Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT August 05, 2026

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

GALVESTON DIVISION

DONALD LYNN THOMPSON, JR., §

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Plaintiff. §

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V. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-cv-00253

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MATAGORDA COUNTY, et al., §

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Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION

This civil rights case is before me on a motion to dismiss for the second time.

I previously recommended that Plaintiff Donald Thompson’s claims against all

defendants be dismissed, but that Thompson be given the opportunity to amend

his complaint. See Dkt. 42. Judge Jeffrey V. Brown adopted my recommendation,

see Dkt. 44, and Thompson amended his complaint. See Dkt. 45. The Matagorda

County Defendants now move to dismiss Thompson’s amended complaint.1 See

Dkt. 52. Having reviewed the briefing, the record, and the applicable law, I

recommend that the motion be granted. I also recommend that the court sua

sponte dismiss Buster Jackson d/b/a Jackson Towing Services.

BACKGROUND2

On May 14, 2023, Thompson was operating a vehicle in Markham, Texas,

when he was stopped and arrested by Defendant Deputy Raymond Gonzales for

driving with an expired registration. Gonzales handcuffed, arrested, and

transported Thompson to the Matagorda County Jail where he was detained for

1 The Matagorda County Defendants are Matagorda County, Texas; Jennifer Chau, the

Matagorda County Attorney; Judge Jason Sanders, Justice of the Peace Precinct 1; Judge

Mark Finlay, Justice of the Peace Precinct 4; Matagorda County Sheriff’s Deputies

Raymond Gonzales and J. Wamget; Michaela Riley; and Jane Doe Deputy, alleged to be

employed by the Matagorda County Sheriff’s Department.

2 These facts, which I accept as true, are taken from Thompson’s first amended complaint

and the attachments to it. See Dkts. 45–48.

approximately 18 hours. In connection with his arrest, the vehicle that Thompson

was driving was towed by Jackson Towing Services after Gonzales and Jane Doe

Deputy allegedly searched it with flashlights.

On May 15, 2023, Defendant Judge Jason Sanders, Justice of the Peace for

Precinct 1, conducted a magistration and entered a disposition of time served

against Thompson.

On June 22, 2023, a vehicle tow hearing was held before Defendant Judge

Mark Finlay, Justice of the Peace for Precinct 4. Defendant County Attorney

Jennifer Chau appeared at the hearing, as did Buster Jackson, the owner of the

company that towed the vehicle that Thompson was driving. During the hearing,

Thompson’s wife requested the body-worn and dash camera footage of

Thompson’s arrest. Judge Finlay denied that request and ruled that the tow was

lawful. Michaela Riley, a records clerk, denied Thompson’s request for access to

body camera and dash camera footage.

Thompson asserts nine causes of action: (1) unlawful seizure against

Gonzales; (2) unlawful arrest against Gonzales; (3) unlawful search against

Gonzales and Jane Doe Deputy; (4) excessive force against Gonzales and Wamget;

(5) deprivation of due process against Judge Sanders based on jurisdictional

deprivation; (6) deprivation of due process against Chau, Riley, and Judge Finlay

based on the suppression of exculpatory evidence; (7) malicious prosecution

against Gonzales, Sanders, and Chau; (8) civil conspiracy to violate constitutional

rights against all defendants; and (9) Monell liability against Matagorda County.

The Matagorda County Defendants have moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for

failure to state a claim.

LEGAL STANDARD

A defendant may move to dismiss a complaint when a plaintiff fails “to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a

motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as

true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “The plausibility standard is

not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility

that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

Conversely, “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a

claim of entitlement to relief, this basic deficiency should be exposed at the point

of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the

court.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558 (cleaned up).

When evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, I accept “all well-pleaded facts as

true and view[] those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Cummings

v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C., 948 F.3d 673, 675 (5th Cir. 2020) (quotation

omitted). I “do not, however, accept as true legal conclusions, conclusory

statements, or naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Benfield

v. Magee, 945 F.3d 333, 336–37 (5th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). “Threadbare recitals

of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do

not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The Fifth Circuit “hold[s] pro se plaintiffs to a

more lenient standard than lawyers when analyzing complaints, but pro se

plaintiffs must still plead factual allegations that raise the right to relief above the

speculative level.” Chhim v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 836 F.3d 467, 469 (5th

Cir. 2016); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

ANALYSIS

The central dispute in this case is whether Gonzales lawfully stopped and

arrested Thompson for driving with an expired registration sticker.

A. GONZALES LAWFULLY STOPPED THOMPSON

Thompson concedes that the registration on the vehicle he was driving “was

factually expired.” Dkt. 45 at 4. There is ample authority, from the United States

Supreme Court down to the lowest courts, stating that: “If an officer has probable

cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal

offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest

the offender.” Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001); see also

Jaycox v. Pyle, No. 6:18-cv-00016, 2021 WL 1140865, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 25,

2021) (“The failure to display proper vehicle registration through a valid

registration sticker . . . [is] lawful grounds for arrest under Texas law.”); State v.

Gray, 158 S.W.3d 465, 469 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“[A]n arrest for a minor traffic

offense is not an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment.”); Hodnett

v. State, No. 05-01-01323-CR, 2002 WL 31845821, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec.

20, 2002, pet. ref’d) (“When an officer has probable cause to believe a person is

committing an offense, even a traffic offense, an officer can reasonably arrest that

person.”).

Against this mountain of authority, Thompson now argues that Gonzales’s

“own written records prove he lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop and

lacked probable cause to execute a custodial arrest within two minutes.” Dkt. 45 at

2. This is simply incorrect. Taking Thompson’s alleged facts as true, Thompson

“executed a lawful left-hand turn to travel southbound on Avenue I, at which point

Defendant Gonzales activated his emergency overhead lights and initiated a traffic

stop.” Id. at 9. According to Thompson, Gonzales was “traveling south-to-north”

on Avenue I. Id. Thus, when Thompson turned to travel southbound on the same

road that Gonzales was traveling northbound, Thompson’s vehicle was facing

Gonzales, and Gonzales could have easily visualized the registration sticker on the

driver’s side of the windshield. In any event, to have lawfully stopped Thompson,

Gonzales needed only reasonable suspicion that the registration sticker was

expired. See United States v. Montes-Hernandez, 350 F. App’x. 862, 867 (5th

Cir. 2009) (“To have an objectively reasonable suspicion, an officer does not have

to determine that a suspect has in fact violated the law.”). Thus, Thompson’s

unlawful seizure claim fails.

B. GONZALES LAWFULLY ARRESTED THOMPSON

Similarly, Gonzales lawfully arrested Thompson for driving with an expired

registration sticker. Thompson makes much of the fact “that no electronic

verification was conducted prior to the stop.” Dkt. 45 at 11. But Gonzales was not

required to verify anything electronically. “A person commits an offense if the

person operates on a public highway during a registration period a motor vehicle

that does not properly display the registration insignia issued by the department

that establishes that the license plates have been validated for the period.” Tex.

Transp. Code Ann. § 502.473(a). Texas law also prohibits displaying a registration

insignia “assigned for a registration period other than the registration period in

effect.” Tex. Transp. Code § 502.475(a)(3). Thus, the display offense did not

depend on whether an electronic inquiry would have shown that the underlying

registration had been renewed. In other words, even if Thompson’s registration

had been current, driving with an expired registration sticker is against the law,

and the admittedly expired sticker gave Gonzales probable cause to arrest

Thompson. Accordingly, Thompson’s unlawful arrest claim against Gonzales fails.

C. GONZALES AND DOE DID NOT SEARCH THOMPSON’S VEHICLE

Thompson alleges that while he was handcuffed, “Gonzales and Jane Doe

Deputy immediately began searching [his] vehicle with flashlights.” Dkt. 45 at 15.

Taking this fact as true, it does not constitute a search. The United States Supreme

Court has stated that it is “beyond dispute that . . . shining [a] flashlight to

illuminate the interior of [a plaintiff]’s car trenched upon no right secured to the

latter by the Fourth Amendment.” Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739–40 (1983).

Thus, Gonzales and Doe committed no Fourth Amendment violation by simply

shining their flashlights into Thompson’s vehicle.

D. GONZALES AND WAMGET DID NOT USE EXCESSIVE FORCE

Thompson contends that “Gonzales and Wamget used objectively

unreasonable and excessive physical force” when they arrested him. Dkt. 45 at 28.

Specifically, Thompson alleges that “Gonzales yanked [Thompson] from his

vehicle by opening the door from the outside (the interior handle was broken—the

only means of opening the door) without warning, before [Thompson] could fully

lower his window.” Id. According to Thompson, “Defendants then pushed

[Thompson] against the convertible top despite [his] verbal warnings of severe

pain from his deteriorating shoulders, hips, and knees.” Id.

“Although [the Fifth Circuit] no longer require[s] significant injury for

excessive force claims, the injury must be more than de minimis.” Tarver v. City

of Edna, 410 F.3d 745, 752 (5th Cir. 2005) (cleaned up). Thompson’s conclusory

allegation that he suffered “[e]xacerbation” of “severe, known physical disabilities

(deteriorating shoulders, hips, and knees)” does not suffice to establish an injury

that would qualify for an excessive force claim. Dkt. 45 at 35. And while

“psychological injuries can serve as a basis for § 1983 liability,” Thompson “does

not demonstrate that he suffered psychological injury” from his arrest. Tarver, 410

F.3d at 752. Rather, Thompson simply states that he has experienced emotional

distress and mental anguish. See Dkt. 45 at 35. Such conclusory allegations “do not

suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Thus, Thompson’s excessive force claim should be

dismissed.

E. JUDGE SANDERS AND JUDGE FINLAY ARE ABSOLUTELY IMMUNE

Thompson alleges that Judge Sanders deprived Thompson of his right to due

process when Judge “Sanders, acting in the clear absence of all jurisdiction,

unilaterally imposed a criminal conviction without a formal charging instrument,

without a plea, and without an open court proceeding.” Dkt. 45 at 28–29.

Additionally, Thompson alleges his “offense occurred within JP 4, not JP 1” and

“[n]o legal charging instrument existed to confer subject-matter jurisdiction upon

the JP 1 court for a JP 4 offense.” Id. at 29. These allegations cannot overcome

Judge Sanders’s judicial immunity.

The Fifth Circuit has explained the contours of judicial immunity:

Absolute judicial immunity extends to all judicial acts that are

not performed in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. Adams v.

McIlhany, 764 F.2d 294, 297 (5th Cir. 1985). Thus, a judge has no

immunity (1) for actions taken outside of his judicial capacity, or

(2) for actions that are judicial in nature, but occur in the complete

absence of all jurisdiction. . . .

In determining whether [a judge’s] actions were “judicial in

nature,” this Court considers four factors: (1) whether the precise act

complained of is a normal judicial function; (2) whether the acts

occurred in the courtroom or appropriate adjunct spaces such as the

judge’s chambers; (3) whether the controversy centered around a case

pending before the court; and (4) whether the acts arose directly out

of a visit to the judge in his official capacity. McAlester v. Brown, 469

F.2d 1280, 1282 (5th Cir. 1972). The four factors are to be broadly

construed in favor of immunity, and immunity should not be denied

where the denial carries the potential of raising more than a frivolous

concern in a judge’s mind that to take proper action might expose him

to personal liability. Adams, 764 F.2d at 297. In some situations,

immunity is to be afforded even though one or more of the McAlester

factors is not met.

Malina v. Gonzales, 994 F.2d 1121, 1124 (5th Cir. 1993) (cleaned up).

Thompson alleges that “Judge Sanders had [Thompson] pulled from

holding and brought to the jailhouse picket window for what [Thompson] assumes

was a magistration. Due to the small county atmosphere, [Judge] Sanders

addressed [Thompson] by name and stated, ‘we’re going to get you outta here with

time served.’” Dkt. 45 at 16. This sequence satisfies all four factors required for

judicial immunity.

Although a jailhouse is not a courtroom or the judge’s chambers (second

factor), the Texas Judicial Council has recognized that “[m]agistration proceedings

usually occur in jail facilities.” Texas Judicial Council, Public Trust and Confidence

Committee Report and Recommendations (2024), https://www.txcourts.gov/med

ia/1459239/public-trust-and-confidence-committee-report-2024.pdf (last visited

Aug. 4, 2026). Indeed, Thompson himself assumed that Judge Sanders was there

for “a magistration,” which is a judicial function (first factor). Thompson had a case

before the court: Case No. 1-23-TR-0306 (third factor). Judge Sanders’s

sentencing of Thompson arose out of that case (fourth factor). Thus, all four factors

weigh in favor of upholding Judge Sanders’s judicial immunity.

Thompson believes that Judge Sanders acted without jurisdiction because

Thompson’s “offense occurred within JP 4, not JP 1” and “[n]o legal charging

instrument existed to confer subject-matter jurisdiction upon the JP 1 court for a

JP 4 offense.” Dkt. 45 at 29. “Where a court has some subject-matter jurisdiction,

there is sufficient jurisdiction for immunity purposes.” Malina, 994 F.2d at 1125.

There is no question that Judge Sanders generally has jurisdiction to adjudicate

traffic offenses. See Thompson v. Matagorda County, No. 3:25-cv-00253, 2026

WL 1133358, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 27, 2026) (“Judge Sanders acted well within his

jurisdiction when he credited Thompson’s time served toward the fine for an

expired registration.”), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:25-cv-00253,

2026 WL 1300546 (S.D. Tex. May 12, 2026). Nothing about Thompson’s amended

pleading changes this inescapable fact. Accordingly, all Thompson’s claims against

Judge Sanders should be dismissed based on judicial immunity.

Likewise, Thompson’s claims against Judge Finlay should also be dismissed

on judicial immunity grounds. While Thompson argues against Judge Sanders’s

judicial immunity in his amended complaint, Thompson fails to even reference

Judge Finlay’s judicial immunity or attempt to explain why it would not apply.

Similarly, in his response brief, Thompson argues why he believes that judicial

immunity does not shield Judge Sanders but mentions Judge Finlay only in

passing. Because Judge Finlay’s denial of Thompson’s request for video evidence

was a quintessential judicial function (first factor); that occurred in a courtroom

(second factor); which centered around a case pending before the court (third

factor); and that arose out of Thompson’s appearance before Judge Finlay in his

judicial capacity (fourth factor), Judge Finlay is absolutely immune.

F. NEITHER CHAU NOR RILEY SUPPRESSED EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE

Thompson alleges that his right to due process was violated when “Chau and

Riley intentionally suppressed material, exculpatory video evidence [at the June

22, 2023 administrative tow hearing] that would have exposed Defendant

Gonzales’s perjury and the lack of probable cause.” Dkt. 45 at 29. Thompson claims

that this evidence would have shown: (1) that he was parked in a private driveway;

(2) that Gonzales could not have observed Thompson’s registration sticker;

(3) that Gonzales never ran Thompson’s plates before activating his lights; (4) that

Thompson was compliant; and (5) that any search was warrantless. See id. at 30.

Taking all these allegations as true, none of them show that the video evidence

Thompson sought was exculpatory because none of them suggest that Thompson’s

registration was not expired.

G. THOMPSON’S MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CLAIMS FAIL

Having established that Gonzales lawfully stopped and arrested Thompson,

Thompson’s malicious prosecution claims against Gonzales, Judge Sanders,3 and

Chau necessarily fail. To state a constitutional malicious prosecution claim,

Thompson must allege:

(1) the commencement or continuance of an original criminal

proceeding; (2) its legal causation by the present defendant against

plaintiff who was defendant in the original proceeding; (3) its bona

fide termination in favor of the present plaintiff; (4) the absence of

probable cause for such proceeding; (5) malice; and (6) damages.

Espinal v. City of Houston, 96 F.4th 741, 748 (5th Cir. 2024) (emphasis added).

Because there was probable cause to arrest Thompson, he cannot prevail on a

malicious prosecution claim.

H. THOMPSON’S DETENTION CLAIM FAILS

Thompson contends that his 18-hour detention was unconstitutional. To the

extent this claim rests on the duration of his detention alone, it fails. Thompson

alleges that he was brought before Judge Sanders and released within

approximately 18 hours. A probable-cause determination occurring within 48

hours is presumptively prompt absent facts showing that the delay was undertaken

to gather additional evidence, motivated by ill will, or imposed for delay’s sake. See

County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56–57 (1991). Thompson

3 As established above, Judge Sanders has absolute judicial immunity irrespective of the

merits of Thompson’s malicious prosecution claim.

advances no such allegations. Accordingly, Thompson has not overcome the

presumption that his 18-hour detention was constitutional.4

I. MONELL LIABILITY AGAINST MATAGORDA COUNTY

As I have explained once before, Thompson’s claims against Matagorda

County should be dismissed because “Thompson cannot establish a constitutional

violation that would give rise to Monell liability.” Thompson, 2026 WL 1133358, at

*4; see also Romero v. City of Grapevine, 888 F.3d 170, 178 (5th

Cir. 2018) (holding that claims against a municipality “cannot survive” where the

plaintiff “failed to demonstrate” a constitutional violation); Whitley v. Hanna, 726

F.3d 631, 648 (5th Cir. 2013) (“All of Whitley’s inadequate supervision, failure to

train, and policy, practice, or custom claims fail without an underlying

constitutional violation.”).

J. “NO DEPRIVATION; NO § 1983 CONSPIRACY.”5

Thompson alleges that all “Defendants reached a meeting of the minds and

acted jointly and in concert to deprive [Thompson] of his constitutional rights.”

Dkt. 45 at 31. Thompson’s “conspiracy claim [is] properly dismissed because [he]

has not plausibly pled any underlying constitutional deprivation by the

defendants.” Armstrong v. Ashley, 60 F.4th 262, 280 (5th Cir. 2023).

K. THOMPSON HAS NO CLAIM AGAINST JACKSON

Thompson’s only claim against Jackson is for civil conspiracy to violate

Thompson’s constitutional rights. See Dkt. 45 at 31. Because Thompson’s civil

conspiracy claim fails, Jackson should be dismissed from this lawsuit.6

4 Jauch v. Choctaw County, a case on which Thompson relies for the notion that his

detention was unconstitutional, involved 96 days of detention without an appearance

before a judge and is not analogous. See 874 F.3d 425, 428–29 (5th Cir. 2017).

5 Shaw v. Villanueva, 918 F.3d 414, 419 (5th Cir. 2019).

6 “A district court may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim on its own motion

as long as the procedure is fair.” Miller v. Sam Houston State Univ., 986 F.3d 880, 888

(5th Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted). Fairness “requires both notice of the court’s intention

and an opportunity to respond.” Davoodi v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 755 F.3d 307, 310

(5th Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted). “This report is such notice. [Thompson’s] objections

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, I recommend that the Matagorda County

Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Dkt. 52) be granted. I also recommend that the

court sua sponte dismiss Jackson as a defendant in this lawsuit.

The parties have 14 days from service of this Memorandum and

Recommendation to file written objections. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections will preclude appellate review of

factual findings and legal conclusions, except for plain error.

SIGNED this day of August 2026.

______________________________

ANDREW M. EDISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

to this report, if any, are his opportunity to be heard.” Crosswell v. Rodriguez, No. 4:22-

cv-01105, 2023 WL 6206911, at *8 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 8, 2023), report and recommendation

adopted as modified sub nom. Crosswell v. Martinez, No. 4:22-cv-01105, 2023 WL

6207754 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2023), aff’d, 120 F.4th 177 (5th Cir. 2024).