Fulcher

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

AMY FULCHER, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. Civil Action 2:26-cv-353

District Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.

Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson

HOLZER HEALTH SYSTEM,

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion Seeking Leave to File Their Opposition to

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Under Seal. (Doc. 17). Plaintiffs simultaneously filed a redacted

version of their Opposition. (Doc. 16). For the following reasons, the Motion is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs initiated this case on March 20, 2026, alleging that Defendant systematically

violated patients’ and its website users’ privacy rights by disclosing protected health information

(“PHI”) to Google and third parties without the patients’ or users’ knowledge or consent. (Doc. 1

at ¶ 1). Plaintiffs bring their action under 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6(a)(3); Electronic Communications

and Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) et seq.; and Ohio state laws and request class certification;

injunctive relief; statutory, actual, compensatory, consequential, and nominal damages; restitution

and/or disgorgement of profits; pre- and post-judgment interest; and attorneys’ fees and costs. (Id.

at ¶¶ 365–496; id. at 120–21).

Simultaneously, Plaintiffs moved to file an unredacted version of their Complaint under

seal and for permission for the redacted version to remain on the public docket to prevent

disclosure of their protected health information (“PHI”). (Doc. 2). The Court granted that request.

(Doc. 3). Several months later, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 13). Now, Plaintiffs

seek leave to file their response under seal and maintain the redacted version on the public docket

because it includes their Complaint allegations referencing PHI. (Doc. 17). This matter is ready

for consideration.

II. STANDARD

When considering a motion to seal, courts distinguish between limiting public disclosure

of information during discovery versus the adjudicative stage of a case. See Shane Grp., Inc. v.

Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 825 F.3d 299, 305 (6th Cir. 2016). “The line between these two

stages, discovery and adjudicative, is crossed when the parties place material in the court record.”

Id. (citation omitted). “Unlike information merely exchanged between the parties, ‘[t]he public

has a strong interest in obtaining the information contained in the court record.’” Id. (quoting

Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C., 710 F.2d 1165, 1180 (6th Cir. 1983)). For this

reason, the moving party has a “heavy” burden of overcoming a “‘strong presumption in favor of

openness’ as to court records.” Id. (quoting Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1179); see also id.

(“Only the most compelling reasons can justify non-disclosure of judicial records.” (quotation

omitted)).

“[I]n civil litigation, only trade secrets, information covered by a recognized privilege

(such as the attorney-client privilege), and information required by statute to be maintained in

confidence (such as the name of a minor victim of a sexual assault), is typically enough to

overcome the presumption of access.” Id. at 308 (citation omitted). “[T]he seal itself must be

narrowly tailored to serve” the reason for sealing, which requires the moving party to “analyze in

detail, document by document, the propriety of secrecy, providing reasons and legal citations.” Id.

at 305–06 (quotation omitted). Ultimately, the movant must show that “disclosure will work a

clearly defined and serious injury. . . . And in delineating the injury to be prevented, specificity is

essential.” Id. at 307–08 (internal citations and quotations omitted). If there is a compelling

reason, “the party must then show why those reasons outweigh the public interest in access to those

records.” Kondash v. Kia Motors Am., Inc., 767 F. App’x 635, 637 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing Shane

Grp., 825 F.3d at 305).

The Court “has an obligation to keep its records open for public inspection [and] that

obligation is not conditioned upon the desires of the parties to the case.” Harrison v. Proctor &

Gamble Co., No. 1:15-CV-514, 2017 WL 11454396, at *1–2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 11, 2017) (citing

Shane Grp., 825 F.3d at 307). A court “that chooses to seal court records must set forth specific

findings and conclusions ‘which justify nondisclosure to the public.’” Shane Grp., 825 F.3d at

306 (citing Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1176). In sum, to overcome “the strong presumption

in favor of openness,” parties who move to seal documents must demonstrate: “(1) a compelling

interest in sealing the records; (2) that the interest in sealing outweighs the public’s interest in

accessing the records; and (3) that the request is narrowly tailored.” Kondash, 767 F. App’x at

637.

III. DISCUSSION

As noted above, Plaintiffs seek to seal their opposition containing their PHI, including their

“health conditions, symptoms, and health related services.” (Doc. 17 at 4). “[T]rial courts have

always been afforded the power to seal their records when interests of privacy outweigh the

public’s right to know.” In re Knoxville News-Sentinel Co., Inc., 723 F.2d 470, 474 (6th Cir.

1983). Sealing medical records “is in accordance with the strong public policy of HIPAA and

Ohio Revised Code Section 2317.02(B) of protecting patient information.” Harrison v. Scott,

2:18-cv-1023, 2021 WL 2438858, at *2 (S.D. Ohio June 15, 2021). And “[c]ourts have recognized

a person’s interest in the privacy of their health information as a legitimate basis for sealing.”

Hines v. Humana Ins. Co., No. 1:21-cv-409, 2023 WL 2562723, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 17, 2023)

(sealing plaintiff’s medical records); see also Harrison, 2021 WL 2438858, at *2 (same).

Here, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have a compelling interest in the non-disclosure of their

PHI and it outweighs the public’s interest in access to the same. What’s more, Plaintiffs’ request

is narrowly tailored, as the redactions are limited to two portions of two sentences. C.f. In re E.I.

Du Pont de Nemours and Co. C-8 Personal Injury Litig., No. 2:13-md-2433, 2:18-cv-136, 2019

WL 3208711, at *1 (S.D. Ohio July 16, 2019) (finding a request to redact lines from a deposition

was “no broader than necessary” to protect medical information).

Accordingly, Plaintiffs may maintain the redacted version of their opposition on the docket

and file an unredacted version under seal on or before July 31, 2026.

A final note. In the interest of efficiency, the parties may redact Plaintiffs’ PHI and file an

unredacted version under seal without seeking leave of Court moving forward.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion Seeking Leave to File Their Opposition to

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Under Seal is GRANTED. (Doc. 17). Plaintiffs are DIRECTED

to file an unredacted version under seal on or before July 31, 2026.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: July 29, 2026 /s/ Kimberly A. Jolson

KIMBERLY A. JOLSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE