CRUZ

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CAMDEN VICINAGE

JACQUELINE CRUZ,

Plaintiff,

Civil No. 24-8782 (RMB-EAP)

v.

OPINION

MILLVILLE BOARD OF

EDUCATION, et al.,

Defendants.

APPEARANCES

AIELLO, HARRIS & ABATE LAW GROUP, P.C.

Sebastian Ben Ionno, Esq.

140 S. Broadway, Suite 5

Pitman, New Jersey 08071

Attorney for Plaintiff

CAPEHART SCATCHARD, P.A.

Joseph F. Betley, Esq.

8000 Midatlantic Drive, Suite 300S

P.O. Box 5016

Mount Laurel, New Jersey 08054

Attorney for Defendants

RENÉE MARIE BUMB, Chief United States District Judge

THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon a Motion for Summary

Judgment filed by Defendants Millville Board of Education (“Board” or “District”)

and Tony Trongone (“Trongone”) (collectively, “Defendants”). [MSJ (Docket No.

23).] Having considered the parties’ submissions, the Court resolves the Motion

without oral argument. FED. R. CIV. P. 78(b); D.N.J. LOC. CIV. R. 78.1(b). For the

reasons below, Defendants’ Motion is DENIED in its entirety. The Court intends to

SCHEDULE this matter for TRIAL upon submission of the Final Pre-Trial Order.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

In 2008, Plaintiff Jacqueline Cruz (“Plaintiff” or “Cruz”), who is Hispanic,

began working for Defendant Millville Board of Education as a long-term substitute.

[Defs.’ SMF ¶ 1; Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ SMF ¶ 1 (Docket No. 29-5); Pl.’s SMF ¶ 15.] In

2009, Plaintiff began serving as a bilingual teacher, in which she taught students in

both English and Spanish, provided English as a Second Language (“ESL”)

instruction, and developed a bilingual program for learning-disabled students. [Defs.’

SMF ¶ 1; Pl.’s SMF ¶¶ 1–3.] Plaintiff obtained New Jersey certifications in bilingual

education and ESL, in addition to supervisor and principal endorsements. [Pl.’s SMF

¶ 11; Defs.’ SMF ¶ 3.] In 2019, Plaintiff began working as a Response to Intervention

Teacher (“RIT”), in which she continued providing translation services for Spanish-

speaking students and parents. [Defs.’ SMF ¶ 2; Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ SMF ¶ 2; Pl.’s

SMF ¶ 8.]

In July of 2020, Trongone became Superintendent of the District. [Defs.’ SMF

¶ 4.]

1 The material facts underlying this matter are drawn from the parties’ respective

statements of material facts (“SMF”) [Defs.’ SMF (Docket No. 23-2); Pl.’s SMF

(Docket No. 29-6)], where admitted, as well as the exhibits of record. The Court

recites only the facts relevant to the motions before it.

A. The 2021 Promotional Opportunity

Following the conclusion of the 2020-2021 school year, Maggie Sanchez-Colina

(“Sanchez-Colina”), who was serving as the District’s PK-5 Supervisor of Curriculum

and Instruction-Language Arts/Social Studies/World Language/Bilingual and ESL,

retired. [Id. ¶ 9; Pl.’s SMF ¶ 74.] Dr. Pamela Moore (“Moore”), the District’s

Assistant Superintendent of Curriculum and Instruction, oversaw the process for

filling the vacancy. [Defs.’ SMF ¶ 10.]

The parties agree that, during the summer of 2021, Trongone and Moore were

discussing how supervisory responsibilities would be redistributed following Sanchez-

Colina’s retirement, and that at the time the vacancy was posted, District

administrators had not yet finalized which supervisory position would oversee the

District’s World Language, ESL, and bilingual programs. [Defs.’ SMF ¶¶ 11–12; Pl.’s

Resp. to Defs.’ SMF ¶¶ 11–12.]

Defendants contend that because the allocation of World Language, ESL, and

bilingual programs responsibilities remained under consideration, the District

intentionally limited the posted position to PK-5 Supervisor of Curriculum and

Instruction – Language Arts and Social Studies, while administrative discussions

continued. [Defs.’ SMF ¶¶ 19, 24–25.] According to Defendants, the District’s

immediate priority was hiring a candidate with substantial English Language Arts

(“ELA”) curriculum experience because that individual would be responsible for

selecting and implementing a new district-wide ELA program. [Id. ¶¶ 13–15.]

On July 21, 2021, the District posted the position of PK-5 Supervisor of

Curriculum and Instruction – Language Arts and Social Studies. [Defs.’ SMF ¶ 19.]

The posting required applicants to possess a supervisor or principal endorsement, at

least five years of relevant experience, leadership ability, and excellent interpersonal

and collaborative skills. [Id.] The World Language, Bilingual, and ESL parts of the

job description were removed. [Pl.’s SMF ¶ 22.] Plaintiff applied for the position the

day that it was posted. [Defs.’ SMF ¶ 20.] The following day, District administrators

exchanged emails regarding whether the posting should reference World Language,

bilingual, and ESL responsibilities. [Id. ¶¶ 21–23.]

On August 10, 2021, Plaintiff and eight other candidates interviewed for the

PK-5 Supervisor of Curriculum & Instruction – Language Arts & Social Studies

position. [Defs.’ SMF ¶ 29.] The candidates were interviewed by a committee of eight

District employees, including Moore. [Id. ¶ 30.] Before the interviews, the committee

discussed the qualifications it sought in the successful candidate. Moore informed the

committee that the ELA portion of the job was most important, with Defendants

contending that the committee prioritized ELA curriculum expertise because the

successful candidate would oversee implementation of the District’s next reading

program. [Id. ¶¶ 31–32.] During the interviews, all candidates were asked one

question about bilingual/ESL compliance. [Pl.’s SMF ¶ 23; Defs.’ Resp. to Pl.’s SMF

¶ 23 (Docket No. 34-1).]

Following the interviews, committee members discussed and scored each

candidate. [Defs.’ SMF ¶ 41.] The three highest scores advanced to the final round of

interviews, and Plaintiff was informed on August 11, 2021, that she had not been

selected to advance. [Id. ¶¶ 41–43.] On the District’s Scoring Summary form,

members of the committee remarked on Plaintiff’s “lack of ELA knowledge.” [Id. ¶

38.] Ultimately, Trongone selected Cheryl Banks (“Banks”) for the position. [Id. ¶

49.] Banks had “overwhelming experience” as a literacy coach from her former school

district. [Id. ¶ 44.] However, Banks, who does not identify as Hispanic, had no

experience with ESL and bilingual programs and did not speak any languages other

than English. [Pl.’s SMF ¶¶ 25, 82.] After Banks was selected, the District assigned

her responsibility for the bilingual and ESL programs, and Plaintiff was asked to assist

Banks with those responsibilities. [Defs.’ SMF ¶ 50; Pl.’s SMF ¶¶ 28, 79.]

i. Related EEOC Proceedings

On April 18, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination (“Charge I”) with

the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). [Pl.’s SMF ¶ 164.] In

Charge I, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants discriminated against her based on her

national origin in violation of Title VII by failing to promote her to the supervisory

position. [Defs.’ SMF ¶¶ 89–90.] The Board submitted a position statement to the

EEOC responding to Plaintiff’s allegations on May 6, 2022. [Id. ¶ 91.]

On April 11, 2024, the EEOC issued a Letter of Determination regarding

Charge I, finding reasonable cause to believe that discrimination had occurred, and

inviting the parties to participate in conciliation. [Id. ¶¶ 96–97; Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’

SMF ¶¶ 96–97; Pl.’s SMF ¶¶ 170–71; Defs.’ Resp. to Pl.’s SMF ¶¶ 170–71.] As of

April 2024, Plaintiff had not received a Right to Sue Letter for Charge I. [Defs.’ SMF

¶ 99.] After conciliation efforts were unsuccessful, the EEOC notified the parties on

May 2, 2024, that the matter would be forwarded to the Department of Justice for

litigation review. [Id. ¶ 100.] On May 15, 2025, approximately eleven months after

Plaintiff filed her Complaint in state court, the EEOC issued a Right to Sue Letter. [Id.

¶ 106; Pl.’s SMF ¶ 174.]

B. The 2022 Promotional Opportunity

On July 19, 2022, the District posted a vacancy for PK-5 Supervisor of

Curriculum and Instruction, which Plaintiff applied for on August 2, 2022. [Defs.’

SMF ¶¶ 65–66.] Plaintiff participated in the first and second round of interviews for

the position. [Id. ¶¶ 67, 71.] The members of both the first and second round interview

committee for this position did not participate in the interviews for the 2021 position.

[Id. ¶¶ 69, 73.]

Following the second round of interviews, the committee sent Trongone two

finalists, Plaintiff and Cristy Lopergolo (“Lopergolo”). [Pl.’s SMF ¶ 116.] The

committee strongly recommended Lopergolo, a Caucasian woman. [Defs.’ SMF ¶ 75;

Pl.’s SMF ¶ 41.] Trongone interviewed both Plaintiff and Lopergolo during the final

round of interviews. [Id. ¶ 78.] Trongone ultimately agreed that Lopergolo be

promoted to the position. [Pl.’s SMF ¶ 117.] Trongone testified that he could not

recall if he was aware of Plaintiff’s EEOC Complaint prior to the promotional process

in August 2022. [Defs.’ SMF ¶ 86; Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ SMF ¶ 86.]

i. Related EEOC Proceedings

On September 7, 2022, Plaintiff filed a second EEOC charge (“Charge II”),

alleging that Defendants retaliated against her for filing Charge I by denying her the

2022 promotion. [Defs.’ SMF ¶¶ 92–93.] On April 11, 2024, Plaintiff received the

April 2024 Right to Sue Letter providing her with the right to sue under the retaliation

claims in Charge II. [Id. ¶ 98.]

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on June 24, 2024, in Superior Court of New Jersey,

Cumberland County, alleging violations of the New Jersey Law Against

Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1, et seq. (“NJLAD”), and Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964. [Docket No. 1-1 ¶¶ 21–32.] On August 27, 2024, Defendants removed

this action to federal court. [Docket No. 1-1.] On September 18, 2024, Defendants

filed their Answer. [Docket No. 3.] Thereafter, the parties engaged in discovery. On

December 12, 2025, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. [MSJ]

Plaintiff filed in Opposition [Pl.’s Opp’n (Docket No. 29)], and Defendants replied.

[Defs.’ Reply (Docket No. 34).] The Motion is now ripe for determination.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Courts must grant summary judgment if “the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” only if it might impact the

“outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Gonzalez v. Sec'y of Dep't of Homeland

Sec., 678 F.3d 254, 261 (3d Cir. 2012). A dispute is “genuine” if the evidence would

allow a reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving party. Id. To prevail on a summary

judgment motion, the moving party must show the nonmovant cannot establish one

or more essential elements of its case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

And if the nonmoving party “‘fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the

existence of an element essential to [its] case, and on which [it] will bear the burden of

proof at trial,’ then summary judgment is appropriate for the moving party.”

SodexoMAGIC, LLC v. Drexel Univ., 24 F.4th 183, 204 (3d Cir. 2022) (alterations in

original) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

Defendants first argue that Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative

remedies because she commenced this action before receiving a Notice of Right to Sue

from the EEOC. [Defs.’ SJ Br. at 10 (Docket No. 23-3).] According to Defendants,

Plaintiff’s subsequent receipt of the Right to Sue notice during the pendency of this

litigation cannot cure that defect. [Id. at 15.]

Before bringing suit under Title VII, a plaintiff generally must file a timely

charge with the EEOC and obtain a Notice of Right to Sue. See Fort Bend Cnty., Texas

v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541, 544–45 (2019). “While the attainment of a right-to-sue letter

from the EEOC is a condition precedent for filing Title VII… suits, the failure to obtain

notice of the right to sue is a curable defect.” Tlush v. Manufacturers Res. Ctr., 315 F.

Supp. 3d 650, 654–55 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (citing Gooding v. Warner–Lambert Co., 744 F.2d

354, 358 (3d Cir. 1984); Jones v. American State Bank, 857 F.2d 494, 500 (8th Cir. 1988)).

“The Third Circuit has held that issuance of a right-to-sue letter is a statutory

requirement that does not deprive a district court of jurisdiction and may be satisfied

by issuance of the letter after the complaint has been filed.” Id. (citing Gooding, 744

F.2d at 358; Molthan v. Temple University, 778 F.2d 955, 960 (3d Cir. 1985)). “Several

other Circuit Courts of Appeals have held that the defect is cured if the plaintiff

receives a “right-to-sue” letter prior to trial and neither the EEOC nor defendants are

prejudiced by plaintiff's initial failure to obtain the letter.” Id. (citing Parry v. Mohawk

Motors of Michigan, Inc., 236 F.3d 299, 310 (6th Cir. 2000); Pinkard v. Pullman–Standard,

678 F.2d 1211, 1215 (5th Cir. 1982); Henderson v. Eastern Freight Ways, Inc., 460 F.2d

258, 260 (4th Cir. 1972)).

It is undisputed that Plaintiff timely filed Charge I with the EEOC challenging

Defendants’ decision not to promote her in 2021. [Pl.’s SMF ¶ 164; Defs.’ SMF ¶¶

89–90.] The EEOC investigated the charge, issued a Letter of Determination finding

reasonable cause to believe discrimination had occurred, and attempted conciliation

before ultimately issuing Plaintiff a Notice of Right to Sue on May 15, 2025. [Defs.’

SMF ¶¶ 96–97, 100, 106; Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ SMF ¶¶ 96–97; Pl.’s SMF ¶¶ 170–71,

174; Defs.’ Resp. to Pl.’s SMF ¶¶ 170–71.] Thus, unlike cases in which plaintiff

bypasses the administrative process altogether or files suit before ever presenting her

claim to the EEOC, Plaintiff completed every step of the administrative process while

the action remained pending. Compare Powell v. Verizon N.J., Inc., 2022 WL 2188724,

at *6–7 (D.N.J. June 17, 2022) (finding plaintiff did not exhaust administrative

remedies where plaintiff commenced suit before even filing administrative charge with

EEOC) with Gooding, 744 F.2d at 358, and Molthan, 778 F.2d at 960 (holding District

Court could consider claim where right-to-sue letter was issued after complaint but

before trial).

Defendants’ reliance on Simko v. United States Steel Corp., 992 F.3d 198 (3d Cir.

2021), and Schenck v. United Airlines, Inc., 2025 WL 2779141 (D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2025),

is misplaced. Both cases involved claims that had not been administratively exhausted

because they were either outside the scope of the plaintiff’s EEOC charge or otherwise

had not been presented to the EEOC. See Simko, 992 F.3d at 206–07; Schenck, 2025

WL 2779141, at *7–8. Neither decision addressed the narrow question presented here,

whether a plaintiff who timely initiates and completes the EEOC process may cure the

premature filing of a Title VII action by obtaining a Notice of Right to Sue while the

litigation remains pending. Instead, the question presented here remains governed by

the Third Circuit’s decisions in Gooding and Molthan, which hold that a prematurely

filed Title VII action may proceed where the plaintiff receives a Notice of Right to Sue

while the action is pending. See Gooding, 744 F.2d at 358; Molthan, 778 F.2d at 960.

Accordingly, because Plaintiff timely initiated the administrative process, the

EEOC investigated Charge I, found reasonable cause, attempted conciliation, and

ultimately issued Plaintiff a Notice of Right to Sue while this action was pending, the

Court concludes that Plaintiff satisfied Title VII's administrative prerequisites. The

receipt of the Notice of Right to Sue prior to trial, and before the Court adjudicated

the merits of Defendants’ Motion, cured any defect in the premature filing of this

action. See, e.g., Moffett v. Woodlake Props., LLC, 2021 WL 4123914, at *5 (E.D. Pa.

Sept. 9, 2021) (finding plaintiff cured her defect and exhausted her administrative

remedies by receiving a right to sue letter fifteen days after filing her first Amended

Complaint); Riemensnyder v. Paragon Sys., 2022 WL 22887723, at *5 (M.D. Pa. June

29, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 22887683 (M.D. Pa. July 22,

2022) (finding defendants were not “prejudiced by … plaintiff’s initial failure to obtain

the letter because … [they] had notice of the plaintiff’s claims after receiving her initial

… EEOC complaint… and the defendant had the opportunity to answer the complaint

in the context of the administrative proceeding” and “plaintiff has cured the defect by

presenting the right to sue letter, albeit after the litigation has already commenced.”)

Therefore, Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on the ground that

Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies.

B. Title VII Claims

Under Title VII, an employer may not “discriminate against any individual ...,

because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin[.]” 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e–2(a)(1). In connection with this prohibition, these statutes also protect an

employee who complains of discrimination.2

Discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII are analyzed under the

burden shifting framework initially set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411

2 Under Title VII, an employer may not discriminate against an employee “because he

has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter,

or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in

an investigation ... under this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).

U.S. 792 (1973). See Tourtellotte v. Eli Lilly & Co., 636 F. App'x 831, 841 (3d Cir. 2016).

The framework requires that Plaintiff first establish a prima facie case of discrimination

or retaliation. If Plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to

Defendants to articulate a legitimate, nonretaliatory or nondiscriminatory reason for

their actions. If Defendants articulate such a reason, the burden then shifts back to

Plaintiff to establish that the proffered nonretaliatory or nondiscriminatory

explanation is merely a pretext for the discrimination or retaliation.

At the summary judgment stage, Plaintiff may meet this burden by “point[ing]

to some evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a factfinder could reasonably

either (1) disbelieve the employer’s articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that

an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or

determinative cause of the employer's action.” Tomasso v. Boeing Co., 445 F.3d 702,

706 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994)). In other

words, Plaintiff must “demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies,

incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its

action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them ‘unworthy of credence,’

and hence infer ‘that the employer did not act for [the asserted] non-discriminatory

reasons.’” Id. (quoting Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765).

i. Title VII Disparate Treatment Claim

1. Plaintiff’s Prima Facie Case

To establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment under Title VII, a plaintiff

must show the following: “(1) [s]he belongs to a protected class; (2) [s]he is qualified

for the position; (3) [s]he suffered some form of adverse employment action; and (4)

the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances that give rise to an

inference of unlawful discrimination.” Stewart v. Union Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 655 F. App’x

151, 155 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506–07

(1993); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981); McDonnell

Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802).

Plaintiff is Hispanic and therefore belongs to a protected class. Defendants

argue that Plaintiff’s discrimination claim is actually based on her bilingual status,

which is not a protected characteristic under Title VII. [Defs.’ SJ Br. at 28–30.] The

Court disagrees with Defendants’ characterization. Rather, Plaintiff contends that

Defendants manipulated the qualifications for the position by temporarily removing

bilingual and ESL responsibilities in a manner designed to disadvantage Plaintiff

because of her Hispanic national origin. [Pl.’s Opp’n Br. at 21–23 (Docket No. 29).]

Thus, Plaintiff’s bilingual abilities are relevant only insofar as they constitute

circumstantial evidence of Defendants’ allegedly discriminatory motive, not because

bilingual status itself is protected under Title VII. For the purposes of this Motion, it

is undisputed that Plaintiff was qualified for the PK-5 Supervisor Language

Arts/Social Studies position. [Defs.’ SJ Br. at 30.] Finally, Defendants’ decision not

to promote Plaintiff constitutes an adverse employment action. See Qin v. Vertex, Inc.,

100 F.4th 458, 472–73 (3d Cir. 2024) (analyzing failure to promote claim under

McDonnell Douglas framework); Ford v. Cnty. of Hudson, 729 F. App'x 188, 195 (3d Cir.

2018) (quoting Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 152–53 (3d Cir. 1999)

(internal citations omitted)).

2. Defendants’ Legitimate Nondiscriminatory Reason and Pretext

Defendants have provided ample evidence of a legitimate business reason for

not selecting Plaintiff for the position. This evidence includes that at the time of the

interview Defendants had not yet determined whether bilingual and ESL

responsibilities would remain with the position, and that Banks was selected because

of her higher scores from the interview committee and superior ELA experience which

was the District’s priority. [Defs.’ SMF ¶¶ 13–15, 19, 24–25, 41–44.]

The burden therefore shifts back to Plaintiff to produce evidence from which a

“factfinder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve … [Defendants’] … articulated

legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more

likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the … action.” Fuentes, 32 F.3d

at 764. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that

Plaintiff has satisfied that burden.

Plaintiff has identified evidence that calls into question Defendants’ explanation

regarding the restructuring of the position itself. The record reflects that the position

previously included responsibility for the District’s bilingual and ESL programs.

[Defs.’ SMF ¶ 9; Pl.’s SMF ¶ 74.] However, when the vacancy was posted in July

2021, those responsibilities were omitted from the position description. [Pl.’s SMF ¶

22.] The record also contains evidence that Defendants discussed the removal of

bilingual and ESL responsibilities from the posting, and that all candidates were asked

one question about bilingual/ESL compliance. [Defs.’ SMF ¶¶ 21–23; Pl.’s SMF ¶ 23;

Defs.’ Resp. to Pl.’s SMF ¶ 23.] Moreover, Plaintiff has produced evidence that, after

Banks was selected, those bilingual and ESL responsibilities were in fact assigned to

Banks, who asked for Plaintiff’s assistance in those responsibilities. [Defs.’ SMF ¶ 50;

Pl.’s SMF ¶¶ 28, 79.]

These facts, viewed collectively, permit a reasonable factfinder to question

Defendants’ explanation that the omission of bilingual responsibilities merely reflected

an unfinished administrative reorganization. A reasonable jury could instead

conclude that bilingual and ESL responsibilities remained an anticipated component

of the position throughout the hiring process and that the temporary omission of those

duties from the posting was inconsistent with Defendants’ stated explanation, thereby

permitting an inference that the explanation was pretextual.

Accordingly, because there is a question the jury must decide, Defendants are

not entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s disparate treatment claim.

ii. Title VII Retaliation Claim

Before addressing the merits of Plaintiff’s retaliation claim, the Court briefly

addresses Defendants’ contention that the Complaint failed to plead retaliation arising

from the District’s 2022 promotional decision. [Defs.’ SJ Br. at 36–38.] Whatever

ambiguity may have existed in the Complaint has long since been eliminated through

discovery, which included Plaintiff’s retaliation claim. Moreover, Defendants fully

briefed the retaliation claim’s merits in support of summary judgment. [Id. at 38–43.]

Accordingly, the Court rejects Defendants’ argument that the retaliation claim should

be dismissed based on any pleading deficiency.

1. Plaintiff’s Prima Facie Case

Title VII prohibits an employer from “discriminat[ing] against any individual

... because he has opposed ... an unlawful employment practice ....” 42 U.S.C. §

2000e–3(a). In order to make a prima facie case of retaliation, Plaintiff must show: (1)

that she engaged in protected employee activity; (2) that there was an adverse action

by Defendants either after or contemporaneous with her protected activity; and (3) that

there is a causal connection between her protected activity and Defendants’ adverse

action. See Marra v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 497 F.3d 286, 300 (3d Cir. 2007).

Having reviewed the record evidence, the Court will assume that Plaintiff has

presented a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII. Plaintiff was engaged in a

protected activity when she filed EEOC charges on April 18, 2022. [Pl.’s SMF ¶ 164.]

See Young v. City of Philadelphia Police Dep't, 651 F. App'x 90, 97 (3d Cir. 2016) (noting

that the filing of an EEOC charge is “quintessential protected activity”). Likewise, the

denial of a promotion plainly constitutes a materially adverse employment action. See

Qin, 100 F.4th at 472–73; Ford, 729 F. App'x at 195 (internal citations omitted).

Accordingly, the Court turns to the dispositive issue of pretext.

2. Defendants’ Legitimate Nondiscriminatory Reason and Pretext

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants retaliated against her for filing Charge I with

the EEOC by denying her the second promotional opportunity in August 2022. [Pl.’s

Opp’n Br. at 10.] Defendants argue that the undisputed evidence demonstrates that

Plaintiff was not selected because Lopergolo was more qualified for the position.

[Defs.’ SJ Br. at 42–43.] Although the Court agrees that Defendants have presented

substantial evidence supporting their decision, the Court concludes that, viewing the

record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, one narrow factual dispute precludes

summary judgment.

Defendants have articulated legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for selecting

Lopergolo rather than Plaintiff. The record reflects that the 2022 vacancy was

evaluated by interview committees that did not participate in the 2021 hiring process

and resulted in Lopergolo receiving the strongest recommendations from those

committees. [Defs.’ SMF ¶¶ 69, 73, 75.] These explanations readily satisfy

Defendants’ burden under McDonnell Douglas.

To show that an employer's explanation constitutes pretext, “the plaintiff must

point to some evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a factfinder could

reasonably either (1) disbelieve the employer's articulated legitimate reasons; or (2)

believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating

or determinative cause of the employer's action.” Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764.

Plaintiff’s evidence of retaliation is limited. However, viewing the evidence in

the light most favorable to Plaintiff, a genuine dispute remains as to whether

Superintendent Trongone knew of Plaintiff’s pending EEOC charge when he made

the final promotion decision. [Defs.’ SMF ¶ 86; Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ SMF ¶ 86.] The

Court therefore finds that Plaintiff, albeit scarcely, has “cast … sufficient doubt upon

… the legitimate reasons proffered by … [D]efendant[s] so that a factfinder could

reasonably conclude that each reason was a fabrication ... or ... allow[] the factfinder

to infer that discrimination was more likely than not a motivating or determinative

cause of the adverse employment action.” Wishkin v. Potter, 476 F.3d 180,185 (3d Cir.

2007) (quoting Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 762). Because the factual dispute bears directly on

retaliatory motive, and because the Court may not “weigh the evidence and determine

the truth of the matter” at summary judgment, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 249 (1986), the Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that retaliation played

no role in the decision. Accordingly, the Court finds summary judgment as to

Plaintiff’s retaliation claim inappropriate at this time.

V. CONCLUSION

For the above-stated reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is

DENIED in its entirety. The Court intends to SCHEDULE this matter for TRIAL

upon submission of the Final Pre-Trial Order. An accompanying Order shall issue

separately on this date. FED. R. CIV. P. 58(a).

DATED: July 29, 2026 /s/Renée Marie Bumb

RENÉE MARIE BUMB

Chief United States District Judge