The opinion
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE
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ALAN ADAMS, CASE NO. 2:25-cv-02256-JNW
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Plaintiff, DISMISSAL ORDER
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v.
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KING COUNTY ET AL.,
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Defendants.
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1. INTRODUCTION
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This matter comes before the Court on Defendants King County, Jason
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Poydras, Aimee Sutton, Ketu Shah, Linda Ridge, and Ronda Bliey’s motion to
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dismiss. Dkt. No. 32. Having considered the parties’ filings, the relevant record, and
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the law, the Court GRANTS the motion.
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19 2. BACKGROUND
20 Plaintiff Alan Adams is a party to an ongoing family law case in King County
21 Superior Court. He generally alleges that Defendants—King County, Judges Jason
22 Poydras, Aimee Sutton, and Ketu Shah, and judicial administrators Linda Ridge,
23 and Ronda Bliey—violated federal law by failing to accommodate his disabilities
1 during that case. Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiff submitted multiple accommodation requests
2 throughout the pretrial process, including in September 2022 and February 2023,
3 but alleges that the Court failed to timely respond to the requests before the four-
4 day trial in early 2023. Id. Plaintiff continued to request disability accommodation
5 for post-trial proceedings, some of which were granted in part and others of which
6 were denied. Id.
7 Adams then sued here, alleging that by delaying and denying his
8 accommodation requests, Defendants violated Title II of the Americans with
9 Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C.
10 § 794, and various constitutional rights. Dkt. No. 1 at 29–32. Defendants now move
11 to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failing to state a claim.
12 Dkt. No. 32.
13 3. LEGAL STANDARD
14 Courts will grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss only if the complaint fails
15 to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell
16 Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A claim
17 is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
18 to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
19 alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
20 556). Rule 8 does not demand detailed factual allegations, but it “demands more
21 than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. at 679.
22 “Conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences will not defeat an
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1 otherwise proper motion to dismiss.” Vasquez v. L.A. Cnty., 487 F.3d 1246, 1249
2 (9th Cir. 2007); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.
3 Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[p]leadings must be construed
4 so as to do justice.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e). Thus, a “document filed pro se is to be
5 liberally construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held
6 to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v.
7 Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations omitted). Courts are not to “dismiss a pro
8 se complaint without leave to amend unless ‘it is absolutely clear that the
9 deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.’” Rosati v. Igbinoso,
10 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th
11 Cir. 2012) (quoting Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir. 1988)).
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4. DISCUSSION
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4.1 Judicial and quasi-judicial immunity bars Plaintiff’s claims against
Defendants Poydras, Sutton, and Bliey.
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Judges have absolute immunity for acts they perform that relate to the
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“judicial process,” no matter the judge’s alleged motives. In re Castillo, 297 F.3d
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940, 947 (9th Cir. 2002) as amended (Sept. 6, 2002). Immunity fails to attach only
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when judicial officers act clearly and completely outside the scope of their
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jurisdiction. Demoran v. Witt, 781 F.2d 155, 158 (9th Cir. 1985). Judicial immunity
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is not limited to judges and instead “[a]ll those who perform judge-like functions are
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immune from civil damages liability.” Ryan v. Bilby, 764 F.2d 1325, 1328 n.4 (9th
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Cir. 1985).
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1 Adam’s claims against Judges Poydras and Sutton arise solely from their
2 judicial actions—holding hearings and issuing orders—so absolute immunity
3 applies. See Munoz v. Superior Ct. of Los Angeles Cnty., 91 F.4th 977, 981 (9th Cir.
4 2024) (Section 1983’s plain text provides “judicial immunity from suit for injunctive
5 relief for acts taken in a judicial capacity.”). Adam’s claims against Poydras and
6 Sutton are dismissed.
7 Similarly, Plaintiff’s claims against Bliey also arise from her official duties as
8 an officer of the court, so quasi-judicial immunity applies. See Acres Bonusing, Inc v.
9 Marston, 17 F.4th 901, 916 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Court for
10 Dist. of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987). Adams alleges that Bliey
11 “neglected to process requests, went on extended leave . . . and failed to contact
12 Plaintiff’s treating professionals.” Dkt. No. 1 at 9. But Bliey’s duties as King County
13 Superior Court’s ADA coordinator—processing requests for accommodation—are
14 not merely ministerial; they are essential to the administration of justice and “when
15 viewed in context[,] are actually a part of the judicial function.” In re Castillo, 297
16 F.3d at 952. Any action or inaction on Bliey’s part related to those functions is
17 immune from suit, so the Court dismisses Adams’s claims against her too.
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4.2 Adams does not allege that Defendants Shah and Ridge personally
violated his rights.
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Adams alleges that Defendant Shah, Chief Judge of the King County
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Superior Court, is liable for the actions of Judges Poydras and Sutton as their
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supervisor. Similarly, he seeks to impute liability for the actions (or inactions) of
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1 Bliey upon her supervisor, Defendant Ridge. Those are the only allegations touching
2 either defendant.
3 “[A] supervisor may be held liable under § 1983 if he or she was personally
4 involved in the constitutional deprivation or a sufficient causal connection exists
5 between the supervisor’s unlawful conduct and the constitutional violation.”
6 Jackson v. City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 653 (9th Cir. 2001). Adams never
7 alleges Shah and Ridge were personally involved in the accommodation procedure
8 or the underlying family law matter, nor does he establish any causal connection
9 between their supervision and the actions of Poydras, Sutton, or Bliey.
10 Accordingly, his claims against Shah and Ridge are dismissed for failing to
11 state a claim.
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4.3 Younger abstention bars Adams’s claims.
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Under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), federal courts must not
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interfere with pending state court litigation that implicates “important state
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interests.” Potrero Hills Landfill, Inc. v. Cnty. of Solano, 657 F.3d 876, 881 (9th Cir.
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2011). Younger abstention is required if the state proceedings (1) are ongoing, (2)
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implicate “important state interests,” (3) provide an adequate opportunity to raise
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federal questions, and if (4) federal adjudication would enjoin or have the practical
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effect of enjoining the state proceeding. Logan v. U.S. Nat’l Bank Ass’n, 722 F.3d
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1163, 1167 (9th Cir. 2013).
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Each condition is satisfied here. First, Adams alleges that “[f]rom 2023
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through current, the King County Superior Court continues to conduct trial,
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1 enforcement, and property-transfer proceedings,” and he asks this Court to enjoin
2 additional proceedings. Dkt. No. 1 at 27, 32. Second, the Ninth Circuit has held that
3 ongoing family court matters like this one implicate important state
4 interests. See H.C. ex rel. Gordon v. Koppel, 203 F.3d 610, 613 (9th Cir. 2000).
5 Third, while Adams believes his access to the superior court has been
6 unconstitutionally barred, he concedes that his objections were dismissed “solely
7 because they were not presented in the formal legal style or sequence the court
8 preferred.” Dkt. No. 1 at 28. There are no allegations that Adams lacks sufficient
9 access to the courts necessary to raise his concern. Lastly, the injunctive relief
10 Adams seeks would have the practical effect of enjoining the state court
11 proceedings. Dkt. No. 1 at 32.
12 Accordingly, the Court finds that Adams’s claims are barred by Younger
13 abstention.
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4.4 Leave to amend would be futile.
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Ordinarily, when a court dismisses a pro se plaintiff’s complaint, it should
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grant leave to amend, even if no request to amend is made. Flowers v. First
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Hawaiian Bank, 295 F.3d 966, 976 (9th Cir. 2002). But leave to amend may be
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denied where amendment would be futile. Id.
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The Court concludes that amendment would be futile here. The claims
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against Poydras, Sutton, and Bliey necessarily turn on their roles as judges and
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court personnel, and therefore judicial immunity and quasi-judicial immunity are
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fundamental barriers to this Court’s ability to hear the case. Adams does not allege
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1 that Shah or Ridge had any role in denying his ADA accommodations, and even if
2 he did, they would be immune from suit for the same reasons as the other named
3 Defendants. And finally, Younger abstention applies to Adams’s claims. No
4 amendment could overcome these defects.
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5. CONCLUSION
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In sum, the Court GRANTS the motion, Dkt. No. 32, and DISMISSES the
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complaint with prejudice.
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Dated this 20th day of July, 2026.
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A
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Jamal N. Whitehead
United States District Judge
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