Woodard

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JEREMY TRAVIS WOODARD, :

Petitioner : No. 1:24-cv-01381

:

v. : (Judge Kane)

:

PA PAROLE BOARD, et al., :

Respondents :

MEMORANDUM

Currently before the Court is pro se Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus under

28 U.S.C. § 2254 in which he challenges his denial of parole. For the reasons set forth below,

the Court will deny the petition, decline to issue a certificate of appealability, and direct the Clerk

of Court to close this case.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural Background

Pro se Petitioner Jeremy Travis Woodard (“Woodard”) commenced this action by filing a

petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, an application for leave to proceed

in forma pauperis (“IFP Application”), and a certified prison trust fund account statement, all of

which the Clerk of Court docketed on August 16, 2024. (Doc. Nos. 1–3.) On September 4,

2024, the Court issued an Order which, inter alia, granted the IFP Application and directed

Respondents to file a response to the habeas petition. (Doc. No. 5.) Respondents timely filed a

response in opposition to the habeas petition on September 24, 2024. (Doc. No. 8.) In response,

Woodard filed a “Motion to Object to Respondents [sic] Answer for [sic] Writ of Habeas

Corpus.” (Doc. No. 9.) As such, the habeas petition is ripe for disposition.

B. Factual Background

On August 10, 2006, Woodard was sentenced to concurrent sentences of state

two (2) years’ probation, after pleading guilty to possession of a controlled substance (35 P.S. §

780-113(a)(16)), simple assault (18 Pa. C.S. § 2701(a)(1)), and resisting arrest (18 Pa. C.S. §

5104) in the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County. (Doc. Nos. 8 at 1; 8-1 at 4–7);

Commonwealth v. Woodard, No. CP-11-CR-0001089-2006 (Cambria County Ct. Com. Pl. May

8, 2006) (“Woodard I”).1 On May 15, 2007, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Board of

Probation and Parole (“Parole Board”) denied Woodard parole based on (1) his need to

participate in and complete additional institutional programs and (2) his “institutional behavior,

including reported misconducts or community corrections residency failure.” See (Doc. Nos. 8

at 1; 8-1 at 8–10). Later that same year, on September 13, 2007, the Parole Board again denied

Woodard parole and indicated that he would serve his maximum sentence. (Doc. Nos. 8 at 1; 8-1

at 11–13). The Parole Board indicated that it denied Woodard parole because (1) he refused to

accept responsibility for the offenses committed, (2) the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

Department of Corrections (“DOC”) did not recommend parole, and (3) his poor institutional

behavior. (Doc. No. 8-1 at 12).

Woodard served his maximum sentence and began his consecutive probationary sentence.

On February 17, 2009, the trial court determined that Woodard violated the conditions of his

probation, revoked his probation, and sentenced him to a period of state incarceration for a

minimum of one year to a maximum of two years. See (Doc. Nos. 8 at 2; 8-1 at 14–17);

Woodard I. Seven days later, the trial court sentenced Woodard to a period of incarceration for a

1 The Court takes judicial notice of the docket sheet in Woodard’s criminal cases referenced in

this Memorandum, which are available through the Unified Judicial System of Pennsylvania

Web Portal at https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/CaseSearch (“Portal”). See Orabi v. Att’y Gen. of the

U.S., 738 F.3d 535, 537 n.1 (3rd Cir. 2014) (stating that the court “may take judicial notice of the

contents of another [c]ourt’s docket”); Wilson v. McVey, 579 F. Supp. 2d 685, 688 n.5 (M.D. Pa.

2008) (taking judicial notice of court docket).

minimum of two (2) days to a maximum of six months after pleading guilty to driving under the

influence (“DUI”) – high rate of alcohol (75 Pa. C.S. § 3802(b)). See (Doc. Nos. 8 at 2; 8-1 at

15); Commonwealth v. Woodard, No. CP-11-CR-0001671-2008 (Cambria County Ct. Com. Pl.

Aug. 14, 2008) (“Woodard II”).2

On September 20, 2010, the Parole Board denied Woodard parole and directed that he

serve his maximum sentence of incarceration. (Doc. Nos. 8 at 2; 8-1 at 18–19.) The Parole

Board stated that it had denied parole because of (1) Woodard’s (a) “unacceptable compliance

with prescribed institutional programs,” (b) “institutional behavior, included reported

misconducts,” (c) “prior unsatisfactory parole supervision history,” and (d) “failure to

demonstrate motivation for success”; (2) the DOC’s recommendation that he not receive parole;

and (3) the trial judge’s recommendation that he not receive parole. See (Doc. No. 8-1 at 19).

On July 5, 2018, Woodard was sentenced to period of state incarceration for a minimum

of six (6) years to a maximum of twenty (20) years after pleading nolo contedere to conspiracy to

commit aggravated assault – serious bodily injury (18 Pa. C.S. §§ 903, 2702(a)(1)). See (Doc.

Nos. 8 at 2; 8-1 at 20–23); Commonwealth v. Woodard, No. CP-11-CR-0001247-2014 (Cambria

County Ct. Com. Pl. June 30, 2014) (“Woodard III”).3 On December 4, 2019, the Parole Board

denied Woodard parole. (Doc. Nos. 8 at 2; 8-1 at 24–26.) The Parole Board indicated that it

denied parole because of (1) Woodard’s (a) “need to participate in and complete additional

institutional programs,” (b) “institutional behavior, including reported county jail misconducts,”

(c) “risk and needs assessment indicating [his] level of risk to the community,” (d)

2 Woodard also pleaded nolo contendere to Public Drunkenness (18 Pa. C.S. § 5505) and

received no further penalty. See (Doc. No. 8-1 at 17); Woodard II.

3 Woodard also pleaded nolo contendere to DUI – general impairment (second offense) (75 Pa.

C.S. § 3802(a)(1)) and was sentenced to a concurrent period of incarceration for a minimum of

five (5) days to a maximum of six (6) months. See Woodard III.

“minimization/denial of the nature and circumstances of the offense(s) committed,” and (e) “lack

of remorse for the offense(s) committed”; (2) reports, evaluations, and assessments indicating

that he was a risk to the community; and (3) the negative recommendations by the DOC and the

prosecuting attorney. See (Doc. No. 8-1 at 25).

Almost a year after denying parole, on November 9, 2020, the Parole Board granted

Woodard parole, and he was released from incarceration on December 30, 2020. (Doc. Nos. 8 at

2; 8-1 at 27–38.) On August 2, 2021, the Parole Board recommitted Woodard to serve six (6)

months’ state incarceration for technical parole violations which included using drugs, failing to

abide by a curfew, and failing to refrain from entering establishments that sell or dispense

alcohol. (Doc. Nos. 8 at 2; 8-1 at 39–42.) After his release from incarceration,4 Woodard was

charged with DUI – general impairment (second offense) and driving while his operating

privilege was suspended or revoked (75 Pa. C.S. § 1543(a)) on March 21, 2022, and on August

29, 2022, he was sentenced to a period of incarceration for a minimum of three (3) months to a

maximum of six (6) months, to be followed by six (6) months’ probation. See Commonwealth v.

Woodard, No. CP-11-CR-000452-2022 (Cambria County Ct. Com. Pl. May 5, 2022).

Because of these convictions, the Parole Board determined that Woodard was a technical

parole violator and recommitted him to a state correctional institution to serve six (6) months’

incarceration on September 6, 2022. (Doc. Nos. 8 at 2; 8-1 at 43–45.) The Parole Board also

indicated that Woodard was not eligible for reparole until February 28, 2023, and his parole

violation maximum date was November 15, 2034. (Doc. No. 8-1 at 42.)

4 The Parole Board’s August 2, 2021 decision to recommit Woodard included language

indicating that he was to be automatically reparoled on January 12, 2022 without further action

by the Parole Board. (Doc. No. 8-1 at 41.)

Since his reincarceration, the Parole Board has denied Woodard parole on three

occasions. First, on January 3, 2023, the Parole Board denied Woodard parole because of his (1)

“need to participate in and complete additional institutional programs,” (2) “risk and needs

assessment indicating his level of risk to the community,” (3) “prior unsatisfactory supervision

history,” (4) “failure to demonstrate motivation for success,” (5) “minimization/denial of the

nature and circumstances of the offense(s) committed,” (6) “refusal to accept responsibility for

the offense(s) committed,” (7) “lack of remorse for the offense(s) committed,” and (8) reports,

evaluations and assessments showing that he remained a risk to the community. See (Doc. Nos.

8 at 2; 8-1 at 46–48). Second, on January 5, 2024, the Parole Board denied Woodard parole

because of his (1) “need to participate in and complete additional institutional programs,” (2)

“risk and needs assessment indicating his level of risk to the community,” (3) “prior

unsatisfactory supervision history,” (4) “minimization/denial of the nature and circumstances of

the offense(s) committed,” (5) “refusal to accept responsibility for the offense(s) committed,”

and (6) reports, evaluations and assessments showing that he remained a risk to the community.

See (Doc. Nos. 8 at 2; 8-1 at 49–51). Third, and finally, on June 20, 2024, the Parole Board

denied Woodard parole due to his (1) “risk and needs assessment indicating his level of risk to

the community,” (2) “prior unsatisfactory supervision history,” (3) “failure to demonstrate

motivation for success,” (4) “minimization/denial of the nature and circumstances of the

offense(s) committed,” (5) “refusal to accept responsibility for the offense(s) committed,” (6)

“lack of remorse for the offense(s) committed,” and (7) reports, evaluations and assessments

showing that he remained a risk to the community. See (Doc. Nos. 8 at 2; 8-1 at 52–54).

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Challenges to Parole Denials Under Section 2254

A state prisoner’s challenge to the denial of parole is cognizable under Section 2254. See

Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 486 (3d Cir. 2001) (determining that jurisdiction to entertain

state prisoner’s habeas petition challenging denial of parole lies under Section 2254 and not 28

U.S.C. § 2241). However, a federal district court may not grant parole or determine parole

eligibility. See Billiteri v. U.S. Bd. of Parole, 541 F.2d 938, 944 (2d Cir. 1976). Instead, “[t]he

only remedy which the court can give is to order the Board to correct the abuses or wrongful

conduct within a fixed period of time, after which, in the case of non-compliance, the court can

grant the writ of habeas corpus and order the prisoner discharged from custody.”5 See id.; see

also Bridge v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 981 F.2d 97, 105 (3d Cir. 1992) (explaining that “the relief a

court may grant [from a parole denial] is limited”).

B. Due Process Challenges to Parole Denials6

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law.” See U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1. “[T]here is

no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the

5 As stated above, Woodard requests to either be released from incarceration or receive a new

parole hearing. See (Doc. No. 1 at 14). Woodard may not obtain his release through these

habeas proceedings because, as explained here, his only available relief is a new parole hearing

absent the alleged constitutional violations. Therefore, the Court considers Woodard’s petition in

the context of his only available remedy, namely, an order directing the Parole Board to

reexamine his eligibility for parole via a new parole hearing.

6 Woodard asserts that his parole denial(s) violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from

cruel and unusual punishment. See (Doc. No. 1 at 5). However, the Eighth Amendment does not

require that a prisoner “be released before the expiration of a valid prison term.” See Urruita v.

PA Atty. Gen., No. 13-cv-00577, 2014 WL 6982993, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 9, 2014) (citing

Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979)). As such, the Court

considers Woodard’s challenge to the denial of parole as only a due process challenge.

expiration of a valid sentence,” nor has the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania created such a right.

See Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7; see also Burkett v. Love, 89 F.3d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 1996)

(recognizing general principle that Pennsylvania’s parole statute does not create a liberty interest

in the right to be paroled); Coady v. Vaughn, 770 A.2d 287, 289 (Pa. 2001) (“It is undisputed that

[an inmate] does not have a clear legal right to the grant of parole, nor does the [Parole Board]

have a corresponding duty to grant the same.”). “Since a discretionary decision of the Parole

Board denying an inmate early parole does not implicate any constitutionally [or state] protected

liberty interest, the scope of federal judicial review of these decisions is necessarily quite

limited.” Diehl-Armstrong v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, No. 13-cv-02302, 2014 WL 1871509, at

*5 (M.D. Pa. May 7, 2014). In this regard, the role of a federal court is confined to reviewing the

substance of the state parole decision to determine whether the Parole Board violated the

petitioner’s substantive due process rights by exercising its authority in an arbitrary and

capricious, or constitutionally impermissible manner. See Block v. Potter, 631 F.2d 233, 236 (3d

Cir. 1980).

To show a violation of substantive due process, a habeas petitioner must demonstrate

that: (1) they were arbitrarily denied parole due to impermissible reasons such as race, religion,

or political beliefs, and/or (2) the Parole Board failed to apply appropriate, rational criteria in

reaching its determination to deny parole. See id. at 236; Bonsall v. Gillis, 372 F. Supp. 2d 805,

807 (M.D. Pa. 2005). “However, federal courts are not authorized by the due process clause to

second-guess parole boards[,] and the requirements of substantive due process are met if there is

some basis for the challenged decision.” Coady, 251 F.3d at 487. The “relevant level of

arbitrariness required to find a substantive due process violation involves not merely action that

is unreasonable, but, rather, something more egregious, which we have termed at times

‘conscience shocking’ or ‘deliberately indifferent.’” See Hunterson v. DiSabato, 308 F.3d 236,

247 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Woodard contends that the Court should grant him habeas relief because the Parole Board

violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution by denying

him parole for “arbitrary, egregious[,] and capricious reasons” despite him completing all

programs, remaining misconduct free, and maintaining a job. See (Doc. No. 1 at 5). He also

asserts that the Parole Board’s denial of parole “bear[s] no rational relationship to rehabilitation

or deterrance [sic].” See (id.). He believes that “parole has become desensitized and

dehumanizing to a degree of terrorism,” and the Parole Board requiring him to remain

incarcerated despite his completion of all his programming is a “waste of taxpayer’s money.”

See (id.).

In response to Woodard’s petition, Respondents argue that the Court should dismiss the

petition because Woodard failed to exhaust his available state remedies. (Doc. No. 8 at 3–6.)

They also argue that Woodard’s petition is meritless insofar as he has not identified an Eighth

Amendment violation and, even though he did not explicitly mention due process in his petition,

Woodard has not shown that his due process rights were violated. (Id. at 7–11.) The Court will

address each of these arguments in turn.

A. Challenges to Prior Parole Denials

As indicated above, the Parole Board has denied Woodard parole on three occasions—on

January 3, 2023, January 5, 2024, and June 20, 2024—since recommitting him to state prison on

September 6, 2022. It is unclear from Woodard’s petition whether he challenges only the latest

parole denial or all three denials because he does not state the date of the parole denial he

challenges in his petition. See (Doc. No. 1 at 1–13). To the extent that Woodard attempts to

challenge his denials of parole on January 3, 2023, and January 5, 2024, those challenges are

moot.

Related to this mootness issue, the Court notes that:

In many habeas cases, the crucial issue with respect to mootness is whether “some

concrete and continuing injury other than the now-ended incarceration or parole”

might still be amenable to remedy. Spencer[ v. Kemma, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998)]. In

other words, there still may be a case or controversy before the court – even if the

injury that a complaining party seeks to remedy through litigation no longer exists

– if there is a “collateral injury” that is “likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial

decision.” Id. (quoting Lewis[ v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990)]);

Burkey[ v. Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 147–51 (3d Cir. 2009)]. This is not the case,

however, in the context of a parole denial or calculation. Rather, because the only

relief that a court can grant in such circumstances is a new parole hearing, a

subsequent hearing held by the Parole Board renders an inmate’s challenge to the

prior parole decision moot. See, e.g., Henderson v. Brookes, [No. 15-cv-02358,]

2017 WL 6497358, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 19, 2017) (“Given that the Board issued a

decision on June 19, 2017 granting Henderson the relief sought in his petition,

Henderson’s petition challenging the Board’s [prior] denials has been rendered

moot.”); Alex v. Gavin, [No. 14-cv-00261,] 2015 WL 8012825, at *3 (M.D. Pa.

Dec. 7, 2015) (“As noted, the only relief we can grant would be a new parole

hearing and since Alex admits he received a new hearing . . . since the filing of his

habeas petition, his challenge to the denials of parole before the March 2015

decision is now moot.”); Coles v. Folino, [No. 12-cv-00238,] 2014 WL 5685547[,

at *2] (W.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2014) (“Because the appropriate remedy in this case

would be a new hearing before the Board, and because Petitioner has had a new

hearing since the time he filed this petition, any claims challenging the denial of

parole prior to [the most recent hearing] are moot.”).

See Pullium v. Bd. of Prob. and Parole, No. 1:22-cv-00140, 2024 WL 3445462, at *2 (W.D. Pa.

June 26, 2024); see also Sims v. Mahally, No. 17-cv-01647, 2018 WL 5718498, at *3 (M.D. Pa.

Nov. 1, 2018) (“The Parole Board has issued its most recent decision to deny Petitioner parole on

January 11, 2017; therefore, to the extent that Petitioner challenges the Parole Board's decisions

to deny him parole [in 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2015], these claims have been

rendered moot.” (citations omitted)); Brown v. Kauffman, No. 18-cv-00089, 2018 WL 4087551,

at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2018) (“[S]ince the appropriate remedy would have been a new hearing

before the Board, and because Brown has since had another hearing, any challenge to the prior

denial is now moot.” (citations omitted)), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL

4054329 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 23, 2018). Therefore, the Court will consider only the Parole Board’s

most recent parole denial on June 20, 2024, when determining whether to grant Woodard habeas

relief in this case.7

B. Exhaustion of State Remedies

Respondents contend that the Court should dismiss Woodard’s habeas petition because he

did not exhaust his state-court remedies insofar as he did not file a petition for mandamus with

the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court prior to filing his habeas petition in this case. See (Doc.

No. 8 at 3–6). Woodard argues that he did not need to exhaust his state-court remedies because

he is challenging a parole denial. The Court agrees with Woodard.

Although a Pennsylvania state prisoner filing a habeas petition under Section 2254 is

ordinarily required to fully exhaust their state-court remedies prior to filing their petition, see

Slutzker v. Johnson, 393 F.3d 373, 379 (3d Cir. 2004) (explaining that state prisoners typically

must fully “exhaust their claims in state court before seeking relief from the federal courts”

(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A)), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in DeFoy v. McCollough,

concluded that a state prisoner challenging the denial of parole on constitutional grounds, other

than asserting an ex post facto claim, is not required to exhaust state-court remedies prior to

filing a habeas petition. See 393 F.3d 439, 445 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[W]e conclude that claims of

constitutional violations in the denial of parole in Pennsylvania need not be presented to the state

courts via a petition for writ of mandamus in order to satisfy the requirement of exhaustion.”). In

DeFoy, the Third Circuit determined that the Commonwealth Court’s decision in Weaver v.

7 Assuming arguendo that Woodard could challenge his other two parole denials in this petition,

the Court’s analysis and determination that he is not entitled to habeas relief applies equally to

those prior denials.

Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole, 688 A.2d 766, 771–72 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997),

which “held that mandamus is not available to a prisoner denied parole based upon a

constitutional error by the parole board,” was “the best indication of how the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court would resolve the issues” raised in the case. See id. at 444.

Respondents argue that this Court should no longer follow DeFoy because since that

decision, the Commonwealth Court has issued numerous decisions stating that state prisoners

can file constitutional challenges to Parole Board denials of parole in mandamus actions in the

Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction. See (Doc. No. 8 at 4–5 (citing cases)).

Respondents’ most recent cited case is Toland v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, in

which the Commonwealth Court held that “under [its] precedent, both ex post facto and due

process challenges [to the Board’s denial of parole] may be raised in a mandamus action.” See

263 A.3d 1220, 1233 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2021).

As Respondents point out, some district courts in the Third Circuit have questioned “[t]he

continuing validity of DeFoy.” See (Doc. No. 8 at 6 (citing cases)); Begandy v. Pa. Bd. of Prob.

and Parole, No. 19-cv-00639, 2021 WL 1986415, at *4 (W.D. Pa. May 18, 2021) (citing Bradley

v. Wingard, No. 15-cv-00235, 2017 WL 11476608, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 2017), report and

recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 10150909 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 5, 2018)); (Doc. No. 8 at 7–8

(citing cases)); see, e.g., Harley v. Pa. Parole Bd., No. 25-cv-01343, 2025 WL 1873016, at *2

(E.D. Pa. July 7, 2025) (agreeing with other district courts within the Third Circuit that Toland

“undercut[] the factual predicate on which DeFoy was decided” and “expanded scope of state

court review,” and concluding that a Section 2254 habeas petitioner “must raise due process

challenges to parole board decisions in state court before petitioning for federal habeas relief”);

Purcell v. Pa. Parole Bd., No. 23-cv-00311, 2024 WL 5340671, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 10, 2024)

(indicating that habeas petitions challenging denials of parole “are unexhausted and can be

dismissed on that ground alone [under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases]

because [DeFoy] is no longer good law”), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 240959

(W.D. Pa. Jan. 17, 2025). In doing so, those district courts essentially follow the same reasoning

as Respondents’ argument here, i.e., DeFoy no longer applies because the Pennsylvania caselaw

it relied upon in concluding that there was no mandamus remedy for constitutional challenges

has changed to the contrary over the almost twenty years since it was decided. See, e.g.,

Bowman v. Brittan, No. 23-cv-02092, 2024 WL 5050028, at *1 n.2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 21, 2024)

(“Based upon Toland, which DeFoy could not consider since it had yet been decided, it is clear

that Petitioner had an available state court remedy; hence, he was required to comply with the

exhaustion requirement.”).

Nevertheless, even if these other district court decisions choosing not to follow DeFoy

are correct concerning the change in Pennsylvania law recognizing that Pennsylvania inmates

now have a state-court remedy they can exhaust concerning their parole-denial claims because

the Commonwealth Court has recognized that constitutional claims, including due process

challenges, can be raised through a petition for a writ of mandamus, the fact remains that DeFoy

is a precedential Third Circuit decision that remains binding on this Court under principles of

vertical stare decisis. See Pease v. Lycoming Engines, No. 10-cv-00843, 2011 WL 6339833, at

*22 n.35 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 19, 2011) (“Stare decisis requires district courts to follow the binding

precedents of higher courts.”); Hernandez v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc., No. 19-cv-

15679, 2023 WL 2634496, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 24, 2023) (“As this is a federal district court in

New Jersey, it is duty-bound to follow precedent set forth by the Third Circuit, the federally

recognized circuit in which this Court sits.” (citations omitted)); UTI Corp. v. Fireman’s Fund

Ins. Co., 896 F. Supp. 362, 379 (D.N.J. 1995) (“[A]s a federal district court, we are bound by the

pronouncements of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.”); see also Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370,

375 (1982) (“[U]nless we wish anarchy to prevail within the federal judicial system, a precedent

of this Court must be followed by the lower federal courts . . . .”); cf. United States v. Higdon,

638 F.3d 233, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[N]either this court, nor any other court, can tolerate a

situation where a judge decides to follow his/her own custom and concepts of justice rather than

the precedent of the applicable appellate court or the United States Supreme Court. Ours is a

nation of laws, not judges.”), abrogated on other grounds by Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S.

225 (2019).

In addition, in 2012, the Third Circuit recognized that the Commonwealth Court had

“adjudicated mandamus actions involving parole denials by the Board and [had] considered

constitutional claims other than ex post facto claims,” and yet still decided that “to the extent

there has been any shift in Pennsylvania law, we cannot comfortably say that it is clear enough to

alter our decision in DeFoy.” See Roman v. DiGuglielmo, 675 F.3d 204, 209 (3d Cir. 2012). In

deciding not to disturb DeFoy, the Third Circuit in Roman explained that:

The availability of Pennsylvania mandamus review for inmates challenging the

denial of their parole on non-ex post facto grounds remains unsettled. Though

certain courts since DeFoy have demonstrated some willingness to consider

constitutional claims outside the ex post facto context, none have addressed or

acknowledged the language that drove our reading of Coady. See Nieves v. Pa. Bd.

of Prob. & Parole, 995 A.2d 412, 418 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010) (substantive due

process and ex post facto); Wilson v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 942 A.2d 270 (Pa.

[Commw.] Ct. 2008) (Fifth Amendment in context of sexual offender rehabilitation

program); Dodgson v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 922 A.2d 1023, 1026 (Pa.

Commw. Ct. 2007) (due process, equal protection, Fifth Amendment, court access

and ex post facto); Nickson v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 880 A.2d 21, 23 (Pa.

Commw. Ct. 2005) (Eighth Amendment). But see Nieves, 995 A.2d at 421–22

(Leavitt, J., concurring) (citing Coady for the proposition that “mandamus will not

lie” in challenges to the denial of parole and arguing that the court need not have

considered the claims before it at all).

See id. at 209 n.4.

The Court acknowledges that the Third Circuit in Roman did not have the benefit of

Toland and other Commonwealth Court decisions in deciding not to overrule DeFoy.

Nevertheless, a federal district court cannot decide not to follow appellate court precedent simply

because it may be wrong. To the contrary, “[r]especting stare decisis means sticking to some

wrong decisions. The doctrine rests on the idea . . . that it is usually ‘more important that the

applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.’” See Kimble v. Marvel Entmt.,

LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 455 (2015) (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406

(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).

In conclusion, if the Court were to adopt Respondents’ argument and no longer follow

DeFoy, Woodard’s habeas claims pertaining to his parole denial in March 2025 should be

dismissed for failure to exhaust because he did not file a petition for a writ of mandamus with the

Commonwealth Court in which he challenged the Parole Board’s denial of parole and, if the

Commonwealth Court denied the petition, filed a petition for allowance of appeal with the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See, e.g., Williams v. Wynder, 232 F. App’x 177, 181 (3d Cir.

2007) (unpublished) (concluding that, to fully exhaust a challenge to the Parole Board’s decision

to revoke parole, a habeas petitioner must seek allowance of appeal in the Pennsylvania Supreme

Court after an adverse decision by the Commonwealth Court).8 Nonetheless, as the Court must

continue to follow DeFoy, Woodard did not need to fully exhaust his challenges to his parole

denials through the state courts, and the Court will consider the merits of his challenge to his

June 20, 2024 parole denial here.9

8 This reasoning would be equally applicable to any prior parole denials, to the extent they are

not moot, as it does not appear that Woodard filed any petitions for mandamus with the

Commonwealth Court following those denials of parole.

9 Some district courts decline to address the exhaustion issue in Section 2254 habeas cases

involving challenges to parole denials if the petitioner’s habeas claims lack merit. See Strother v.

Pa. Bd. of Parole, No. 24-cv-00157, 2025 WL 2050200, at *1 (W.D. Pa. July 22, 2025) (“A court

. . . ‘may bypass the exhaustion issue altogether should [it] decide that the petitioner’s habeas

claim fails on the merits.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Roman, 675 F.3d at 209)); see also 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits,

C. The Merits

The Parole Board has vast discretion to refuse or deny parole. See 61 Pa. C.S. §

6137(a)(1) (stating that, inter alia, the Parole Board “may release on parole any offender to

whom the power to parole is granted to the board by this chapter, . . . whenever in its opinion: (i)

The best interests of the offender justify or require that the offender be paroled. (ii) It does not

appear that the interests of the Commonwealth will be injured by the offender’s parole”). The

record clearly reflects that the Parole Board based its parole determination here on factors that it

is statutorily required to consider in accordance with 61 Pa. C.S. § 6135. See McGinnis v.

Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 277 (1973) (holding that there is a “legitimate desire of the state

legislature to afford state prison officials an adequate opportunity to evaluate both an inmate’s

conduct and his rehabilitative progress before he is eligible for parole”). Under Section 6135,

the Parole Board must consider:

(1) The nature and circumstances of the offense committed.

(2) Any recommendations made by the trial judge and prosecuting attorney.

(3) The general character and background of the inmate.

(4) Participation by an inmate sentenced after February 19, 1999, and who is

serving a sentence for a crime of violence as defined in 42 Pa. C.S. § 9714(g)

(relating to sentences for second and subsequent offenses) in a victim impact

education program offered by the Department of Corrections.

(5) The written or personal statement of the testimony of the victim or the victim’s

family submitted under section 6140 (relating to victim statements, testimony and

participation in hearing).

(6) The notes of testimony of the sentencing hearing, if any, together with such

additional information regarding the nature and circumstances of the offense

committed for which sentence was imposed as may be available.

notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the

State.”); Taylor v. Horn, 504 F.3d 416, 427 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[B]ecause we will deny all of

[petitioner’s] claims on the merits, we need not address exhaustion.”).

(7) The conduct of the person while in prison and his physical, mental and

behavioral condition and history, his history of family violence and his complete

criminal record.

See 61 Pa. C.S. § 6135(a)(1)–(7).

In this case, Woodard has not pointed to any impermissible factor the Parole Board relied

on, or any factor that could be described as conscience shocking or deliberatively indifferent. In

fact, he does not address any of the Parole Board’s reasons for denying him parole in June 2024,

such as his (1) “risk and needs assessment indicating his level of risk to the community,” (2)

“prior unsatisfactory supervision history,” (3) “failure to demonstrate motivation for success,”

(4) “minimization/denial of the nature and circumstances of the offense(s) committed,” (5)

“refusal to accept responsibility for the offense(s) committed,” (6) “lack of remorse for the

offense(s) committed,” and (7) reports, evaluations and assessments showing that he remained a

risk to the community. Instead, he focuses only on having completed all required programming

while incarcerated. See (Doc. No. 1 at 5). This disagreement does not entitle him to habeas

relief.

By merely disagreeing with the Parole Board’s analysis and asserting that it should have

done more when considering whether to grant him parole, Woodard is essentially requesting that

the Court second-guess the Parole Board, something that the Court cannot do. See Coady, 251

F.3d at 487. The Parole Board explained to Woodard that it reached the decision to deny him

parole after interviewing him, reviewing his file, and considering “all matters” in the Code.

(Doc. No. 8-1 at 53.) It also provided “some basis” for its decision insofar as it provided seven

minimally detailed reasons for denying parole, see (id.), none of which were based on

impermissible factors. Overall, Woodard has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that the

Parole Board violated his constitutional rights in denying parole in June 2024. Accordingly, the

Court will deny his Section 2254 petition.

D. Certificate of Appealability

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A), unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate

of appealability (“COA”), an appeal may not be taken from a final order in a proceeding under

28 U.S.C. § 2254. A COA may issue only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the

denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. §2253(c)(2). “A petitioner satisfies this standard by

demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of [their]

constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve

encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003). Because

reasonable jurists could not disagree with the resolution of this petition, there is no basis for the

issuance of a COA. Thus, the Court will decline to issue a certificate of appealability, as

Woodard has failed to demonstrate “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”

See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); see also Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court will deny Woodard’s Section 2254 habeas

petition, decline to issue a certificate of appealability, and direct the Clerk of Court to close this

case. An appropriate Order follows.

s/ Yvette Kane

Yvette Kane, District Judge

United States District Court

Middle District of Pennsylvania