Gilliam

Southern District of Texas

ENTERED

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT July 31, 2026

HOUSTON DIVISION

JAYCE GILLIAM, §

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Plaintiff, §

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V. § Civil Action No. H-25-6327

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. SETH NAGEL, et. al., §

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Defendants. §

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ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendants’ 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff's Original Complaint (Document No. 11). Having considered the motion,

submissions, and applicable law, the Court determines that the motion should be

granted.

I. BACKGROUND

This is a matter involving alleged Constitutional violations. On July 13,.2024,

Plaintiff Jayce Gilliam (“Plaintiff’) was on a walk while open carrying arifleona_ □

sling and concealed carrying a handgun. After receiving multiple 911 calls,

Defendants Deputy Seth Nagel and Sergeant Ron Naumann (collectively “Individual

Defendants”) arrived on scene. Ultimately, Plaintiff was arrested for violating Tex.

Penal Code 42.01(a)(8), disorderly conduct. Plaintiff spent a total of thirteen hours

in jail. □

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff filed suit in this Court, pursuant to federal

question jurisdiction, bringing several § 1983 claims against the Individual

Defendants and several § 1983 claims against Defendant Fayette County (the

“County”) under a Monell liability theory. On March 30, 2026, the Individual

Defendants and the County (collectively “Defendants”) moved jointly to dismiss

Plaintiff's claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.’ On

April 7, 2026, Plaintiff responded in opposition.”

Tl. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 12(b)(6) allows dismissal if a plaintiff fails “to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a pleading must

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although “the pleading standard Rule 8 announces

does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . it demands more than . . . ‘labels

and conclusions.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “[A] formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do.” Jd. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, “[t]he

! See Defendants’ 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Original Complaint,

Document No. 11 at 1.

2 See Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss,

Document No. 13 at 1. .

>

‘court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff.’” In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (Sth Cir.

2007) (quoting Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464,

467 (5th Cir. 2004)). To survive the motion, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

“Conversely, ‘when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a

claim of entitlement to relief, this basic deficiency should . .. be exposed at the point

of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court.’” Cuvillier

v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (Sth Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558).

I. LAW & ANALYSIS

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's claims, contending that each fails to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In response, Plaintiff contends that

his claims against both the Individual Defendants and the County are sufficiently

pled. The Court will consider, in turn, Defendants’ motion as it relates to the

Individual Defendants and the County.

A. Individual Defendants

The Individual Defendants contend, in relevant part, that they “are entitled to

qualified immunity for all of Plaintiff Gilliam’s claims.” In response, Plaintiff

3 Defendants’ 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Original Complaint, Document

No. 11 at 11.

contends that “Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity because their

actions violated clearly established law and were unreasonable, objectively, or even

subjectively unreasonable.”

When government officials are sued for a Constitutional violation under

Section 1983, they may assert the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. Porter

v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 612 (Sth Cir. 2004). “Qualified

immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from

[civil] liability ‘unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Glenn v.

City of Tyler, 242 F.3d 307, 312 (Sth Cir. 2001) (quoting Gibson v. Rich, 44 F.3d

274, 276 (Sth Cir. 1995)). The defense of qualified immunity provides ample room

for mistaken judgments on the government actors’ part and protects “all but the

plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Estate of Davis ex rel.

McCully v. City of N. Richland Hills, 406 F.3d 375, 380 (Sth Cir. 2005) (quoting

Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). Qualified immunity is “immunity from

suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 237

(2009) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)).

4 Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Document

No. 13 at 5.

Once qualified immunity is asserted, therefore, the burden shifts to the

plaintiff to demonstrate the defense does not apply. See McClendon v. City of

Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 323 (5th Cir. 2002). This burden requires the plaintiff to

allege sufficient facts showing that: (1) the defendants violated a clearly established

constitutional right; and (2) the defendants’ actions were objectively unreasonable

under the circumstances. Collins v. Ainsworth, 382 F.3d 529, 537 (5th Cir. 2004).

This inquiry also requires a court to “ask whether the law so clearly and

unambiguously prohibited his conduct that every reasonable official would

understand that what he is doing violates the law.” Morgan v. Swanson, 696 F.3d

359, 370 (Sth Cir. 2011). “In other words, existing precedent must have placed the

statutory or constitutional question confronted by the official beyond debate.”

Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 779 (2014) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563

U.S. 731, 741 (2011)).

Here, the Individual Defendants have asserted qualified immunity.°

Accordingly, it is now the plaintiff's burden to establish that the Individual

Defendants’ actions were objectively unreasonable and violated a clearly established

constitutional right. See Collins, 382 F.3d at 537. Plaintiff contends that the

> Defendants’ 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Original Complaint, Document

No. 11 at 11.

Individual Defendants violated his Second, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments.°

As such, Plaintiff contends that the following clearly established rights were

violated: (1)”[t]he right to carry firearms openly in Texas was clearly established[;]”

(2)“[t]he right to be free from arrest without probable cause was clearly

established[;] and (3)“[t]he right to be free from excessive force was clearly

established[.]”” Having reviewed the facts in this matter, the Court finds that it need

not address whether or not a clearly established right was violated because Plaintiff

has failed to allege sufficient facts to show that the Individual Defendants’ actions

were objectively unreasonable.

Outside of the conclusory allegations about “what reasonable officer[s] would

have known”, Plaintiff's only argument directly relating to reasonableness is that

“Tw]hen Defendants arrived on scene, the La Grange Police Chief was already on

scene and did not have his gun drawn. Was the chief unreasonable, or were the much

younger Defendants? If an experienced law man like the police chief felt it was

unreasonable . . . how is it reasonable for Defendants?” The Court rejects this

argument and finds that one officer’s subjective belief that drawing his weapon was

6 See Plaintiffs Response in Opposition to Defendants ” Motion to Dismiss,

Document No. 13 at 18.

7 Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Document

No. 13 at 18.

8 Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Document

No. 13 at 15-16, 19.

unnecessary does not establish that the other two officers’ decisions to draw their

weapons were objectively unreasonable.’ Furthermore, the Court notes the facts in

this matter, including that several 911 calls had been made about a man with a rifle

and that Plaintiff was, at the time the Individual Defendants arrived on scene,

suspected of violating Texas Penal Code § 42.01(a)(8).!°

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to plausibly

allege that the Individual Defendants’ actions, throughout any portion of the

interaction with Plaintiff, were objectively unreasonable in light of the relevant facts

and applicable law.!! Considering this finding, and the Fifth Circuit’s clear guidance

requiring a Plaintiff to show objectively unreasonable actions to overcome qualified

immunity, the Court finds that the Individual Defendants are entitled to qualified

immunity and that the motion to dismiss, with respect to the Individual Defendants,

° The Court notes that it has inquired as to “whether the law so clearly and

unambiguously prohibited his conduct that every reasonable official would understand that

what he is doing violates the law.” Morgan v. Swanson, 696 F.3d 359, 370 (Sth Cir. 2011).

Based on the clear guidance of the Fifth Circuit in Morgan, the Court finds that one

officer’s actions are insufficient to establish objective unreasonableness.

10 See Defendants’ 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Original Complaint,

Document No. 11, Exhibit 3 (/st 91] Call), Exhibit 4 (2nd 911 Call); see also Tex. Penal

Code § 42.01(a)(8) (Making it an offence to intentionally or knowingly “display[] a firearm

or other deadly weapon in a public place in a manner calculated to alarm.”).

!! The Court further notes that, to the extent Plaintiff brings claims connected to his

arrest, neither of the Individual Defendants in this matter were the arresting officers.

should be granted. The Court will now consider the pending motion to dismiss as it

relates to the County.

B. The County Defendant

The County moves to dismiss Plaintiff's Monell liability claim, contending

that it has not been plausibly pled.'? In response, Plaintiff contends that he has

sufficiently pled a Monell liability claim for failure to train and failure to supervise.!?

Generally, to successfully bring a Monell liability claim for failure to train or

supervise “[a] plaintiff must show that (1) the municipality’s training policy or

procedure was inadequate; (2) the inadequate training policy was a ‘moving force’

in causing violation of the plaintiffs rights; and (3) the municipality was deliberately

indifferent in adopting its training policy. Valle v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d 536,

544 (Sth Cir. 2010); Goodman v. Harris County, 571 F.3d 388, 395 (Sth Cir.2009)

(applying the same test to claims for the failure to supervise). “To establish

deliberate indifference, ‘a plaintiff usually must demonstrate a pattern of violations

and that the inadequacy of the training is obvious and obviously likely to result in a

12 Defendants’ 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Original Complaint,

Document No. 11 at 17.

\3 Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Document

No. 13 at 19-21.

constitutional violation.”” Goodman, 571 F.3d at 395 (citing Cousins v. Small, 325

F.3d 627, 637 (5th Cir. 2003).

Here, the County contends, in relevant part, that Plaintiff has failed to plead a

pattern of violations, and thus, failed to adequately plead a Monell claim for failure

to supervise or failure to train.'4 In response, Plaintiff contends that “[w]hile

Defendants argue that Plaintiff must allege a pattern of similar violations, this

requirement is not absolute at the pleading stage when other facts support deliberate

indifference.”'!> The Court notes that Plaintiff cites no authority to support this

contention. In contrast, the Court notes that the Fifth Circuit does require a showing

of prior incidents. See Munajj v. City of Fredericksburg, No. 25-50353, 2026 WL

897005 at *4 (Sth Cir. Apr. 1, 2026) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of

plaintiffs case when plaintiff failed to “‘cite sufficiently numerous prior

incidents[.]’” (citing Verastique v. City of Dallas, 106 F.4th 427, 452 (Sth Cir.

2024))). Based on the foregoing, and the clear guidance of the Fifth Circuit that a

plaintiff must identify sufficient prior incidents, the Court finds that Plaintiff has

failed to identify any prior incidents sufficiently similar to the current matter, and

thus, finds that the County’s motion should be granted as to Plaintiff's Monell claim.

4 See Defendants’ 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Original Complaint,

Document No. 11 at 20.

15 Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Document

No. 13 at 21. .

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby

ORDERS that Defendants’ 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Original

Complaint (Document No. 11) is GRANTED. The Court further

ORDERS that Plaintiff's claims against all Defendants are hereby

DISMISSED.

SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on this BO day of July, 2026.

United States District Judge

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