Singh

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

HARKAMAL SINGH, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) Case No. CIV-26-1194-J

)

ROBERT CERNA,1 et al., )

)

Respondents. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Harkamal Singh, a noncitizen2 and Indian national proceeding with

counsel, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”), Doc. 1, challenging under

28 U.S.C. § 2241 his detention by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”).

United States District Judge Bernard M. Jones, II referred this matter to the undersigned

Magistrate Judge in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)-(C). Doc. 3. The

undersigned set an expedited briefing schedule, Doc. 10, and the Petition is at issue. For

the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends that the Court grant the Petition,

Doc. 1, in part and order Respondents to immediately release Petitioner subject to the

conditions of his prior release on bond.

1 Chris Gantt was announced as Warden of Cimarron Correctional Facility in May 2026.

He replaces Scarlet Grant and is substituted as the proper respondent pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d). David Venturella was announced as Acting Director of

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement on June 1, 2026. He replaces Todd Lyons

and is substituted as the proper respondent pursuant to Rule 25(d).

2 Unless quoting, this Report and Recommendation “uses the term ‘noncitizen’ as

equivalent to the statutory term ‘alien.’” Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 578 n.2 (2020)

(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3)).

I. Background

Petitioner, a citizen of India, entered the United States on or about January 25, 2016.

Pet. at 4-5; Doc. 14-7 at 3 (Petitioner’s Form I-213). Shortly thereafter, ICE encountered

and detained Petitioner. Pet. at 5. On February 20, 2016, ICE placed Petitioner into

removal proceedings before the Immigration Court pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a through

the issuance of a Notice to Appear, and charged him with being inadmissible under 8

U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as someone who entered the United States without inspection.

Pet. at 5-6; Doc. 1-1 at 1 (Notice to Appear); Doc. 14-7 at 3.

On April 12, 2016, an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) ordered Petitioner released from

custody on a $30,000 bond. Pet. at 5; Doc. 14-2 at 6 (Bond Order). Petitioner alleges he

has “fulfilled the conditions of his release.” Pet. at 5; see also id. at 6 (describing

Petitioner’s “compliance while released, including attending his court hearings in his

removal proceedings”). Respondents do not contest this assertion.

After his release on bond, Petitioner received an employment authorization and filed

an asylum application. Id. at 5; Doc. 1-6 at 1 (Employment Authorization); Doc. 14-3 at 1

(Asylum Application). On January 17, 2020, an IJ denied Petitioner’s asylum application

and ordered him removed to India. Pet. at 5; Doc. 14-6 at 11 (Removal Order). Petitioner

appealed this decision; his appeal remains pending. Pet. at 5; Resp. at 2; Doc. 1-4 at 1

(Immigration Court Docket). Therefore, his removal order is not yet final under 8 C.F.R.

§ 1241.1.

On May 9, 2026, the Oklahoma Highway Patrol (“OHP”) stopped Petitioner, who

was working as a commercial truck driver, to inspect his vehicle. Pet. at 6; Doc. 1-5 at 1

(Driver/Vehicle Examination Report). While OHP’s inspection did not uncover any

violations, OHP detained Petitioner and subsequently transferred him to ICE custody. Pet.

at 6; Doc. 14-7 at 3.

Respondents contend Petitioner is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

Resp. at 6. It is not clear whether Petitioner has requested a bond hearing. See Pet. at 10

(asserting he “has no administrative remedies to exhaust” and “[f]utility is an exception to

the prudential exhaustion requirement”). Such a request, though, would likely be futile

because all IJs are subject to the binding precedent of Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I & N

Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), which holds those noncitizens who entered the country without

admission or parole are ineligible for a bond hearing.

When Petitioner filed his Petition, he was detained at Cimarron Correctional Facility

in Cushing, Oklahoma. Pet. at 7. He remains detained there. See ICE Online Detainee

Locator System, at https://locator.ice.gov/odls/#/results (last visited August 4, 2026).

II. Petitioner’s Claims

Petitioner asserts six counts in his Petition.

• Count I: Violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act

(“INA”). Petitioner alleges his continued detention under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(b)(2) is unlawful and violates the INA because that provision

does not apply to noncitizens, like him, who previously had been

granted bond pursuant to § 1226(a) and have no change in

circumstances. Pet. at 19-20.

• Count II: Violation of Due Process. Petitioner alleges his continued

detention without an individualized custody determination violates

his right to procedural due process. Id. at 20-22.

• Count III: Violation of the Administrative Procedure Act

(“APA”). Petitioner alleges his detention without an individualized

custody determination is arbitrary and capricious in violation of the

APA. Id. at 22-24.

• Count IV: Violation of Equal Protection. Petitioner alleges his

detention without an individualized bond hearing, when similarly

situated noncitizens have received one, violates his right to equal

protection. Id. at 24-26.

• Count V: Violation of the Suspension Clause. Petitioner alleges the

lack of a meaningful opportunity to challenge his detention before the

Immigration Court violates the Suspension Clause. Id. at 26-28.

• Count VI: Violation of the Accardi Doctrine. Petitioner alleges

ICE’s disregard for its own regulations violates the principle that

executive branch agencies must follow their own binding regulations.

Id. at 28-30.

He asks the Court to declare his continued detention unlawful and “order [his] immediate

release from ICE custody.” Pet. at 30-31. Petitioner also requests an award of attorney

fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”).3 Id. at 31.

III. Standard of Review

To obtain habeas corpus relief, Petitioner must show that he is “in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2241(c)(3). “Challenges to immigration detention are properly brought directly through

habeas.” Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d 1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Zadvydas v.

Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687-88 (2001)).

3 To the extent Petitioner may be entitled to EAJA fees and costs as a prevailing party, he

must seek those separately after a final judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Thus, the

Court need not address this request at this juncture.

IV. Analysis

A. Section 1226(a) applies to Petitioner’s detention.

The two sections of the INA at issue that govern detention of noncitizens pending

removal proceedings are 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226. Section 1225(a)(1) describes an

“applicant for admission” as “an alien present in the United States who has not been

admitted or who arrives in the United States.” Id. § 1225(a)(1) (citation modified). Under

§ 1225(b)(2)(A), “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining

immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a

doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained.” If Petitioner is detained under

§ 1225(b)(2)(A), he is not entitled to a bond hearing. On the other hand, § 1226(a) more

generally authorizes detention of a noncitizen pending removal proceedings and entitles

the noncitizen to a bond hearing. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 306 (2018)

(“Federal regulations provide that aliens detained under § 1226(a) receive bond hearings

at the outset of detention.” (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1))).

Petitioner alleges his continued detention under § 1225(b)(2) is unlawful and

violates the INA. Pet. at 11-19. He further alleges § 1226(a) governs the detention of

noncitizens, like him, “who have already entered and were residing in the United States at

the time they were apprehended.” Pet. at 19. Respondents maintain Petitioner is properly

detained under § 1225(b)(2)(A). Resp. at 6.

The Tenth Circuit recently rejected the statutory interpretation of § 1225(b)(2) as

urged by Respondents and applied § 1226(a) to govern detention of noncitizens like

Petitioner. Santillan Quiroz v. Mullin, 180 F.4th 1226, 1235-49 (10th Cir. 2026). In

Santillan Quiroz, the Tenth Circuit concluded “those who entered the United States without

admission and who have lived here since are categorically unable to seek admission while

they remain in the country.” Id. at 1239 (citation modified). Accordingly, “noncitizens

who entered the United States and were thereafter detained in the interior of the country

are usually subject to § 1226(a) (and thus eligible for bond), not § 1225(b)(2)(A).” Id. at

1237. Therefore, based on Tenth Circuit precedent and this Court’s prior reasoning in

Coreas v. Noem, No. CIV-26-151-J, 2026 WL 541151, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 26, 2026),

the undersigned recommends the Court apply § 1226(a) to govern Petitioner’s current

detention. See Imami v. Lyons, No. CIV-26-566-J, 2026 WL 1896142, at *1-2 (W.D. Okla.

July 1, 2026) (holding in accordance with Santillan Quiroz that a similarly situated

petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing under § 1226(a)).4

Further, Petitioner’s application for asylum does not change the analysis or render

him “seeking admission” and thereby subject to § 1225(b)(2)(A). Santillan Quiroz, 180

F.4th at 1239 (holding a noncitizen “cannot make a present request for permission to enter

4 This conclusion is also in accord with persuasive authority in the Second, Sixth, Seventh,

Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, which rejected Respondents’ statutory interpretation of

§ 1225(b)(2). See Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock, No. 25-6842, --- F.4th ----, 2026

WL 2196424, at *26 (9th Cir. July 30, 2026); Cirrus Rojas v. Olson, No. 25-3127, --- F.4th

---, 2026 WL 2198315, at *2 (7th Cir. July 30, 2026); Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden, Fed.

Det. Ctr. Miami, 175 F.4th 1258, 1285 (11th Cir. 2026); Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 175

F.4th 713, 722 (6th Cir. 2026); Cunha v. Freden, 175 F.4th 61, 69 (2d Cir. 2026). In

contrast, the Fifth and Eighth Circuits recently applied § 1225 to similar habeas challenges,

agreeing with Respondents’ position. Avila v. Bondi, 170 F.4th 1128, 1134-38 (8th Cir.

2026); Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494, 498, 502-08 (5th Cir. 2026).

Respondents have filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. See Cert.

Pet., Raycraft v. Lopez-Campos, No. 25-1415 (filed June 22, 2026); Cert. Pet., Cunha v.

Freden, No. 26-104 (filed July 23, 2026).

the United States, lawfully or otherwise, once he or she has already entered” and “the only

time a noncitizen can be said to be seeking admission is when he is seeking to enter the

United States at the border” (citation modified)).

B. The revocation of Petitioner’s bond violated the INA and its

implementing regulations.

Ordinarily, the conclusion that a noncitizen’s detention is governed by § 1226(a)

ends the habeas analysis. See, e.g., Coreas v. Noem, No. CIV-26-151-J, 2026 WL 541151,

at *2 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 26, 2026) (declining to decide the merits of a petitioner’s due

process claim when granting a bond hearing pursuant to § 1226(a)). However, in the rare

circumstances when a noncitizen was previously released on bond by an IJ pursuant to

§ 1226(a), as in this case,5 § 1226(b) is also implicated. Under § 1226(b), the Secretary of

Homeland Security may “revoke a bond or parole authorized under subsection (a), rearrest

the alien under the original warrant, and detain the alien.” Section 1226(b) is implemented

by 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(c)(9) and 1236.1(c)(9), which explain that when a noncitizen who,

having been arrested and taken into custody, has been released, such release

may be revoked at any time in the discretion of the district director, acting

district director, deputy district director, assistant district director for

investigations, assistant district director for detention and deportation, or

officer in charge (except foreign), in which event the alien may be taken into

physical custody and detained. If detained, unless a breach has occurred, any

outstanding bond shall be revoked and canceled.

5 The parties do not dispute that Petitioner’s 2016 detention and release on bond were

governed by § 1226(a). See Pet. at 5-6 (“Petitioner was . . . subject to discretionary

detention under Section 236.”); Doc. 14-2 at 6 (bond order citing the regulation

implementing § 1226).

Further, federal courts have consistently relied on longstanding Board of

Immigration Appeals precedent and found the broad discretion that § 1226(b) grants DHS

to re-detain noncitizens previously released on bond is subject to “an important implicit

limitation”: “where a previous bond determination has been made by an immigration judge,

no change should be made . . . absent a change of circumstance.” Saravia v. Sessions, 280

F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1197 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (quoting Matter of Sugay, 17 I & N Dec. 637,

640 (B.I.A. 1981)). In this District, Judge Heaton recently applied the same principle. See

Skutar v. Mullin, No. CIV-26-0036-HE, Doc. 15 at 2-3 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 24, 2026)

(ordering a similarly situated petitioner’s release after concluding “while the Attorney

General has authority to revoke bond at any time under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(b), if an

immigration judge has determined the noncitizen should be released, the DHS may not re-

arrest that noncitizen absent a change of circumstance”) (citation modified); see also, e.g.,

Hernandez-Parrilla v. De Anda-Ybarra, No. 25-CV-01224, 2025 WL 3632769, at *5

(D.N.M. Dec. 15, 2025); Salcedo Aceros v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-06924, 2025 WL 2637503,

at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025).6 Thus, where an IJ has previously granted a noncitizen

bond under § 1226(a), ICE may only revoke that bond when it can show there are changed

circumstances, and only certain immigration officials may exercise that discretion.

6 A few courts have declined to read the change-in-circumstances requirement into

§ 1226(b). E.g., Garcia v. Jamison, No. 26-2214, 2026 WL 1122608, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Apr.

24, 2026); O.F.C. v. Almodovar, No. 25-cv-9816, 2026 WL 74262 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2026);

Salvador F.-G. v. Noem, No. 25-CV-0243, 2025 WL 1669356, at *9 (N.D. Okla. June 12,

2025).

Here, there is no evidence in the record that an ICE district director, acting district

director, deputy district director, assistant district director for investigations, assistant

district director for detention and deportation, or officer in charge made the decision to

revoke Petitioner’s parole. Instead, Petitioner was detained after an ICE Supervisory

Detention and Deportation Officer issued a warrant for his arrest. Doc. 14-7 at 1.

Moreover, the record does not reflect any material changes in Petitioner’s circumstances;

nor do Respondents argue any such changes have occurred. Petitioner alleges that since

the IJ released him on bond more than a decade ago, he has complied with conditions of

his release, maintained employment, and pursued his case before the Immigration Court.

Pet. at 5-6. There is no indication that during this time, he has become a flight risk or a

danger to his community.

For these reasons, the undersigned concludes ICE violated § 1226(b) and its

implementing regulations when it detained Petitioner on May 9, 2026.

C. The revocation of Petitioner’s bond violated his procedural due process

rights.

Because § 1226(b) governs the revocation of Petitioner’s bond, he is owed the due

process provided to him under the statute. The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause

protects all persons within the United States from being “deprived of life, liberty, or

property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. It applies to noncitizens

within the United States “whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or

permanent.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693. In the civil immigration detention context, courts

consistently apply the test from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), to evaluate the

process owed a noncitizen. See, e.g., Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 27-39 (1st

Cir. 2021) (applying Mathews to due process challenges to prolonged detention under

§ 1226(a)); Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 851-55 (2d Cir. 2020) (same).

The Mathews test includes three factors: (1) “the private interest that will be affected

by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through

the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural

safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the

fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement

would entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. All three factors weigh in Petitioner’s favor.

First, Petitioner has a strong liberty interest in being free from physical detention.

This is “the most significant liberty interest there is—the interest in being free from

imprisonment.” Velasco Lopez, 978 F.3d at 851 (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507,

529 (2004)). Because freedom from restraint is “at the core of the liberty interest protected

by the Due Process Clause, commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant

deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.” Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S.

71, 80 (1992) (citation modified). “Congress may make rules as to aliens that would be

unacceptable if applied to citizens,” Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 522 (2003), but that

power remains subject to “important constitutional limitations,” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695.

It does not eliminate Petitioner’s significant interest in being free from detention. See, e.g.,

Diaz v. Noem, No. 26-CV-00782, 2026 WL 733587, at *3 (D. Colo. Mar. 16, 2026)

(concluding the first Mathews factors supports finding a due process violation where

petitioner “is being held in a detention facility that strongly resembles penal confinement,

is away from his family, and is unable to maintain his employment” (citation modified)).

Second, the risk of erroneous deprivation is high here, because an IJ has already

granted Petitioner bond, presumably on a finding that he posed neither a risk of flight nor

a danger to the community. Doc. 14-2 at 6. Petitioner’s re-detention “without notice or a

hearing” creates a “considerable” risk of erroneous deprivation because it omits necessary

“procedural safeguards to determine whether the revocation of his release and bond were

justified.” Amefia v. Grant, No. CIV-26-975-R, 2026 WL 2113994, at *4 (July 22, 2026)

(R&R). The risk is compounded by Respondents’ current position to afford Petitioner no

bond hearing. See, e.g., Montero Cordova v. Noem, No. 26-CV-00526, 2026 WL 867689,

at *9 (D.N.M. Mar. 30, 2026) (finding the second Mathews factor favors petitioner because

“the risk of erroneous deprivation will remain high” “without the opportunity to have the

hearing to which Petitioner is entitled” under § 1226(a) and noting “a bond hearing before

a neutral immigration judge will provide immense value as an additional safeguard”

(citation modified)); Orellana v. Noem, 807 F. Supp. 3d 745, 754 (W.D. Ky. 2025) (“A re-

detention, without any individualized assessment, leads to a high risk of erroneous

deprivation of an individual’s liberty interest.”). This is especially true given that

Petitioner’s detention was not deemed necessary for more than ten years.

Finally, the Court must consider the government’s interest, including any fiscal or

administrative burdens. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. While “control over matters of

immigration is a sovereign prerogative” and the “government’s interest in efficient

administration of immigration laws at the border is weighty,” Landon v. Plasencia, 459

U.S. 21, 34 (1982) (citation modified), such interests in detaining Petitioner without

procedural safeguards do not outweigh his liberty interest or risk of erroneous deprivation.

See, e.g., Amefia, 2026 WL 2113994, at *4 (“[T]he Court can discern no significant

administrative or fiscal burden associated with placing the burden on the Government to

follow its own laws and regulations.”).

For these reasons, Petitioner’s re-detention without notice and a pre-detention

hearing violated his due process rights.

D. The proper remedy is release.

Petitioner seeks an order ensuring his “immediate release from ICE custody.” Pet.

at 31. When “§ 1226 governs Petitioner’s detention, the due process owed to Petitioner is

that provided for in § 1226.” Velasquez Salazar v. Dedos, 806 F. Supp. 3d 1231, 1241

(D.N.M. 2025). Typically, that process is “an individualized bond hearing before an IJ.”

Id. But where a noncitizen has previously been granted bond by an IJ and is entitled to

remain at liberty absent changed circumstances, matters are different.

Petitioner’s re-detention without changed circumstances justifying the revocation of

his IJ-granted bond violated the INA, ICE regulations, and his procedural due process

rights. When confronted with similarly situated noncitizens, Judges in this District have

found the noncitizens are entitled to immediate release. See Skutar, No. CIV-26-0036-HE,

Doc. 15 at 2-3 (ordering a noncitizen released from custody where “the record contain[ed]

no facts which show[ed] any change in circumstances since petitioner’s initial release” and

there was no indication the petitioner posed a flight or safety risk); see also Singh v. Grant,

No. CIV-26-289-R, 2026 WL 1099500, at *5 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 22, 2026) (R&R)

(recommending “release . . . from detention” where ICE “summarily revoked [a

noncitizen’s] bond”), adopted, 2026 WL 1483557, at *2 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2026) (“The

Magistrate issued a well-reasoned opinion finding ICE failed to comply with procedures.

Upon review, and considering the lack of more specific arguments from Respondents, the

Court agrees with the Magistrate.”); Amefia, 2026 WL 2113994, at *5 (recommending

“immediate release” for a noncitizen whose IJ-issued bond was improperly revoked).

This approach of immediate release aligns with the scope of habeas remedy ordered

by many out-of-district courts considering what relief to provide noncitizens whose IJ-

ordered bond was improperly revoked. E.g., B.F. v. Mullin, No. 26-cv-2992, 2026 WL

2198915, at *5 (D. Minn. July 24, 2026); Peña Becerra v. Sparks, No. 26-cv-00212, 2026

WL 915439, at *7 (D. Utah Apr. 3, 2026); Singh v. Hale, No. 26-cv-53, 2026 WL 765623,

at *5 (D. Vt. Mar. 18, 2026); Hernandez-Parrilla, 2025 WL 3632769, at *7; accord

Galindo Vega v. Warden, No. 26-cv-03604, 2026 WL 1707804, at *1 (E.D. Cal. June 12,

2026) (finding a bond hearing, rather than immediate release, was the appropriate remedy

where evidence the record indicated changed circumstances).

Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that Petitioner be immediately released

from detention subject to the conditions of his prior bond.7

7 In ordering similar relief, Judges in other districts have acknowledged that ICE retains

the power to re-detain noncitizens previously released on IJ-ordered bond where it proves

by clear and convincing evidence at a pre-detention hearing before an IJ that the

noncitizen’s circumstances have changed in a manner justifying the revocation of the

previous bond. E.g., Peña Becerra, 2026 WL 915439, at *7; Hernandez-Parrilla, 2025

WL 3632769, at *7; dos Santos v. Noem, No. 25-CV-12052, 2025 WL 2370988, at *9 (D.

Mass. Aug. 14, 2025); Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2019); cf.

E. The Court should decline to address Petitioner’s remaining claims.

Petitioner also argues his continued detention without a bond hearing violates the

INA, the APA, his Fifth Amendment equal protection rights, the Suspension Clause, and

the Accardi doctrine. Pet. at 19-30. If the Court grants Petitioner’s requested relief for

release, the undersigned recommends the Court decline to decide the merits of Petitioner’s

remaining claims based on his continued detention. See, e.g., Coreas, 2026 WL 541151,

at *2 (declining to decide the merits of a petitioner’s due process claim when granting a

bond hearing pursuant to § 1226(a)).

At most, Petitioner’s due process claims based on his continued detention entitle

him to a bond hearing pursuant to § 1226(a) at which he will bear the burden of proof. See

Imami, 2026 WL 1896142, at *1 (holding § 1226(a) entitles a noncitizen to a bond hearing);

Zhakhonov v. Grant, No. CIV-26-350-J, 2026 WL 1865418, at *3 (W.D. Okla. June 29,

2026) (holding it is unnecessary to reach a due process claim for a petitioner when “the

proper remedy is an individualized bond hearing” under § 1226(a)) (citation modified); see

also Singh v. Grant, No. CIV-26-279-J, 2026 WL 1035100, at *1-2 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 16,

2026) (declining to reach petitioner’s due process claims and concluding burden shifting

O.F.C., 2026 WL 74262, at *12 (while finding that due process does not require a pre-

detention hearing, concluding “due process requires the Government to provide a prompt

post-arrest hearing at which the individual can contest his detention and at which the

Government bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence the individual's

dangerousness or risk of flight based on changed circumstances”). Judges in this District

have not squarely addressed this issue. In Singh v. Grant, Judge Mitchell recommended

the government be enjoined “from re-detaining [the] Petitioner without notice and . . . a

pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral decisionmaker.” Singh, 2026 WL 1099500, at *5.

Adopting the report and recommendation, Judge Russell ordered “immediate release” but

did not address what should happen after release. Singh, 2026 WL 1483557, at *3.

to the government in a § 1226(a) bond hearing is premature and not ripe for adjudication

before a bond hearing has been conducted).

V. Recommendation and Notice of Right to Object

For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that the Court GRANT in

part the Petition for habeas relief by ordering Respondents to immediately release

Petitioner subject to the conditions of his 2016 bond order and to enjoin Respondents from

re-detaining him without notice and a pre-detention hearing before a neutral IJ.

The parties are advised of their right to object to this Report and Recommendation.

See 28 U.S.C. § 636. Any objection must be filed not later than August 11, 2026. See id.

§ 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to object timely waives the right to appellate

review of the factual and legal issues addressed in this Report and Recommendation. See

Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).

This Report and Recommendation disposes of all issues referred to the undersigned

Magistrate Judge in this matter.

ENTERED this 4" day of August, 2026.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

15