Bruney

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

--------------------------------------------------------------- X

:

LENIECE BRUNEY,

:

Plaintiff, : MEMORANDUM DECISION AND

ORDER

:

– against – 25-CV-1762 (AMD) (CHK)

:

CITY OF NEW YORK; THOMAS P. SMITH, :

individually; STEPHEN LEWIS, individually; and

:

AHMED ABDULLA, individually,

:

Defendants. :

:

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ANN M. DONNELLY, United States District Judge:

The plaintiff brings this action against the City of New York, Deputy Inspector Thomas

P. Smith, Officer Stephen Lewis, and Detective Ahmed Abdulla of the New York City Police

Department, in their individual capacities, for alleged violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. (ECF No 29.) Before the Court is

the defendants’ motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 42.) As explained below, the Court grants the

motion in part and denies it in part.

BACKGROUND1

The plaintiff owns a 2020 Nissan Rogue. (ECF No. 29 ¶ 17.) At some point, she loaned

the car to a friend. (Id. ¶ 19.)2 The driver of the car allegedly hit a pedestrian in Brooklyn, but

1 The facts are drawn from the complaint, documents and exhibits that the plaintiff includes with the

complaint or incorporates into the complaint by reference, and documents that are integral to the

complaint. See Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2002).

2 The plaintiff does not say when the friend borrowed the car.

left the scene before the police arrived. (ECF No. 45 at 7.) The friend returned the car on

December 13, 2023, and parked it outside the plaintiff’s home. (ECF No. 29 ¶¶ 17, 20.) Two

New York City Police Department (“NYPD”) officers seized the car the same day, and took it to

the 71st Precinct. (Id. ¶ 18.) When the plaintiff tried to stop the officers, one of them told her

that she could not have her car “unless and until” she told them who borrowed it. (Id. ¶ 21.) One

officer showed the plaintiff of a photograph of a man “in an attempt to have her identify an

alleged suspect.” (Id.) The plaintiff did not identify the suspect, and the officers “effected the

seizure and removed the vehicle.” (Id. ¶ 23.) The plaintiff claims that she does not know who

was involved in the hit-and-run, and that the defendants are keeping her car to “extort” her into

identifying the suspect. (Id. ¶ 25.)

On January 3, 2024, Defendant Lewis applied for a warrant to search the car, and an

order of seizure. (ECF No. 44-1.) 3 Lewis stated, among other things, that he was investigating a

motor vehicle collision that “resulted in the serious physical injury” of the victim. (Id. ¶ 4.) He

explained that the police found the victim “unresponsive in the roadway with severe head and

body trauma.” (Id. ¶ 6.) Lewis “reviewed video footage from the vicinity of the Collision

Location,” which showed the plaintiff’s car strike the victim and leave the scene “immediately

without reporting said collision to the police or emergency services.” (Id. ¶ 7.) Lewis also noted

that the plaintiff’s car had damage that was “consistent with striking a pedestrian in that the

subject vehicle had damage about the hood consistent with striking a pedestrian.” (Id. ¶ 14.)

New York State Supreme Court Judge Donald Leo signed the warrant. (Id. at 5.) On February

3 As explained below, the Court considers the warrant application and the signed warrant because they are

integral to the complaint. The warrant permitted the police to search the car for “Evidence of the crime

of Leaving the Scene of an Accident Without Reporting Resulting in Serious Physical Injury,” including

physical and forensic evidence. (ECF No. 44-1 ¶ 2.)

12, 2025, the plaintiff sent a letter to the King’s County District Attorney’s Office requesting the

return of her car. (ECF No. 29 ¶ 26; ECF No. 29-1.) She alleges that she was afforded “no

notice of any pre-seizure or post-seizure hearing.” (ECF No. 29 ¶ 32.)

The plaintiff brought this action on March 17, 2025 and filed an amended complaint on

August 13, 2025. (ECF No. 1; ECF No. 29.) The plaintiff alleges that the defendants violated

her Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights and her Fourth Amendment right to be

free from unlawful seizure. (ECF No. 29 ¶¶ 2, 7.)4 The defendants move to dismiss the

complaint. (ECF Nos. 42–44.)

LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint

must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While “detailed

factual allegations” are not required, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Id. (quoting Twombly,

550 U.S. at 555). Pleadings are construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See

Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 160 (2d Cir. 2010).

4 The plaintiff also states without explanation that her claims arise under the Eighth Amendment (ECF

No. 29 ¶ 7), but does not describe any such violations or claim them in her prayer for relief.

Accordingly, the Court does not construe the plaintiff’s claims as Eighth Amendment claims.

DISCUSSION

I. Constitutional Claims

a. Procedural Due Process

“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall

‘deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.’” Mercedes-Benz

Fin. Servs. USA v. City of New York, 770 F. Supp. 3d 643, 656 (S.D.N.Y. 2025) (quoting

Santander Consumer USA, Inc. v. City of Yonkers, No. 22-CV-8870, 2024 WL 4817649, at *8

(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2024)). In evaluating a Section 1983 due process claim, a court must

consider “(1) whether [the plaintiff] possessed a liberty or property interest and, if so, (2) what

process [she] was due before he could be deprived of that interest.” Ciambriello v. Cnty. of

Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 313 (2d Cir. 2002).

There is no dispute that the plaintiff has a property interest in the use and possession of

her car. To determine what process was due, and whether the plaintiff was afforded it, the Court

uses the three-part inquiry in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976): (1) “the private interest

that will be affected by the official action;” (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such

interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute

procedural safeguards;” and (3) “the [g]overnment’s interest, including the function involved and

the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement

would entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. The Second Circuit addressed “the City’s continued

retention of vehicles after their warrantless seizure by the police and prior to the ultimate

resolution of the forfeiture action in court” in Krimstock v. Kelly, 306 F.3d 40, 48 (2d Cir. 2002),

abrogated by Culley v. Marshall, 601 U.S. 377 (2024).5

5 The Krimstock court held that a “prompt post-seizure retention hearing” was “constitutionally required.”

Krimstock, 306 F.3d at 48. In Culley v. Marshall, the Supreme Court held that due process “requires a

The first factor — the private interest affected by the official action — favors the

plaintiff. “The deprivation of real or personal property involves substantial due process

interests,” especially when the property is a car. Krimstock, 306 F.3d at 61. “The particular

importance of motor vehicles derives from their use as a mode of transportation and, for some,

the means to earn a livelihood.” Id. (citing Lee v. Thornton, 538 F.2d 27, 31 (2d Cir. 1976)).

“Another consideration is the length of deprivation, which increases the weight of an owner’s

interest in possessing the vehicle.” Id. (citing Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422,

434 (1982)). The plaintiff alleges that the City seized her car in December 2023 (ECF No. 29 ¶

18); she has now been without her car for more than two and a half years.

The second factor — “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the

procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural

safeguards” — also favors the plaintiff. In Krimstock, which involved a “DWI owner-arrestee,”

this factor “narrow[ly]” favored the City because a “trained police officer’s assessment of the

owner-driver’s state of intoxication can typically expected to be accurate,” and “the risk of

erroneous seizure and retention of a vehicle is reduced.” Id. at 62. The plaintiff in this case,

however, is not the arrestee; she is an “innocent owner,” and thus the risk of erroneous

deprivation for her is “comparably greater.” Id. at 64; see also id. at 56 (“[T]he Supreme Court

has shown special concern for the risk of erroneous deprivation posed to innocent owners.”).

The third factor — the government’s interest — also weighs in the plaintiff’s favor. The

defendants do not explain their interest in retaining the car for more than two years. In her

opposition to the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff says that the City offered to return her car if she

timely forfeiture hearing,” but “does not require a separate preliminary hearing.” Culley, 601 U.S. at

384–386 (emphasis in Culley).

signed a “waiver” of defenses and claims against the City, which suggests that the City’s only

interest in keeping the car is to secure a signed release. (ECF No. 45-2 at 2; see also ECF No.

45-2 at 2.) The Court does not consider this allegation, because the plaintiff did not include it in

her complaint. See Chambers, 282 F.3d at 154. Still, the defendants have not asserted any

legitimate interest in holding onto the plaintiff’s car. Nor do they claim that holding a hearing

would impose a significant burden.

Evaluation of the Mathews factors compels the conclusion that the plaintiff was entitled

to due process. “For more than a century the central meaning of procedural due process has been

clear: Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may

enjoy that right they must first be notified.” Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (citation

omitted). The hallmarks of due process are the “right to notice and an opportunity to be heard . .

. at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Id. (citation omitted). “[A] post-seizure

delay may become so prolonged that the dispossessed property owner has been deprived of a

meaningful hearing at a meaningful time.” Culley, 601 U.S. at 386. The plaintiff was entitled to

be notified after the police seized her car that she had a right to a hearing. See Krimstock, 306

F.3d at 68–69 (holding that the plaintiff was entitled to “an early opportunity to test the probable

validity of further deprivation, including probable cause for the initial seizure, and to ask whether

other measures, short of continued impoundment, would satisfy the legitimate interests of the

City in protecting the vehicles from sale or destruction pendente lite”). She plausibly alleges that

she did not receive that notice, and that the post-seizure delay has become so prolonged as to

deprive her of her due process rights. (See ECF No. 29 ¶¶ 26–32.)

According to the defendants, Krimstock does not apply when property is seized pursuant

to a warrant. But the defendants did not get a warrant until January 3, 2024, more than two

weeks after they seized her car. (See ECF No. 44-2.) That warrant authorized the police to

execute the search within ten days and “return[] and deliver[] to the Court without unnecessary

delay” any property they seized pursuant to the warrant. (See id.) The precise bounds of the

search and seizure authority granted by the warrant, and whether the search and seizure were

executed within those bounds, are issues for summary judgment or trial. Cf. Rivera v. United

States, 928 F.2d 592, 606–08 (2d Cir. 1991) (whether searches were executed in accordance with

search warrant was question for trial). In any event, a warrant is not a substitute for the

plaintiff’s right to challenge the retention of her car.

The defendants also say that they followed the procedures for vehicle seizures enunciated

in Krimstock IV, 506 F. Supp. 2d 249 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), by applying ex parte for a retention

order, and that the plaintiff “should have demanded a copy of the Order and requested a hearing,

. . . which she does not allege to have done.” (ECF No. 43 at 18.) The defendants do not explain

how the plaintiff could have known to demand a copy of the order or request a hearing when

they did not notify her that she could do so. In any event, these are factual questions that the

Court cannot resolve at this stage.

Accordingly, the Court denies the motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s procedural due

process claim and her claims for declaratory and injunctive relief.

i. Adequacy of State Law Remedies

The defendants maintain that the plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed because she

had adequate post-deprivation remedies, including an Article 78 proceeding. (ECF No. 43 at 18–

19.) Post-deprivation remedies, like Article 78 proceedings, satisfy due process only when the

deprivation resulted from a “random, unauthorized act by a state employee.” Hellenic Am,

Neighborhood Action Comm. v. City of New York, 101 F.3d 877, 880 (2d Cir. 1996). But when

the deprivation flows from systemic practices or established procedures, rather than a random

act, the availability of post-deprivation remedies does not by itself satisfy due process. See

Logan, 455 U.S. at 436; see also Hamilton v. City of New York, No. 24-CV-2550, 2025 WL

2961714, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2025). “[W]here the deprivation is systemic, litigants have a

well-established right to pursue their claims in federal court without resorting to state judicial

remedies.” Van Oss v. New York, 783 F. Supp. 2d 681, 695 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); see also

Krimstock, 306 F.3d at 60 (“[T]he suggested remedy of an Article 78 proceeding does not

provide a prompt and effective means for claimants to challenge the legitimacy of the City’s

retention of their vehicles pendente lite.”).

The plaintiff “alleges that the NYPD’s practice of seizing and retaining vehicles without

prompt hearings — and its practice of failing to train its police officers in their responsibilities

under Krimstock — is a systemic policy.” Hamilton, 2025 WL 2961714, at *5. As explained

below, the plaintiff properly pleaded a Monell claim against the City on that basis. Accordingly,

the plaintiff was not required to pursue state post-deprivation remedies before filing a federal

claim.

b. Substantive Due Process

“Substantive due process protects against government action that is arbitrary, conscience-

shocking, or oppressive in a constitutional sense, but not against a government action that is

‘incorrect or ill-advised.’” Kaluczky v. City of White Plains, 57 F.3d 202, 211 (2d Cir. 1995)

(quoting Lowrance v. Achtyl, 20 F.3d 529, 538 (2d Cir. 1994)). “Substantive due process

standards are violated only by conduct that is so outrageously arbitrary as to constitute a gross

abuse of governmental authority.” Natale v. Town of Ridgefield, 170 F.3d 258, 263 (2d Cir.

1999).

The plaintiff alleges that the defendants “arbitrarily, capriciously, and deliberately

deprived the plaintiff of [her] property rights.” (ECF No. 29 ¶ 53.) But “not all property rights

are entitled to the protections of substantive due process.” Fasciana v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 996 F.

Supp. 2d 174, 183 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). Rather, substantive due process protects “fundamental”

rights, such as those “relating to marriage, family, procreation, and the right to bodily integrity.”

Id.; see also Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 272 (1994). The plaintiff’s property interest in the

use and possession of her car is not a fundamental right subject to substantive due process

protections. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s substantive due process claim is dismissed.

c. Fourth Amendment

“The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures

applies to the states — and to municipalities and municipal subdivisions acting under color of

state law — through the Fourteenth Amendment.” Rackley v. City of New York, 186 F. Supp. 2d

466, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). A seizure of property “occurs when there is some meaningful

interference with an individual’s possessory interests in [his] property.” Id. (quoting Soldal v.

Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992)). However, “reasonableness is still the ultimate standard

under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. (quoting Soldal, 506 U.S. at 71.) “To determine whether a

search or seizure is reasonable, courts consider ‘whether the action was justified at its

inception.’” Anderson v. Townsend, No. 21-CV-3569, 2021 WL 5359681, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.

17, 2021) (quoting O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725–26 (1987)).

Seizure of personal property without a warrant is ordinarily per se unreasonable. United

States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983). However, “[w]here law enforcement authorities have

probable cause to believe” that the property holds “evidence of a crime,” the Fourth Amendment

permits warrantless seizure, “pending issuance of a warrant to examine its contents, if the

exigencies of the circumstances demand it or some other recognized exception to the warrant

requirement is present.” Id.; see also Harrell v. City of New York, 138 F. Supp. 3d 479, 488–89

(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“There are recognized exceptions under which warrantless seizures will be

considered reasonable.”), on reconsideration in part sub nom. Harrell v. Joshi, No. 14-CV-7246,

2015 WL 9275683 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2015).

When a car is involved in a crime, there are often exigent circumstances because the

“opportunity to search is fleeting since a car is readily movable.” Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S.

583, 590 (1974) (quoting Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 50–51 (1970)). “This is strikingly

true where the automobile’s owner is alerted to police intentions and, as a consequence, the

motivation to remove evidence from official grasp is heightened.” Id.

The officers had probable cause to seize the plaintiff’s car. They told the plaintiff that it

had been involved in a hit-and-run incident, which was described in the application for the

warrant. (See ECF No. 44-1.) Moreover, according to the warrant application, there were

exigent circumstances that justified the police in seizing the car immediately. Lewis represented

in the warrant application that the driver of the car struck a pedestrian, causing serious injury,

and fled the scene. (See id. ¶ 6.) Seizure of the plaintiff’s car was necessary so that the police

could search it and perform any necessary forensic testing. (See id. ¶¶ 21–22.)6

“The Second Circuit has held that where the reasonableness of an initial seizure is

adjudicated, ‘failure to return the items does not, by itself, state a separate Fourth Amendment

6 The defendants submitted the search warrant application and the warrant with the motion to dismiss.

The Court considers this evidence, because it is integral to the complaint. See Salvador v. City of New

York, No. 15-CV-5164, 2016 WL 2939166, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2016) (considering search warrant

attached to motion to dismiss as integral to the complaint because “its validity is at the core of

[plaintiff’s] claims” (citing Smith v. Hogan, 794 F.3d 249, 254 (2d Cir. 2015)); Floyd v. Rosen, No. 21-

CV-1668, 2022 WL 1451405, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2022) (noting that a court may take judicial notice

of an application for a search warrant).

claim.’” Anderson, 2021 WL 5359681, at *5 (quoting Ahlers v. Rabinowitz, 684 F.3d 53, 62 (2d

Cir. 2012)). Accordingly, the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim based on the City’s continued

retention of the plaintiff’s car is dismissed.

II. Liability Under Section 1983

a. The Individual Defendants

“Under the well-settled law of this Circuit, ‘in order to establish a defendant’s individual

liability in a suit brought under Section 1983, a plaintiff must show, inter alia, the defendant’s

personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation.’” Tammaro v. City of New York,

No. 13-CV-6190, 2018 WL 1621535, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2018) (quoting Grullon v. City of

New Haven, 720 F.3d 133, 138–39 (2d Cir. 2013)). “Thus, for individual liability to attach, [the

plaintiff] must plausibly allege that the [individual defendants] were personally involved in

violating his procedural due process rights by depriving [the plaintiff] of his property without

providing him meaningful notice of the procedures for recovery.” Id. “[A] plaintiff should at

minimum allege a defendant’s intentional participation in failing to provide notice and

knowledge that the plaintiff did not receive notice of the procedures to retrieve his property.” Id.

at *10.

According to the defendants, the plaintiff “fails to allege with any specificity what actions

or omissions were taken by any of the individual [defendants] showing their involvement in any

constitutional violations.” (ECF No. 43 at 24.) The plaintiff alleges that the Commanding

Officer Thomas Smith “was made affirmatively aware” that the police were holding the

plaintiff’s car, and knew that the officers in the precinct were following NYPD’s unlawful policy

of retaining people’s cars; nevertheless, Smith did not investigate or address the constitutional

violation. (ECF No. 29 ¶¶ 43–44.) She also alleges that Smith did not adequately train or

supervise at least one detective under his command about the procedures to follow in retaining

the plaintiff’s car. (Id. ¶ 47.) The plaintiff does not allege that defendant Smith is a “link” in the

“chain of command;” she alleges that he “had responsibility for enforcing or allowing the

continuation of the challenged policies that resulted in the denial” of her constitutional rights.

See McKenna v. Wright, 386 F.3d 432, 437 (2d Cir. 2004). The plaintiff has therefore

adequately alleged that defendant Smith was personally involved.

However, the plaintiff has not adequately alleged that Lewis and Abdulla were personally

involved — or involved at all — in the actions giving rise to her complaint. (See generally ECF

No. 29.) For this reason, the claims against defendants Lewis and Abdulla are dismissed without

prejudice.

i. Qualified Immunity

The defendants argue that the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

(ECF No. 43 at 25–26.) “In making determinations on qualified-immunity claims, the Supreme

Court requires a court to determine two matters, i.e., (1) whether the facts alleged by the plaintiff

are sufficient to make out a violation of a constitutional right, and (2) whether the right at issue

was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct.” Kalamaras v. Cnty. of Nassau,

No. 17-CV-1068, 2019 WL 4452281, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2019) (citing Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)). Rights are “clearly established” when supporting Supreme

Court or Second Circuit precedent existed at the time of the alleged unconstitutional conduct.

See Russell v. Scully, 15 F.3d 219, 223 (2d Cir. 1994). On a motion to dismiss, “[t]he plaintiff is

entitled to all reasonable inferences from the facts alleged, not only those that support [her]

claim, but also those that defeat the immunity defense.” McKenna, 386 F.3d at 436.

As explained above, the plaintiff has alleged a constitutional violation against defendant

Smith, and her right to due process was clearly established. “Since at least the Second Circuit’s

2006 Krimstock decision, it has been clear that owners of vehicles that have been seized as

evidence in criminal cases are entitled to notice of their right to a hearing and ‘some immediate

judicial review of the retention [of their vehicle].’” Ezagui v. City of New York, 726 F. Supp. 2d

275, 288–89 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting Krimstock, 464 F.3d at 255) (alterations in Ezagui). The

Krimstock court “determined that claimants must ‘be given a prompt post-seizure retention

hearing, with adequate notice’ to comport with due process.” Innamorato v. Cnty. of Suffolk, No.

23-CV-06573, 2025 WL 2605604, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2025) (quoting Krimstock). In

Culley v. Marshall, the Supreme Court held that “due process does not require a separate

preliminary hearing before the forfeiture hearing.” 601 U.S. at 390. However, “[w]hen States

seize and seek civil forfeiture of personal property, due process requires a timely post-seizure

forfeiture hearing.” Id. at 384 (emphasis in Culley). Thus, defendant Smith was on notice that as

of the date the NYPD seized the plaintiff’s car, the plaintiff had a clearly established right to

notice of her right to a timely post-seizure hearing. Accordingly, at this stage, the Court rejects

the defendants’ qualified immunity defense.

b. The City Defendant

“[M]unicipalities may be liable only where ‘execution of a government’s policy or

custom’ causes constitutional violations.” Buari v. City of New York, 530 F. Supp. 3d 356, 397

(S.D.N.Y. 2021) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694

(1978)). “A plaintiff can plead a ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ by alleging one of the following:

(1) a formal policy officially endorsed by the municipality; (2)

actions taken by government officials responsible for establishing

the municipal policies that caused the particular deprivation in

question; (3) a practice so consistent and widespread that, although

not expressly authorized, constitutes a custom or usage of which a

supervising policy-maker must have been aware; or (4) a failure by

policymakers to provide adequate training or supervision to

subordinates to such an extent that it amounts to deliberate

indifference to the rights of those who come into contact with the

municipal employees.

Id. at 397–98 (quoting Jones v. Westchester County, 182 F. Supp. 3d 134, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)).

The plaintiff alleges that defendant Smith was “affirmatively aware” that the plaintiff’s car was

being held, and that “the policy” being carried out by the precinct “was that detectives were

authorized to unilaterally choose to release or retain” the plaintiff’s car. (ECF No. 29 ¶ 43.) The

plaintiff also alleges that the NYPD “failed to train and/or properly supervise its Detectives and

Officers” as to the “clearly-established requirements of Krimstock and its progeny.” (Id. ¶ 45.)

At this stage, the plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to withstand the motion to dismiss,

and she is entitled to discovery on the defendants’ training programs and policies. See Jackson v.

Nassau Cnty., 552 F. Supp. 3d 350, 380–81 n.10 (E.D.N.Y. 2021)); see also Hamilton, 2025 WL

2961714, at *4 (“Plaintiff Hamilton has pleaded a Monell claim successfully; he pleads that the

City had a long-standing practice of violating Krimstock, and of failing to train its officers in

how not to violate Krimstock.”) Accordingly, the plaintiff’s claims against the City may

proceed.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.

The plaintiff’s substantive due process claim, Fourth Amendment claim, and claims against

individual defendants Lewis and Abdulla, are dismissed. The plaintiff’s procedural due process

claims against the City and individual defendant Smith may proceed.

SO ORDERED.

_ _ _ _ _s_/_A_n_n__ M__._ D__o_n_n_e__ll_y_____

ANN M. DONNELLY

United States District Judge

Dated: Brooklyn, New York

August 11, 2026