REED

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

PITTSBURGH DIVISION

GARRICK WESLEY REED, )

) Case No. 2:25-cv-01919

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) United States District Judge

) Christy Criswell Wiegand

WARDEN ALLEGHENY COUNTY )

JAIL and PENNSYLVANIA BOARD )

OF PROBATION AND PAROLE, ) United States Magistrate Judge

) Christopher B. Brown

Respondents. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Christopher B. Brown, United States Magistrate Judge

I. Recommendation

For the following reasons, it is respectfully recommended the petition for writ

of habeas corpus field by Garrick Wesley Reed be dismissed with prejudice for

failure to prosecute.

II. Report

a. Background

Reed initiated this case on December 9, 2025 by submitting a five-page

“Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus” under “Article I, Section 14 of the

Pennsylvania Constitution and 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and 2254.” ECF No. 1. The

Petition was signed by Reed on 11/9/2025. Id. at 5. The Petition was “lodged” as it

did not come with the filing fee or a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

On March 4, 2026, Reed paid the filing fee, ECF No. 5, and the Petition was

officially docketed at ECF No. 6. About a week later, Reed submitted a seven-page

handwritten Amended Petition, again under “Article I, Section 14 of the

Pennsylvania Constitution and 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and 2254.” ECF No. 7.

On March 23, 2026, the undersigned issued a Deficiency Order informing

Reed there were a number of problems with the Amended Petition. ECF No. 8. For

example, Reed referenced being unlawfully detained on a “probation detainer” and

also stated his speedy trial rights had been violated in a “related” pending criminal

case. Reed was directed to refile his claims on the Court-approved forms for a 2241

habeas petition (challenging detention prior to trial) or a 2254 petition (challenging

a judgment of conviction) by April 24, 2026. Reed was also informed, under the

habeas statute, an application for habeas corpus shall not be granted unless the

petitioner has exhausted all remedies available in state court and, from the face of

the Amended Petition, it did not appear Reed had exhausted any of his claims.

Reed was informed failure to comply with this Order may result in the case being

dismissed for failure to prosecute. Id.

Because Reed did not refile his amended petition within the time required by

the Order entered March 23, 2026, the undersigned issued an Order to Show Cause

on May 29, 2026. ECF No. 9. Reed was ordered to respond to the show cause order

by June 26, 2026 and was advised failure to comply with this Order may result in

the recommendation the case be dismissed for failure to prosecute. Id. The time to

comply with the Order to Show Cause has expired. Reed has not responded to the

Order to Show Cause, contacted the Court, or otherwise prosecuted this case. The

Order to Show Cause was mailed to Reed at his address of record and has not been

returned as undeliverable. The Court has no reason to believe Reed did not receive

it.

b. Discussion

Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure addresses the involuntary

dismissal of an action or a claim, and, under this rule, a District Court has the

authority to dismiss an action sua sponte if a litigant fails to prosecute or to comply

with a court order. See, e.g., Adams v. Trs. of New Jersey Brewery Employees’

Pension Tr. Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 871 (3d Cir. 1994). In Poulis v. State Farm Fire &

Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984), the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

set forth the following six factors to be weighed in considering whether dismissal is

proper under Rule 41(b):

(1) the extent of the party’s personal responsibility; (2)

the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to

meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a

history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the

party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the

effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which

entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the

meritorious of the claim or defense.

Id. at 868 (emphasis omitted). There is no “magic formula” or “mechanical

calculation” to determine whether a case should be dismissed for failure to

prosecute, Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992), and not all of the

six factors need to weigh in favor of dismissal before dismissal is warranted. Hicks

v. Feeney, 850 F.2d 152, 156 (3d Cir. 1998). Application of the Poulis factors is

appropriate in the context of habeas cases as well as to civil rights actions.

Harlacher v. Pennsylvania, No. 10-0267, 2010 WL 1462494, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 12,

2010), report and recommendation adopted, 2010 WL 1445552 (M.D Pa. Apr. 9,

2010) (applying Poulis to a habeas case).

Consideration of the factors listed above is as follows:

The first, third, and fourth Poulis factors (the extent of the party’s personal

responsibility, history of dilatoriness, and whether the conduct is willful) each

weigh heavily against Reed. He did not comply with the Deficiency Order of March

23, 2026 or the Order to Show Cause of May 2, 2026. He has not communicated

with the Court in any manner since March 12, 2026, when he filed the Amended

Petition. Reed’s failure to comply with Court orders "demonstrate[s] a willful

disregard for procedural rules and court directives." Doss v. United States, No. 1:22-

cv-00328, 2024 WL 759058, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 2024), report and

recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 757090 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 20, 2024).

The second Poulis factor assesses whether the adverse party has suffered

prejudice because of the dilatory party’s behavior. Here, the Amended Petition has

not been served. There is no indication that any Respondent has been prejudiced

unfairly by Reed’s conduct. Therefore, this factor should not be weighed against

Reed. Similarly, the sixth Poulis factor (the meritoriousness of his claim) should

not be weighed either in favor or against Reed. All the Court has before it at this

time are the allegations contained in the Amended Petition, ECF No. 7, to which

Respondents have not had the opportunity to respond. Therefore the Court does not

have enough information at this stage to determine whether Reed might ultimately

prevail on his claims. However, even if the Court concluded the Amended Petition

presented viable claims, this factor cannot save Reed’s case in the face of his non-

compliance with the Court’s instructions. See Stephens v. Mosher, Civil No. 3:22-cv-

645, 2024 WL 1501801, at * 3 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 2024) ("[Petitioner] cannot refuse to

comply with court orders which are necessary to allow resolution of the merits of

[his] claims, and then assert the untested merits of these claims as grounds for

declining to dismiss the case.").

Finally, the fifth Poulis factor requires the Court to consider the effectiveness

of sanctions other than dismissal. Dismissal is a sanction of last resort, and it is

incumbent upon a court to explore the effectiveness of lesser sanctions before

ordering dismissal. Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868. In general, however, "sanctions less

than dismissal [are] ineffective when a litigant, such as [Reed], is proceeding pro

se." Lopez v. Cousins, 435 F. App’x 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2011). See also Brennan v.

Clouse, Civ. Act. No. 11-0146, 2012 WL 876228, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 14, 2012)

("Alternative sanctions, such as monetary penalties, are inappropriate as sanctions

with indigent pro se parties."). Absent the ability to craft an effective monetary

sanction, and given Reed’s failure to respond to the Court’s prior orders, the fifth

factor weighs in favor of dismissal.

As the Court noted at the outset, "no single Poulis factor is dispositive," and

"not all of the Poulis factors need be satisfied in order to dismiss a complaint."

Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 263 (3rd Cir. 2008) (quoting Mindek, 964 F.2d at

1373). Nevertheless, the undersigned concludes that four of the six Poulis factors

heavily support dismissal, with two factors weighing against. Upon balancing those

factors as they apply to this case, the Court finds the balance of the Poulis factors

weighs in favor of dismissal.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, it is respectfully submitted the Amended

Petition be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to prosecute, in light of the facts

and circumstances of the case and the relevant factors under Poulis as set forth

above.

Reed is permitted to file written specific objections to this Report and

Recommendation to the assigned United States District Judge. In accordance with

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2), and LCvR 72.D.2, written objections, if

any, to this Report and Recommendation are due by July 29, 2026. Reed is

cautioned that failure to file Objections within this timeframe “will waive the right

to appeal.” Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011)(quoting

Siers v. Morrash, 700 F.2d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 1983). See also EEOC v. City of Long

Branch, 866 F.3d 93, 100 (3d Cir. 2017) (describing standard of appellate review

when no timely and specific objections are filed as limited to review for plain error).

It is further recommended, to the extent that one is necessary, a certificate of

appealability be denied.

Dated this 10th day of July, 2026.

Respectfully submitted,

s/Christopher B. Brown

Christopher B. Brown

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: GARRICK WESLEY REED

135848

ALLEGHENY COUNTY JAIL

950 Second Avenue

Pittsburgh, PA 15219

(via U.S. First Class Mail)