Brown

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

CHRISTIAN BROWN,

Plaintiff,

No. 24 CV 2170

v.

Judge Manish S. Shah

THOMAS MOCKLER and JOSE NEVAREZ,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Defendants Thomas Mockler and Jose Nevarez investigated a homicide as

members of the South Suburban Major Crimes Task Force. The investigation

obtained video footage of plaintiff Christian Brown and his uncle (the victim’s

husband) entering the victim’s home the morning after her murder. A few days after

the murder and after one task force member revealed his and other members’

presence in front of Brown’s home, members of the task force arrested plaintiff

without a warrant while he stood inside his residence. They then transported him to

the police department, where he was detained for over 36 hours before being released

without charges. Brown brought Fourth Amendment claims against several officers

and the Village of South Holland. The only claims remaining in the case are for

unconstitutional entry and unlawful seizure against defendant Mockler and unlawful

seizure and unlawful detention against defendant Nevarez. Defendants move for

summary judgment. For the reasons discussed below, the motion is granted in part,

denied in part.

I. Legal Standards

Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact exists if the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the non-

moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). To determine

whether summary judgment should be granted, I view all the facts and draw

reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See Sullivan v. Flora, Inc., 63

F.4th 1130, 1141 (7th Cir. 2023). The party seeking summary judgment has the

burden of establishing that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). I may consider materials that are in the

record even if not cited by the parties. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).

II. Local Rule 56.1 and Evidentiary Issues

Local Rule 56.1 “aims to make summary-judgment decisionmaking

manageable for courts.” Kreg Therapeutics, Inc. v. VitalGlo, Inc.. 919 F.3d 405, 415

(7th Cir. 2019). The moving party must file a supporting memorandum of law and

statement of facts demonstrating that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

See Petty v. City of Chicago, 754 F.3d 416, 420 (7th Cir. 2014); N.D. Ill. Local R.

56.1(a). The non-moving party must file a response to that statement and may provide

a separate statement of additional facts. N.D. Ill. Local R. 56.1(b)(2)–(3).

Both the initial statements of facts and statements of additional facts must

consist of concise numbered paragraphs, supported by citations to specific pages in

the evidentiary record. See N.D. Ill. Local R. 56.1(a), (b)(3). The non-moving party

must cite specific, admissible evidence to dispute an asserted fact and concisely

explain how the cited material controverts the asserted fact. N.D. Ill. Local R.

56.1(b)(3).

Defendants argue that certain of Brown’s responses to their statement of facts

and certain of Brown’s additional statements of facts failed to comply with Rule 56.

[145] at 6–10.1 True, certain of plaintiff’s responses do not respond directly to the

statements they seek to controvert. See, e.g., [131] ¶¶ 25, 45, 47, 55, 77. Further, I

agree that certain of plaintiff’s additional statements of facts are not supported by

the cited evidence (or, at the very least, are not as definitive as the statements seem

to suggest). See, e.g., [141] ¶¶ 1, 3, 17. Although I would be within my discretion to

strike plaintiff’s assertions, I consider those facts to the extent that they are properly

supported by the record.

III. Facts

A. The Homicide

On June 22, 2023, Lone Williams did not show up for work. [131] ¶ 15. That

same morning, her husband, Joseph Wingard, left their residence (called the

1 Bracketed numbers refer to entries on the district court docket. Referenced page numbers

are taken from the CM/ECF header placed at the top of filings, except in the case of citations

to depositions, which use the deposition transcript’s original page and line numbers.

Citations to video recordings use the minutes and seconds according to the digital file

uploaded to the docket. The facts are largely taken from the parties’ responses to their

adversary’s Local Rule 56.1 statement of facts, [131] and [141], where both the asserted fact

and the opposing party’s response are set forth in one document. Any asserted fact that is not

controverted by reference to specific, admissible evidence is deemed admitted. N.D. Ill. Local

R. 56.1(e)(3); see Cracco v. Vitran Exp., Inc., 559 F.3d 625, 632 (7th Cir. 2009).

“Woodlawn Residence” by the parties) at 8:00 a.m. in Lone’s Kia Sorrento. [131] ¶ 17.

He picked up his nephew, plaintiff Christian Brown, from plaintiff’s home (the

“Throop Residence”), and the two returned to the Woodlawn Residence. [131] ¶ 18.

Just before Wingard and Brown arrived, Lone’s son left the Woodlawn

Residence. [131] ¶¶ 19–20. Wingard and Brown entered the house. [131] ¶ 21.

Wingard gifted plaintiff a Buick, which plaintiff used to depart from the Woodlawn

Residence at the same time that Wingard departed the residence in Lone’s Kia

Telluride. [131] ¶¶ 23–24. The two ultimately went their separate ways in the

afternoon. [131] ¶¶ 28–30.

At 10:11 p.m., Lone’s son returned to the Woodlawn Residence. [131] ¶ 34. He

left ten minutes later, before returning home with his girlfriend at 10:53 p.m. [131]

¶ 35. Soon after, he discovered a bullet hole in a portrait, prompting him to search

the house. [131] ¶ 36. Lone’s son forced open her locked bedroom, where he discovered

Lone on her bed, deceased. [131] ¶ 37. There was a noticeable smell in the bedroom,

the TV had been left on, a window was open, and a candle was burning. [131] ¶ 38.

Around 11:36 p.m., Lone’s son and his girlfriend called 911. [131] ¶ 39.

South Holland police officers arrived at the scene and requested assistance

from the South Suburban Major Crimes Task Force in investigating the apparent

homicide. [131] ¶ 40. Lone’s son identified plaintiff as one of Wingard’s closest

associates and disclosed that Wingard owned a handgun. [131] ¶¶ 41–42.

The following day, on June 23, officers obtained search warrants for Lone’s cars

and located two boxes of ammunition. [131] ¶ 43. They did not find a handgun. [131]

¶ 43. The medical examiner estimated that Lone was killed on June 21. [131] ¶ 44.

B. The Arrest

Defendant Jose Nevarez was the Assistant Commander of the Task Force and

the commander of the investigation. [131] ¶ 3. During the investigation, about 12 to

15 detectives, including defendant Thomas Mockler, reported to Nevarez about its

progress. [131] ¶ 8. On June 25, Nevarez (at least in part) led a briefing session for

the task force. [131] ¶ 48. The task force planned to conduct covert surveillance at the

Throop Residence, where plaintiff was suspected of being. [131] ¶ 48. The parties

dispute whether the task force planned to place plaintiff into custody or whether they

intended only to talk to Brown. [131] ¶ 49.

The following events were captured on body-worn cameras. While surveilling

the Throop Residence, one of the detectives seized a man he observed approaching

the home, mistakenly believing that he was plaintiff. [131] ¶ 52. Detectives then

learned that the man was the boyfriend of plaintiff’s sister. [131] ¶ 53. The arrest

revealed the task force’s presence, thereby ending the covert surveillance. [131] ¶ 54.

With their cover blown, a detective knocked on the front door of the Throop Residence.

[131] ¶ 56.

Plaintiff’s sister answered the door and gave detectives permission to enter

before her mother quickly revoked consent. [131] ¶ 57. Plaintiff’s mother agreed to

bring Brown to the front door, where he arrived shortly after. [131] ¶ 58. Plaintiff

declined to step outside to speak to the detectives, so detective Justin Bultema

stepped inside, seized plaintiff, and removed him from the residence. [131] ¶ 59.

Shortly before Bultema entered the residence, another officer can be heard directing

Bultema to grab Brown. [116-6] at 3:45–47; [116-5] at 10:20–23.

The parties agree that defendant Mockler assisted in the arrest and

handcuffed plaintiff outside the home but dispute whether Mockler ever entered the

residence. [131] ¶¶ 60–61. The body-cam footage depicts Mockler walking up the

steps to the front door and stepping onto the threshold. [116-5] at 10:23–26. Plaintiff

attaches screenshots from the footage depicting what he alleges to be Mockler

reaching into the residence and grabbing Brown’s forearm. [141] ¶ 10. Defendant

Nevarez was not present for the arrest and did not instruct anyone to enter the

residence. [131] ¶ 62.

About an hour after the arrest, at 10:48 a.m., two detectives conducted an

interview of plaintiff at the police station. [131] ¶ 64. He declined to consent to a

search of his phone. [116-7] at 120:15–17. At approximately 12:19 p.m., officers

obtained a search warrant for plaintiff’s phone. [131] ¶ 65. The search warrant was

based on the same information detailed above. See [116-16]. At approximately 7:14

p.m., detectives conducted a second interview of plaintiff. [131] ¶ 66.

The parties dispute at what point defendant Nevarez made the decision to

continue detaining plaintiff for further questioning. Nevarez testified that he decided

not to release Brown after the initial interview and that he could not remember

whether Brown said anything during the initial interview that implicated him in a

crime. [116-12] at 30:12–31:12. Video footage depicting Brown’s first interview

confirms that Brown told the detectives that he did not enter the Woodlawn

Residence and only went into the garage to get the Buick. [111-12] at 47:28–49:03.

Ultimately, Brown was not released on June 25.

The next day, the extraction and examination from plaintiff’s cell phone was

completed. [131] ¶ 68.2 Plaintiff’s “Notes” app contained an entry saying, “Heard my

uncle say his last goodbyes” and “Sitting in the house with dead bodies.” [131] ¶ 69.

The phone also contained web searches related to murders in South Holland around

the relevant time. [131] ¶ 70. After the extraction was complete, detectives

interviewed plaintiff for the third time. [131] ¶ 71. Nevarez decided that Brown would

not be released at 11:56 a.m., after this third interview. [131] ¶ 74. Plaintiff was

instead released that evening without charges at approximately 10:16 p.m., after over

36 hours in custody. [131] ¶¶ 75–76. In December 2023, the grand jury returned an

indictment against Wingard for the first-degree murder of Lone. [131] ¶ 78.

Plaintiff filed his initial complaint against the Village of South Holland and

one detective in March 2024. His second amended complaint (filed in April 2025)

brought claims against the Village and several law enforcement officers for

2 Plaintiff objects to defendants’ facts related to the cell phone extraction on the grounds that

they are based on expert testimony that was not properly disclosed. [133] at 3–4. But the

Seventh Circuit has never held that testimony about extracting data from a cell phone is

expert testimony. See United States v. Julius, 14 F.4th 752, 755 (7th Cir. 2021). Rule 701

allows testimony based on the expertise a lay witness acquires on the job. United States v.

Montijo-Maysonet, 974 F.3d 34, 48 (1st Cir. 2020). Here, the witness has acquired significant

experience in extracting data from cell phones. [116-3]. Ultimately, I need not resolve this

issue. The evidence extracted from plaintiff’s cell phone only matters if Nevarez lacked

probable cause after Brown’s first interview, and as discussed below, I conclude that Nevarez

had probable cause to detain Brown.

unconstitutional entry, unlawful seizure, and unlawful detention. [60]. Defendants

Mockler and Nevarez are the only remaining defendants. Count II is a Fourth

Amendment claim against Mockler and Nevarez for the warrantless entry into

Brown’s home. [60] at 7; [133] at 4. Counts III and IV are overlapping Fourth

Amendment claims against Mockler and Nevarez for the initial seizure of Brown. [60]

at 8–9; [133] at 6. Count VI is a Fourth Amendment claim against Mockler and

Nevarez for Brown’s continued detention at the police station. [60] at 10; [133] at 10.

IV. Analysis

A. Unconstitutional Entry (Mockler)

Plaintiff acknowledges that defendant Nevarez was not present for his arrest

nor ordered anyone to conduct a warrantless entry. [133] at 5 n.3. Thus, Nevarez is

entitled to summary judgment with respect to Count II because he was not personally

involved in the alleged constitutional violation.

1. Supervisory Liability

In addition to liability based on defendant Mockler’s warrantless entry into the

Throop Residence (discussed below), plaintiff also maintains that Mockler can be

liable for Detective Bultema’s undisputed warrantless entry into plaintiff’s residence.

[133] at 5–7. Claims under § 1983 are predicated on individual liability so respondeat

superior does not apply. See Ollison v. Gossett, 136 F.4th 729, 735 (7th Cir. 2025). To

prevail on a theory of supervisory liability, plaintiff must show that a supervisor,

through his own conduct, violated his rights. Stockton v. Milwaukee Cnty., 44 F.4th

605, 619 (7th Cir. 2022).

Here, the parties dispute whether Mockler was a supervisor at the time of the

arrest. According to defendants, Mockler was a detective with the Task Force in June

2023 and was not responsible for giving other task force members orders during

investigations. [131] ¶ 4. However, as noted by plaintiff, several of the other

detectives present at the arrest testified that Mockler was a supervisor at the scene.

[131] ¶ 4. Defendants respond by noting that Mockler ultimately became the

Assistant Commander of the Task Force in September 2024 (months before the

depositions in the instant case occurred) which may have led to the deponents’

confusion. [145] at 18. But for summary judgment purposes, there is a genuine

dispute of material fact surrounding whether Mockler was Detective Bultema’s

supervisor when the latter’s warrantless entry occurred.

That said, Mockler must be personally liable for Bultema’s unlawful action. See

Ollison, 139 F.4th at 735–36 (explaining that “the supervisory official must have

known of, facilitated, approved, condoned, or turned a blind eye to his subordinates’

activity”). Plaintiff has not pointed to any evidence suggesting that Mockler

instructed Bultema to enter Brown’s house, grab him, and effectuate the arrest.

Mockler is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s supervisory liability theory.3

3 I note, however, that there are audible statements in the body-cam footage in which

someone is directing Bultema to grab Brown and thus seemingly approving and condoning

his decision to effectuate a warrantless arrest inside of plaintiff’s residence. [116-5] at 10:20–

23. If defendant Mockler is the individual instructing the other officers to grab Brown, then

there would be sufficient evidence to find that he was personally involved in Bultema’s

unlawful entry and seizure of plaintiff.

2. Mockler’s Unlawful Entry

With respect to his own personal liability, defendant Mockler moves for

summary judgment on the unconstitutional entry claim on the grounds that he never

entered the Throop Residence. [117] at 13–14.

When video footage “firmly settles a factual issue,” a court “will not indulge

stories clearly contradicted by the footage.” Horton v. Pobjecky, 883 F.3d 941, 944 (7th

Cir. 2018); see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). But video footage can

resolve a factual dispute only when the footage “is so definitive that there could be no

reasonable disagreement about what the video depicts.” Kailin v. Vill. of Gurnee, 77

F.4th 476, 481 (7th Cir. 2023). Video footage that is incomplete or open to different

interpretations creates triable issues of fact. See Horton, 883 F.3d at 944.

Here, the body-cam footage does not clearly contradict Brown’s narrative of the

arrest. Though the video evidence of Mockler’s entry is less clear than that of

Detective Bultema, it nonetheless supports a reasonable inference that Mockler

entered plaintiff’s residence without a warrant. [116-5] at 10:20–26 (showing Mockler

climbing the stairs and stepping on the door sill as Bultema removes plaintiff from

the residence). Although defendants argue that the screenshots attached by plaintiff

are susceptible to distortion, viewing the images with inferences in favor of Brown,

Mockler appears to be across the threshold. Coupled with the body-cam footage that

shows Mockler plant his feet on the threshold of the Throop Residence, a jury could

find that Mockler crossed into the home.

3. Exigent Circumstances

Defendants argue that even if Mockler entered the Throop Residence, both his

and Bultema’s warrantless entries were justified by exigent circumstances. [117] at

15–19; [145] at 14–17.4

Defendants cite Illinois state law in support of their exigent-circumstances

argument. [117] at 16–17. But the present case is in federal court, under federal-

question jurisdiction, on issues of federal constitutional law. Illinois appellate

interpretations of federal law are not controlling. In support of their position on

applicable law, defendants quote Sutterfield v. City of Milwaukee, 751 F.3d 542 (7th

Cir. 2014), which states that “[f]ederal courts do not possess exclusive authority to

decide Fourth Amendment issues.” [145] at 17. This quote is taken out of context; the

court in Sutterfield was explaining why state cases are relevant to the issue of

qualified immunity, where state precedent may assist in evaluating the

reasonableness of an officer’s actions. 751 F.3d at 573. Indeed, in its analysis of the

exigent-circumstances defense, the Sutterfield court cited exclusively to federal case

law. Id. at 553–66.

4 Plaintiff asserts that Mockler’s opening brief focused exclusively on the exigent

circumstances justifying Bultema’s warrantless entry and that he has therefore waived the

argument that exigent circumstances justified his own warrantless entry. [133] at 5 n.4.

True, the section header in defendants’ opening brief referred only to Bultema. [117] at 15.

But I am satisfied that the argument applied to officers more broadly. For one, defendants

concluded the argument by saying that exigent circumstances required “officers, including

Bultema, to make quick decisions.” [117] at 19. Further, defendants do not argue that

Bultema’s entry contributed to the exigency of Mockler’s entry. The same arguments that

apply to Bultema also apply to Mockler.

Warrantless searches and seizures within a home are presumptively

unreasonable. Russell v. Comstock, 167 F.4th 984, 987 (7th Cir. 2026). This

presumption may be overcome “where the exigencies create a compelling need to act

and no time to secure a warrant, such as situations involving hot pursuit of a fleeing

subject, the need to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence, or the need to

protect an occupant from imminent injury or to render emergency aid.” Id.; see also

Jackson v. City of Madison, 176 F.4th 1005, 1019 (7th Cir. 2026) (“We ask ‘whether

the exceedingly strong privacy interest in one’s residence is outweighed by the risk

that delay will engender injury, destruction of evidence, or escape.’” (citation

omitted)).

Defendants argue that the destruction-of-evidence theory applies to the

present case. [117] at 16–17. Though the task force initially planned to conduct covert

surveillance at the Throop Residence and arrest plaintiff only if it was possible to do

so in a public space, the plan changed after the officers mistakenly arrested the wrong

man. [131] ¶¶ 52–54. Combined with the fact that Wingard’s handgun was still at

large, defendants argue that the officers had an objectively reasonable belief that

there was a compelling need to act and no time to obtain a warrant. [117] at 15–16

(citing United States v. Andrews, 442 F.3d 996, 1000 (7th Cir. 2006)).

But a mere possibility that evidence would be destroyed is not enough to create

exigent circumstances. United States v. Etchin, 614 F.3d 726, 733 (7th Cir. 2010). The

officer knocking at the door must also “observe[] objective evidence that there is an

ongoing crime within that must be stopped before it is completed.” Id. at 733–34.

Doors slamming or people running, for example, “may be evidence that there is an

emergency that calls for an immediate, warrantless intrusion.” Id. at 734. Here, by

contrast, Brown was merely backing away from the door with his hands raised when

Bultema proceeded to cross the threshold. [116-6] at 3:46–49. There was no objective

evidence that Brown possessed evidence related to the homicide nor that he would

have destroyed it but for the warrantless arrest.

This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the officers left the Throop

Residence following the arrest and did not seek permission to search the home for

evidence that Brown may have sought to destroy. And the covert nature of the initial

surveillance further suggests the lack of any emergency before officers knocked on

the door. Nothing objectively alerted the officers to any imminent risks when Brown’s

family answered the door and declined to allow the entry, but otherwise complied

with lawful instructions.

4. Qualified Immunity

“Qualified immunity shields police officers from liability for constitutional

violations unless a plaintiff shows that (1) the official violated a constitutional right,

and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.”

Jackson, 176 F.4th at 1021 (internal quotation marks omitted). With respect to the

second prong, the right “must be so well defined that it is clear to a reasonable officer

that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id. (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted).

It is undisputed that Bultema and Mockler (to the extent that he crossed the

threshold into the Throop Residence) violated Brown’s constitutional right to be free

from a warrantless arrest inside the home. Instead, the parties disagree over whether

it was clearly established that the officers’ warrantless entry into the Throop

Residence violated Brown’s Fourth Amendment rights based on the information the

officers possessed.

The burden is on plaintiff to prove that the law is clearly established. Villalobos

v. Picicco, 168 F.4th 1057, 1062–63 (7th Cir. 2026). “A plaintiff carries this burden by

pointing to specific cases, not general legal principles.” Id. at 1063. Here, plaintiff

cites several cases for the proposition that “the law is clearly established that non-

exigent warrantless arrests inside the home violate the Fourth Amendment.” [133]

at 13 (citing Gaddis v. DeMattei, 30 F.4th 625, 633 (7th Cir. 2022)). But none of these

cases “both articulate[] the right at issue and appl[y] it to a factual circumstance

similar to the one at hand” where defendants have argued that exigent circumstances

justified their arrest. Villalobos, 168 F.4th at 1063 (citation omitted); see also District

of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018) (noting that the second prong of the

qualified immunity analysis requires a high degree of specificity).

Plaintiff further cites cases for the proposition that “it was clearly established

that police cannot claim a warrantless entry is justified to prevent the destruction of

evidence unless they actually observed objective evidence that there is an ongoing

crime that must be stopped.” [133] at 13. This contention more closely fits this case.

Though neither case cited by plaintiff addresses the viability of a qualified immunity

defense, the court in Etchin found that a warrantless entry violated the Fourth

Amendment where the detective “did not see or hear anything to suggest that an

emergency was taking place inside of [the arrestee’s] apartment.” 614 F.3d at 734.

The court in United States v. Collins, 510 F.3d 697 (7th Cir. 2007), similarly found

that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred when the police conducted a

warrantless arrested within an individual’s residence where they had not heard a

crime.

Because defendants have not established that there was objective evidence of

an ongoing crime occurring within Brown’s residence, I find that Mockler is not

entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law with respect to Count II. Summary

judgment on Count II, warrantless entry, is denied.

B. Unlawful Seizure (Mockler)

1. Probable Cause

Defendant Mockler next moves for summary judgment on Count III—the

unlawful seizure claim against him—on the grounds that probable cause existed at

the time of arrest. An officer has probable cause to arrest an individual when “the

totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of the arrest would

warrant a reasonable person in believing that the arrestee had committed … a crime.”

Gutierrez v. Kermon, 722 F.3d 1003, 1008 (7th Cir. 2013). The probable-cause

standard is not a high bar and “inherently allows room for reasonable mistakes.” Id.;

see also Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 338 (2014).

Probable cause is not offense-specific; probable cause to arrest for any offense

is sufficient to overcome a wrongful arrest claim. Thomas v. McAuliffe, 170 F.4th

1057, 1063 (7th Cir. 2026); see also Burritt v. Ditlefsen, 807 F.3d 239, 249 (7th Cir.

2015) (explaining that probable cause to arrest “is an absolute defense to any claim

under Section 1983 against police officers for wrongful arrest, false imprisonment, or

malicious prosecution”).

Defendants argue that Mockler had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for

concealment of a homicide, concealing or aiding a fugitive, or obstruction of justice.

[117] at 20–21; [110] at 6–8.5 An individual is guilty of concealing a homicidal death

when he “knowingly conceals the death of any other person with knowledge that such

other person has died by homicidal means.” 720 ILCS 5/9-3.4(a). In other words, the

offense requires an individual to (1) know that a homicide has occurred and (2) have

taken some affirmative act to conceal the homicide. People v. Dibbern, 2019 WL

4390641, at *3 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019).

Defendants argue that officers had probable cause to suspect Brown of

concealing a homicide as a result of the circumstances surrounding the discovery of

Lone’s body (e.g., the body was behind a locked door, the television was on, a candle

was lit, and a window was open). [110] at 7. Defendants argue—and I agree—that

this is all evidence that a homicide was concealed.

5 Defendants have incorporated by reference the probable cause arguments made in former-

defendant Coleman’s motion for summary judgment. [117] at 19–20.

But defendants have not established that Brown himself took any affirmative

acts to conceal the homicide. Brown’s presence inside the Woodlawn Residence and

close association with Wingard the day following the homicide are not sufficient to

demonstrate, as a matter of law, Brown’s probable and knowing concealment of

Lone’s murder.

For one, a “person’s mere propinquity to others independently suspected of

criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause.” United States

v. Carpenter, 342 F.3d 812, 815 (7th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). While propinquity

is not irrelevant, there must be something more to connect Brown to an actual crime.

Defendants’ “something more”—that Brown entered and exited the residence

where Lone’s body was decomposing and therefore knowingly participated in the

concealment—is weakened by the same evidence that defendants use to show

concealment in the first instance: a burning candle and open window lessened the

likelihood that someone would be capable of smelling the dead body. [110] at 7. Lone’s

son apparently slept in the house the night of the homicide (given that he left the

residence in his car the morning after she died) and was home for at least ten minutes

the evening after she died without noticing anything was wrong. [131] ¶¶ 19, 34. It

was ultimately a bullet hole, not the smell, that prompted Lone’s son to search the

house. [131] ¶ 36.

There is a dispute of material fact surrounding whether Brown would have

known about a dead body inside the house as a result of spending time there the day

after Lone’s homicide. The facts known to officers at the time of Brown’s arrest did

not support probable cause to arrest for concealment of a homicide.

Nor do the facts support probable cause for concealing or aiding a fugitive—an

offense that required Brown to conceal his knowledge that an offense had been

committed or have the specific intent to prevent the apprehension of an offender. 720

ILCS 5/31-5(a), (b). Defendants have not established that (at the time of arrest)

Mockler reasonably believed Brown knew that Wingard had committed a crime and

was trying to conceal his whereabouts.

Finally, an individual “obstructs justice when, with intent to prevent the

apprehension or obstruct the prosecution or defense of any person,” he knowingly

“[d]estroys, alters, conceals or disguises physical evidence, plants false evidence, [or]

furnishes false information.” 720 ILCS 5/31-4 (a)(1). Defendants’ probable-cause

argument for obstruction of justice is similarly grounded in their assertion that the

evidence shows Brown knowingly participated in the concealment of the discovery of

Lone’s death. [117] at 21. For the same reasons discussed above, the officers did not

have probable cause to arrest plaintiff for obstructing justice.

At the time of plaintiff’s arrest, the task force did not possess facts suggesting

that Brown knew there had been a homicide or knew that Wingard had committed a

crime. Probable cause to arrest was lacking.

2. Qualified Immunity

Defendant Mockler argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity on the

unlawful seizure claim because, even if probable cause was lacking, a reasonable

officer could have believed there was probable cause to arrest Brown. [117] at 20.

Brown has shown a violation of his constitutional right to be free from arrest without

probable cause. In the unlawful seizure context, the second prong of the qualified

immunity test can be framed as “whether a reasonable officer could have mistakenly

believed that probable cause existed.” Williams v. City of Chicago, 733 F.3d 749, 758

(7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). This concept is often called “arguable probable

cause;” officers “who reasonably but mistakenly believed they had probable cause to

arrest” are entitled to qualified immunity. Id.

Plaintiff asserts that no reasonable police officer could have understood that

there was probable cause to arrest Brown and detain him for questioning. [133] at

14–15. Specifically, plaintiff cites Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626 (2003), for the

proposition that it was a Fourth Amendment violation for officers to handcuff and

interrogate an individual, “even when there was no doubt a murder had occurred, one

person confessed, and they purportedly implicated the defendant.” [133] at 14.6 While

plaintiff’s cited case need not be perfectly analogous to the case at hand, “the bar is

still high: plaintiff[] must point to precedent placing the statutory or constitutional

question beyond debate.” Villalobos, 168 F.4th at 1063 (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted).

6 Plaintiff also cites a line of cases holding that there is no probable cause to arrest when it

is unclear whether a crime has occurred. [133] at 14. But the circumstances in the cited cases

are not sufficiently analogous to those in the present to establish that the officers were

unreasonable in their belief that they had probable cause to arrest Brown in connection with

the homicide.

This case is not sufficiently analogous to Kaupp. In Kaupp, the defendant had

voluntarily taken and passed a polygraph test denying his involvement in the

murder. 538 U.S. at 628. More importantly, the detective had “tried but failed to

obtain a warrant to question [the defendant].” Id. In other words, the detectives had

an unmistakable reason to believe that they lacked probable cause to arrest. Any

mistaken belief the detectives in Kaupp had regarding probable cause to arrest was

not reasonable.

Here, by contrast, the task force had not previously attempted to obtain an

arrest warrant. While the parties dispute whether the task force should have first

sought an arrest warrant, see [131] ¶ 47, the dispute does not detract from the fact

that the officers had not been informed that they lacked probable cause. To the

contrary, when waiting to speak with Brown outside of the Throop Residence, the

task force can be heard articulating their understanding that they had probable cause

for plaintiff’s arrest. [116-4] at 1:00–07. Regardless of whether they were mistaken,

the audio belies the possibility that the officers knew that they did not have probable

cause to arrest. Further, when the officers sought a search warrant for Brown’s

phone, they relied upon the same evidence detailed above and a judge determined

that there was probable cause to believe the device possessed evidence of murder. See

[116-16].

The facts in the three district court cases cited by plaintiff are more dissimilar

to the case at bar than those in Kaupp. These cases do not establish that a reasonable

officer could not have mistakenly believed that there was probable cause to arrest

Brown for knowingly concealing a homicide, aiding a fugitive, or obstructing justice.

At the time of plaintiff’s arrest, the task force knew there was a dead body,

plaintiff had been inside the residence where the body was being concealed, plaintiff

was a close associate of the primary suspect, and plaintiff had been in at least one of

the victim’s vehicles after her death. Because plaintiff has not directed me to clear

precedent to the contrary, I find that this is sufficient to establish arguable probable

cause of all three of the proposed offenses. Defendant Mockler is entitled to qualified

immunity on the unlawful seizure claim and summary judgment is granted on

Count III. The rush to grab plaintiff was a mistake, but not one by a plainly

incompetent officer. See City of Tahlequah, Oklahoma v. Bond, 595 U.S. 9, 12 (2021)

(qualified immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly

violate the law).

C. Unlawful Seizure and Detention (Nevarez)

Plaintiff concedes that defendant Mockler did not order plaintiff’s transport to

a police station and that Mockler was not responsible for the subsequent detention.

Therefore, Counts IV and VI pertain only to defendant Nevarez. [133] at 10 n.6.

Nevarez moves for summary judgment on these remaining counts on the grounds

that probable cause defeats the unlawful seizure claim (Count IV) and the

reasonableness of Brown’s detention defeats the unlawful detention claim (Count VI).

The decision to transport an individual to be questioned must be supported by

probable cause. See Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 815–16 (1985). With the

knowledge of the task force members imputed to Nevarez, see United States v.

Williams, 627 F.3d 247, 252 (7th Cir. 2010) (describing collective knowledge doctrine),

Nevarez, like Mockler, had arguable probable cause to seize plaintiff.

Summary judgment is granted on Count IV.

Finally, even if the officers had only arguable probable cause at the time of

Brown’s arrest, defendant Nevarez had probable cause to continue detaining Brown

following his first interview.7 Before the arrest, the task force had seen video footage

confirming that plaintiff had entered the Woodlawn Residence the day after Lone was

killed (while her body was still inside). [131] ¶ 21. Yet during his first interview,

Brown told the detectives that he did not enter the Woodlawn Residence that day and

only went into the garage to get the Buick. [111-12] at 47:28–49:03.

Knowingly furnishing false information constitutes obstruction of justice. 720

ILCS 5/31-4 (a)(1). It was reasonable for Nevarez to deduce from Brown’s lie that

Brown was involved in (or at least had knowledge pertaining to) Lone’s murder.8

Plaintiff’s unlawful detention argument focuses exclusively on the issue of

probable cause; he does not argue that the ultimate length of his detention was

7 The parties dispute whether Nevarez decided that plaintiff would not be immediately

released after his first interview or his second interview. [131] ¶ 74; [141] ¶ 13. But since

sufficient probable cause existed after the first interview, any additional probable cause

obtained after the second interview is immaterial.

8 Plaintiff faults Nevarez for being unable to articulate his basis for continuing to detain

plaintiff during his deposition. [133] at 10–11. “A party cannot claim a lack of general

knowledge about a subject and later make a statement which requires detailed knowledge

about the same subject.” Unterreiner v. Volkswagen of Am., 8 F.3d 1206, 1210 (7th Cir. 1993).

But the order of operations here is reversed. Nevarez’s deposition was taken over two years

after Brown’s arrest in this case. The fact that he could not remember whether plaintiff

implicated himself in a crime during the first interview does not mean Nevarez lacked

probable cause to continue detaining Brown in June 2023.

unreasonable. And nor could he. Where probable cause exists within 48 hours of

arrest, the burden is on the arrested individual to prove unreasonable delay.

Riverside Cnty. v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56-57 (1991). Arguable probable cause

existed at the time of plaintiff's arrest, developed into probable cause as a matter of

law after he was detained and made a materially false statement to the police, and

he was released within 48 hours. Summary judgment is granted on Count VI.

V. Conclusion

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, [115], is granted in part, denied in

part. Summary judgment is granted to defendants on all claims except for the

unconstitutional-entry claim against defendant Mockler.

ENTER:

hud SAA

Manish 8. Shah

United States District Judge

Date: August 11, 2026

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