Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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GARRETT B. TUPPER JR.,

REPORT AND

Plaintiff,

RECOMMENDATION

- against -

24-CV-2582(GRB)(SIL)

THE STATE OF NEW YORK, JUDGE DAVID

P. SULLIVAN, MAUREEN O’CONNELL,

ARTHUR NASTRE, RONALD D. WEISS P.C.,

FRIEDMAN VARTOLO, LLP, KNUCLKES

KOMOSINSKI AND MANFRO LLP, RICHARD

R. KOMOSINSKI, MICHAEL W.

NARDOLILLO, JULIANA THIBAUT,

ZACHARY ROBIN GOLD, and SEAN

MONAHAN,

Defendants.

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STEVEN I. LOCKE, United States Magistrate Judge:

Presently before the Court in this action seeking relief from a judgment of

foreclosure and sale entered in New York State Court, on referral from the Honorable

Gary R. Brown for Report and Recommendation, is Defendants’ The State of New

York (“New York”), Judge David P. Sullivan (“Judge Sullivan”), Maureen O’Connell

(“O’Connell”), Arthur Nastre (“Nastre”), Ronald D. Weiss P.C. (“Weiss P.C.”),

Friedman Vartolo, LLP (“Friedman Vartolo”), Knuckles Komosinski and Manfro LLP

(“Knuckles Komosinski”), Richard F. Komosinski (“Komosinski”), Michael W.

Nardolillo (“Nardolillo”), Juliana Thibaut (“Thibaut”), Zachary Robin Gold (“Gold”),

and Sean Monahan (“Monahan” and, collectively, “Defendants”) motion to dismiss pro

se Plaintiff Garrett B. Tupper’s (“Plaintiff” or “Tupper”) Complaint (“Compl.”), DE [1],

pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Fed.

R. Civ. P.”). DE [91]. Plaintiff has also filed a motion to compel, DE [102], a motion

for declaratory judgment, DE [108], and a motion for leave to file an amended

complaint, DE [96], the latter two of which effectively seek the same relief sought in

his Complaint – namely, that the Court declare that Plaintiff rescinded the mortgage

at issue in this action and that it is deemed canceled. For the reasons set forth herein,

the Court respectfully recommends that Defendants’ motion to dismiss be granted in

its entirety and that Plaintiff’s motions to compel, for a declaratory judgment, and for

leave to file an amended complaint be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Relevant Facts1

1. Parties

This action arises out of the successful effort of non-party MTGLQ Investors,

Inc. (“MTGLQ”), decided in New York State Court, to foreclose upon the property

located at 537 Liberty Ave., Williston Park, NY 11596 (the “Property”). Plaintiff is a

resident of Nassau County, New York. Compl. ¶ 81. He is a signatory to a mortgage

(the “Mortgage”), DE [1-5] at Ex. C, securing a note (the “Note”), signed by his wife,

related to the Property. Id. at Ex. B.

Knuckles Komosinski is a law firm in Westchester County, New York that is

in the practice of debt collection. Id. at ¶ 81(i). Tupper alleges that Knuckles

Komosinski, as well as individual Defendant Komosinski, commenced foreclosure

1 The facts drawn from the Complaint are accepted as true for purposes of this motion. See Loeb v.

Cnty. of Suffolk, No. 22-CV-6410(HG), 2023 WL 4163117, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. June 23, 2023) (“In resolving

a motion to dismiss, ‘consideration is limited to the factual allegations in plaintiffs’ . . . complaint,

which are accepted as true.’”) (quoting Brass v. Am. Film Techs., Inc., 987 F.2d 142, 150 (2d Cir. 1993)).

proceedings related to the Property. Id. at ¶¶ 30, 81(h). He further alleges that

Friedman Vartolo is a law firm in New York County, New York that is “in the

business of conducting judicial foreclosures,” id. at ¶ 81(f), and that Nardolillo,

Thibaut, Gold, and Monahan are “believed to be” its agents. Id. at ¶¶ 81(i)-(l). Weiss,

P.C. is a law firm in Suffolk County, New York that is “in the business of foreclosure

defense and bankruptcy . . . .” Id. at ¶ 81(e). Tupper alleges that O’Connell is the

Nassau County Clerk and that she failed to record a “Notice of Cancellation” of the

Mortgage. Id. at ¶ 81(c). He further alleges that Nastre is the attorney for Nassau

County, id. at ¶ 81(d), and that Judge Sullivan ordered the judgment of foreclosure

and sale described herein. Id. at ¶ 109.

2. Underlying Agreement and State Court Proceedings

On October 18, 2017, MTGLQ commenced an action in the Supreme Court of

the State of New York, Nassau County, bearing the caption MTGLQ Investors, L.P.

v. Aileen Tupper, Garrett Tupper, and John Doe #1 through John Doe #10, No.

614054/2018, seeking to foreclose upon the Property (the “Foreclosure Action”). See

Declaration of Zachary Gold in Support of Motion to Dismiss (“Gold Decl.”), DE [92-

3], Ex. 1.

On September 24, 2019, the Supreme Court, Nassau County granted MTGLQ’s

motion for summary judgment in the Foreclosure Action and ordered the entry of a

Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale (the “Foreclosure Judgment”). Id. at Ex. 3. On

June 12, 2024, the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division,

Second Department, affirmed the Foreclosure Judgment. Id. at Ex. 4.

In this action, Tupper seeks to collaterally attack the Foreclosure Judgment,

alleging that “[t]he contract in this case is forged and missing at least 6 provisions

that are listed in the original contract.” Compl. ¶ 24. He further alleges that “[t]he

foreclosure statute used to provide the [state] court with jurisdiction is not a valid

law as it is missing the 3 elements the State Constitution mandates must be present

. . . .” Id. at ¶ 25. Each of Tupper’s claims regarding the foreclosure of the Property

was addressed by the state court or encompassed by the Foreclosure Judgment. DE

[91-8]. By way of example, Tupper asserts that the original contract “with the

signatures of both the alleged borrower and the lender have never been filed in court

to verify there was a bilateral contract.” Compl. ¶ 27. Tupper takes the position that

this precludes finding that there was a valid debt. Id. at ¶ 28. He further claims that

there “is no bona fide signature on the alleged promissory note,” id. at ¶ 11, that “[t]he

promissory note is a forgery,” id. at ¶ 12, and that “[t]he defendant wrongfully

foreclosed on [him]. . . .” Id. at ¶ 33. Tupper does not allege that Defendants in this

action acted unlawfully in any way following the Foreclosure Action or upon entry of

the Foreclosure Judgment.

B. Procedural Background

By way of a Complaint dated April 5, 2024, Plaintiff commenced this action

against all Defendants, asserting causes of action for: (1) wrongful foreclosure; (2)

violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.;

(3) violation of the Truth In Lending Act (“TILA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.; (4) breach

of contract; (5) slander of title; (6) slander of credit; (6) intentional infliction of

emotional distress; and (7) “improper service.” DE [1]. These are the same claims

Tupper asserted in the Foreclosure Action. See DE [91-8].

On June 3, 2025, Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and for failure to state

a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). DE [91]. In conjunction with their

motion, Defendants filed a Notice to Pro Se Litigants Who Opposes a Rile 12 Motion

Supported by Matters Outside the Pleadings as required by Local Rule 12.1. DE [91-

1]. Defendants assert that, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), this Court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to: (1) the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; (2) the

Colorado River doctrine; and (3) Younger abstention. See Defendants’ Memorandum

of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss (“Defs.’ Mem.”), DE [91-11], at 7-13;

Defendants’ Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss (“Defs.’

Reply Mem.”), DE [91-14] at 3-5. Defendants further argue that the Complaint

should be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

Defs.’ Mem at 13-17; Defs.’ Reply Mem. at 5-7. Tupper opposes Defendants’ motion

on both bases. See generally Plaintif’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), DE [94].

Plaintiff also seeks leave to file a “supplemental pleading” pursuant to Fed. R.

Civ. P. 15, naming MTGLQ, JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“JP Morgan”), Shellpoint

Mortgage Servicing (“Shellpoint”), SN Servicing Corporation (“SN Servicing”), and

U.S. Bank Trust National Association as Trustee for Dwelling Series IV Trust (“U.S.

Bank” and, collectively, the “Additional Defendants”) as additional defendants. DE

[96]. Finally, Tupper filed a motion to compel and a motion for declaratory judgment

– both of which effectively seek the same relief sought in the Complaint – in which he

asserts that he validly rescinded his Mortgage and should be relieved of any

obligations with respect to the Property. DE [102], [108].

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court respectfully recommends that

Defendants’ motion to dismiss be granted and that Plaintiff’s Complaint be dismissed

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Accordingly, the Court declines to address Defendants’

other arguments, including whether Plaintiff otherwise states a claim for relief. The

Court further recommends that Plaintiff’s various other motions be denied.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), a complaint must be dismissed where the

district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Bryant v. Steele, 25 F. Supp. 3d

233, 241 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (“A federal court has subject matter jurisdiction over a cause

of action only when it has authority to adjudicate the cause pressed in the

complaint.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, “[a] case is properly

dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) when the district

court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.” Makarova v. U.S.,

201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). In reviewing such a motion, the Court accepts “as

true all material factual allegations of the complaint, and draw[s] all reasonable

inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Molinari v. Equifax Inc., No. 18-CV-

3282(ILG)(RLM), 2022 WL 318001, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2022) (quoting Sonterra

Cap. Master Fund Ltd. v. UBS AG, 954 F.3d 529, 533 (2d Cir. 2020)) (internal

quotations marks omitted).

When evaluating a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction, “the court ‘may consider affidavits and other materials beyond the

pleadings to resolve the jurisdictional issue, but . . . may not rely on conclusory or

hearsay statements contained in the affidavits.’” Razi Sch. v. Cissna, 519 F. Supp.

3d 144, 148 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) (quoting J.S. ex rel. N.S. v. Attica Cent. Sch., 386 F.3d

107, 110 (2d Cir. 2004)); see Prime Contractors, Inc. v. APS Contractors Inc., 754 F.

Supp. 3d 289, 298 (E.D.N.Y. 2024) (“[T]the Court may rely upon materials outside of

the pleadings.”). The plaintiff bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the

evidence that subject matter jurisdiction exists. Makarova, 201 F.3d at 110.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction is Appropriate

Defendants move to dismiss Tupper’s Complaint for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, among other arguments, Defs.’

Mem. at 7-13, which falls within the purview of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)’s subject

matter jurisdiction requirement. See Hylton v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 338

F. Supp. 3d 263, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“An argument that the court does not have

subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is properly

considered under Rule 12(b)(1).”); Chery v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, 18 Civ.

1240(PAC), 2018 WL 3708664, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2018) (“Because Rooker-

Feldman applies, Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction.”). Pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, all federal

courts other than the Supreme Court should not sit in direct review of state court

decisions unless Congress has specifically authorized such relief. District of

Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 481-82, 103 S. Ct. 1303, 1314-

15 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415, 44 S. Ct. 140, 150 (1923); see

28 U.S.C. § 1257 (vesting authority in the Supreme Court alone to review final

judgments rendered by the highest courts of the states).

The four factors courts in the Second Circuit consider when evaluating the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine are whether the plaintiff: (1) lost in state court; (2) alleges,

in the district court, injuries caused by the state-court judgment; (3) invites the

district court to review and reject the state-court judgment; and (4) commenced the

district court proceedings after the state-court judgment was rendered. Vossbrinck

v. Accredited Home Lenders, Inc., 773 F.3d 423, 426 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing Hoblock v.

Albany Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 2005)) (internal alterations

omitted). Importantly, the Second Circuit has reaffirmed that the doctrine

establishes “the clear principle that federal district courts lack jurisdiction over suits

that are, in substance, appeals from state-court judgments.” Sung Cho v. City of New

York, 910 F.3d 639, 644 (2d Cir. 2018); Harper v. Bank of New York, No. 25-CV-

1573(NJC), 2026 WL 1174506, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2026) (“The Rooker-Feldman

doctrine bars federal courts from exercising ‘jurisdiction over cases that essentially

amount to appeals of state court judgments.’”) (quoting Vossbrinck, 773 F.3d at 426).

Relevant here, federal courts should not revisit the decisions of state courts in

foreclosure actions. Burton v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 738 F. Supp. 3d 272, 288-89

(E.D.N.Y. 2024) (“Faced with similar claims, ‘courts in this Circuit have consistently

held that any attack on a judgment of foreclosure is clearly barred by the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine.”) (quoting Davis v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, No. 14-CV-

6263(KMK), 2016 WL 1267800, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2016)). Moreover, a plaintiff

cannot avoid the Rooker-Feldman doctrine simply by relying on a legal theory not

relied upon in state court. Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 87. Instead, the key inquiry is

whether the complaint alleges an injury caused by a state-court judgment. See, e.g.,

Swiatkowski v. Citibank, 745 F. Supp. 2d 150, 162 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (dismissing claims

due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction where the plaintiff sought to relitigate

adverse state-court judgment); Dorce v. City of New York, 460 F. Supp. 3d 327, 340

(E.D.N.Y. 2020) (applying four-part Hoblock test).

Consistent with these standards, courts routinely reject FDCPA claims

attacking state court judgments of foreclosure. See Harper, 2026 WL 1174506, at *11

(holding that the plaintiff’s FDCPA claim was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

where the plaintiff alleged that the defendants attempted to collect a debt they had

“no authority to collect” and never had “lawful authority [or] possession of [plaintiff’s]

[n]ote”); Craig v. Saxon Mortg. Servs., Inc., 13-CV-4526(SJF)(GRB), 2015 WL 171234

at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2015) (“These Notices arise from the state court Judgment

of Foreclosure and Sale, and the state court’s acceptance of the validity of the

mortgage documents that formed the basis for that judgment.”) (internal quotation

omitted); Quiroz v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. 10-CV-2485(KAM)(JMA), 2011 WL

2471733, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. May 16, 2011) (“[A]ny FDCPA claim based on the falsity of

the debt is barred by Rooker-Feldman because it would be [the state court’s order of

foreclosure and sale] which held [the creditor] had a valid right to collect the debt.”).

Plaintiff offers no allegations suggesting that Defendants engaged in conduct outside

the purview of the Foreclosure Judgment. His FDCPA claim is therefore barred by

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

The same is true for TILA claims attacking state court foreclosure judgments.

Noriega v. US Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, No. 16-CV-1058(JS)(ARL), 2017 WL 3172998, at *4

(E.D.N.Y. July 25, 2017) (“To the extent [p]laintiff seeks ‘rescission’ of the [m]ortgage

as relief for his TILA claim, that relief is barred by Rooker-Feldman as it necessitates

a review and rejection of the [f]oreclosure [j]udgment.”) (alterations in original);

Garcia v. Lasalle Bank NA., No. 16 Civ. 3485(PAE), 2017 WL 253070, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.

Jan. 19, 2017) (holding that a claim for “declaratory judgment that [plaintiffs] retain

a right to rescind their loan under TILA” was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

because “allowing rescission would be tantamount to finding that no valid mortgage

existed and thus no basis for foreclosure”).

Moreover, the fact that the parties and causes of action in either this action or

the proposed amended Complaint are not identical to the state court Foreclosure

Action is inconsequential. See Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 87 (specifying that the identity

of claims is not dispositive in evaluating subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine). Rather, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies where a

federal court plaintiff effectively seeks relief from a prior state court judgment. Id.

To this end, courts routinely apply the Rooker-Feldman doctrine even where plaintiffs

assert new causes of action, including under the FDCPA, because the complained-of

injury flows from the foreclosure of judgment itself. See, e.g., Done v. Wells Fargo,

N.A., No. 12-CV-4296(JFB)(ETB), 2013 WL 3785627, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. July 18, 2013)

(“Given the factual allegations and relief sought here, which are inextricably

intertwined with the state court judgment and would require overturning the state

court judgment, this Court concludes that the substantive requirements of the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine are met.”). Likewise, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies

where the parties are not identical. See Done, 2013 WL 3785627, at *6 (holding that

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applied to defendants who were not named in the

underlying state action); Swiatkowski v. Citibank, 446 F. App’x 360, 361 (2d Cir.

2011) (affirming dismissal based upon Rooker-Feldman doctrine).

In moving to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Defendants have

offered evidence that: (1) Tupper lost in the Foreclosure Action; (2) he effectively

seeks reconsideration of the Foreclosure Judgment; and (3) the instant action was

commenced after the decision in the Foreclosure Action and entry of the Foreclosure

Judgment. Plaintiff has not plausibly disputed these facts and they establish that

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine warrants dismissal of this action in federal court. See

Hourani v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 158 F. Supp. 3d 142, 146 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (“[T]he

Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives this Court of jurisdiction to hear [the plaintiff’s]

claims against Wells Fargo to the extent that his claims request that this Court

vacate the Foreclosure Judgment.”); Webster v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 08 Civ.

10145(LAP), 2009 WL 5178654, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2009) (holding that the Court

“plainly lack[ed] subject matter jurisdiction” over the plaintiff’s claims “attacking the

validity of the foreclosure proceedings and the validity of the underlying mortgage

loan documents” pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because “the injury

complained of is the judgment permitting foreclosure, which implicitly held that the

mortgages were valid”).

In opposition to Defendants’ jurisdictional arguments, Tupper relies upon

Cestaro v. Osorio, 21 Misc. 3d 1144(A) (Sup.Ct. Bronx Cnty. 2008), in support of his

assertion that “because the state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction,” and,

therefore, “the “foreclosure judgment [is] void.” See Pl.’s Opp’n at ¶ 27. Cestaro is a

state court case that has no bearing on this Court’s application of the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine. Ultimately, Plaintiff turns to this Court to dispute a state court outcome

that he deems unfavorable. This is impermissible, as this Court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction to render such a decision pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

Accordingly, the Court respectfully recommends that Defendants’ motion to dismiss

Plaintiff’s Complaint, DE [91], be granted.

B. Motion to Amend

Tupper seeks to amend his Complaint to add additional defendants MTGLQ,

JP Morgan, Shellpoint, SN Servicing, and U.S. Bank, as well as facts concerning the

existing individual Defendants. DE [96]. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), courts

have discretion to allow parties to amend their pleadings “when justice so requires.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); see TechnoMarine SA v. Giftports, Inc., 758 F.3d 493, 505 (2d

Cir. 2014) (“Under Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 15(a), leave to amend shall be freely given

when justice so requires.”); Amaya v. Roadhouse Brick Oven Pizza, Inc., 285 F.R.D.

251, 253 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (“A court should freely give leave when justice so requires,

and such leave is in the court’s discretion.”) (internal quotation omitted). The

amendment standard is liberal so as to permit plaintiffs “to assert matters that were

overlooked or were unknown at the time of the original complaint or answer.” RCX

I, LLC v. Pitter-Nelson, No. 11 Civ. 3513(CM), 2014 WL 5809514, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.

6, 2014) (internal quotation marks, citation and alterations omitted); see Assam v.

Deer Park Spring Water, Inc., 163 F.R.D. 400, 404 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (“[Fed. R. Civ. P.]

15(a) dictates that motions to amend complaints be liberally granted absent a good

reason to the contrary . . . .”). Leave to amend should only be denied “if there is delay,

bad faith, futility, or prejudice to the non-moving party.” Hosking v. New World

Mortg., Inc., 602 F. Supp. 2d 441, 445 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371

U.S. 178, 182, 83 S. Ct. 227, 230 (1962)). A party opposing a motion to amend bears

the burden of establishing that the amendment should be denied. See Joinnides v.

Floral Park-Bellerose Union Sch. Dist., No. 12-CV-5682(JS)(AKT), 2015 WL 1476422,

at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2015) (“With respect to the Rule 15(a) factors, ‘[t]he party

opposing the motion for leave to amend has the burden of establishing that an

amendment would be prejudicial or futile.’”) (quoting Cummings-Fowler v. Suffolk

Cnty. Cmty. Coll., 282 F.R.D. 292, 296 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)).

“The futility of an amendment is determined by whether it could survive a

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) . . . .” E&E

Co. v. London Luxury LLC, 571 F. Supp. 3d 64, 67 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (quoting R & M

Jewelry, LLC v. Michael Anthony Jewelers, Inc., 221 F.R.D. 398, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1940 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1960 (2007)).

Applying these standards, the motion for leave to amend should be denied as

facially deficient. In Tupper’s Proposed Amended Complaint (“PAC”), DE [96], he

seeks to name as new Defendants JP Morgan, MTGLQ, Shellpoint, SN Servicing, and

U.S. Bank. Id. The claims in the PAC, however, mirror those set forth in the original

Complaint. For the reasons stated above, these causes of action are barred under the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and the motion to amend should be denied. Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s proposed amendments are futile and the Court recommends that the

motion for leave to amend, DE ]96], be denied.

C. Motions to Compel and for Declaratory Judgment2

Finally, Tupper filed a motion to compel, DE [102], and a motion for a

declaratory judgment, DE [108], in both of which he seeks a determination by this

Court that: (1) he rescinded the Mortgage at issue in the Foreclosure Action, (2) the

Mortgage must be deemed rescinded pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b), and (3) the

2 Although filed as a motion to compel, DE [102] seeks the same relief as Tupper’s motion for

declaratory judgment filed at DE [108], both of which are based upon a stipulation filed in state court

in which the parties agreed that the foreclosure sale of the Property was canceled in light MTGLQ’s

“receipt of the full reinstatement amount of Defendants’ loan . . . .” Id. This stipulation has no bearing

on this Court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction and does not provide a basis for disrupting the

Foreclosure Judgment.

Mortgage be deemed cancelled pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02. DE [102], [108].

These motions, like Tupper’s original claims, attempt to collaterally attack the state

court’s Foreclosure Judgment, which this Court lacks jurisdiction to address.

Accordingly, the Court respectfully recommends that both motions be denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court respectfully recommends that

Defendants’ motion to dismiss. DE [91], be granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

The Court further recommends that Plaintiff’s motion to amend, DE [96], motion to

compel, DE [102], and motion for declaratory judgment, DE [108], be denied.

V. OBJECTIONS

A copy of this Report and Recommendation is being served on Defendants via

electronic filing on the date below. Defendants are instructed to serve a copy of the

Report and Recommendation on Plaintiff and file proof of service via ECF. Any

objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of the

Court within fourteen days of service. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72;

Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a) and 6(d). Failure to file objections within this period waives the

right to appeal the District Court’s Order. See Ferrer v. Woliver, No. 05-CV-3696,

2008 WL 4951035, at *2 (2d Cir. Nov. 20, 2008); Beverly v. Walker, 118 F.3d 900, 902

(2d Cir. 1997); Savoie v. Merchants Bank, 84 F.3d 52, 60 (2d Cir. 1996).

Dated: Central Islip, New York

July 7, 2026 /s/ Steven I. Locke

STEVEN I. LOCKE

United States Magistrate Judge