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FATES DISTRICT

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT AUG 14 2026

WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

a ANOREW ier. OF

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STERN DISTRICL>

JOHN ANTONI AGUILAR GUZMAN,

Petitioner,

v. 6:26-CV-6655 (JLS)

MICHAEL BALL, tn his official capacity

as Acting Deputy Field Office Director,

Buffalo Field Office, U.S. Immigration &

Customs Enforcement; PHILIP RHONEY,

in his official capacity as Acting Field

Office Director, Buffalo Field Office, U.S.

Immigration & Customs Enforcement;

DAVID VENTURELLA, in his official

capacity as Senior Official Performing the

Duties of the Director, U.S. Immigration

& Customs Enforcement; TODD

BLANCHE, in his official capacity as

United States Attorney General;

MARKWAYNE MULLIN, in his official

capacity as Secretary of Homeland

Security;

Respondents. !

DECISION AND ORDER

Petitioner John Antoni Aguilar Guzman, a citizen and national of Mexico,

commenced this habeas corpus proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging his

continued detention in the custody of the Department of Homeland Security

(“DHS”). See Dkts. 1, 6. For the reasons below, Petitioner’s petition is dismissed.

The caption has been updated pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d).

BACKGROUND

In October 2011, Petitioner unlawfully entered the United States. Dkt. 1, at

3 491. He was not encountered by immigration authorities upon entry. Id.; see also

Dkt. 6, at 2 (Petitioner “arrived in the United States at an unknown location” and

“was not admitted or paroled.”). He “made a life in the [American] community” for

the next fifteen years. Dkt. 1, at 3] 3. On June 6, 2026, he was detained by

Respondents. Id. at 3 4 1.

On June 28, 2026, Petitioner was scheduled to have a custody

redetermination hearing. Dkt. 6, at 3; Dkt. 6-2 at 18. The hearing did not take

place, however, because Petitioner withdrew his request for it. Dkt. 6, at 3.

Petitioner nonetheless remains eligible for a custody redetermination hearing,

should he renew his request for one with the immigration court. See generally Dkt.

8.

Petitioner filed a petition on June 25, 2026, seeking a writ of habeas corpus

releasing him and providing that Respondents not re-detain him without “a pre-

deprivation hearing at which the government bears the burden... .” Dkt. 1, at 17.

Respondents moved to dismiss this case on the grounds that Petitioner had not

exhausted his administrative remedies before filing a petition with this Court and

that this Court is unable to order Petitioner’s release. Dkts. 5-6. Petitioner replied,

arguing that he did not need to exhaust administrative remedies because

exhaustion was futile and that he should either receive a bond hearing with the

burden of proof on the Government or immediate release. Dkt. 7. Respondents

then submitted a further filing, arguing that exhaustion was not futile, that it was

incorrect to determine the burden of proof of a bond hearing at this stage, and that

immediate release should be denied. Dkt. 8.

Because this Court finds that administrative exhaustion is warranted, the

petition must be dismissed.

DISCUSSION

A “habeas petitioner must normally exhaust administrative remedies before

seeking federal court intervention.” Castillo Lachapel v. Joyce, 786 F. Supp. 3d 860,

864 (S.D.N_Y. 2025) (quoting Michalski v. Decker, 279 F. Supp. 3d 487, 495

(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (subsequent citation omitted). Although “Section 2241 does not

include a statutory exhaustion requirement, courts generally require exhaustion as

a ‘prudential matter.” Hossain v. Barr, No. 6:19-CV-06389-MAT, 2019 WL

5964678, at *8-5 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2019) (quoting Michalski, 279 F. Supp. 3d at

495 (subsequent citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). In the Second

Circuit, a “district court may excuse prudential exhaustion where: ‘(1) available

remedies provide no genuine opportunity for adequate relief; (2) irreparable injury

may occur without immediate judicial relief; (3) administrative appeal would be

futile; and (4) in certain instances a plaintiff has raised a substantial constitutional

question.” Batista v. Genalo, No. 1:26-cv-05408-MKV, 2026 WL 2169849, at *3

(S.D.N.Y. July 28, 2026) (quoting Beharry v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 51, 62 (2d Cir.

2003)).

Petitioner argues that exhaustion should be excused because the available

administrative remedies would be futile. See Dkt. 7, at 1 (“This Court has held

that, in a nearly identical matter, exhaustion was futile... .”). He also argues that

exhaustion ought to be excused because it is a prudential, not a statutory,

requirement, and the process to appeal bond before the Board of Immigration

Appeals is too long and cumbersome to be prudential. Id. at 1-2.

In order “to understand the futility exception to the exhaustion requirement,

the purposes behind the requirement of exhaustion . . . should be understood.”

Beharry, 329 F.3d at 62 (quoting Kennedy v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 989

F.2d 588, 594 (2d Cir. 1993)). These purposes include “protecting the authority of

administrative agencies, limiting interference in agency affairs, developing the

factual record to make judicial review more efficient, and resolving issues to render

judicial review unnecessary.” Id. at 62. If a petitioner shows “that pursuing

available administrative remedies would be futile,” then “a court will release the

[petitioner] from the exhaustion requirement” because “the purposes behind the

requirement of exhaustion are no longer served.” Id. (quoting Kennedy, 989 F.2d at

594). But it is not enough for a petitioner to argue that his or her claim would likely

fail in immigration court to demonstrate “that it would . . . be[] futile to raise it”

there. Jd.

Here, Petitioner essentially argues that, because he believes his claim may

fail in immigration court, it would be futile to raise it there. This is not enough to

establish futility. Further, prudence “counsels judicial restraint ..., especially in

the immigration arena in which the federal government’s political branches exercise

plenary authority.” Michalski, 279 F. Supp. at 497 (citing Rajah v. Makasey, 544

F.3d 427, 438 (2d Cir. 2008)). Additionally, “the substance of ICE’s individualized

determination” . . . “is outside [of] the Court’s jurisdiction.” Marshall v. Arteta, 1:26-

cv-04110-MKV, 2026 WL 1724311 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2026) (quoting Fontanelli ex

rel. Bernal Garcia v. Francis, No. 25-cv-7115, (JLR), 2025 WL 2773234, at *8

(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2025)). Petitioner may request a custody redetermination

hearing before an immigration judge.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Respondents’ motion to dismiss, Dkt. 5, is granted,

and the Petition is dismissed without prejudice.

The Clerk of Court shall close this case.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 14, 2026 >

Buffalo, New York

JO L. SINATRA, JR.

UMTED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE