and any

papers required by this rule, have been personally served on, or mailed to

the last known residence (for an individual defendant) or business address

(for other defendants) of, the party against whom default judgment is

sought.

. . .

(c) By the Court (available under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2)). In addition to the matters

required in section (a), above, the party must file a statement of damages, sworn or

affirmed to by one or more people with personal knowledge, in support of the

request, showing the proposed damages and the basis for each element of damages,

including interest, attorney’s fees, and costs.

Loc. Civ. R. 55.2.

Here, Plaintiffs properly obtained the certificate of default against Defaulting Defendants

under Local Civil Rule 55.2(a)(1)(A). See Dkt. Nos. 24, 25.

As to Local Civil Rule 55.2(a)(1)(B), Plaintiffs have satisfied the requirements of the

Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (“SCRA”). GVA Group is a corporate entity such that the SCRA

requirement does not apply to them. See Loc. 1992 Pension Fund v. All Serv. Equip. Corp., No.

22-CV-2522 (HG) (JMW), 2023 WL 11868244, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 28, 2023) (noting that the

SCRA’s affidavit requirement does not apply to corporate defendants), report and recommendation

adopted, Text Order, dated Aug. 18, 2023. As for Ageyev, Plaintiffs filed a report from the

Department of Defense Manpower Data Center—an entity that hosts the SCRA verification

website—certifying that Ageyev was not in active military service as of the filing of Plaintiffs’

motion. See Dkt. No. 27-3 ¶ 50; Dkt. No. 27-13; see also Wilmington Savs. Fund Soc’y FSB v.

Fernandez, 712 F. Supp. 3d 324, 333 (E.D.N.Y. 2024) (holding that “[a]dequate proof might

consist of a report from the Department of Defense’s website obtained after the defendant’s default

certifying that the defendant is not in active military service” (citation omitted)); ADI Glob.

Distrib. v. Green, No. 20-CV-3869 (AMD) (JMW), 2023 WL 3355049, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 24,

2023) (“Certification . . . of a defendant’s military status [under 50 U.S.C. § 3931(A)] can be

obtained from the Department of Defense’s Servicemembers Civil Relief Act website.” (citation

omitted)), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 3346499 (E.D.N.Y. May 9, 2023).

Per Local Civil Rule 55.2(a)(1)(C), no Defaulting Defendant is a minor or an incompetent

person. See Dkt. No. 27-3 ¶¶ 51-52, 54.

Next, Local Civil Rule 7.1 requires that a plaintiff attach to a motion for default judgment:

(1) a notice of motion specifying the applicable rules or statutes pursuant to which the motion is

brought and specifying the relief sought; (2) a memorandum of law setting forth the cases and

other authorities relied upon in support of the motion; (3) supporting affidavits and exhibits

containing any factual information and portions of the record necessary for the decision of the

motion; and (4) a certificate of compliance with the word count requirements of Local Civil Rule

7.1(c). See Loc. Civ. R. 7.1(a), (c). Local Civil Rule 55.2(a)(2) also requires a proposed order

detailing the proposed judgment to be entered. Loc. Civ. R. 55.2(a)(2). Plaintiffs complied with

the procedural requirements of Local Civil Rule 7.1(a) by filing a notice of motion (Dkt. No. 27),

a memorandum of law (Dkt. No. 27-1), and declaration and exhibits in support of the motion (Dkt.

Nos. 27-2, 27-3, 27-5 – 27-19). Plaintiffs also filed a proposed order detailing the proposed

judgment to be entered in compliance with Local Civil Rule 55.2(a)(2). Dkt. No. 27-4.7 Plaintiffs,

however, failed to include a page count certification statement in their memorandum of law as

required by Local Civil Rule 7.1(c). The undersigned respectfully recommends that the word count

7 Plaintiffs appear to have included a typographical error in its proposed judgment, substituting “Zenith

Medical Supply Corp.” for GVA Group in one paragraph of the proposed judgment. See Dkt. No. 27-4 at

2. The Court excuses such scrivener’s error.

certification requirement be waived because the omission is not material to the relief sought. See

Great Bowery, 2026 WL 1029641, at *9 n.6 (excusing the word count certification); see also Andy

Ryan Photographer, LLC v. City Visa, Inc., No. 24-CV-3369 (OEM) (JAM), 2025 WL 2778372, at

*5 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 30, 2025) (same), report and recommendation adopted, Text Order, dated

Oct. 20, 2025. In any event, on February 10, 2026, the Court granted Plaintiffs leave to enlarge

the page limit of their memorandum of law to forty pages. Text Order, dated Feb. 10, 2026. Thus,

Plaintiffs complied with Local Civil Rules 7.1 and 55.2(a)(2).

Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 55.2(a)(3), Plaintiffs filed a certificate of service stating that

all documents in support of the request for default judgment, including the “Clerk’s Certificate of

Default” and any papers required by this rule, have been mailed to Defaulting Defendants’ last

known addresses. See Dkt. No. 28.

Finally, Plaintiffs have filed sufficient documentation to fulfill Local Rule 55.2(c)’s

requirement to “file a statement of damages, sworn or affirmed to by one or more people with

personal knowledge, . . . showing the proposed damages and the basis for each element of damages,

including interest, attorney’s fees, and costs.” Loc. Civ. R. 55.2(c). Plaintiffs filed the Declaration

of Oren Kutnowsky, an Analyst in the Special Investigations Unit of Plaintiff Allstate Insurance

Company, which sets forth, inter alia, the damages sustained by Plaintiffs. See Dkt. No. 27-2.

Kutnowsky “assisted with and was involved in [Plaintiffs’] identification and investigation of the

Defaulted Defendants in this action.” Id. ¶ 2.

Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court find that Plaintiffs

have satisfied Local Civil Rules 7.1 and 55.2.

IV. Entry of Default Judgment

As the Second Circuit has explained,

Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides a two-step process for

obtaining a default judgment. The first step is to obtain an entry of default. When a

party against whom affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise

defend, a plaintiff may bring that fact to the court’s attention. In such circumstances

Rule 55(a) empowers the clerk of court to enter a default. The next step requires

the plaintiff to seek a judgment by default under Rule 55(b). Rule 55(b)(1) allows

the clerk to enter a default judgment if the plaintiff’s claim is for a sum certain and

the defendant has failed to appear. In all other cases Rule 55(b)(2) governs. It

requires a party seeking a judgment by default to apply to the court for entry of a

default judgment.

Priestley v. Headminder, Inc., 647 F.3d 497, 504-05 (2d Cir. 2011). To “enter or effectuate

judgment,” a court is empowered to: “(A) conduct an accounting; (B) determine the amount of

damages; (C) establish the truth of any allegation by evidence; or (D) investigate any other matter.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2).

“A threshold question before reaching liability or damages is whether [the defaulting

defendant’s] conduct is sufficient to warrant default judgment being entered.” Annuity, Pension,

Welfare & Training Funds of the Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs v. NAMOW, Inc., No. 17-CV-

1469 (ARR) (SJB), 2018 WL 1440545, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2018), report and

recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 1440542 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2018). The Second Circuit

“generally disfavor[s]” default judgment and has repeatedly expressed a “preference for resolving

disputes on the merits.” Enron Oil Corp. v. Diakuhara, 10 F.3d 90, 95-96 (2d Cir. 1993) (citation

omitted). “Nevertheless, in evaluating a motion for default judgment, a court accepts as true the

plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations, except those relating to damages.” BASF Corp. v.

Original Fender Mender, Inc., No. 23-CV-2796 (HG) (JAM), 2023 WL 8853704, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.

Dec. 22, 2023) (first citing Greyhound Exhibitgroup, Inc. v. E.L.U.L. Realty Corp., 973 F.2d 155,

158 (2d Cir. 1992); and then citing Flaks v. Koegel, 504 F.2d 702, 707 (2d Cir. 1974)), report and

recommendation adopted, Text Order, dated Jan. 9, 2024. The plaintiff bears the burden of

alleging “specific facts,” rather than “mere ‘labels and conclusions’ or a ‘formulaic recitation of

the elements,’” so that a court may infer a defendant’s liability. Cardoza v. Mango King Farmers

Mkt. Corp., No. 14-CV-3314 (SJ) (RER), 2015 WL 5561033, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 1, 2015)

(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)), report and recommendation adopted, 2015

WL 5561180 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 21, 2015).

The decision to grant or deny a motion for default judgment is “left to the sound discretion

of a district court.” Esquivel v. Lima Rest. Corp., No. 20-CV-2914 (ENV) (MMH), 2023 WL

6338666, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 29, 2023) (quoting Shah v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Civ. Serv., 168 F.3d

610, 615 (2d Cir. 1999)), report and recommendation adopted, Text Order, dated Nov. 30, 2023.

“A court ‘possesses significant discretion’ in granting a motion for default judgment, ‘including

[determining] whether the grounds for default are clearly established.’” Chen v. Oceanica Chinese

Rest., Inc., No. 13-CV-4623 (NGG) (PK), 2023 WL 2583856, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2023)

(adopting report and recommendation) (citation omitted). The Court may also “consider numerous

factors, including whether plaintiff has been substantially prejudiced by the delay involved . . . and

whether the grounds for default are clearly established or in doubt.” Franco v. Ideal Mortg.

Bankers, Ltd., No. 07-CV-3956 (JS) (AKT), 2010 WL 3780972, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2010)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted), report and recommendation adopted, 2010 WL

3780984 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 17, 2010).

As the Second Circuit has observed, “[t]hese widely accepted factors are: (1) whether the

default was willful; (2) whether setting aside the default would prejudice the adversary; and (3)

whether a meritorious defense is presented.” Enron Oil, 10 F.3d at 96 (citations omitted); see also

Trico Tarek Factory v. Jetax Inc., Nos. 24-CV-3731 (JMA) (ST), 24-CV-2409 (ST), 2025 WL

2625376, at *29 (E.D.N.Y Sep. 11, 2025) (“Notably, the Enron factors are used not only to

determine whether to set aside an entry of default or default judgment, but also in deciding whether

granting a default judgment is warranted in the first instance.” (citing Grp. One Ltd. v. GTE GmbH,

625 F. Supp. 3d 28, 54-61 (E.D.N.Y. 2022))), report and recommendation adopted, No. 24-CV-

3731 (JMA) (ST), 2025 WL 2782485 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 30, 2025). “Willfulness ‘is the most

significant factor’ but is not dispositive.” Henry v. Oluwole, 108 F.4th 45, 52 (2d Cir. 2024) (first

quoting In re Orion HealthCorp, Inc., 95 F.4th 98, 104 n.4 (2d Cir. 2024); and then citing W.B.

David & Co. v. De Beers Centenary AG, 507 F. App’x 67, 69-70 (2d Cir. 2013)); see also Grp.

One, 625 F. Supp. 3d at 55 (“However, in neither case did the court find default judgment

appropriate based solely on willfulness.”). “Other relevant equitable factors may also be

considered, for instance, whether the failure to follow a rule of procedure was a mistake made in

good faith and whether the entry of default would bring about a harsh or unfair result.” Enron Oil,

10 F.3d at 96 (citation omitted).

Here, as to the first factor, Defaulting Defendants’ failure to respond to the Complaint

demonstrates the willfulness of their default. “‘[W]illfulness,’ in the context of a default, . . .

refer[s] to conduct that is more than merely negligent or careless,” but is instead “egregious and .

. . not satisfactorily explained.” Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers Loc. 2, Albany, N.Y. Pension

Fund v. Moulton Masonry & Const., LLC, 779 F.3d 182, 186 (2d Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). As

described above, Defaulting Defendants were properly served with the Complaint.

Notwithstanding that service, Defaulting Defendants did not respond to the Complaint, did not

appear, and have not in any way attempted to defend this action, thus constituting willfulness in

the context of default judgment. See, e.g., Krevat v. Burgers to Go, Inc., No. 13-CV-6258 (JS)

(AKT), 2014 WL 4638844, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 16, 2014) (adopting report and recommendation,

and holding that defendant’s failure to appear demonstrated willfulness of default); Sola Franchise

Corp. v. Solo Salon Studios Inc., No. 14-CV-946 (JS) (AKT), 2015 WL 1299259, at *6 (E.D.N.Y.

Mar. 23, 2015) (adopting report and recommendation, and holding that “[d]efendant’s failure to

answer the Complaint and to respond to the instant motion is sufficient to establish willfulness”

(citations omitted)). Although Plaintiffs have repeatedly served Defaulting Defendants with

filings throughout this case, see, e.g., Dkt. Nos. 22-4, 23-5, Defaulting Defendants have

consistently failed to respond or appear. Such disregard for the Court and the present litigation

militate in favor of the first factor being satisfied.

As to the second factor, the Second Circuit has held that “[w]hether a defense is meritorious

‘is measured not by whether there is a likelihood that it will carry the day, but whether the evidence

submitted, if proven at trial, would constitute a complete defense.’” In re Orion HealthCorp, 95

F.4th at 105 (quoting Enron Oil, 10 F.3d at 98). The Court cannot conclude that Defaulting

Defendants have a meritorious defense to the allegations in the Complaint because Defendants did

not appear in this case to proffer any defenses. See Korzeniewski v. Sapa Pho Vietnamese Rest.

Inc., No. 17-CV-5721 (MKB) (SJB), 2019 WL 312149, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2019) (“[T]he

Court cannot conclude there is any meritorious defense to the allegations because [the defendant]

did not appear nor present evidence of such a defense.”), report and recommendation adopted,

2019 WL 291145 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2019). This factor therefore weighs in favor of entering

default judgment because the allegations in Plaintiffs’ Complaint are deemed admitted. See Sola

Franchise, 2015 WL 1299259, at *6 (“Here, Defendant has not interposed an answer, nor has it

otherwise presented any defense to the Court. These factors weigh in favor of granting a default

judgment, and the allegations in Plaintiffs’ Complaint are deemed admitted.” (citation omitted)).

As to the third factor, the Second Circuit has held that “delay alone is not a sufficient basis

for establishing prejudice. Rather, it must be shown that delay will result in the loss of evidence,

create increased difficulties of discovery or provide greater opportunity for fraud and collusion.”

Henry, 108 F.4th at 52-53 (citations omitted). Here, Plaintiffs will suffer prejudice if their motion

is denied because without the entry of default judgment, Plaintiffs could be left without the ability

to recover against Defaulting Defendants for the claims set forth in the Complaint. See Grp. One,

625 F. Supp. 3d at 60 (“Plaintiff will suffer prejudice if its motion is denied because Plaintiff will

be unable to recover against Defendants for the claims adequately set forth in its Amended

Complaint.” (citation omitted)); Sola Franchise, 2015 WL 1299259, at *15 (“[D]enying this

motion would be prejudicial to Plaintiffs ‘as there are no additional steps available to secure relief

in this Court.’” (citation omitted)).

Therefore, the undersigned respectfully recommends that all three factors permit entry of

default judgment against Defaulting Defendants. The Court next turns to evaluating liability and

damages.

V. Liability

As discussed above, Plaintiffs move for default judgment on their claims of (1) a pattern

of racketeering activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) against Ageyev; (2) common law fraud

against Ageyev and GVA Group; and (3) unjust enrichment against Ageyev and GVA Group. See

Dkt. No. 27-1 at 18-35. As noted above, “[i]n the context of a motion for default judgment, a court

should accept the well-pleaded allegations of a complaint pertaining to liability as true.” Janssen

Scis. Ir. Unlimited Co. v. Safe Chain Sols., LLC, No. 22-CV-1983 (BMC), 2025 WL 3640661, at

*1 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2025) (citing Greyhound Exhibitgroup, 973 F.2d at 158); see also Vera v.

Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A., 946 F.3d 120, 135 (2d Cir. 2019) (“In reviewing a default

judgment, we generally ‘deem[] all the well-pleaded allegations [as to liability] in the pleadings to

be admitted.’” (quoting Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency, Inc. v. Ace Shipping Corp., 109 F.3d

105, 108 (2d Cir. 1997)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6) (“An allegation—other than one relating to the

amount of damages—is admitted if a responsive pleading is required and the allegation is not

denied.”).

The undersigned addresses liability as to each of Plaintiffs’ claims below.

A. RICO Claim Against Ageyev

1. Legal Standard

“To establish civil liability under RICO, a plaintiff must show a ‘substantive RICO

violation under 18 U.S.C. § 1962,’ and that the plaintiff suffered damages as a result.” Allstate

Ins. Co. v. Maccabi Pharm. Rx Inc., No. 24-CV-6214 (CBA) (RML), 2026 WL 794231, at *4

(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2026) (citations omitted), report and recommendation adopted, 2026 WL

792509 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2026). As is relevant here, RICO makes it “unlawful for any person

employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect,

interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of

such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.”

18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).

To demonstrate a RICO claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), a plaintiff must show: “(1) that

the defendant (2) through the commission of two or more acts (3) constituting a ‘pattern’ (4) of

‘racketeering activity’ (5) directly or indirectly invests in, or maintains [an] interest in, or

participates in (6) an ‘enterprise’ (7) the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce.”

Williams v. Affinion Grp., LLC, 889 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Moss v. Morgan

Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 17 (2d Cir. 1983)); see also Maccabi Pharm., 2026 WL 794231, at *5

(listing the elements of a § 1962(c) claim (quoting Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Infinity Health Prods.,

Ltd., No. 10-CV-5611 (JG) (JMA), 2012 WL 1427796, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2012), report and

recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 1432213 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2012))). Under RICO, a

“‘person’ includes any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in

property;” and an “‘enterprise’ includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or

other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal

entity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3), (4). A “‘pattern of racketeering activity’ requires at least two acts

of racketeering activity, . . . the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of

imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity.” Id. § 1961(5).

“Racketeering includes ‘mail fraud’ as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1341 to encompass using

interstate mails for a scheme to defraud.” Maccabi Pharm., 2026 WL 794231, at *5 (citing

S.Q.K.F.C., Inc. v. Bell Atl. TriCon Leasing Corp., 84 F.3d 629, 633 (2d Cir. 1996); Allstate Ins.

Co. v. Nazarov, No. 11-CV-6187 (PKC) (VMS), 2015 WL 5774459, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 30,

2015) (adopting report and recommendation)); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (“‘[R]acketeering

activity’ means . . . any act which is indictable under . . . section 1341 (relating to mail fraud)” of

title 18 of the United States Code.). “The elements of mail or wire fraud are (i) a scheme to defraud

(ii) to get money or property (iii) furthered by the use of interstate mail or wires.” Williams, 889

F.3d at 124 (first quoting United States v. Autuori, 212 F.3d 105, 115 (2d Cir. 2000); and then

citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343). “The gravamen of the offense is the scheme to defraud.” Id.

(quoting United States ex rel. O’Donnell v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 822 F.3d 650, 657 (2d

Cir. 2016)). “A ‘scheme to defraud’ is ‘a plan to deprive a person of something of value by trick,

deceit, chicane or overreaching.’” Id. (quoting Autuori, 212 F.3d at 115). “To make out such a

scheme, a plaintiff must provide proof of a material misrepresentation.” Id. (citing Neder v. United

States, 527 U.S. 1, 25 (1999)). To sufficiently allege the “use of interstate mails,” Plaintiffs “need

not allege that each defendant sent a piece of mail; rather, ‘it need only be shown that [each

defendant] acted with knowledge that the use of the mails will follow in the ordinary course of

business, or that such use can reasonably be foreseen, even though not actually intended.’”

Maccabi Pharm., 2026 WL 794231, at *5 (quoting Nazarov, 2015 WL 5774459, at *12).

“The predicate acts must be related, and either amount to or pose a threat of continuing

criminal activity.” Id. (quoting Nazarov, 2015 WL 5774459, at *13). The continuity requirement

may be satisfied “either by showing a closed-ended pattern—a series of related predicate acts

extending over a substantial period of time—or by demonstrating an open-ended pattern of

racketeering activity that poses a threat of continuing criminal conduct beyond the period during

which the predicate acts were performed.” Id. (quoting Nazarov, 2015 WL 5774459, at *13). “A

closed-ended pattern generally requires that the predicate acts span at least two years.” Id. (first

citing Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Scheer, No. 13-CV-4039 (SLT) (SMG), 2014 WL 4966150, at *7

(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2014) (for purposes of default judgment, finding a closed-ended pattern where

the enterprise “submitted bills for reimbursement to which it was not entitled over a period

exceeding two years”), report and recommendation adopted, 2014 WL 4966137 (E.D.N.Y. Sep.

30, 2014); and then citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Smirnov, No. 12-CV-1246 (CBA) (SMG), 2013 WL

5407224, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2013) (finding RICO liability where the defendants submitted

bills for reimbursement to which they were not entitled over periods exceeding two years), report

and recommendation adopted, Dkt. No. 197 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 25, 2013)).

Because the Complaint here alleges mail fraud as a predicate act, “the allegations are

subject to the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

which requires that ‘a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or

mistake.’” Brodie v. Rower, No. 25-CV-103 (ALC), 2026 WL 880345, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31,

2026) (citation omitted); see also Williams, 889 F.3d at 124-25 (“The elements of mail and wire

fraud must be pled with particularity. The complaint must detail the specific statements that are

false or fraudulent, identify the speaker, state when and where the statements were made, and

explain why the statements were fraudulent.” (citations omitted)).

“‘Given the powerful incentive for plaintiffs to attempt to fit garden variety fraud claims

within the standard of civil RICO,’ which allows for treble damages, ‘courts must scrutinize civil

RICO claims . . . to separate the rare complaint that actually states a claim for civil RICO from

that more obviously alleging common law fraud.’” Maccabi Pharm., 2026 WL 794231, at *4

(quoting Rajaratnam v. Motley Rice, LLC, 449 F. Supp. 3d 45, 64 (E.D.N.Y. 2020)).

2. Analysis

Plaintiffs adequately plead that Ageyev is liable for a RICO violation pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

§ 1962(c). The undersigned examines each RICO element below.

a. The RICO Person and RICO Enterprise

The Complaint alleges that Ageyev is a natural person and liable under RICO. See Dkt.

No. 1 ¶ 68; Dkt. No. 27-1 at 19. The Complaint also alleges that GVA Group is a corporation that

constitutes an enterprise affecting interstate commerce. See Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 69, 232; Dkt. No. 27-1

at 20-22. The Complaint further alleges that Ageyev “operated, managed, and/or controlled” GVA

Group. See Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 69, 99, 234.

Furthermore, the enterprise must exist “separate and apart from the pattern of activity in

which it engages.” Allstate Ins. Co. v. New Century Pharm. Inc., No. 19-CV-5702 (ENV) (VMS),

2021 WL 7830141, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2021) (first quoting D. Penguin Bros. v. City Nat’l

Bank, 587 F. App’x 663, 667 (2d Cir. 2014); and then citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Yehudian, No. 14-

CV-4826 (JS) (AKT), 2018 WL 1767873, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2018) (“The alleged enterprise

through which a pattern of racketeering activity is conducted must be distinct from those persons

or entities who stand accused of conducting that racketeering activity.”), report and

recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 1686106 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2018)), report and

recommendation adopted, Text Order, dated Mar. 24, 2022. “This requirement is met by

demonstrating that a ‘formal legal distinction’ exists between the individual defendants and the

RICO enterprise.” Id. (citing Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 165 (2001)).

“Where the alleged enterprises are corporations and the individual defendants are natural persons,

the person-enterprise distinction is met.” Id. (citing Palatkevich v. Choupak, No. 12-CV-1682

(CM), 2014 WL 1509236, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2014) (“[A] natural person named as the

defendant ‘person’ is inherently distinct from a corporate entity ‘enterprise’ for which he acts as

an agent; in such a case, the distinctness requirement is met.”)).

Here, because Ageyev—the party whom Plaintiffs seek to hold liable under RICO—is a

natural person, and the alleged enterprise—GVA Group—is a corporation, the required person-

enterprise distinction is met. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Abramov, No. 16-CV-1465 (AMD)

(SJB), 2020 WL 1172697, at *6-7 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2020) (stating that the distinctiveness

requirement for RICO claims is met where “none of the RICO Defaulting Defendants is alleged to

be a RICO enterprise”), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 1166498 (E.D.N.Y. Mar.

11, 2020); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Abutova, No. 13-CV-3494 (ARR) (LB), 2017 WL 1185222, at *4

(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2017) (“Since these allegations must be accepted as true in the context of a

default judgment, courts have held that this degree of specificity in pleading is sufficient to satisfy

the distinctiveness requirement under RICO, when alleged in the context of a no-fault billing

insurance case.” (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Afanasyev, No. 12-CV-2423 (JBW) (CLP), 2016 WL

1156769, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 1189284

(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2016))), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 1184107 (E.D.N.Y.

Mar. 29, 2017).

Accordingly, the first and sixth elements of a RICO cause of action have been adequately

alleged.

b. Participation in a Pattern of Racketeering Activity

Plaintiffs allege that, beginning in 2021, Ageyev engaged in racketeering acts on a

“continued basis” as part of his ongoing scheme to “fraudulently bill for DME and/or orthotic

devices to defraud insurers.” Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 69, 105, 233, 237. “Through the GVA Group

enterprise, Defendant Ageyev submitted numerous . . . fraudulent claim forms seeking payment

for DME and/or orthotic devices that were purportedly (but not actually) provided to numerous of

Covered Persons as billed.” Id. ¶ 240. Plaintiffs detail the mechanics of the scheme to defraud.

See id. ¶¶ 105-52. Plaintiffs allege the ways in which Ageyev fraudulently billed for custom

fabricated or custom fit DME and/or orthotic devices, cervical traction equipment, and DME

and/or orthotic devices that were not actually provided, and mis-used fee schedule codes. See id.

¶¶ 153-227. Plaintiffs also provide further specific allegations regarding a “representative sample

of predicate acts” in an appendix attached to the Complaint, which “identifies the nature and date

of mailings that were made by Defendant Ageyev, in furtherance of the scheme as well as the

specific misrepresentations identified for each of the mailings.” Id. ¶ 241; see also Dkt. No. 1-3.

Further, Plaintiffs allege that the “bills and supporting documents that were sent by Defendant

Ageyev, as well as the payments that Plaintiffs made in response to those bills, were sent through

the United States Postal Service.” Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 240. Plaintiffs also contend that they suffered

“injur[y] in their business and property and have been damaged in the aggregate amount presently

in excess of $53,000.00, the exact amount to be determined at trial.” Id. ¶ 244.

In short, the factual allegations in the Complaint are sufficient to demonstrate that Ageyev

engaged in two or more acts that constitute a pattern of mail fraud in which Ageyev, via GVA

Group, repeatedly used the U.S. Mail to submit fraudulent claims between at least 2021 and 2023,

and that Plaintiffs suffered significant monetary damages caused by Ageyev’s conduct in that

Ageyev’s repeated submission of fraudulent no-fault claims caused Plaintiffs, reasonably relying

on the false documentation, to make payments on those claims. See, e.g., New Century Pharm.,

2021 WL 7830141, at *10 (finding that plaintiffs pled sufficient facts to establish a pattern of

racketeering activity under RICO where defendants participated in a large-scale scheme repeatedly

using the U.S. Mail to submit fraudulent claims containing charges for drugs, medications,

treatments, tests, and services that were medically unnecessary over at least two years, and

plaintiffs described the specific circumstances of the fraudulent scheme and their significant

monetary damages); Abramov, 2020 WL 1172697, at *8 (finding that plaintiffs pled sufficient facts

to establish a pattern of racketeering activity under RICO where plaintiffs alleged how defendants

mailed thousands of fraudulent insurance claims over periods of time ranging from three to fifteen

years); Abutova, 2017 WL 1185222, at *6 (finding that plaintiffs established that defendants

participated in a pattern of racketeering activity where they alleged specific facts showing that the

defendants engaged in two or more acts of mail fraud by mailing fraudulent invoices between the

Retail defendants and the Wholesale defendants).

Accordingly, elements two through five of a RICO cause of action have been adequately

alleged.

c. Activities Affecting Interstate Commerce

“The law in this Circuit does not require RICO plaintiffs to show more than a minimal

effect on interstate commerce.” DeFalco v. Bernas, 244 F.3d 286, 309 (2d Cir. 2001) (citation

omitted); see also Abramov, 2020 WL 1172697, at *8 (“[P]laintiffs need only show a minimal

effect on interstate commerce.” (quoting Abutova, 2017 WL 1185222, at *6)). Here, Plaintiffs

have alleged a fraudulent scheme involving national insurance companies and the mailing and

cashing of checks obtained through falsely inflated invoices. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 50, 62-65,

84, 101, 239. “Such facts are sufficient to meet the interstate commerce requirement.” Abramov,

2020 WL 1172697, at *8 (citing Afanasyev, 2016 WL 1156769, at *10 (collecting cases, and noting

that “[s]everal courts have found that identical facts are sufficient to establish the necessary impact

on interstate commerce”)).

Accordingly, Plaintiffs have properly pled the seventh, and final, element of a civil RICO

claim.

***

The undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court find that Plaintiffs have

adequately stated a RICO claim against Ageyev.

While the Complaint also brings RICO claims against the John Doe Defendants, as set

forth in Plaintiffs’ June 23, 2026 letter, Plaintiffs state that they intend to voluntarily dismiss,

without prejudice, all claims against the John Doe Defendants upon the Court’s granting of their

motion for default judgment, in whole or in part. Dkt. No. 30. The undersigned, therefore,

respectfully recommends that the John Doe Defendants be dismissed from this action without

prejudice.

B. New York State Common Law Fraud Claim Against Ageyev and GVA Group

1. Legal Standard

To state a common law fraud claim under New York law, “a plaintiff must allege (1) a

material misrepresentation or omission of fact; (2) which the defendant knew to be false; (3) which

the defendant made with the intent to defraud; (4) upon which the plaintiff reasonably relied; and

(5) which caused injury to the plaintiff.” Fin. Guar. Ins. Co. v. Putnam Advisory Co., LLC, 783

F.3d 395, 402 (2d Cir. 2015) (first citing Crigger v. Fahnestock & Co., 443 F.3d 230, 234 (2d

Cir.2006); and then citing Wynn v. AC Rochester, 273 F.3d 153, 156 (2d Cir.2001) (per curium));

see also Maccabi Pharm., 2026 WL 794231, at *8 (stating the elements of a New York common

law fraud claim as: “(1) a material representation or omission of fact; (2) made with knowledge of

its falsity; (3) with scienter or an intent to defraud; (4) upon which the plaintiff reasonably relied;

and (5) [that] such reliance caused damage to the plaintiff” (quoting Soley v. Wasserman, 823 F.

Supp. 2d 221, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 2011))). A common law fraud claim, like Plaintiffs’ RICO claim, is

subject to the particularity pleading requirements of Rule 9(b), “which requires that the plaintiff

(1) detail the statements (or omissions) that the plaintiff contends are fraudulent, (2) identify the

speaker, (3) state where and when the statements (or omissions) were made, and (4) explain why

the statements (or omissions) are fraudulent.” Fin. Guar. Ins., 783 F.3d at 402-03 (quoting Eternity

Glob. Master Fund Ltd. v. Morgan Guar. Tr. Co. of N.Y., 375 F.3d 168, 187 (2d Cir. 2004)).

Under Rule 9(b), “[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind

may be alleged generally.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Plaintiffs still must allege facts that “give rise to

a strong inference of fraudulent intent” either “(a) by alleging facts to show the defendants had

both motive and opportunity to commit fraud, or (b) by alleging facts that constitute strong

circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness.” Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v.

Elmwood Park Med. Grp., P.C., No. 21-CV-617 (FB) (RER), 2022 WL 772737, at *7 (E.D.N.Y.

Feb. 23, 2022) (first quoting Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Badia, No. 13-CV-1720 (CBA) (VMS), 2015

WL 1258218, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2015) (adopting report and recommendation); and then

citing Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Hollis Med. Care, P.C., No. 10-CV-4341 (ILG) (RML), 2011 WL

5507426, at *8 n.11 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2011)), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL

768360 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2022). “The intent prong of common law fraud is established ‘when

it is clear that a scheme, viewed broadly, is necessarily going to injure.’” Id. (quoting Scheer, 2014

WL 4966150, at *6).

2. Analysis

Plaintiffs adequately plead that Ageyev and GVA Group are liable for fraud.

First, Plaintiffs allege that Defaulting Defendants “made material misrepresentations

and/or omitted material statements in submitting No-fault claims to Plaintiffs for payment,” and

that “[e]ach and every bill and supporting documentation submitted by [Defaulting Defendants] to

Plaintiffs set forth false and fraudulent amounts for reimbursement for DME and/or orthotic

devices that they purportedly supplied to Covered Persons.” Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 247-48. Plaintiffs

allege that documents submitted to them by Defaulting Defendants contained: (1) “[f]alse and

misleading statements as to the nature, quality, and cost of the DME and/or orthotic devices

purportedly supplied to Covered Persons;” (2) “[f]alse and misleading statements as to the amounts

GVA Group was entitled to be reimbursed under the No-fault Law;” (3) “[w]ith respect to Fee

Schedule items, false and misleading statements . . . that the DME and/or orthotic devices allegedly

supplied were in fact the items supplied to the Covered Persons;” (4) “[w]ith respect to Non-Fee

Schedule items, false and misleading statements . . . misrepresenting that the charges for the DME

and/or orthotic devices did not exceed the lesser of the actual wholesale cost of the medical

equipment to the provider, plus 50%; or the usual and customary price charged to the public;” (5)

“[f]alse and misleading prescriptions for the DME and/or orthotic devices purportedly supplied to

Covered Persons, generically describing the item to conceal the type of item being prescribed;”

and/or (6) “[f]alse and misleading prescriptions for DME and/or orthotic devices, concealing the

fact that the (a) DME and/or orthotic devices were prescribed and supplied pursuant to a pre-

determined, fraudulent protocol whereby” medically unnecessary DME and/or orthotic devices

were prescribed; “(b) DME and/or orthotic devices were not covered by the . . . Fee Schedule; and

(c) DME and/or orthotic devices were generically described on the prescriptions, all of which was

designed to permit [Defaulting Defendants] to manipulate the payment formulas and their claims

submissions in order to maximize the charges” submitted to Plaintiffs. Id. ¶ 249. Plaintiffs further

allege that Defaulting Defendants knew that these material misrepresentations were false. Id. ¶

251.

The Complaint also contains specific examples in a “Compendium of Exhibits” and

appendix incorporated into the Complaint. See Dkt. Nos. 1-3, 1-4. These documents detail

representative samples of claims submitted by Defendants and identify “the specific

misrepresentations identified for each of the mailings.” Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 241, 250. Several courts

have held that these documents, attached to the Complaint, are sufficient to identify with

particularly the requirements of Rule 9(b). See Elmwood Park Med. Grp., 2022 WL 772737, at

*7 (holding that plaintiff’s “allegations and the supporting charts are sufficient to establish with

particularity the first element of common law fraud” where, “[i]n addition to describing the scheme

generally, [plaintiff] provides detailed charts listing a representative sample of the charges that the

Defaulting Defendants submitted or caused to be submitted to [plaintiff], the date [plaintiff]

received each submission, and the claim numbers that correspond with each submission”

(collecting cases)); New Century Pharm., 2021 WL 7830141, at *5 (finding that plaintiffs met Rule

9(b) standard for common law fraud where “[t]he complaint attaches as exhibits a chart that lists

claims submitted by [defendant] under allegedly fraudulent [Current Procedural Terminology]

codes, as well as lists of allegedly fraudulent No-Fault claims paid out by Allstate to” defendants

(citations omitted)); Abramov, 2020 WL 1172697, at *10 (“The Claims Charts—which contain

statements or claims made by each of the Fraud Defaulting Defendants and when those claims

were made—are sufficient to meet this standard” under Rule 9(b). (collecting cases)).

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ allegations and their supporting documents are sufficient to establish with

particularity the first element of common law fraud.

Second, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged the knowledge and scienter elements. Plaintiffs

contend that Defaulting Defendants “intended to defraud Plaintiffs” by making these false

representations, and that Defaulting Defendants “knew the foregoing material misrepresentations

to be false when made and nevertheless made these false representations with the intention and

purpose of inducing Plaintiffs to rely thereon.” Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 248, 251. Further, Plaintiffs allege

that Defaulting Defendants “intended to deceive and mislead Plaintiffs into paying [Defaulting

Defendants’] claims under the No-fault Law.” Id. ¶ 250. Plaintiffs also allege that Defaulting

Defendants’ scheme was “motivated by money.” Id. ¶ 54. These allegations are sufficient to set

forth the second and third elements of common law fraud. See, e.g., Elmwood Park Med. Grp.,

2022 WL 772737, at *8 (finding the knowledge and intent to defraud elements satisfied where

plaintiff “avers in detail that the Defaulting Defendants knew that the claims they submitted were

fraudulent, and that the submissions were made as part of an intentional scheme to defraud the

insurer” (citation omitted)); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Avetisyan, No. 17-CV-4275 (RPK) (RML), 2021

WL 1227625, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2021) (finding that the Amended Complaint alleged that

the defendants “had both motive and opportunity for the fraud: they each had strong motive to

receive monetary reimbursements to which they were not entitled, and they had the opportunity

and ability to receive those reimbursements by submitting fraudulent claims to plaintiffs” (citations

omitted)), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 1224101 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2021);

Abutova, 2017 WL 1185222, at *7 (finding that the intent element was adequately alleged where

plaintiffs alleged that defendants “established a process to submit false claims and invoices in an

attempt to obtain undeserved and inflated payments from [plaintiffs]”).

Finally, the fourth and fifth elements of fraud have also been adequately pled. “A

plaintiff’s reliance on intentionally fraudulent statements is reasonable without further

investigation when ‘matters are held to be peculiarly within defendant’s knowledge, as plaintiff

has no independent means of ascertaining the truth.’” Elmwood Park Med. Grp., 2022 WL

772737, at *8 (quoting Scheer, 2014 WL 4966150, at *6). “In the context of insurance fraud

schemes, courts in this district regularly find that [i]nsurance companies are permitted to rely on

facially valid insurance reimbursement claims.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted).

Here, Plaintiffs allege that Defaulting Defendants represented that the claims were facially

valid, and that, “[t]o fulfill its obligation to promptly process claims, Plaintiffs justifiably relied

upon the bills and documentation submitted by GVA Group in support of its claims, and paid GVA

Group based on the representations and information contained in the bills and documentation that

Defendants mailed to Plaintiffs.” Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 82, 84. Furthermore, Plaintiffs allege that the

“documents submitted to Plaintiffs in support of the fraudulent claims at issue, combined with the

material misrepresentations, omissions and acts of fraudulent concealment described [in the

Complaint], were designed to, and did cause Plaintiffs to justifiably rely on them,” and that, as “a

proximate result, Plaintiffs have incurred damages of more than $53,000.00 based upon the

fraudulent bill submissions.” Id. ¶ 229.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs have sufficiently set forth the fourth and fifth elements of common

law fraud. See, e.g., Maccabi Pharm., 2026 WL 794231, at *9 (finding that the fourth and fifth

elements were satisfied where plaintiff averred that “it relied on the facially valid documents that

were submitted by the defaulting defendants,” and, therefore, “paid out at least $516,988 in claims

otherwise not reimbursable under the no-fault law” (citation omitted)); New Century Pharm., 2021

WL 7830141, at *6 (same); Nazarov, 2015 WL 5774459, at *15 (finding that the issuance of

reimbursements based on fraudulent billing satisfies the fourth and fifth prongs).

***

The undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court find that Plaintiffs have

adequately alleged common law fraud as to Defaulting Defendants.

C. Unjust Enrichment

Plaintiffs also seek default judgment on their unjust enrichment claim against Defaulting

Defendants. See Dkt. No. 27-1 at 34-35. Because the undersigned recommends granting default

judgment on the common law fraud claims against these parties, it is unnecessary to also grant

judgment on the unjust enrichment claims.

“Properly understood, an unjust enrichment claim is intended to protect a plaintiff only in

those circumstances where it has no other recourse in tort or contract.” Maccabi Pharm., 2026

WL 794231, at *9 (first quoting Avetisyan, 2021 WL 1227625, at *6; and then citing Corsello v.

Verizon N.Y., Inc., 967 N.E.2d 1177, 1186 (N.Y. 2012) (“[Unjust enrichment] is available only in

unusual situations when, though the defendant has not breached a contract nor committed a

recognized tort, circumstances create an equitable obligation running from the defendant to the

plaintiff . . . . An unjust enrichment claim is not available where it simply duplicates, or replaces,

a conventional contract or tort claim.”)).

Here, Plaintiffs allege that Defaulting Defendants were unjustly enriched at Plaintiffs’

expense, but based these claims on the same transactions as their claims for common law fraud.

See Dkt. No. 27-1 at 35; Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 257-59. Accordingly, the unjust enrichment claims are

duplicative of the fraud claims and, as a result, Plaintiffs are not entitled to a judgment on their

unjust enrichment claims. See, e.g., Elmwood Park Med. Grp., 2022 WL 772737, at *9 (“[F]inding

liability on [plaintiff’s] unjust enrichment claims would be inappropriate given that they are based

on the same transactions and conduct as the common law fraud claims.”); Abramov, 2020 WL

1172697, at *12 (finding unjust enrichment claims duplicative of fraud claims (first citing Hughes

v. Ester C Co., 330 F. Supp. 3d 862, 877 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (“Unjust enrichment claims should be

dismissed where the violative conduct alleged is conterminous with a conventional tort or contract

claim, regardless of whether the tort or contract claim is dismissed.”); then citing Spinnato v. Unity

of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 322 F. Supp. 3d 377, 404 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (“The instant case is not

representative of the ‘unusual’ circumstances which provide for an unjust enrichment claim. The

Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim rehashes and improperly duplicates their fraud claims . . . . As

this claim is based on the same set of facts as the fraud claim, the Plaintiffs’ thirteenth (unjust

enrichment) claim is dismissed.”); and then citing Nazarov, 2015 WL 5774459, at *16 (denying

liability in default judgment motion reasoning that “as Plaintiffs have established the Danilovich

Defendants’ liability for common law fraud, Plaintiffs have not adequately pled a claim for unjust

enrichment because that claim would rely on duplicative facts”))).

Thus, in light of the undersigned’s recommendation that the Court grant default judgment

on the common law fraud claims against Defaulting Defendants, the undersigned respectfully

recommends that the Court deny Plaintiffs’ request for default judgment on their unjust enrichment

claim and dismiss the unjust enrichment claim.

VI. Damages

As Plaintiffs have proven Defaulting Defendants’ liability on their RICO and common law

fraud claims, the Court next evaluates damages. “While a party’s default is deemed to constitute

a concession of all well pleaded allegations of liability, it is not considered an admission of

damages.” Greyhound Exhibitgroup, 973 F.2d at 158 (citations omitted). “Rather, [t]he [C]ourt

must be satisfied that [the] [p]laintiff has met the burden of proving damages to the [C]ourt with

reasonable certainty.” Balhetchet v. Su Caso Mktg. Inc., No. 19-CV-4475 (PKC) (SJB), 2020 WL

4738242, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2020) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). On a

default judgment motion, “[a]n evidentiary hearing is not required; rather, in determining damages,

the Court may rely on detailed affidavits and other documentary evidence.” Abbott Lab’ys v.

Adelphia Supply USA, No. 15-CV-5826 (CBA) (LB), 2024 WL 4250223, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 22,

2024) (citations omitted), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 4263935 (E.D.N.Y. Sep.

23, 2024). Concerning the scope of damage recovery pursuant to a default judgment, the Second

Circuit has held that a default judgment does not give plaintiff “a blank check to recover from

[defendant] any losses it had ever suffered from whatever source. [The plaintiff] could only

recover those damages arising from the acts and injuries pleaded and in this sense it was

[plaintiff’s] burden to show ‘proximate cause.’” Greyhound Exhibitgroup, 973 F.2d at 159

(citation omitted).

Plaintiffs seek treble compensatory damages as well as prejudgment interest against

Ageyev in the total amount of $168,510.72. See Dkt. No. 27-4 at 2; Dkt. No. 27-17 at 2. As to

GVA Group, Plaintiffs seek compensatory damages with prejudgment interest in the total amount

of $61,988.26. See Dkt. No. 27-4 at 2; Dkt. No. 27-17 at 2. In support of their damages requests,

Plaintiffs have filed the Declaration of Oren Kutnowsky, an Analyst in the Special Investigations

Unit of Plaintiff Allstate Insurance Company, and a spreadsheet “containing information extracted

from summaries of payments made on claims for reimbursement under the No-Fault law,” which

are “maintained by Allstate in its ordinary course of business.” See Dkt. No. 27-2; Dkt. No. 27-3

¶ 58; Dkt. No. 27-15. The spreadsheet itemizes “each payment made by Plaintiffs to the GVA

Group enterprise in which Ageyev is alleged to have participated.” Dkt. No. 27-3 ¶ 58; see also

Dkt. No. 27-15. The spreadsheet lists the claim numbers submitted, the dates of payment, the

amounts paid, and the check numbers. See Dkt. No. 27-15. The spreadsheet shows compensatory

damages in the total amount of $53,256.23. Id. Plaintiffs also filed their prejudgment interest

calculations. See Dkt. No. 27-3 ¶ 64; Dkt. No. 27-16.8

A. RICO Damages Against Ageyev

Plaintiffs argue that, based on the itemized spreadsheet and the underlying information,

they sustained damages in the amount of $53,256.23, which they argue should be trebled under

RICO against Ageyev for a total award of $159,768.69. Dkt. No. 27-1 at 36-37.

The documents filed by Plaintiffs support their claim of $53,256.23 in damages related to

the RICO violation. See Nazarov, 2015 WL 5774459, at *17 (noting that “[i]n similar cases, courts

have found such documentation [(an affidavit from an Allstate Special Investigations Unit analyst

and copies of payment summaries)] sufficient to support a damages award” (collecting cases));

Maccabi Pharm., 2026 WL 794231, at *11 (finding damages calculations submitted by plaintiffs,

supported by a declaration of a Allstate Special Investigations Unit analyst, sufficient evidence on

which to award RICO damages (collecting cases)).

Pursuant to RICO, “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation

of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and

shall recover threefold the damages he sustains.” 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c); see also Allstate Ins. Co.

v. Geykhman, No. 24-CV-4580 (PKC) (CLP), 2025 WL 2576749, at *16 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 7, 2025)

(noting that “an injured party is automatically entitled to recover ‘threefold the damages’ it sustains

8 Plaintiffs do not seek attorneys’ fees or costs, see Dkt. No. 29, nor do they seek postjudgment interest.

for a RICO violation” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c))), report and recommendation adopted in part,

Text Order, dated Feb. 19, 2026. “Courts have found that an award of treble damages is

appropriate in no-fault billing cases involving RICO fraud claims, even in the context of a default.”

Avetisyan, 2021 WL 1227625, at *8 (quoting Afanasyev, 2016 WL 1156769, at *12 (collecting

cases)); Maccabi Pharm., 2026 WL 794231, at *10 (same). Accordingly, Plaintiffs are entitled to

trebled damages on the RICO claim.

The undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court award Plaintiffs treble damages

on their RICO claim against Ageyev, in the total amount of $159,768.69.

B. Fraud Damages and Joint and Several Liability

Plaintiffs do not seek any additional damages on their fraud claim as to Ageyev, but seek

compensatory damages in the amount of $53,256.23 against GVA Group on the fraud claim and

argue that Ageyev and GVA Group are “jointly and severally liable for all damages” relating to

the fraud claim. See Dkt. No. 27-1 at 36; Dkt. No. 27-4 at 2; Dkt. No. 27-17 at 2.

“As Plaintiffs have demonstrated liability on their fraud claims, they are entitled to

damages in the entire amount they paid to Defaulting Defendants, unless they are already

recovering those same damages under RICO.” New Century Pharm., 2021 WL 7830141, at *12

(first citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Williams, No. 13-CV-2893 (RJD) (JMA), 2014 WL 6900121, at *10

(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2014) (adopting report & recommendation, and finding that “separate awards

under RICO and state law would be duplicative”); and then citing Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Esses,

No. 12-CV-4424 (RJD) (VVP), 2013 WL 5972481, at *10 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2013) (adopting

report & recommendation)). Where RICO damages wholly compensate a plaintiff and that award

has been trebled, a separate award of damages on an overlapping fraud claim would “amount to

double recovery for plaintiff.” Am. Transit Ins. Co. v. Bilyk, 514 F. Supp. 3d 463, 479 (E.D.N.Y.

2021) (Cogan, J.) (citation omitted). Moreover, “New York law provides for joint and several

liability for fraudulent acts where defendants acted jointly or concurrently to produce a single

injury.” New Century Pharm., 2021 WL 7830141, at *12 (citations omitted).

Here, Plaintiffs allege that Ageyev submitted or caused to be submitted fraudulent claims

through his company, GVA Group and, accordingly, Ageyev is jointly and severally liable with

GVA Group for the $53,256.23 in common law fraud damages. These damages overlap with

$53,256.23 of the $159,768.69 sought against Ageyev for the RICO violation. Plaintiffs’ damages

calculation and proposed judgment, however, appear to seek $53,256.23 from GVA Group

separate and apart from the $159,768.69 sought from Ageyev. See Dkt. No. 27-4 at 2; Dkt. No.

27-17 at 4. Because the RICO damages wholly compensate Plaintiffs, and that award has been

trebled, Plaintiffs are not entitled to a separate award on the fraud claim. See Esses, 2013 WL

5972481, at *10 n.3 (“Since the award of damages under RICO wholly compensates the plaintiffs,

and the award having been trebled, the plaintiffs are not entitled to separate awards of damages on

the claims for common law fraud and unjust enrichment.”).

Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court decline to award any

additional damages based on common law fraud, but recommends that GVA Group be held jointly

and severally liable with Ageyev for $53,256.23 of the RICO damages, the actual damages from

the GVA Group enterprise. See, e.g., New Century Pharm., 2021 WL 7830141, at *13

(recommending denial of plaintiffs’ request for additional damages based on the common law fraud

claim, but also recommending that the Court hold the non-RICO defendant jointly and severally

liable with the RICO defendant for the fraud damages also attributed to the non-RICO defendant);

Bilyk, 514 F. Supp. 3d at 479 (awarding trebled RICO damages against each individual defendant,

“plus prejudgment interest on the fraud damages, for which the associated Retail Defendant is

jointly and severally liable for the total amount of fraud damages”); Badia, 2015 WL 1258218, at

*24 (recommending that “Baneur and the Referral Defendants are jointly and severally liable for

the $117,210.85 in actual damages arising from the fraud and RICO claims, respectively, and that

the Referral Defendants alone are jointly and severally liable among themselves for $234,421.70

(which represents the trebled RICO damages reduced by $117,210.85)”).

C. Prejudgment Interest

Plaintiffs seek prejudgment interest on the damages awards under RICO and the state

claims. Dkt. No. 27-1 at 37-38.

First, as to RICO, “[a]n award of prejudgment interest is [not] mandatory . . . under RICO”;

rather, prejudgment interest is “awarded at the discretion of the Court.” Abramov, 2020 WL

1172697, at *14 (citations omitted). “Courts in this circuit generally only award prejudgment

interest in civil RICO actions where treble damages do not adequately compensate for plaintiff’s

losses.” Id. Here, Plaintiffs are already sufficiently compensated by the recommended award of

treble damages for their RICO claim, and, thus, an award of prejudgment interest from Ageyev on

the RICO damages is inappropriate. See id. (“[T]he Court finds that Allstate is already sufficiently

compensated by the award of treble damages for its RICO claims, and thus an award of

prejudgment interest from the RICO Defaulting Defendants is inappropriate.”); Abutova, 2017 WL

1185222, at *9 (“[T]he Court finds that the treble damages awarded under the civil RICO claims

are sufficient to compensate Allstate.”); Avetisyan, 2021 WL 1227625, at *9 (finding “that

plaintiffs are already sufficiently compensated by the award of treble damages for their RICO

claims, and thus an award of prejudgment interest from the RICO defendants is inappropriate”).

Thus, no prejudment interested is warranted on the RICO claim.

Second, as to prejudgment interest relating to the common law fraud claim, as discussed

above, the undersigned has recommended that the Court decline to award any additional damages

based on common law fraud, but recommends that GVA Group be held jointly and severally liable

with Ageyev for $53,256.23 of the RICO damages. Although prejudgment interest is mandatory

for state law fraud in New York, see Avetisyan, 2021 WL 1227625, at *9 (citations omitted), here

the undersigned has recommended that Plaintiffs not receive additional compensatory damages on

their fraud claim. Plaintiffs, therefore, are not entitled to interest on those damages. See Gov’t

Emps. Ins. Co. v. Direct RX Pharm., Inc., No. 19-CV-5876 (DG) (LB), 2021 WL 6494722, at *5

(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2021) (recommending that plaintiffs “should not recover compensatory

damages nor interest for their common law fraud claim”), report and recommendation adopted,

2022 WL 125822 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2022).

Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court deny Plaintiffs’

request for prejudgment interest.

D. Postjudgment Interest

The Second Circuit has “consistently held that an award of postjudgment interest is

mandatory.” Schipani v. McLeod, 541 F.3d 158, 165 (2d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).

Postjudgment interest is mandatory, even if not sought by the plaintiff. See Garcia v. Three Star

Constr. Grp. LLC, No. 26-CV-1353 (BMC), 2026 WL 1983312, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 9, 2026)

(“Plaintiff argues that the judgment should include a provision for post-judgment interest. That is

unnecessary as post-judgment interest accrues on every federal judgment as a matter of law.”

(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1961)); Garcia v. J&L Constr. LLC, No. 24-CV-5260 (DEH) (GS), 2026 WL

789496, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2026) (recommending that the award of postjudgment interest

is mandatory “regardless of whether postjudgment interest is sought by the plaintiff” (citing

Bleecker v. Zetian Sys., Inc., No. 12-CV-2151 (DLC) (SN), 2013 WL 5951162, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.

Nov. 1, 2013) (adopting report and recommendation, and noting that, “[a]lthough the Complaint

did not seek relief in the form of post-judgment interest, such relief is mandatory under federal

law”))), report and recommendation adopted, Dkt. No. 62 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2026). Moreover,

federal courts award postjudgment interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) on civil RICO and

common law fraud claims. See, e.g., Zamora v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 14-CV-5344

(WHP) (SN), 2019 WL 3401693, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2019) (recommending postjudgment

interest under 28 U.S.C. § 1961 in a case involving civil RICO on a default judgment motion),

report and recommendation adopted sub nom., Zamora v. FIT Int’l Grp., Corp., 2019 WL 2416941

(S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2019); see also J&L Constr., 2026 WL 789496, at *13 (awarding postjudgment

interest under 28 U.S.C. § 1961 for a fraud claim because “in a diversity case ‘postjudgment

interest is governed by federal statute’” (quoting Schipani, 541 F.3d at 164-65)).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1961, “interest is calculated ‘from the date of the entry of judgment, at

a rate equal to the weekly average 1-year constant maturity Treasury yield, as published by the

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, for the calendar week preceding[] the date of

the judgment.’” Weber Cap., 821 F. Supp. 3d at 389 (citation omitted).

Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Plaintiffs be awarded

postjudgment interest, to be calculated from the date the Clerk of Court enters judgment in this

action until the date of payment, using the federal rate set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1961.

VII. Declaratory Judgment

Finally, Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 2201, relieving Plaintiffs

“from any obligation to pay any unpaid No-Fault claims submitted to them by GVA Group.” Dkt.

No. 27-4 at 3; see also Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 260-267; Dkt. No. 27-1 at 38-41. “Under the Declaratory

Judgment Act, ‘any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may

declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether

or not further relief is or could be sought.’” Elmwood Park Med. Grp., 2022 WL 772737, at *12

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2201). The Declaratory Judgment Act “is an enabling Act, which confers a

discretion on the courts rather than an absolute right upon the litigant. The propriety of issuing a

declaratory judgment may depend upon equitable considerations, and is also informed by the

teachings and experience concerning the functions and extent of federal judicial power.” Id.

(quoting Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Hudson River-Black River Regulating Dist., 673 F.3d

84, 106 n.7 (2d Cir. 2012)).

“A court may consider whether to enter a declaratory judgment only if the action presents

an actual case or controversy that is ‘real and immediate, allowing specific and conclusive relief,’

and ‘ripe for adjudication.’” Id. (quoting Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Spectrum Neurology Grp., LLC,

No. 14-CV-5277 (ENV) (SMG), 2016 WL 11395017, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2016), report and

recommendation adopted sub nom., Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Premier Pro. Servs., 2016 WL

1071099 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2016)); see also Maccabi Pharm., 2026 WL 794231, at *9 (“A party

seeking a declaratory judgment must allege that there is a ‘substantial controversy, between parties

with adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a

declaratory judgment.’” (quoting Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca

Indians, 94 F.3d 747, 752 (2d Cir. 1996))). “The controversy must be ‘real and substantial’ such

that declaratory relief will provide ‘specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as

distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.’”

Maccabi Pharm., 2026 WL 794231, at *9 (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Williams, No. 13-CV-2893

(RJD) (JO), 2015 WL 5560543, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2015), report and recommendation

adopted sub nom., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dublin, 2015 WL 5560546 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 21, 2015)).

Declaratory relief “is appropriate ‘(1) where the judgment will serve a useful purpose in clarifying

and settling the legal relations in issue; or (2) when it will terminate and afford relief from the

uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy giving rise to the proceedings.’” Elmwood Park Med.

Grp., 2022 WL 772737, at *12; see also Maccabi Pharm., 2026 WL 794231, at *10 (same).

“Courts within this district have, on numerous occasions, found these requirements met in actions

by insurers seeking declaratory judgments regarding obligations relating to allegedly fraudulent

claims.” Bilyk, 514 F. Supp. 3d at 475 (quoting Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Jacques, No. 14-CV-5299

(KAM) (VMS), 2017 WL 9487191, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2017), report and recommendation

adopted, 2017 WL 1214460 (Mar. 31, 2017)).

Here, Plaintiffs have filed a spreadsheet that contains information, extracted from billing

summaries, reflecting the bills that Plaintiffs have received from GVA Group but remain unpaid.

See Dkt. No. 27-2 ¶ 5; Dkt. No. 27-3 ¶ 67; Dkt. No. 27-18. A total of $96,721.25 in pending and/or

unpaid claims submitted to Plaintiffs by GVA Group remains actively in dispute. See Dkt. No. 27-

2 ¶ 6; Dkt. No. 27-3 ¶ 66; Dkt. No. 27-18. Further, GVA Group continues to pursue one collection

proceeding in Kings County Civil Court. Dkt. No. 27-3 ¶ 68; see also Dkt. No. 27-19. A review

of the docket of the Kings County Civil Court proceeding identified by Plaintiffs demonstrates that

GVA Group initiated a proceeding against Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance Company in

2023, alleging failure to pay an insurance claim for $9,848.58, interest, and attorney’s fees, and

that, on May 20, 2024, GVA Group filed a Notice of Trial, indicating that the proceeding was ready

for trial. See Notice of Trial, GVA Group Inc. v. Allstate Property & Casualty Ins. Co., No. CV-

705362-24/KI (May 20, 2024), Dkt. No. 7. The case remains pending. Plaintiffs argue, therefore,

that “unless or until Plaintiffs’ declaratory relief is granted, [GVA Group] may continue to submit

to new claims and file collections proceedings for the unpaid claims either in the civil courts of

the State of New York and/or before Arbitrators of the American Arbitration Association seeking

payment from Plaintiffs for the same DME, and/or orthotic devices that Plaintiffs’ Complaint

alleges has been fraudulently billed.” Dkt. No. 27-3 ¶ 68.

Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that there is an actual controversy between Plaintiffs

and Defaulting Defendants of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a

declaratory judgment. Specifically, the unpaid claims and pending collection proceeding

constitute an actual controversy for which a declaratory judgment would provide specific and

conclusive relief from the uncertainty that those claims pose. “Courts in this district routinely

grant declaratory relief in similar circumstances, where fraudulently incorporated medical

practices have fraudulent claims pending against insurers for No-Fault benefits.” Elmwood Park

Med. Grp., 2022 WL 772737, at *13 (collecting cases); see also Avetisyan, 2021 WL 1227625, at

*10 (“Courts in this district have granted declaratory relief in numerous cases where the defendants

. . . were involved in similar schemes to defraud insurers for charges that are not permissible under

the no-fault law.” (collecting cases)); Bilyk, 514 F. Supp. 3d at 476 (granting plaintiff’s request for

a declaratory judgment and ordering that “plaintiff is not obligated to pay any of the defaulted

Retail Defendants’ pending claims” where plaintiff “established the existence of an actual

controversy so as to warrant a declaratory judgment” via plaintiff’s “chart demonstrating that 181

collections actions and arbitrations are pending between itself and the defaulted Retail Defendants”

and plaintiff’s sufficiently particular allegations regarding how “how defendants’ pending, unpaid

claims are part of a fraudulent scheme to submit inflated claims”).

Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Plaintiffs are entitled to a

declaration that they are not obligated to pay GVA Group’s outstanding claims and that their

request for declaratory relief be granted.

VIII. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Plaintiffs’ motion

be granted in part and denied in part. Specifically, the undersigned respectfully recommends that

the Court hold that Defendant Ageyev is liable under RICO for the first cause of action alleged in

the Complaint, that Defaulting Defendants are liable for common law fraud as to the second cause

of action alleged in the Complaint, and that RICO damages be trebled and awarded against Ageyev

in the amount of $159,768.69, $53,256.23 of which GVA Group should be held jointly and

severally liable with Ageyev. Additionally, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the

Court grant Plaintiffs’ request for declaratory relief and direct that Plaintiffs are not obligated to

pay GVA Group’s outstanding claims. Further, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the

Court dismiss Plaintiffs’ third cause of action for unjust enrichment, deny Plaintiffs’ request for

prejudgment interest, and dismiss the John Doe Defendants from this action without prejudice.

Finally, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court award postjudgment interest.

A copy of this Report and Recommendation is being electronically served on counsel. This

Court directs Plaintiffs’ counsel to serve a copy of this Report and Recommendation by first-class

mail and overnight mail on Defendants and to file proof of service on ECF by July 16, 2026.

Copies shall be served at the following addresses:

GVA Group Inc.

2167 East 21st St., Suite 242

Brooklyn, NY 11229

GVA Group Inc.

1133 East 35th St., Suite 4D

Brooklyn, NY 11210

Aleksandr Ageyev

1854 Ocean Avenue, Apartment 3F

Brooklyn, New York 11230

Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed within fourteen (14) days

after service of this Report and Recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P.

72(b)(2); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d) (addressing computation of days). Any requests for an

extension of time for filing objections must be directed to Judge Merchant. The “failure to object

timely to a [magistrate judge]’s report operates as a waiver of any further judicial review of the

[magistrate judge]’s decision.” Caidor v. Onondaga Cnty., 517 F.3d 601, 604 (2d Cir. 2008)

(quoting Small v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 892 F.2d 15, 16 (2d. Cir. 1989)).

Dated: Brooklyn, New York SO ORDERED.

July 15, 2026

/s/ Joseph A. Marutollo

JOSEPH A. MARUTOLLO

United States Magistrate Judge