Daniels

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

DARRIAN DANIELS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 3:25-cv-3120-DJQ

)

LUPITA GARCIA, et al. )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and presently incarcerated at Western Illinois

Correctional Center brought the present lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging

an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need

against Defendants Garcia and Little in their individual capacities. The matter comes

before this Court for ruling on Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended

Complaint (Doc. 62) and Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of

exhaustion of administrative remedies. (Doc. 65).

I. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff’s motion seeks leave to add Western Illinois Correctional Center’s

warden as a defendant in this case. Plaintiff states that the Court previously notified the

warden of his allegations that he was not receiving mental health treatment “because

[Defendants] Garcia and Littles don’t work at Western Il. C.C. anymore and I’m being

denied all the mental health staff’s names so someone has to be held accountable.” (Doc.

62-1 at 2). Plaintiff asserts that the warden should now be held liable because he has

notice of his allegations regarding mental health treatment, but he failed to take action.

Regarding Plaintiff’s latter argument, the Court’s Text Order entered March 20,

2026, directed the Clerk to send a courtesy copy of Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary

injunction to the warden “to inform him or her of Plaintiff's allegations re: mental health

treatment.” (Doc. 40). Courts in this district routinely forward these types of pleadings

to wardens for purposes of notifying these officials of a potential issue and affording

them an opportunity to address them before court proceedings may be able to do so.

The Court’s actions should not be construed as an attempt to impose liability on any

person.

A district court should “freely give leave [to amend a pleading] when justice so

requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “[D]istrict courts have broad discretion to deny leave

to amend where there is undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, repeated failures to

cure deficiencies, undue prejudice to defendants, or where the amendment would be

futile.” Mulvania v. Sheriff of Rock Island Cnty., 850 F.3d 849, 855 (7th Cir. 2017).

The proposed amended complaint Plaintiff attached to his motion does not

include the allegations currently pending in this case. Any amended complaint the

Court allows will supersede hiss previous complaints, resulting in the dismissal of his

claims against Defendants Garcia and Littles. Beal v. Beller, 847 F.3d 897, 901 (7th Cir.

2017) (“For pleading purposes, once an amended complaint is filed, the original

complaint drops out of the picture.”). The Court assumes Plaintiff does not want to

dismiss these claims, and absent the inclusion of all allegations against all officials

Plaintiff intends to sue, Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint is the type of piecemeal

pleading the Court does not accept. See (Doc. 35 at 2, ¶ 2). Plaintiff filed his motion

outside of the 90-day deadline set forth in the Court’s Scheduling Order. Id.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act also requires Plaintiff to fully exhaust his

administrative remedies regarding any new claims and officials before seeking a

judicial remedy. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395 (7th Cir. 2004).

Plaintiff also cannot hold the warden liable for the actions of any subordinates. Vance v.

Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Section 1983 creates a cause of action based on

personal liability and predicated upon fault; thus, liability does not attach unless the

individual defendant caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation.”).

The Court finds that Plaintiff failed to comply with the format and deadline

requirements imposed in the Court’s Scheduling Order, and that any proposed

amendment would be futile. Plaintiff’s motion is denied.

II. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A. Facts

Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on May 8, 2025. (Doc. 1). The Court dismissed

Plaintiff’s original complaint with leave to amend pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (Doc. 13). Plaintiff filed an amended complaint containing

allegations the Court summarized as follows:

Plaintiff alleges inmates at Menard Correctional Center with whom he

shared a cell had attacked him on two separate occasions: (1) a 2012 attack

that left him partially blind in his left eye; and (2) a 2024 attack that

resulted in first and second-degree burns on his upper body. Plaintiff

alleges that a psychiatrist thereafter diagnosed him with “fear and

depression” and issued him a permit to be housed by himself. Plaintiff

alleges that he was then transferred to Western Illinois Correctional

Center.

Plaintiff alleges that he told his mental health counselor, Defendant

Garcia, about the attacks, his single-cell status, and his diagnoses, but that

she refused to issue a single-cell permit or otherwise address his mental

health issues. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Cooley and Ruiz directed

other prison guards to “upgrade” disciplinary charges for refusing

housing after Plaintiff had twice refused to be housed with a cellmate as

retaliation for Plaintiff’s prior refusals. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant

Cooley and Ruiz, in their capacities as members of the Adjustment

Committee, found him guilty and sent him to segregation for 42 days.

Plaintiff alleges that an unidentified prison official occasionally denied

him meals while he was housed in segregation and that Defendant Garcia

refused to provide “all the mental health treatment for trauma that I was

receiving in Menard C.C.” Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Greene ignored

his grievances.

Plaintiff alleges that upon his release from segregation he continued to

refuse housing and that Defendant Forman and Franklin “upgraded” his

charges for disobeying a direct order. Plaintiff alleges he returned to

segregation for 56 days. Plaintiff alleges that unidentified guards again

occasionally denied him meals. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Littles

refused to provide mental health treatment.

(Doc. 22 at 2-3). The Court found that Plaintiff stated an Eighth Amendment claim for

deliberate indifference to a serious mental health need against Defendants Garcia and

Littles in their individual capacities based on his allegations that they refused to

provide any mental health treatment. Id. at 4. The Court dismissed all other alleged

claims and defendants. Id. at 11.

Illinois prison grievance rules require an inmate to first attempt to resolve their

issues informally with prison staff, and, if unsuccessful, a prisoner may file a written

grievance on a form provided by the prison. 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 504.810(a). The

grievance must be filed “within 60 days after the discovery of the incident, occurrence,

or problem that gives rise to the grievance,” unless the prisoner “can demonstrate that a

grievance was not timely filed for good cause….” Id. § 504.810(a). The grievance must

“contain factual details regarding each aspect of the offender’s complaint, including

what happened, when, where and the name of each person who is the subject of or who

is otherwise involved in the complaint.” Id. § 504.810(c). If an inmate does not know the

names of the officials involved, he “must include as much descriptive information

about the individual as possible.” Id.

A grievance officer considers each grievance and submits a recommendation to

the Chief Administrative Officer (“CAO”), who notifies the inmate of his decision. Id. §

504.830(d). An inmate may appeal the CAO’s decision to the Director/Administrative

Review Board, but he or she must do so within 30 days of the decision. Id. § 504.850(a).

Once an appeal is received, the Administrative Review Board (“ARB”) reviews the

appeal and provides the Director with a written report of its findings and

recommendations. Id. § 504.850(e).

An inmate may also submit a request for a grievance to be handled on an

emergency basis by forwarding it directly to the CAO. Id. § 504.840. If determined to be

a non-emergency, the CAO must notify the inmate that he or she may resubmit the

grievance via the normal procedures. Id. § 504.840(c). If the CAO determines that the

grievance warrants emergency review, “he or she shall expedite processing of the

grievance and respond to the offender, indicating what action shall be or has been

taken.” Id. § 504.840(b).

The prison grievances rules identify four circumstances that require an inmate to

send the grievance directly to the ARB:

1) Decisions regarding protective custody placement, including

continued placement in or release from protective custody;

2) Decisions regarding the involuntary administration of psychotropic

medication;

3) Decisions regarding disciplinary proceedings that were made at a

facility other than the facility where the offender is currently

assigned;

4) Other issues that pertain to a facility other than the facility where

the offender is currently assigned, excluding personal property and

medical issues.

Id. 504.870(a). Once received, the ARB reviews the grievance the same way it handles

appeals. Id. 504.870(b).

Plaintiff filed an emergency grievance dated February 17, 2025. (Doc. 65-2 at 12).

At the top of the form, he checked the boxes indicating the topic of his grievance as Staff

Conduct, Disciplinary Report, and “Other,” which he defined as “Mental Health Staff

and Placement.” Id. Plaintiff did not mark the box for “medical treatment.” Id.

Plaintiff states in the grievance that “since being transferred to Western Ill. C.C.

mental health staff and placement is continuing to ignore the [trauma] that I have from

being almost killed twice.” Id. at 13. Plaintiff describes attacks he suffered from his

previous cellmates, his attempts to be housed with a cellmate at Western, and the

symptoms he has experienced from what he described as the resulting lifelong trauma.

Id. He states, “I was going to speak with mental health about this situation but it never

happen[ed].” Id. He does not identify any prison officials by name or further

description. Plaintiff requested “that I be housed in a single man cell just like I was in

Menard” or a transfer to a different facility. Id. at 12.

The CAO/warden granted Plaintiff’s request for emergency review on February

18, 2025, and the grievance officer received the grievance on February 19, 2025. Id. at 12.

In a response dated July 30, 2025, the grievance officer summarized Plaintiff’s past and

upcoming appointments with mental health staff, indicating that Plaintiff had refused

to meet with mental health staff in February, March, and April 2024, that Plaintiff had

requested to be removed from the mental health caseload in May 2024, and that, per his

request, “you…have been scheduled for an initial evaluation [with mental health staff]

on 3/19/25.” Id. at 10. The grievance officer’s response also described the criteria for

cellmate assignment, and recommended denial of the grievance as moot. Id.

The CAO concurred on August 11, 2025. Id. Neither the section relevant to an

appeal, nor the ARB records, indicate that Plaintiff appealed this grievance. Id.; (Doc.

65-1 at 9). Plaintiff states in his response that officials never told him that the warden

had granted his request for emergency review. (Doc. 67 at 4).

The record contains a grievance dated April 14, 2025, wherein Plaintiff stated

that “unknown Jane Does of Mental Health” had and were intentionally denying all

mental health treatment since his transfer to Western. (Doc. 65-3 at 3). Plaintiff checked

the boxes indicating that his grievance concerned staff conduct, mental health and

medical treatment, and a disciplinary report. Id.

Plaintiff stated therein that he was housed in segregation, that he spoke with a

“mental health lady” once a week who refused to address his concerns about having a

cellmate, and that the warden had ignored several emergency grievances. Id. at 4.

Plaintiff requested “that I receive my single cell permit and all the rest of my mental

health treatment and that warden Greene respond to my emergency grievance.” Id. at 3.

The grievance contains no indicia or marks indicating that Plaintiff submitted this

grievance to his counselor or grievance officer. Id.

The remaining grievances in the record are not relevant to the claims currently

pending in this lawsuit. See (Doc. 65-1 at 10-12) (hearing loss); (Doc. 65-2 at 6-9) (food

service); (Doc. 65-2 at 14-15) (issues at Menard Correctional Center); (Doc. 65-3 at 1-2, 5-

8) (housing and disciplinary tickets).

B. Legal Standard

Summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). All facts must be construed in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in his

favor. Ogden v. Atterholt, 606 F.3d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 2010). The party moving for

summary judgment must show the lack of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp.

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). In order to be a “genuine” issue, there must be more

than “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). “Only disputes over facts that might affect

the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of

summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

C. Analysis

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) provides:

No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section

1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any

jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative

remedies as are available are exhausted.

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The PLRA does not define the process a prisoner must utilize;

rather, “state law establishes the administrative remedies that a state prisoner must

exhaust for purposes of the PLRA.” Lanaghan v. Koch, 902 F.3d 683, 687 (7th Cir. 2018).

The PLRA requires only that inmates exhaust available remedies. See Ross v.

Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1858 (2016) (“An inmate…must exhaust available remedies, but

need not exhaust unavailable ones.”). A formal grievance process is unavailable when

the process: (1) “operates as a simple dead end—with officers unable or consistently

unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates;” (2) is “so opaque that it becomes,

practically speaking, incapable of use;” and (3) “when prison administrators thwart

inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination,

misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Id. at 1859-60.

Administrative remedies also become unavailable “[w]hen prison officials fail to

timely respond to a prisoner’s grievances.” Jones v. Lamb, 124 F.4th 463, 468 (7th Cir.

2024); see also Jackson v. Esser, 105 F.4th 948, 957 (7th Cir. 2024) (“If administrative

remedies are genuinely unavailable or nonexistent because, for example, prison

employees failed to respond to properly filed grievances, we consider the prisoner to

have satisfied the exhaustion requirement.”). Or, when a prisoner “has not been

informed of the process, whether due to misconduct by prison employees, or because

his personal circumstances preclude him from being able to make use of the process.”

Smallwood v. Williams, 59 F.4th 306, 315 (7th Cir. 2023).

Failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense, and, therefore, defendants bear the

burden of showing that a prisoner failed to exhaust all available remedies, not on a

prisoner to show that the remedies were unavailable. Davis v. Mason, 881 F.3d 982, 985

(7th Cir. 2018); Smallwood, 59 F.4th at 315.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s grievances are insufficient because they fail to

mention them by name. The prison’s grievance rules discussed above permit an inmate

to identify the responsible officials by name or other description. An inmate satisfies

this requirement if he “offer[s] descriptive information sufficient to put the prison on

notice of his claims.” Boyce v. Cox, 170 F.4th 613, 618 (7th Cir. 2026). Plaintiff stated in his

February 17, 2025, grievance that “mental health staff” and “placement” had failed to

address the mental health issues he experienced when housed with a cellmate since his

transfer to Western. Plaintiff’s April 14, 2025, grievance states that “Jane Does of mental

health” failed to address the same issues.

Plaintiff’s grievances identify officials from specific departments, provide a

timeframe, and identify a specific mental health issue and what he believes to be the

cause. The grievance officer’s response on the merits of the February 2025 grievance

permits only the inference that Plaintiff provided sufficient information for officials to

determine the nature of his claims, and that Plaintiff’s alleged procedural defect did not

affect their investigation. The Court finds that Plaintiff’s grievances provided sufficient

information to satisfy the grievance rules. See Boyce, 170 F.4th at 618 (grievance that

stated that “dental staff at Western in July 2022” left him with “a hole in his tooth” was

sufficiently descriptive); Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 722 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Where prison

officials address an inmate's grievance on the merits without rejecting it on procedural

grounds, the grievance has served its function of alerting the state and inviting

corrective action, and defendants cannot rely on the failure to exhaust defense.”).

Plaintiff, nonetheless, did not fully exhaust his administrative remedies through

an ARB appeal as the rules require before he filed suit. He can survive summary

judgment only if the process became unavailable. He argues this occurred when the

CAO/warden failed to advise him of her decision on his request for the February 18,

2025, grievance to be handled on an emergency basis, when the grievance officer did

not respond to the same grievance within 60 days of receipt, and, generally, when the

warden failed to respond to his other emergency grievances.

The grievance rules requiring the warden to advise inmates of his or her decision

regarding emergency grievance review does not specify a timeframe for doing so. 20 Ill.

Admin. Code § 504.840(b). The warden’s forwarding of Plaintiff’s grievance to the

grievance officer the day after she found it warranted emergency review and the

contents of her August 11, 2025, decision arguably complied with the applicable rule’s

requirement to “expedite processing…and respond to the offender, indicating what

action shall be or has been taken.” Id. Nor did the grievance officer’s failure to respond

within the applicable two-month deadline automatically render the process unavailable.

Ford, 362 F.3d at 400 (60-day deadline for grievance officer to respond is aspirational,

not mandatory).

The dispositive question as to the availability of Plaintiff’s administrative

remedies hinges on the reasons for the grievance officer’s delay. Compare id. (grievance

process remained available despite grievance officer’s 6-month delay in issuing a

decision because the investigation necessarily continued past the 60-day timeframe),

with Reid v. Balota, 962 F.3d 325, 331 (7th Cir. 2020) (process became unavailable when

prisoner did not receive response to standard grievance and ARB provided two

unhelpful responses without indicating if officials were still investigating).

The grievance officer’s response to Plaintiff’s February 17, 2025, grievance that

“you…have been scheduled for an initial evaluation on 3/19/25” suggests that

Plaintiff’s initial evaluation had not yet occurred at the time the grievance officer

obtained that information. The response does not otherwise contain information

suggesting that the grievance officer required, or tried to obtain, additional information

in the four months that elapsed from the date the grievance officer presumably spoke to

mental health officials. Defendants have not explained this delay or why the warden

thereafter required another ten days to concur.

The Court finds that Defendants have not met their burden to show that

Plaintiff’s administrative remedies as it relates to his February 18, 2025, grievance

remained available past March 19, 2025. Because Plaintiff grieved an ongoing condition

in his February 2025 grievance, he was not required to exhaust additional grievances on

the issue. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 2013).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint [62] is DENIED.

2. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [65] is DENIED.

3. The stay on discovery on the merits is lifted.

4. The Court resets deadlines as follows: discovery shall be completed by

November 16, 2026. Dispositive motions shall be filed by December 16, 2026.

ENTERED this 13th day of August, 2026.

/s/Douglas J. Quivey

DOUGLAS J. QUIVEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE