SHORT

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

LENNY RAMON SHORT,

2:25-CV-01315-CCW

Plaintiff,

v.

CHELSEA HOFFMAN, PETER PHILLIPS,

PENNSYLVANIA PAROLE BOARD,

Defendants.

OPINION

Before the Court are Motions to Dismiss the Amended Complaint by Defendant

Pennsylvania Parole Board, ECF No. 18, and by Defendants State Parole Agent Chelsea Hoffman

and State Parole Supervisor Peter Phillips (collectively, “Corrections Defendants”), ECF No. 21.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant the Motions.

I. Background

This case stems from pro se Plaintiff Lenny Ramon Short’s alleged unlawful detention

following his March 26, 2024 arrest for an alleged parole violation. See ECF No. 8. Defendant

Agent Hoffman1 is a Pennsylvania State Parole Agent. Id. ¶ 4. Defendant Supervisor Phillips is

a Pennsylvania State Parole Supervisor. Id. ¶ 5.

In the operative Amended Complaint, Mr. Short makes the following claims: § 1983 Due

Process violation under the Fourteenth Amendment against the Corrections Defendants (Count I);

§ 1983 unlawful seizure and detention under the Fourth Amendment against the Corrections

1 The Corrections Defendants’ briefing states that Ms. Hoffman’s and Mr. Phillips’ last names are actually “Huffman”

and “Peters,” respectively. See ECF No. 22 at 2 n.2. However, the Corrections Defendants failed to move or otherwise

stipulate to correct the docket. Accordingly, the Court will refer to these Defendants as they are identified on the

docket.

Defendants (Count II); Supervisory Liability against Supervisor Peters (Count III); and Failure

to Train or Implement Constitutional Policy against the Pennsylvania Parole Board (Count IV).2

Id. at 1–2.

The following factual allegations are accepted as true. On March 26, 2024, Mr. Short was

“detained based on an alleged parole violation stemming from a summary charge (Disorderly

Conduct).” Id. ¶ 8. Mr. Short had previously been convicted of “a parole-eligible offense” and

released under supervision.3 Id. ¶ 7. The subsequent disorderly conduct charge was “resolved at

a Magisterial District Court.”4 Mr. Short alleges that “[d]espite resolution of the charge,” he was

detained until August 8, 2024, “without a valid commitment order or Gagnon hearing.” Id. ¶ 10.

As relief, he seeks money damages and declaratory judgment that his rights were violated.

In separate Motions to Dismiss, the Pennsylvania Parole Board and the Corrections

Defendants now seek to dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) on the basis that Mr. Short failed to state a claim. ECF Nos. 18, 21.

II. Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal

sufficiency of a claim. In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court accepts as true a complaint’s

factual allegations and views them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Phillips v. Cnty.

of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008). Although a complaint need not contain detailed

factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, it cannot rest on mere labels and conclusions.

2 The Court has jurisdiction over Mr. Short’s claims, which raise federal questions, under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

3 Mr. Short attaches a Pennsylvania Magisterial District Court docket sheet to the Amended Complaint indicating that

he was convicted of Public Drunkenness and Similar Misconduct on February 12, 2024. ECF No. 8-1. He makes no

reference to this attachment in the Amended Complaint.

4 Mr. Short does not specify the date on which the charge was resolved or how the charge was resolved. See ECF No.

8.

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). That is, “a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Id. Accordingly, “[f]actual allegations must be

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” id., and be “sufficient . . . to ‘state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’

but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has established a three-step

process for district courts to follow in analyzing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion: First, the court must

“tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Second, the court should

identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the

assumption of truth.” Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should

assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for

relief.” Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Santiago v.

Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)). That said, under Rule 8’s notice pleading

standard, even after the Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal, a plaintiff need only

“allege sufficient facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will uncover proof of her

claims.” Connolly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 788–89 (3d Cir. 2016) (finding that “at

least for purposes of pleading sufficiency, a complaint need not establish a prima facie case in

order to survive a motion to dismiss.”). In addition, the pleadings of pro se litigants must be

liberally construed. Alexander v. Gennarini, 144 F. App’x 924, 926 (3d Cir. 2005).

III. Analysis

A. The Claim Against the Pennsylvania Parole Board (Count IV) Will Be

Dismissed Because it is Not a Person Subject to Suit Under § 1983

The Pennsylvania Parole Board argues that it should be dismissed as a defendant because

it is not a “person” and therefore cannot be the subject of a § 1983 claim. ECF No. 19 at 3. In his

brief in opposition, Mr. Short fails to respond to the Parole Board’s argument that it should be

dismissed as a defendant. See ECF No. 26. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant

the Parole Board’s Motion and dismiss the claim against it (Count IV) with prejudice.

In the Amended Complaint, Mr. Short alleges that the Parole Board “by and through its

policies, failed to properly train or oversee agents to ensure parolees were not unlawfully

recommitted without valid cause.” ECF No. 8 ¶ 22. Although Mr. Short does not identify a

statutory basis for this claim, he alleges that the Board violated his constitutional rights and seeks

damages for those alleged violations. Id. at 2. Therefore, construing Mr. Short’s Amended

Complaint liberally, the Court construes this claim as arising under § 1983. See, e.g., Mansaray

v. Wenner, No. 1:21-CV-351, 2022 WL 463302, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 15, 2022) (Baxter, J.)

(construing a claim seeking monetary damages for an alleged violation of plaintiff’s constitutional

rights as a § 1983 claim). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege “(1) that the

conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that

the conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution

or laws of the United States.” Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313, 319 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal

citation omitted) (emphasis added).

Here, the § 1983 claim fails because “a [Parole] Board is not a person within the language

of 42 U.S.C.A. Section 1983.” Madden v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 438 F.2d 1189, 1190 (3d Cir.

1971); Moore v. Chester Cnty. Cts., No. 21-CV-5230, 2022 WL 742708, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 10,

2022) (“[A]s a state agency, the State Parole Board is not a ‘person’ against whom a civil rights

action may be brought under Section 1983.”). Therefore, the Court will dismiss the claim against

the Pennsylvania Parole Board (Count IV) with prejudice. See Bryant v. Traendly, No. 19-CV-

4758, 2020 WL 1065704, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 5, 2020) (dismissing § 1983 claims against a Parole

Board with prejudice because it is “not a ‘person’ subject to suit” under § 1983); Thrower v. N.J.

State Parole Bd., 438 F. App’x. 71, 72 (3d Cir. 2011) (affirming dismissal of § 1983 claims against

New Jersey State Parole Board).

B. Mr. Short Fails to Sufficiently Allege a Due Process Violation Under the

Fourteenth Amendment (Count I)

Mr. Short alleges that the Corrections Defendants5 violated his due process rights “[b]y

detaining Plaintiff without lawful cause, hearing, or commitment order,” causing Mr. Short “to be

unlawfully imprisoned for over four months.” ECF No. 8 ¶¶ 15–16. The Corrections Defendants

seek to dismiss this claim, arguing that it fails as a matter of law. ECF No. 22 at 10–15. For the

reasons set forth below, the Court will dismiss Mr. Short’s due process claim (Count I).6

“[T]he conditional freedom of a parolee generated by statute is a liberty interest protected

by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which may not be terminated absent

5 The Amended Complaint does not specify whether claims in are made against Corrections Defendants in their official

or individual capacities. See ECF No. 8. However, in response to their Motion to Dismiss, Mr. Short clarifies that

his claims are against the Corrections Defendants in their individual capacities only. See ECF No. 24 at 3.

Accordingly, the Court will analyze Counts I–III as claims against the Corrections Defendants in their individual

capacities.

6 Although Mr. Short alleges a due process violation under the Fourteenth Amendment, he does not clearly state

whether he intends to assert a procedural or substantive due process claim. See ECF No. 8. The Court construes the

Amended Complaint as asserting a procedural due process claim. Mr. Short alleges that he was detained “without

lawful cause, hearing, or commitment order,” and, specifically, that he was denied a “Gagnon hearing.” Id. ¶¶ 10, 15.

In response to the Pennsylvania Police Department’s Motion to Dismiss, Mr. Short states that he was denied

“procedural safeguards” and detained “without lawful process.” ECF No. 24 at 2. The alleged constitutional

deficiency therefore concerns the process afforded to Mr. Short in connection with his detention and the Court will

analyze this claim under the procedural due process framework. In any event, to the extent Mr. Short alleges a

substantive due process claim, he has failed to allege sufficient facts to sustain a claim against the Corrections

Defendants.

appropriate due process safeguards.” Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 85 (1976) (citing Morrissey

v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)). Thus, to state a claim for a procedural due process violation, “a

plaintiff must allege that (1) he was deprived of an individual interest that is encompassed within

the Fourteenth Amendment[] . . . and (2) the procedures available to him did not provide ‘due

process of law.’” Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 234 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Alvin v.

Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 2000)).

Here, the Amended Complaint does not enable the Court to conclude that the procedures

afforded to Mr. Short were constitutionally inadequate. Mr. Short does not identify the nature of

the parole proceeding that occurred in connection with his March 26, 2024 detention. See ECF

No. 8. He does not indicate how, specifically, the charge against him was “resolved.” Id. ¶ 9.

While Mr. Short alleges that he was detained without a “Gagnon hearing,” he does not state

whether another type of hearing occurred, identify whether or when his parole was actually

revoked, or explain the legal basis on which he remained incarcerated until August 8, 2024. See

id. ¶¶ 7–13. These allegations leave unclear what constitutionally required process Mr. Short was

allegedly denied.

Nor does the Amended Complaint allege any specific conduct by Chelsea Hoffman or Peter

Phillips. See generally id. Mr. Short alleges that “Defendants violated Plaintiff’s rights to due

process of law.” Id. ¶ 15. However, Mr. Short fails to provide how Ms. Hoffman or Mr. Phillips

were personally involved in his conviction, the finding that he had committed a parole violation,

or otherwise were responsible for the revocation of his parole or alleged denial of process. The

conclusory allegation that the Corrections Defendants violated Mr. Short’s rights is insufficient to

plausibly establish their personal involvement.

Accordingly, because Mr. Short fails to sufficiently allege how his due process rights were

violated, and because he fails to allege Ms. Hoffman or Mr. Phillips’ personal involvement, Count

I fails to state a claim against either Corrections Defendant. The Court will therefore grant the

Corrections Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count I, without prejudice and with leave to amend.

C. Mr. Short Fails to Sufficiently Allege Unlawful Seizure and Detention in

Violation of the Fourth Amendment (Count II)

In the Amended Complaint, Mr. Short alleged that his “prolonged detention by state

officers without probable cause or lawful commitment” constituted unlawful seizure in violation

of the Fourth Amendment. ECF No. 8 ¶ 18.

The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free from unreasonable searches and

seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. A “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment occurs “when there

is a governmental termination of freedom through means intentionally applied.” Scott v. Harris,

550 U.S. 372, 381 (2007). An individual is “seized” for Fourth Amendment purposes where that

person’s freedom of movement is restrained such that a reasonable person “would have believed

he [or she] was not free to leave.’” United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553–54 (1980)).

“Generally, a seizure is reasonable only where it is justified by a warrant or probable cause.” Smith

v. Bialik, No. 2:19-CV-00778, 2020 WL 231390, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 15, 2020) (Hornak, J.) (citing

Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483, 494 (3d Cir. 2006)). Finally, to state a § 1983 unlawful seizure

claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that the defendant personally participated in, or was

otherwise responsible for, the allegedly unlawful seizure. See Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629

F.3d 121, 129 (3d Cir. 2010); Torres v. Unuigbe, No. 23-CV-02264, 2026 WL 1893503, at *3

(D.N.J. June 30, 2026) (“In § 1983 actions, liability requires personal involvement in the alleged

constitutional violation.”) (citing Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)).

Mr. Short alleges that he was arrested and detained from March 26, 2024 through August

8, 2024. ECF No. 8 ¶¶ 8, 10. Accepting these allegations as true, the Court concludes that Mr.

Short plausibly alleges that a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave in

the circumstances alleged. See Torres v. Madrid, 592 U.S. 306, 312 (2021) (“[T]he arrest of a

person is quintessentially a seizure.”) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980)).

However, the Amended Complaint contains no factual allegations that Ms. Hoffman or Mr.

Phillips initiated Mr. Short’s arrest, conviction or detention, directed it, or otherwise caused Mr.

Short to be unlawfully detained. Rather, Mr. Short alleges only that his detention “by state

officers” violated his Fourth Amendment rights. ECF No. 8 ¶ 18. Because § 1983 liability requires

personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation, Mr. Short fails to state an unlawful

seizure claim against Ms. Hoffman or Mr. Phillips. Accordingly, Count II is dismissed without

prejudice and with leave to amend.

D. Mr. Short Fails to Sufficiently Allege a Supervisory Liability Claim (Count

III)

Mr. Short asserts a claim of “Supervisory Liability[,]” against Mr. Phillips, arguing that he

“knew or should have known about Plaintiff’s unlawful detention and failed to intervene, correct

the error, or ensure lawful process.” ECF No. 8 ¶ 20. The Corrections Defendants argue that this

claim should be dismissed for failure to allege Mr. Phillips’ personal involvement. For the reasons

set forth below, the Court agrees with the Corrections Defendants, and will dismiss this claim

(Count III).

A supervisor may be liable for the constitutional violations of subordinates “(1) where the

supervisor participated in, directed, or had knowledge of and acquiesced in a subordinate’s

constitutional violation, or (2) where the supervisor had a policy, practice, or custom that caused

the constitutional violation.” Mucci v. Waters, No. CV 23-2649, 2025 WL 2555373, at *3 (E.D.

Pa. Sept. 3, 2025) (citing Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 129 n.5 (3d Cir. 2010)).

Here, even if Mr. Short adequately alleged an underlying constitutional violation by Ms. Hoffman,

which he did not, Mr. Short has failed to adequately plead a claim of supervisory liability against

Mr. Phillips. Mr. Short alleges only that Mr. Phillips “knew or should have known about Plaintiff’s

unlawful detention” and failed to intervene. ECF No. 8 ¶ 20. Such conclusory statements are

insufficient to constitute a viable claim of supervisory liability. Accordingly, the Court will

dismiss this claim (Count III), without prejudice and with leave to amend.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Pennsylvania Parole Board’s Motion to Dismiss and the

Corrections’ Defendants Motion to Dismiss are GRANTED, as set forth fully in the accompanying

Order. Should Mr. Short seek to file an amended complaint, he must do so by August 31, 2026

Any amendment shall be limited to the claims the Court has dismissed without prejudice.

DATED this 13th of August, 2026.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Christy Criswell Wiegand

CHRISTY CRISWELL WIEGAND

United States District Judge

cc (via ECF email notification):

All Counsel of Record

cc (via U.S. Mail):

Lenny Ramon Short, Pro se

631 Allegheny Avenue

Glassport, PA 15045