Opinion

Ramona Matos Rodriguez v. Pan American Health Organization

Court
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
Filed
Aug 14, 2026
Status
Published
Cited by
0 cases
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More cited than 44.1%

The opinion

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 5, 2025 Decided August 14, 2026

No. 24-7135

RAMONA MATOS RODRIGUEZ, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

v.

PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION,

APPELLANT

JOAQUIN MOLINA, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:20-cv-00928)

Daniel S. Volchok argued the cause for appellant. With

him on the briefs was David W. Bowker.

Samuel J. Dubbin argued the cause for appellees. With

him on the brief were Charles J. Cooper, Michael W. Kirk,

Haley N. Proctor, and Joseph O. Masterman.

Andrew Kim was on the brief for amicus curiae Human

Trafficking Legal Center in support of appellees.

2

Dennis H. Hranitzky and Alex H. Loomis were on the brief

for amici curiae Professor William S. Dodge, et al. in support

of appellees.

Before: MILLETT, PAN, and GARCIA, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARCIA.

GARCIA, Circuit Judge: In 2018, a group of Cuban

doctors sued the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO),

alleging that it cooperated in a human trafficking scheme.

PAHO moved to dismiss, arguing that even if the complaint’s

allegations were true, it was immune from suit under the

International Organizations Immunities Act (IOIA). The

district court denied that motion.

Most defendants cannot appeal the denial of a motion to

dismiss. Instead, they must litigate the case until a final

judgment is entered and then, if necessary, seek appellate

review. But because IOIA immunity serves in part to protect

defendants from the burdens of litigating the merits of a suit,

PAHO was entitled to seek immediate appellate review under

the collateral order doctrine. PAHO did so, and we affirmed,

agreeing with the district court that the doctors adequately

pleaded a theory that, if proven, would pierce PAHO’s

immunity.

On remand, PAHO filed a second motion to dismiss,

which remains pending before the district court. Unlike the

first, this motion contests the complaint’s allegations with

evidence to support PAHO’s claim to immunity. If the district

court denies that motion, PAHO will be entitled to a second

round of immediate appellate review before it is required to

litigate any merits issues. But before resolving that motion—

indeed, to help the court properly resolve it—the district court

granted the plaintiffs’ request for discovery in response to

3

PAHO’s evidentiary submissions. Rather than comply,

PAHO sought immediate review of that discovery order too.

We conclude that we lack jurisdiction over the appeal.

Holding otherwise would give defendants in PAHO’s situation

not just two opportunities for appellate review as to immunity,

but a boundless entitlement to appeal any number of district

court orders aimed at resolving that threshold issue. We

decline PAHO’s invitation to extend our appellate jurisdiction

that far.

I

In 2013, Brazil launched Mais Médicos (Portuguese for

“More Doctors”), a public health program aimed at increasing

access to medical care. The program recruited healthcare

professionals from around the world to serve Brazilian

communities that otherwise lacked reliable healthcare

resources. Cuba offered to assign employees from its own

Ministry of Health to Mais Médicos placements in Brazil. To

facilitate the arrangement, PAHO entered agreements with the

two countries. PAHO is the world’s oldest international

public health organization and is headquartered in Washington,

D.C.

The agreements gave PAHO a central role in the payment

structure for Cuba’s participation in Mais Médicos. Brazil

paid for the services of thousands of Cuban healthcare

professionals by transferring funds to PAHO. PAHO retained

five percent of those funds for itself and sent the remainder to

Cuba. According to PAHO, the 5% “offset” enabled the

organization to recoup indirect costs associated with the

technical and administrative support it provided to the

program. Appellant’s Brief 8.

Concerns arose that Cuba’s “medical missions,” including

its partnership with Mais Médicos, were part of a human-

4

trafficking scheme. The U.S. Department of State noted that

the Cuban government was collecting immense sums from

such programs but would often withhold wages from the

physicians on the ground. See Compl. ¶ 31 (quoting U.S.

Dep’t of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 162–64 (2019)).

Some physicians in these programs reported substandard

working and living conditions. Id. ¶ 30 (quoting U.S. Dep’t

of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 4 (2017)). As one

amicus noted, a complaint filed with the International Criminal

Court alleged that 75% of participants in these missions had

not joined the programs voluntarily; 75% had been threatened

or witnessed coworkers being threatened; and 40% were

separated from their children as a consequence for defecting.

Human Trafficking Legal Center Amicus Brief 9 n.4 (citing

U.S. Dep’t of State, Trafficking in Persons and Cuba’s Labor

Export Program (Jan. 20, 2025), https://perma.cc/GW7H-

GTQP).

In 2018, four Cuban doctors who allege they were coerced

to participate in Mais Médicos and who are now living in the

United States sued PAHO for “enabling, managing, and

enforcing illegal human trafficking of Cuban medical

professionals in Brazil.” Compl. ¶ 1. The doctors alleged,

among other things, that the Cuban government restricted their

access to family members, see id. ¶ 102; limited their freedom

of movement, see id. ¶¶ 88–89; and compensated them with

only a fraction of the sums Brazil paid for their work, see id.

¶ 96, all under threat of “harassment, intimidation, and

retaliation,” id. ¶ 79. They asserted claims under the

Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA), which forbids

various forms of human trafficking, see 18 U.S.C. § 1590, and

empowers trafficking victims to sue and recover damages from

“whoever knowingly benefits . . . from participation in a

venture” that the defendant “knew or should have known”

involved such a violation, id. § 1595(a). The doctors sued on

5

behalf of a class of about 3,500 similarly situated Cuban

medical professionals. Compl. ¶ 118.

Nearly eight years into the litigation, the parties remain

enmeshed in a threshold dispute over PAHO’s claim to

immunity under the IOIA.

Enacted in 1945, the IOIA affords “[i]nternational

organizations . . . the same immunity from suit and every form

of judicial process as is enjoyed by foreign governments.” 22

U.S.C. § 288a(b). In 1960, President Eisenhower designated

PAHO an international organization under the Act. See

Rodriguez v. PAHO, 29 F.4th 706, 712 (D.C. Cir. 2022)

(PAHO I).

Because IOIA immunity “develops in tandem” with “the

law of foreign sovereign immunity,” it is coextensive with

immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).

Jam v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 586 U.S. 199, 210 (2019). The FSIA,

in turn, provides foreign sovereigns with immunity “from the

jurisdiction of the courts of the United States,” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1604, subject to several enumerated exceptions, see id.

§ 1605. One of those exceptions—the “commercial activity”

exception—covers claims “based upon a commercial activity

carried on in the United States by the foreign state.” Id.

§ 1605(a)(2).

A defendant seeking to raise an IOIA or FSIA immunity

defense before litigating the merits has two procedural options

for challenging the court’s subject matter jurisdiction and can

pursue either or both. The defendant can file what we will call

a “legal” motion to dismiss, which accepts “the plaintiff’s

factual allegations as true” and argues that those allegations do

not “bring the case within any of the exceptions to immunity

invoked by the plaintiff.” Phoenix Consulting Inc. v. Republic

of Angola, 216 F.3d 36, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Or the defendant

can file a “factual” motion to dismiss, challenging the

6

plaintiff’s jurisdictional allegations with its own evidence.

See id. The “factual” motion requires the district court to

“resolve any disputed issues of fact” necessary to decide

whether the defendant is entitled to immunity and thus whether

the court may exercise jurisdiction over the action. Id. In

resolving such disputes, the district court “must give the

plaintiff ample opportunity to secure and present evidence

relevant to the existence of jurisdiction,” and so may allow

“jurisdictional discovery” that is “carefully controlled and

limited.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

PAHO pursued both paths. It first filed a “legal” motion

to dismiss. The district court denied it, concluding that the

doctors had alleged facts that, if true, would trigger the

commercial activity exception to IOIA immunity. Rodriguez

v. PAHO, 502 F. Supp. 3d 200, 214 (D.D.C. 2020). We

affirmed. PAHO I, 29 F.4th at 716–17. The physicians

alleged in their complaint that PAHO engaged in unlawful

financial activity within the United States, including by acting

as a financial intermediary “moving money for a fee” between

Brazil and Cuba using a “Washington, D.C. bank account.”

Id. We held that those allegations, if proven, would suffice to

establish the “commercial activity” exception to immunity.

Id. at 717. We then remanded to the district court for further

proceedings. Id. at 720.1

PAHO then filed a second, “factual” motion to dismiss.

This time, PAHO argued that the doctors’ factual allegations

were mistaken. Contrary to the complaint, PAHO urged, none

of the Mais Médicos money ever entered the United States or

a U.S. bank account, and the collection of a 5% “fee” was more

1

In ruling on PAHO’s first motion, the district court held that

PAHO was immune as to two other TVPA claims and a claim under

the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. PAHO I,

29 F.4th at 710.

7

akin to sovereign activity than commercial activity. See

Factual Mot. to Dismiss 1–3, 34, Dkt. No. 80. In response, the

doctors sought discovery to further develop the details of

PAHO’s conduct and clarify whether that conduct was

“commercial activity carried on in the United States” such that

the court could exercise jurisdiction. See Rodriguez v. PAHO,

2024 WL 4251808, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 12, 2024) (PAHO II).

PAHO voluntarily produced various documents in support of

its motion, including declarations and bank statements, but

opposed the doctors’ requests for jurisdictional discovery.

For nearly two years, the parties attempted to negotiate an

agreement regarding the jurisdictional discovery dispute.

When those efforts stalled, the district court ordered PAHO to

comply with ten of the plaintiffs’ requests for production, two

interrogatories, and one deposition request. Id. at *3. PAHO

appealed again.

II

Before we can consider the merits of PAHO’s challenge to

the discovery order, “[w]e must begin with the question of our

[appellate] jurisdiction.” Process & Indus. Devs. Ltd. v. Fed.

Republic of Nigeria, 962 F.3d 576, 580 (D.C. Cir. 2020)

(P&ID). We conclude that we lack jurisdiction because the

discovery order is not effectively “final” under the collateral

order doctrine. We thus dismiss the appeal and remand to the

district court for further proceedings.

A

PAHO invokes this court’s jurisdiction to review district

court “final decisions” under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Typically,

such decisions are those that “end[] the litigation” and “leave[]

nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Geo

Grp., Inc. v. Menocal, 607 U.S. 438, 443 (2026). Section

1291, however, is construed “practical[ly].” Id. at 444. As a

8

result, the collateral order doctrine permits courts to hear

immediate appeals from a “small class” of “non-terminal”

decisions that are effectively “final.” Id.

To qualify for immediate review under this doctrine, the

type of order at issue must “(1) conclusively determine the

disputed question, (2) resolve an important issue completely

separate from the merits of the action, and (3) be effectively

unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Id. Derived

from Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541

(1949), this test identifies orders that “finally determine claims

of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the

action” and that are “too important to be denied review and too

independent of the cause itself to require that appellate

consideration be deferred.” Id. at 546. But, as the Supreme

Court has repeatedly and recently reiterated, the collateral

order doctrine is “narrow,” “stringent,” and of “modest scope.”

Geo Grp., 607 U.S. at 444 (first quoting Digital Equipment

Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 868 (1994); and

then quoting Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 350 (2006)).

Ordinarily, the denial of a motion to dismiss is not

immediately appealable. See Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard,

486 U.S. 517, 527 (1988). The collateral order doctrine,

however, generally permits appeals from the denial of a motion

to dismiss based on an immunity from suit. See Geo Group,

607 U.S. at 444. That category includes motions to dismiss

based on FSIA or IOIA immunity. P&ID, 962 F.3d at 583;

Phoenix Consulting, 216 F.3d at 39; Foremost-McKesson, Inc.

v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 905 F.2d 438, 443 (D.C. Cir. 1990).

Whether a defendant is entitled to such immunity presents

an important question about the court’s subject matter

jurisdiction, which is separate from the merits. And because

IOIA immunity is an “immunity from litigation burdens as well

as from the entry of adverse judgments,” its improper rejection

9

is “effectively unreviewable” at the conclusion of the litigation.

P&ID, 962 F.3d at 582, 584. “[I]f the immunity is wrongly

denied at the outset of a case, it cannot be vindicated after final

judgment,” because the defendant would already have been

forced to litigate the merits of the suit. Id. at 581. Immediate

appeal enables immune defendants to promptly seek redress

from errors that would otherwise “frustrate the significance and

benefit of entitlement to immunity from suit.” Phoenix

Consulting, 216 F.3d at 39 (quotation marks omitted).

Notably, this analysis applies to both “legal” and “factual”

motions to dismiss. See, e.g., Princz v. Fed. Republic of

Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1168–69 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (legal);

Phoenix Consulting, 216 F.3d at 39 (factual). To avoid

piecemeal appeals, a defendant may assert both legal and

factual arguments in support of dismissal as part of one motion,

and obtain immediate appellate view of an adverse ruling.

Where circumstances necessitate filing separate “legal” and

“factual” motions to dismiss, the defendant may obtain

immediate appellate review of adverse rulings on both

motions.

This case requires us to decide whether, and when,

defendants are also entitled to appeal jurisdictional discovery

orders targeted at resolving their entitlement to IOIA

immunity. Like the denial of a motion to dismiss, pretrial

discovery orders generally are not immediately appealable.

See Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 108

(2009). But in Nyambal v. International Monetary Fund, 772

F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 2014), we permitted collateral order review

of one type of jurisdictional discovery order. In that case, the

plaintiff sued the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which

moved to dismiss based on IOIA immunity, attaching

affidavits and evidence to support that defense. Id. at 279.

The plaintiff sought discovery to investigate whether the IMF

had waived its immunity. Id. The district court granted that

10

request without determining whether the plaintiff had made

any well-founded allegations that IOIA immunity did not

apply. Id. We exercised jurisdiction over the IMF’s appeal,

explaining that the discovery order “denie[d] an international

organization protection” from burdens “similar” to “the burden

of a lawsuit.” Id. at 280 (citing Foremost-McKesson, 905

F.2d at 443); see id. at 279, 281 (noting that the district court

“authorized jurisdictional discovery” without confirming the

“plausibility” of the plaintiff’s theory).

PAHO argues that Nyambal governs here. We disagree.

For the reasons below, we conclude that the Cohen analysis

differs when a district court issues a jurisdictional discovery

order in circumstances like those present here.

We focus on Cohen’s third requirement: that the order be

effectively unreviewable after final judgment. The “crucial

question” for that requirement is “whether deferring review

until final judgment so imperils” an “interest” at stake in the

decision “as to justify the cost of allowing immediate appeal of

the entire class of relevant orders.” Mohawk, 558 U.S. at 108.

We are not persuaded that the “interest” at stake in a case like

this one “justif[ies]” the cost of permitting immediate appeal

for an entire class of similar orders. Specifically, we hold that

immediate review of a jurisdictional discovery order is not

available under the collateral order doctrine at least where (1)

the order is issued after a judicial determination that the

complaint adequately pleads an immunity exception, (2) the

defendant files a factual motion to dismiss disputing those

factual allegations, and (3) the discovery addresses the theories

the court has found adequately pleaded by the complaint. To

be clear, we do not hold that interlocutory appeal is available

whenever one of these factors is absent. Today we hold only

that the confluence of all three renders immediate review

inappropriate in this case and others like it.

11

There is a stark difference between the “interest[s]” that

are “imperil[ed]” when a district court denies a motion to

dismiss based on immunity grounds and when, as here, the

district court orders discovery for the purpose of deciding the

immunity question itself. Id. In the motion-to-dismiss

context, our cases emphasize that deferring review until after

final judgment would necessarily require a potentially immune

defendant “to defend litigation on the merits despite an

unresolved assertion of immunity.” P&ID, 962 F.3d at 582

(emphasis added); see also id. (distinguishing the writ of

mandamus granted in In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247 (D.C.

Cir. 1998), which addressed a jurisdictional discovery order,

because “the collateral-order doctrine would not have applied

[in Papandreou] under the reasoning that we adopt here”).

“[C]onsideration of the merits [is] itself an infringement on

foreign sovereign immunity.” Id. at 584 (quoting Republic of

Philippines v. Pimentel, 553 U.S. 851, 864 (2008)).

The burden that PAHO faces here is materially different.

It is true that responding to jurisdictional discovery is itself a

burden, as Nyambal recognized. Nyambal, 772 F.3d at 280.

But that burden, in circumstances like these, is not comparable

to the burden of being forced to litigate the merits of a suit. In

a case like this one, the defendant faces the burden of

answering discovery related to factual questions the defendant

itself placed in dispute to support its immunity claim, after a

court determined that the plaintiff adequately pleaded an

exception to IOIA immunity—a determination that is itself

appealable (and was appealed here). Once the plaintiff

presents that adequately pleaded theory, the defendant “bears

the burden of proving” the claim is not “within a statutory

exception to immunity.” Phoenix Consulting, 216 F.3d at 40.

And when a defendant seeks to meet that burden by disputing

the factual allegations in a complaint regarding immunity,

resolving that dispute may naturally “require[] jurisdictional

12

discovery and factual resolution of immunity questions to take

place.” P&ID, 962 F.3d at 584. Indeed, we have explained

that district courts “must give the plaintiff ample opportunity

to secure and present evidence relevant to the existence of

jurisdiction.” Phoenix Consulting, 216 F.3d at 40 (quotation

marks omitted). And the immunity question must be resolved

“before the [defendant] is required to defend the merits.”

P&ID, 962 F.3d at 584 (citing Phoenix Consulting, 216 F.3d at

39–40). In short, when a defendant disputes a complaint’s

well-pleaded factual allegations with its own evidence aimed

at establishing its immunity, answering discovery targeted to

resolving that dispute is part of the bargain.

Our conclusion is further supported by the idea that

immediate appellate review of a category of orders is unlikely

to have much utility when the type of order is unlikely to be

reversed on appeal. As part of the Cohen analysis, the

Supreme Court has explained that if “interlocutory appeals [of

a category of order] are less likely to bring error-correcting

benefits,” this fact counts against immediate appealability.

Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 316 (1995); see also id. (citing

and quoting Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 416,

434 (1985), for the following proposition: “[T]he fact that

‘[m]ost pretrial orders [of the kind there at issue] are ultimately

affirmed by appellate courts’ militate[s] against immediate

appealability.”). Similarly, other circuits have cited the fact

that a type of order is subject only to abuse-of-discretion

review as a mark against immediate appeal because it suggests

“the likelihood of reversal is too negligible to justify” the costs

of immediate appellate review. Donlon Indus., Inc. v. Forte,

402 F.2d 935, 937 (2d Cir. 1968); accord James v. Jacobson,

6 F.3d 233, 237–38 (4th Cir. 1993); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Omni

Video Games, Inc., 668 F.2d 70, 72 (1st Cir. 1981) (“[W]hen

we are asked to review not a question of controlling law but an

exercise of a judge’s discretion that depended upon the

13

particular facts before him, this factor mitigates against

immediate review.”). That approach makes sense. If a “class

of relevant orders” is, based on its objective characteristics,

inherently less likely to be reversed after appellate review, then

the “cost[s]” of appellate review are harder to “justify” in the

aggregate. Mohawk, 558 U.S. at 108.

Here, the first feature of this case identified above—a prior

judicial determination that the complaint adequately pleads an

exception to IOIA immunity—diminishes the relative

likelihood that an error will be “correct[ed]” via reversal on

appeal. Johnson, 515 U.S. at 316; see Donlon, 402 F.2d at

937. That determination makes jurisdictional discovery more

likely to be appropriate and immediate appellate review less

necessary. Unlike in Nyambal, the plaintiffs here sought

discovery after the district court (and this court) squarely

determined that the complaint adequately pleads an exception

to IOIA immunity. That determination establishes that the

assertion of jurisdiction over PAHO is at least “plausible”

given the complaint’s allegations. PAHO I, 29 F.4th at 711.

The second and third features have a similar effect. When

a defendant then files a factual motion to dismiss disputing the

complaint’s well-pleaded jurisdictional allegations, subsequent

inquiry is further concentrated on those factual issues placed in

contention by the defendant. And when the discovery order

investigates the theories of immunity exceptions the court has

already found adequately pleaded, we can have further

confidence that the discovery granted will be necessary to

resolve the jurisdictional dispute. This procedural posture, in

short, provides objective guardrails that reduce the likelihood

that the ordered discovery is improper. So the risks posed by

deferring review are less likely to “justify” the institutional

costs of our immediate intervention. Mohawk, 558 U.S. at

112; see Johnson, 515 U.S. at 316.

14

PAHO primarily responds by emphasizing our decision in

Nyambal. According to PAHO, that case, in its single

paragraph of analysis, held that every jurisdictional discovery

order involving a defendant invoking IOIA or FSIA immunity

is immediately appealable no matter the circumstances.

We are not persuaded. Nyambal necessarily addressed

only the circumstances presented in that case. The district

court there ordered discovery without any prior assessment of

whether the plaintiff had adequately pleaded an exception to

immunity. See Nyambal, 772 F.3d at 279. That case simply

did not involve a situation like this one, where a court had

determined that the complaint adequately pleaded an exception

to immunity; the defendant disputed the factual allegations

related to that theory, then provided the district court with

evidence of its own selection supporting its view of the facts;

and the trial court ordered discovery related to that theory. For

the reasons we have given, those distinctions matter for the

Cohen analysis.2

We are also wary of the consequences of PAHO’s broad

reading of Nyambal, which seemingly has no limit. PAHO

argues that immediate review is necessary because “subjecting

a foreign sovereign to litigation burdens”—any litigation

burdens—necessarily “triggers the . . . third prong[] of the

collateral-order doctrine.” Appellant’s Brief 23 (quoting

P&ID, 962 F.3d at 582). Taken literally, that approach would

2

Because Nyambal is distinguishable, we need not resolve

whether Jam v. International Finance Corp., 586 U.S. 199 (2019),

effectively overruled Nyambal, see Appellee’s Brief 11, 26, or

whether Nyambal conflicts with prior circuit precedent, see Dodge

et al. Amicus Brief 5, 11, 13 (discussing the availability of

mandamus in our cases Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, and Beecham v.

Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 424 F.3d 1109 (D.C.

Cir. 2005), to address improper jurisdictional discovery).

15

suggest not just that every jurisdictional discovery order is

immediately appealable, but also that any order of any type

entered against a potentially immune defendant is immediately

appealable unless and until the immunity issue has been finally

resolved. After all, any order imposing any burden on such a

defendant could not be retroactively addressed by later review.

But this court has rejected such a sweeping and categorical

approach in cases involving sovereign immunity. See

Beecham v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 424

F.3d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (dismissing appeal from an

order requiring a foreign sovereign to participate in a discovery

conference before immunity was resolved).

The Cohen analysis is sensitive to the risk that “the blunt,

categorical instrument of § 1291 collateral order appeal” will

“unduly delay the resolution of district court litigation and

needlessly burden the courts of appeals.” Mohawk, 558 U.S.

at 112. That risk is certainly present here. Defendants

claiming IOIA or FSIA immunity are already guaranteed a path

to appellate review of a challenge to the court’s subject matter

jurisdiction. The holding PAHO requests—that all

jurisdictional discovery orders are appealable for putatively

immune defendants—would allow seriatim interlocutory

appeals and substantial delay over every interrogatory,

document request, or deposition. This case illustrates the

problem: Nearly eight years have passed, and the question of

immunity has yet to be resolved. PAHO seeks further

“piecemeal, prejudgment appeals,” which “undermine[]

efficient judicial administration and encroach[] upon the

prerogatives of district court judges, who play a special role in

16

managing ongoing litigation.” Id. at 106 (quotation marks

omitted). We reject that request.3

Our approach does create the possibility that potentially

immune defendants will be required to comply with some

jurisdictional discovery orders that might be pared back if this

court engaged in direct review of all such orders. But the

possibility that an error may be “imperfectly reparable” in a

later appeal does not inescapably require immediate review.

Digital Equipment, 511 U.S. at 872. Nor are potentially

immune defendants without recourse against overbroad

discovery orders. If a district court orders jurisdictional

discovery without first identifying well-pleaded allegations

that an exception to immunity applies, leading to the type of

fishing expedition at issue in Nyambal, immediate review is

available. See Nyambal, 772 F.3d at 280. Further, in

appropriate circumstances, a defendant “may ask the district

court to certify, and the court of appeals to accept, an

interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).”

Mohawk, 558 U.S. at 110. And mandamus can provide relief

3

The Tenth Circuit has adopted a similar approach. See

Hansen v. PT Bank Negara Indonesia (Persero), TBK, 601 F.3d

1059 (10th Cir. 2010). In Hansen, the Tenth Circuit concluded that

it had jurisdiction over an appeal from a jurisdictional discovery

order “only if the district court’s order did not adequately limit

permissible discovery to the question of . . . immunity.” Id. at 1064.

Because the defendant had not demonstrated discovery was

unrelated to factual issues bearing on jurisdictional immunity, the

order was not appealable. Id.; see also Maxey ex rel. Maxey v.

Fulton, 890 F.2d 279, 283 (10th Cir. 1989) (discovery orders

“narrowly tailored” to facts bearing on qualified immunity are not

appealable); Asante-Chioke v. Dowdle, 103 F.4th 1126, 1131 (5th

Cir. 2024) (same); 15A Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice &

Procedure § 3914.10.5 (3d ed. 2026) (“For the most part . . . the

strong policies against discovery appeals overcomes the theory of

immunity appeals.”).

17

from particularly egregious discovery orders. See

Papandreou, 139 F.3d at 256.

B

Applying this analysis, we lack jurisdiction over PAHO’s

appeal. The discovery order was issued after a judicial

determination that the complaint adequately alleges facts that

would trigger the commercial activity exception to IOIA

immunity. The district court and this court held that the

complaint adequately pleads that PAHO was “moving money

for a fee” as a “financial intermediary” for U.S.-involved

transactions in the alleged trafficking scheme, and that those

allegations would trigger the commercial activity exception.

PAHO I, 29 F.4th at 715–17. PAHO then filed a factual

motion to dismiss contesting those allegations with its own

evidence. And consistent with both the court’s ruling and

PAHO’s motion, all of the ordered discovery relates to

transactions involving Mais Médicos funds in PAHO bank

accounts, the 5% “fee” PAHO collected for its role in the

program, and the connection of both to the United States.

The district court “approve[d]” three requests for

production to investigate “correspondence touching on the use

of a U.S. bank to facilitate Mais M[é]dicos.” PAHO II, 2024

WL 4251808, at *3. It authorized another four requests for

production along with the request to depose Gerald Anderson,

Director of Administration for PAHO, because they were

“relevant to Plaintiff’s theory that the administration of the

program” through certain “transactions” was “carried on” in

Washington, D.C. Id. The court justified three additional

requests for production to clarify “terms” in documents

“relat[ed] to payments or the movement of money”; to address

“the question of how the 5% fee was ultimately used (and

specifically whether it was used to administer the program in

any way)”; and to probe “the commercial nature of PAHO’s

18

activity.” Id. And it permitted two interrogatories as

“relevant” to the theory these activities were “carried-on” in

the United States, and, again, to “showing the commercial

nature of PAHO’s activity.” Id. The discovery requests, in

short, are focused on “corroborat[ing] that the 5% fee ended up

in the United States.” Id. at *1.

PAHO’s primary argument on this front is that the district

court “erroneously ordered discovery on what it expressly

recognized was a new theory of jurisdiction—one that neither

that court nor this Court ever approved.” Appellant’s Brief

28. We disagree. The district court explicitly stated that it

was not ordering discovery related to any new theories

plaintiffs raised. See PAHO II, 2024 WL 4251808, at *2.

And we are unpersuaded by PAHO’s effort to show that the

discovery is in fact unrelated to the “carried-on” theory to

which the district court directed its order. Take for example

Interrogatory 1, which requests that PAHO “identify all

people . . . who participated from the United States in the

planning, implementation, management, and oversight of

[Mais Médicos] operations and finances.” Id. at *3. PAHO

insists this interrogatory has “nothing to do with the alleged use

of U.S. bank accounts to move money.” Appellant’s Brief 36.

But answers to that interrogatory would identify exactly those

people likely to have information regarding any “use of U.S.

bank accounts to move money.” That is, the request is

certainly “relevant” to plaintiffs’ theory. PAHO II, 2024 WL

4251808, at *2.

Beyond confirming that the discovery order aims to

resolve a factual issue relevant to the theory the court found

well-pleaded, we do not engage in a more granular assessment

of the propriety of this discovery. Our determination that the

discovery targets that theory confirms that immediate appeal is

inappropriate.

19

Further, there is no plausible argument that the district

court has in effect denied PAHO’s claim to immunity or is

otherwise requiring PAHO to litigate on the merits before

resolving that threshold, jurisdictional issue. All agree that

this order, at most, indicates more work must be done to decide

whether IOIA immunity applies.

III

The appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and the

case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

So ordered.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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