GROHS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

STEVEN GROHS, et al.,

Case No. 25–cv–00637–ESK–EAP

Plaintiffs,

v.

OPINION

CRYSTAL RAUPP, et al.,

Defendants.

KIEL, U.S.D.J.

Pro se plaintiffs Steven Grohs and Joseph Walls challenge the

constitutionality of their conditions of confinement under the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendment. They bring this action against New Jersey

Department of Corrections (NJDOC) officials Crystal Raupp and P. McGill1 in

their individual capacities. While defendants seek dismissal of this action for

failure to state a claim and qualified immunity (Motion to Dismiss) (ECF No. 14),

plaintiffs seek injunctive relief to compel defendants to repair certain conditions

of their confinement (Motion for Preliminary Injunction) (ECF No. 23 (Prelim.

Inj. Mot.)). Because plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that defendants

deliberately denied them adequate access to hot showers, laundry services, and

air conditioning, the Motion to Dismiss is granted, and the amended complaint is

dismissed without prejudice. The Motion for Preliminary Injunction is denied as

moot.

1 Defendants refer to McGill as Nah. They indicate that Nah is formally known

as McGill. (ECF No. 14–1 p. 1; ECF No. 18 p. 1.)

I. BACKGROUND

On January 21, 2025, plaintiffs commenced this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action

for declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and damages. (ECF No. 1.) I granted

their applications to proceed in forma pauperis and permitted most of the claims

asserted in their initial complaint to proceed past screening. (ECF Nos. 3, 5.)

On October 16, 2025, defendants sought to dismiss the initial complaint, but

their motion was administratively terminated. (ECF Nos. 11, 14.) On

October 24, 2025, plaintiffs filed the amended complaint. (See generally ECF

No. 12 (Am. Compl.).)

The amended complaint asserts that plaintiffs are civilly committed

residents at the Special Treatment Unit (STU) in Avenel, New Jersey. (Id.

¶¶ 3–5.) They reside in the West Housing Unit of the STU’s Main building.

(Id. ¶¶ 12, 74.) Grohs, who was admitted to the STU in 2011,2 suffers from a

shattered vertebra, tennis elbow, arthritic toe and methicillin-resistant

staphylocuccus aureus. (Id. ¶¶ 51–55.) Walls, who was admitted to the STU

in 2005, suffers from arthritic knees, asthma and high blood pressure. (Id.

¶¶ 63, 64.)

Plaintiffs’ grievances against defendants fall into three categories. First,

they allege that the showers in their housing unit sometimes produce cold

water. (Id. ¶¶ 33–72.) The push-button controls in the showers do not allow

residents to adjust the unpredictable water temperature. (Id. ¶¶ 37, 43.)

Despite defendants responding to plaintiffs’ grievances that the hot water has

been repaired, the issue is ongoing. (Id. ¶¶ 56–61, 65–72.)

Next, plaintiffs assert that their laundry facility violates state

requirements and do not consistently provide clean and dry clothes. (Id.

2 Grohs is a repeat filer who has commenced several lawsuits against the DOC

and various state officials in this District.

¶¶ 73–103.) Grohs alleges that his clothes were returned damp on January 4

and January 7, 2025, and that a lockdown caused his clothing to remain

unwashed for several days. (Id. ¶¶ 93, 95, 96.) Walls alleges that over a six-

month period, he repeatedly lacked clean kitchen-work clothing. (Id. ¶ 102.)

Although the North and West Housing Units share a laundry facility, and only

one of the three dryers available to 81 residents is operational, the North

Housing Unit residents do not experience any of these hardship. (Id. ¶¶ 75,

78.) Defendants are aware of these issues but have not taken any remedial

action. (Id. ¶ 75.) Instead, several new dryers were installed in different

housing units. (Id. ¶ 85.) Because residents can keep only two plastic

hangers and eight days’ worth of clothing in their rooms, plaintiffs claim they

“have no definitive way to dry their wet clothing” or “to maintain a reasonable

degree of hygiene.” (Id. ¶¶ 27, 76, 82, 86.)

Lastly, plaintiffs take issue with defendants not repairing the air

conditioning during the summer of 2025. (Id. ¶¶ 104–131.) Grohs alleges

that in June 2025, his room reached 84 degrees Fahrenheit for 21 days. (Id.

¶ 124.) Walls similarly alleges that his room reached 83 degrees Fahrenheit

for 16 days. (Id. ¶ 128.) Both allege sleep disruption, lethargy, and impaired

participation in treatment. (Id. ¶¶ 126, 127.) The extreme heat and high

humidity has caused black mold to grow in a number of rooms, slippery floors

and stairs railings, water dripping from walls, and foggy windows. (Id. ¶¶ 118,

119.)

II. MOTION TO DISMISS

Although the Court preliminary reviewed plaintiffs’ claims under 28

U.S.C. § 1915 (ECF No. 5), that analysis did not determine whether their

allegations would survive a properly supported motion to dismiss filed by a

defendant after service. See Richardson v. Cascade Skating Rink, No. 19–

08935, 2020 WL 7383188, at *2 (D.N.J. Dec. 16, 2020) (“[T]his Court recognizes

[a] § 1915(e) screening determination is a preliminary and interlocutory

holding, subject to revision at any time prior to entry of final judgment.”

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (Rule) 12(b)(6), when deciding

a motion to dismiss, a court accepts all well-pled facts as true, construes the

complaint in the plaintiff’s favor, and determines “whether, under any

reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.”

Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal

quotation marks omitted). “Under [Rule] 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a

‘short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge, the plaintiff’s claims must be facially

plausible, meaning that the well-pled facts “allow[ ] the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Id. at 678. The allegations must be “more than labels and conclusions, and a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly,

550 U.S. at 555. “In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must consider

only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record,

as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant’s claims are

based upon these documents.” Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir.

2010).

A plaintiff’s pleading obligation is to set forth “a short and plain statement

of the claim,” which “give[s] the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and

the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (second alteration

in original). In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, a court must “take

note of the elements the plaintiff must plead to state a claim. Second, it should

identify allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not

entitled to the assumption of truth. Finally, when there are well-pleaded

factual allegations, the court should assume their veracity and then determine

whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Connelly v. Lane

Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). “[A] complaint’s

allegations of historical fact continue to enjoy a highly favorable standard of

review at the motion-to-dismiss stage of proceedings.” Id. at 790.

A. Conditions of Confinement

Plaintiffs argue that their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment

constitutional rights have been violated by the STU’s conditions. Eighth

Amendment claims challenge cruel and unusual prison conditions. Grohs v.

Yatauro, 984 F. Supp. 2d 273, 283 (D.N.J. 2013). “In such … cases, ‘a prison

official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an

inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and

disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both

be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial

risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.’” Id. (quoting

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). “Thus the mental element is a

subjective one: deliberate indifference.” Id. “And a deprivation that is

sufficiently ‘serious’ is a denial of a ‘minimal civilized measure of life's

necessities.’” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). “That generally implies

that prison officials must provide adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical

care, and must institute reasonable safety-measures.” Id. “To fall short of

that standard is to exceed the proper bounds of punishment.” Id.

Plaintiffs are not prison inmates. Rather, they are confined pursuant to

a civil order of commitment. “Certainly, it is true as a general matter that

persons involuntarily committed are entitled to more considerate treatment

and better conditions of confinement than are persons who are being criminally

punished.” Id. “[T]he state has no less of a duty to provide civilly committed

persons with adequate food, shelter, clothing, medical care, and safety

measures.” Id. “[B]ecause civil commitment is not punishment, the

hardships of civil confinement cannot be punitive; they must “bear some

reasonable relation to the [nonpunitive] purpose for which persons are

committed.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250,

265 (2001)). “When analyzing conditions of civil commitment, some judges in

this District have continued to rely on Eighth Amendment “deliberate

indifference” standards, either alone, by analogy, or in combination with other

factors.” Id. at 284. But other judges find that “it is the Fourteenth

Amendment, not the Eighth, that is most applicable.” Grohs v. Santiago, No.

13–03877, 2014 WL 4657116, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 2014).

“In certain contexts … case law has analyzed conditions of confinement …

under the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Yatauro, 984

F. Supp. 2d at 283. “That analysis requires a court to weigh an individual’s

liberty interests against the relevant interests of the state” under the “standard

of reasonable ‘professional judgment.’” Id. In other words, “[t]he Fourteenth

Amendment requires that committed persons not be subjected to conditions

that amount to punishment, or exceed the proper bounds of professional

discretion.” Santiago, 2014 WL 4657116, at *3. The “‘professional judgment’

standard applies to ‘professional decisionmakers,’ defined as ‘person[s]

competent, whether by education, training or experience, to make the

particular decision at issue.’” Yatauro, 984 F. Supp. 2d at 283 (alteration in

original) (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 n.30 (1982)); see Shaw

by Strain v. Stackhouse, 920 F.2d 1135, 1147 (3d Cir. 1990) (applying to a claim

that personnel of a state mental institution had failed to protect a patient from

assault the professional judgment standard analysis to the institution’s

superintendent, program coordinator, unit manager, resident supervisor, and

recreation director but the deliberate indifference standard to residential

service aids and nonprofessionals who lacked decision-making authority).

“A central issue, then, is whether the conditions of confinement cross the

line that separates institutional administration from punishment.” Santiago,

2014 WL 4657116, at *4. “A court must decide whether the disability is

imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it is but an incident of some

other legitimate governmental purpose.” Id. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.

520, 538–39 (1979)). “Absent a showing of an expressed intent to punish on

the part of the detention facility officials, that determination generally will turn

on whether [it has] an alternative purpose … and whether it appears excessive

in relation to that purpose.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Bell, 441 U.S.

at 538–39.) “Thus, if a particular condition or restriction … is reasonably

related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not, without more,

amount to ‘punishment.’” Id. (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 538–39).

“Conversely, if a restriction or condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate

goal-if it is arbitrary or purposeless-a court may permissibly infer that the

purpose of the governmental action is punishment that may not be

constitutionally inflicted upon [civilly committed inmates].” Id. (alteration in

original) (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 538–39. In other words, the plaintiff must

“show that the defendants acted in a manner evincing ‘a reckless disregard of a

known risk of harm.’” Carson v. New Jersey Dep’t of Corr., No. 16–05163, 2019

WL 2137364, at *4 (D.N.J. May 16, 2019) (quoting Stokes v. Lanigan, No. 12–

01478, 2012 WL 4662487, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 2, 2012)). “This requires a

showing of more than mere negligence.” Id.

1. Hot Water

“The adequacy, or not, of hot water has not given rise to a specialized

jurisprudence with respect to civilly committed persons.” Yatauro, 984 F.

Supp. 2d at 287 (“[T]here is little or no case law on claims on inadequate hot

water” in the civil commitment context and “Eighth Amendment criminal cases

must be applied with care in this context.”). “There is some surface plausibility

that … hot water bears no relation to the legitimate purpose of confining the

residents at” the STU. Id. at 285–86 (“The New Jersey Sexually Violent

Predator’s Act, under which [plaintiffs] are detained, has two fundamental

purposes: to protect the public from dangerous predators and to treat sex

offenders who are, by definition, suffering from a mental abnormality.”) Id.

Yet “[t]here is also some authority for considering adequate hot water as a

reasonable condition of confinement.” Id. “That is particularly true when

inadequate hot water is combined with other factors affecting health and

safety.” Id. “Certainly a complete failure to take steps to prevent a plaintiff

with a medical condition from being daily doused with cold water would

plausibly give rise to such a claim.” Id. at 288.

Here, plaintiffs argue that “one cannot get any reasonable length of time

of hot water” when showering in their housing unit. (Am. Compl. ¶ 43.)

While Grohs alleges that cold showers have contributed to him “suffering from

reoccurring and debilitating back, shoulder, and foot pain, … difficulty walking

correctly, and … severe pain when attempting to sleep” (id. ¶ 62), Walls does

not assert how cold showers have affected him (see id. ¶¶ 63–72). Plaintiffs

submitted several grievances about the hot water issue, noting that only a

limited number of showers are useable. (Id. ¶ 36.) Defendants responded to

these grievances, advising plaintiffs that maintenance either repaired the issue

or were in the process of doing so. (Id. ¶¶ 57–60; 65–72). The amended

complaint does not specify whether this issue is ongoing. (See generally Am.

Compl.) But, the fact that defendants were responsive to plaintiffs’ grievances

and took measures to correct the issue demonstrates that defendants neither

departed from acceptable professional judgment standards nor acted

deliberately indifferent to the situation. See Brooks v. Camden Cnty. Jail, No.

17–00975, 2018 WL 747374, at *7 (D.N.J. Feb. 7, 2018). Since “the mere fact

that the water in a jail cell was cold on isolated occasions during a discrete

period of time, without more, is not sufficient to rise to the level of a

constitutional violation,” I find that plaintiffs fail to state an Eighth or

Fourteenth Amendment claims for lack of hot water. Id.

2. Laundry Services

Absent proof that inadequate laundry services were provided to inmates

specifically to punish them, laundry services are not considered a basic

constitutional right. Carson, 2019 WL 2137364, at *4; Liles v. Camden Cnty.

Dep’t of Corr., 225 F. Supp. 2d 450, 461 (D.N.J. 2002). Particularly when

alternative laundry options, such as hand washing and air drying, are available

and “no disease or injury, nor any mental illness as a result of the laundry

conditions” is asserted, courts will not find isolated or short-lived laundry

disruptions to rise to a requite hardship level. Carson, 2019 WL 2137364, *4.

The amended complaint does not state how or in what fashion defendants

were or became responsible for the laundry in the unit. See Davis v. Yates, No.

15–06943, 2016 WL 5508809, at *8 (D.N.J. Sept. 27, 2016) (finding that the

allegation that the defendants were aware of issues were too general to hold

defendants personally liable). Nor are there allegations of how defendants

personally promulgated or implemented a policy or practice denying plaintiffs

and other residents laundry services. See id. Although Grohs alleges that his

medical condition prevents him from hand-washing his clothing, he identifies

no resulting injury rising to the level of a constitutional violation. (Id. ¶¶ 97–

99.) Beyond Walls asserting that he was forced to wear dirty clothes to his

kitchen shift, he asserts that he “experienced the same or similar laundry

services as described and as suffered by … Grohs.” (Id. ¶ 103.) These

allegations do not sufficiently describe whether defendants imposed such

conditions to punish plaintiffs or to cause them any sufficiently serious harm.

To the extent plaintiffs take issue with new dryers being installed in other

housing units, “it is not for the Court to question the wisdom of the” STU as to

why they replaced the laundry machines in one section but not the other. See

Carson, 2019 WL 2137364, at *4 (noting that the DOC and its employees have

“a valid, legitimate government interest in operating the STU and its laundry

facilities in a reasonable and economical fashion”). While damp or dirty

clothing may cause discomfort, “the Constitution ‘does not mandate comfortable

prisons’” or places of confinement. Liles, 225 F.Supp.2d at 461. Because

alternative means of laundering or drying clothing remain available, plaintiffs

allege no requisite hardship that amount to a constitutional deprivation.

3. Air Conditioning

When conditions of extreme heat contribute to unsanitary conditions

harming a plaintiff’s health and safety, courts may find that a plaintiff

sufficiently pleaded a constitutional violation claim. Grohs v. Lanigan, No.

16–07083, 2019 WL 1500621, at *11 (D.N.J. Apr. 5, 2019). But the

Constitution does not confer a categorical right to air conditioning. See id.

Thus, the relevant inquiry is whether heat, considering its intensity, duration,

ventilation, available mitigation, and effects on health, creates an objectively

serious risk and whether officials impose or disregard that risk in a

constitutionally culpable manner. See Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278,

1294–98 (11th Cir. 2004).

I recognize that discomfort, lethargy, and sleep disruption caused by

summer heat may be unpleasant. But plaintiffs have not pleaded facts

showing either an objectively severe condition or a subjectively culpable state

of mind. Alleging that defendants are aware of this issue merely indicate

awareness of a maintenance problem. (See Am. Compl. ¶ 117.) Plaintiffs do

not specify whether defendants received a complaint concerning a serious

medical or safety threat related to the heat or that defendants intentionally

refused to take reasonable corrective measures. Furthermore, the amended

complaint does not allege facts about fans, water, showers, out-of-cell time, or

other measures from which it could be plausibly inferred that the conditions,

considered as a whole, were extreme and punitive.

B. Qualified Immunity

Defendants argue that the amended complaint should be dismissed

because they are protected by qualified immunity. Of note, “the defense of

qualified immunity is available only for damages claims – not for claims

requesting prospective injunctive relief.” Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455

F.3d 225, 244 (3d Cir. 2006). “Thus, a qualified immunity defense would have

no impact on plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief.” Davis, 2016 WL 5508809,

at *8.

“Qualified immunity protects government officials … from liability for

damages as long as their conduct does not violate ‘clearly established statutory

or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’”

Yatauro, 984 F. Supp. 2d at 286 (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,

231, (2009)). “It does not matter whether the error relates to the law, the facts,

or some mixture of the two.” Id. “As long as an official reasonably believes

that his or her conduct complies with the law, qualified immunity will shield

the official from liability.” Id. “Because qualified immunity is an immunity

from suit, and not just a defense to liability, it is effectively lost if a case

erroneously proceeds to trial.” Id. at 287. Thus, “it is desirable to resolve the

question of qualified immunity as early as possible, ideally at the motion to

dismiss stage.” Id.

“Immunity does not extend to all officers who engage in necessary official

acts.” Id. at 286. “Rather, officers’ individual immunity from suit under

Section 1983 is predicated on ‘a considered inquiry into the immunity

historically accorded the relevant official at common law and the interests

behind it.’” Id. (quoting Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 29 (1991)). “Officials who

seek exemption from personal liability have the burden of showing that such an

exemption is justified by overriding considerations of public policy, and the

Court has recognized a category of ‘qualified’ immunity that avoids

unnecessarily extending the scope of the traditional concept of absolute

immunity.” Id. (quoting Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988)).

When assessing a government official’s qualified immunity claims, a court

must decide whether (1) “the official’s conduct violated a constitutional or

federal right”; and (2) “the right at issue was “clearly established.” Id. at 287

(quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)); Pearson, 555 U.S. at 244

(holding that these two prongs may be analyzed in either order). “Whether

conduct violates a constitutional right …. is a matter of applying case law to the

facts alleged.” Yatauro, 984 F. Supp. 2d at 287. “Whether such a

constitutional violation is ‘clearly established’” is a question of whether it is

“sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is

doing violates that right.” Id. (quoting Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 159

(3d Cir. 2012)). “That is to say, the right the official is alleged to have violated

must have been ‘clearly established’ in a particularized way and the court must

define the right with the appropriate level of specificity.” Id. (quoting

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). “Even if there is no

precedent directly on point, … an action may still violate a clearly established

right where a general constitutional rule already identified in the decisional

law applies with ‘obvious clarity’ to the specific conduct in question.” Id.

As presently pleaded, defendants are protected by qualified immunity.

For the reasons discussed above, the amended complaint does not plausibly

allege that defendants violated a clearly established constitutional right.

III. MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION3

“A preliminary injunction is ‘an extraordinary remedy’ that should be

granted only in limited circumstances.” Id. at 288 (quoting Am. Tel. and Tel.

Co. v. Winback and Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1426–27 (3d

Cir.1994)). “In ruling on a motion for a preliminary injunction, the court must

consider: (1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits at a final

hearing; (2) the extent to which the plaintiff is being irreparably harmed by the

conduct complained of; (3) the extent to which the defendant will suffer

irreparable harm if the preliminary injunction is issued; and (4) the public

interest.” Id. An injunction should be issued “only if the plaintiff has

produced evidence sufficient to convince the court that all four factors favor the

relief.” Id. at 288–89.

Plaintiffs seek an order requiring defendants to repair and/or replace their

housing unit’s air-conditioning system. (Prelim. Inj. Mot. p. 3.) Plaintiffs

argue that since April 2025, “there has been one problem after another” with

the air-conditioning and that the “temperature of [their] rooms has been

inhumanely excessive.” (Id.) As recent as April 2026, their rooms have

exceeded 80 degrees Fahrenheit. (Id. pp. 4, 14, 18.) One day after Grohs

requested that the STU’s administration service the air-conditioning system, A.

Gangi, an administrator not named in this action, stated that the STU was

aware of what needed to be done. (Id. p. 15.) On April 17, 2026, plaintiffs

3 Although I granted plaintiffs’ request for an extension to file a reply in further

support of the Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 28), I have discretion to rule

on a motion without awaiting a reply brief. See JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v.

Roggio, 19-6330, 2024 WL 4800723, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 4, 2024). Because the moving

and opposition briefs provide a sufficient basis to resolve the Motion for a Preliminary

Injunction, the order granting plaintiffs’ extension request is vacated.

again complained of the temperature of their rooms, (Id. pp. 15, 18.) On the

same day, Gangi advised them that the air-conditioning will be turned once the

weather is more consistent and the cold season has passed. (Id.) Yet,

plaintiffs assert that the issue persists, and that they have difficulty sleeping,

headaches, a loss of energy, and an inability to participate meaningfully in

therapy. (Id. pp. 16, 19.)

In opposition to the Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 26),

defendants submit the certification of John Falvey, the NJDOC’s director of

legal services. (ECF No. 26–1). Falvey certifies that the STU’s air

conditioning has been operating since late April 2026. (Id. ¶ 12.) On May 15,

2026, maintenance measured the temperature in plaintiffs’ housing unit and

found temperatures ranging from 69 to 72.5 degrees Fahrenheit, consistent

with temperatures in the STU’s other units. (Id. ¶ 10.)

Since the record reflects that the air-conditioning has since been turned

on, I find that the Motion for Preliminary Injunction to be moot. (Id. ¶¶ 10,

12.) Plaintiffs’ complained-of condition no longer exists. Thus, plaintiffs

cannot show a presently threatened injury, much less one that is imminent and

irreparable. The possibility that the system could malfunction in the future is

insufficient. Should materially different conditions arise, plaintiffs may

pursue relief based on an appropriate evidentiary record. But plaintiffs are

cautioned that absent a showing of deliberate indifference, they will not succeed

on the merits of such a claim. See Lanigan, 2019 WL 1500621, at *11;

Chandler, 379 F.3d at 1294–98.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and

the Motion for Preliminary Injunction is DENIED. An appropriate order

accompanies this opinion.

/s/ Edward S. Kiel

EDWARD S. KIEL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: July 27, 2026