Chapman

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EDWARD CHAPMAN, CASE NO. 4:25-cv-01379

Petitioner, JUDGE JEFFREY J. HELMICK

vs. MAGISTRATE JUDGE AMANDA M. KNAPP

WARDEN IAN HEALY, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Respondent.

Petitioner Edward Chapman (“Petitioner” or “Mr. Chapman”) filed this habeas corpus

action under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on June 23, 2025, asserting that the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) is

improperly denying him First Step Act (“FSA”) time credits and improperly denying or delaying

his placement in a Residential Reentry Center (“RRC”) or home confinement (“HC”) under the

Second Chance Act (“SCA”).1 (ECF Doc. 1 (“Petition”).) Respondent filed a motion to dismiss

the Petition or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, arguing that the Petition is not ripe, that

Mr. Chapman did not exhaust his administrative remedies, and that his claims lack merit. (ECF

Doc. 8 (“Motion”).) Mr. Chapman filed a reply to Respondent’s Motion. (ECF Doc. 9.)

This matter has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to Local Rule

72.2. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends that the Court DENY the

motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), GRANT the motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6) (ECF Doc. 8), and DISMISS the Petition (ECF Doc. 1) without prejudice.

1 “Under the mailbox rule, a habeas petition is deemed filed when the prisoner gives the petition to prison officials

for filing in the federal courts.” Cook v. Stegall, 295 F.3d 517, 521 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S.

266, 273 (1988)). Mr. Chapman’s Petition was docketed on June 30, 2025 (ECF Doc. 1) and placed in the prison

mailing system on June 23, 2025 (id. at p. 18).

I. Background

A. Petitioner’s Conviction and Sentence

Mr. Chapman was convicted of Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with Intent to

Distribute 100 Grams or More of Heroin, 400 Grams or More of Fentanyl, Cocaine, Cocaine

Base, Oxycodone, and Marijuana on March 10, 2022, in the United States District Court for the

District of Massachusetts. (ECF Doc. 1, p. 1; ECF Doc. 8-1, pp. 1-2, ¶ 3 (“Jensen Aff.”); ECF

Doc. 8-2, p. 2.) He was sentenced to a prison term of 120 months. (Jensen Aff., p. 2, ¶ 3; ECF

Doc. 8-2, p. 2.) He is incarcerated at Federal Correctional Institution Elkton. (ECF Doc. 1, p. 1;

Jensen Aff., p. 2, ¶ 5.) Mr. Chapman’s projected release date, assuming he receives available

good conduct time and other credit, is October 24, 2027. (Jensen Aff., p. 2, ¶ 3.)

B. Petitioner’s Habeas Petition

In the Petition, Mr. Chapman challenges the manner in which his sentence is being

carried out, calculated, or credited by the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”). (ECF Doc. 1, p. 2.) Under

the heading “Decision or Action You Are Challenging,” Mr. Chapman states that he is “being

categorically denied programming days as the result of being in transit, and awaiting to be

transferred to [his] designated BOP facility.” (Id.) He identifies three grounds for relief, all of

which are labeled Ground One. (ECF Doc. 1, pp. 9-17.) The three grounds are set forth below

and relabeled Grounds One, Two, and Three.

GROUND ONE: I am being improperly Denied an Additional 5-days of First Step

Act Time Credits, per every 30 days of programming, contrary to the explicit

language in the First Step Act requiring its application.

Supporting facts: My First LOW PATTERN assessment was on 5-1-2024 (Asses.

#6) and my Secondary LOW PATTERN assessment was on 9-5-2024 (Asses. #7).

As such, by Federal Law (18 USC 3632(D)(4)(A)(ii)’s explicit language) the BOP

was required to grant an additional 5-days of FTCs per every 30 days of

programming. “A prisoner determined by the [BOP] to be at a [] low risk of

recidivating, who, over 2 consecutive assessments, has not increased their risk [],

SHALL earn an additional 5 days . . . for every 30 days . . .”

(ECF Doc. 1, pp. 9-10 (alterations, emphasis, and brackets in original).)

GROUND TWO: I was improperly denied RRC/HC placement, or improperly

delayed as a result of staff failure to abide policy, central office directives, and

considerations of law.

Supporting facts: Improperly denied as I have no warrants or detainers.

(Id. at pp. 12-13.)

GROUND THREE: I am improperly being categorically denied First Step Act

Programming Days for the time period that I was in transit or awaiting transfer to

my BOP designated facility.

Supporting facts: I was sentenced on March 10, 2022 (Not 5-05-2022).

Additionally, I was in transit (per FSA FTC calculation page) between 9-19-2023

and 10-11-23, from 8-15-24 to 8-26-24, and lastly from 9-25-2024 to 1-12-25. CFR

523.41(c)(4)(i-iv) includes additional exclusions not found in the FSA, and cannot

be used to categorically deny programming days. (Patel v. Barron, 2023 WL

6311281, at 5) (Jobin v. Warden, FCI-Mendota, 2024 WL 1367902, at 4) (Umejesi

v. Warden, FCI-Berlin, 2023 WE 4101455).

(Id. at pp. 15-16.)

Mr. Chapman requests that the Court: waive any failure to administratively exhaust his

claims; require the BOP to apply the additional 5-days of FTC from the original eligibility date;

order expeditious review and reconsideration of his placement in RRC/HC by a neutral

employee; require that the BOP grant him programming days starting from his sentencing date of

March 10, 2022, not May 5, 2022; and require that the BOP grant him programming days for the

periods of time he was in transit. (Id. at pp. 11, 14, 17.)

C. Respondent’s Motion

Respondent filed a response in opposition and motion to dismiss the Petition under Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for

failure to state a claim; alternately, he seeks summary judgment in his favor under Fed. R. Civ. P.

56. (ECF Doc. 8.) Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), Respondent argues Mr. Chapman’s claims

for application of Federal Time Credit (“FTC”) and placement in a RRC are not ripe for review

because the BOP has not yet made an assessment and recommendation as to his placement under

the SCA, which deprives the Court of subject matter jurisdiction. (Id. at pp. 10-12.) Under Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), Respondent argues the Petition should be dismissed because Mr. Chapman

failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and failed to present plausible claims for relief. (Id.

at pp. 12-14.) Finally, Respondent argues that Mr. Chapman was not eligible to earn FTCs

during non-qualifying periods, and that his claim for credits during those periods should be

dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) or denied as a matter of law under Rule 56. (Id. at pp. 14-16.)

II. Standard of Review

The Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts “may be

applied to § 2241 petitions.” Hargrove v. Healy, No. 4:23-CV-1857, 2024 WL 3992261, at *2

(N.D. Ohio Aug. 28, 2024) (citing Rule 1(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the

United States District Courts). Further, the “Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to the extent that

they are not inconsistent with any statutory provisions or [those] [governing] rules, may be

applied to a proceeding under these rules.” See Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 12, 28

U.S.C.A. foll. § 2254. Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States

District Courts also contemplates the filing of a motion in response to a petition for writ of

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 4, 28 U.S.C.A.

foll. § 2254. Thus, Respondent’s motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6),

and/or Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 is properly before this Court for review.2

2 Courts must consider 12(b)(1) motions before 12(b)(6) motions because a 12(b)(6) challenge is moot if the court

lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Moir v. Greater Cleveland Reg'l Transit Auth., 895 F.2d 266, 269 (6th Cir. 1990).

III. Law and Analysis

A. Dismissal of the Petition Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) is Not Supported

Respondent first argues that the Petition must be dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)

because the “Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Petitioner’s claims for application of

FTCs and placement in an RRC,” and the “claims are not ripe for review.” (ECF Doc. 8, p. 10.)

1. Legal Standard for Rule 12(b)(1) Dismissal Based on Lack of Ripeness

“Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) provides for the dismissal of an action for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction.” Cartwright v. Garner, 751 F.3d 752, 759 (6th Cir. 2014). “[W]here subject

matter jurisdiction is challenged under Rule 12(b)(1), . . . the plaintiff has the burden of proving

jurisdiction in order to survive the motion.” Rogers v. Stratton Indus., Inc., 798 F.2d 913, 915

(6th Cir. 1986) (italics removed); see Cartwright, 751 F.3d at 760. Challenges to subject-matter

jurisdiction “‘come in two varieties: a facial attack or a factual attack.’” Carrier Corp. v.

Outokumpu Oyj, 673 F.3d 430, 440 (6th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). In cases such as this,

where a factual attack has been raised, the court may “weigh evidence to confirm the existence

of the factual predicates for subject-matter jurisdiction[]” and has the “discretion to allow”

additional evidence, including affidavits and documents “to resolve disputed jurisdictional facts.”

Carrier Corp., 673 F.3d at 440 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

To invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts under Article III of the United States

Constitution, there must be “an actual case or controversy.” O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488,

493 (1974). If a claim is filed too early, it is not ripe for the judicial process. Warshak v. United

States, 532 F.3d 521, 525 (6th Cir. 2008). “The ripeness doctrine is drawn both from Article III

limitations on judicial power and from prudential reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction[.]”

Nat’l Park Hosp. Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003) (internal citation and

quotations omitted). “The ripeness doctrine serves to ‘avoid[ ] ... premature adjudication’ of

legal questions and to prevent courts from ‘entangling themselves in abstract’ debates that may

turn out differently in different settings.” Warshak, 532 F.3d at 525 (citing and quoting Nat’l

Park Hosp. Ass’n, 538 U.S. at 807) (omission and first alteration in original).

2. The Evidence Does Not Support Dismissal of the Petition as Unripe

In his Petition, Mr. Chapman asserts three grounds for relief. (ECF Doc. 1, pp. 9-10, 12-

13, 15-16.) First, he argues he is being denied five additional days of FSA time credits per every

thirty days of programming, contrary to the explicit language of the FSA. (Id. at pp. 9-10.)

Second, he argues that his placement in an RRC or HC has been improperly denied or delayed

due to staff’s failure to abide by policy, central office directives, and the law. (Id. at pp. 12-13.)

Finally, he argues the BOP is improperly denying him FSA programming days for time periods

when he was in transit or awaiting transfer to a BOP designated facility. (Id. at pp. 15-16.)

Without individually addressing the three claims articulated in the Petition, Respondent

argues the Petition was prematurely filed—and this Court thus lacks subject matter jurisdiction—

because the BOP has “not yet made an assessment and recommendation on placement pursuant

to SCA.” (ECF Doc. 8, pp. 10-12.) In support, Respondent explains that the “BOP reviews

inmates for placement between 17-19 months from their projected release date” to satisfy the

requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(1). (ECF Doc. 8, p. 11.) “After considering all relevant

factors in accordance with the SCA,” Respondent explains that “the Unit Team will [then] make

a recommendation on Petitioner’s placement.” (Id.) In this case, Respondent explains that “[t]he

earliest that BOP w[ould] begin Petitioner’s assessment for recommendation for placement is 17-

19 months from his projected release date” of October 24, 2027.3 (ECF Doc. 8, p. 12.)

3 Considering Respondent’s projections, the BOP may have performed the described assessment after the present

motion was filed. If the projected release date remains October 24, 2027, Respondent’s projections suggest the

While Respondent generally asserts that the claims in the Petition are not yet ripe because

the SCA Assessment is not complete, he does not individually address each of the three claims in

the Petition, nor does he clearly explain why the assessment is a necessary precursor to each

claim’s ripeness. The language of the claims does not suggest that they are contingent on the

results of a SCA Assessment. Further, Respondent has not clearly identified legal authority to

support a finding that a prisoner may not challenge a notice or decision regarding programming

days or eligibility for placement in RRC/HC until a specific formal SCA Assessment has been

completed. Given the lack of clear argument or authority to support a finding that Petitioner may

not assert his three claims until an SCA assessment is complete, the undersigned concludes that

Respondent’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction lacks merit.

Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the Court DENY Respondent’s motion to

dismiss the Petition pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

B. The Petition Should Be Dismissed for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

Respondent argues next that the Petition should be dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6) because Mr. Chapman failed to properly exhaust his administrative remedies. (ECF

Doc. 8, pp. 3-7, 12-14.) Rather than arguing that he exhausted his remedies, Petitioner asks the

Court to waive the exhaustion requirement. (ECF Doc. 1, pp. 11, 17; ECF Doc. 9, pp. 1-2.)

1. Legal Standard for Rule 12(b)(6) Dismissal

Under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court may dismiss a claim when a party fails to plead facts on

which relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is

assessment may have begun as early as March 2026. The undersigned has not asked Respondent to supplement the

record regarding the status of the assessment because, as discussed herein, the record does not clearly establish that

the ripeness of the three claims in the Petition is dependent on the completion of the described assessment.

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This Court “must construe the complaint in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff and accept all allegations as true.” Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579,

588 (6th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). However, while “we must accept all well-pleaded factual

allegations in the complaint as true, we need not ‘accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a

factual allegation.’” Hensley Mfg. v. ProPride, Inc., 579 F.3d 603, 609 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).

A court presented with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion “may consider the Complaint and any

exhibits attached thereto, public records, items appearing in the record of the case and exhibits

attached to defendant’s motion to dismiss so long as they are referred to in the Complaint and are

central to the claims contained therein.” Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426,

430 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Whittiker v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Tr. Co., 605 F. Supp. 2d 914, 924

(N.D. Ohio 2009). The undersigned concludes that the attachments to Respondent’s Motion

refer to matters that are central to the claims contained in Mr. Chapman’s Petition. Accordingly,

the undersigned finds it appropriate to consider Respondent’s Motion under Rule 12(b)(6) rather

than treating it as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56.4

2. Legal Standard for Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Before filing a § 2241 Petition, a petitioner must exhaust his administrative remedies.

See Luedtke v. Berkebile, 704 F.3d 465, 466 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Fazzini v. Ne. Ohio Corr.

Ctr., 473 F.3d 229, 231 (6th Cir. 2006)); see also Jackson v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 1:07

4 In evaluating the motion, the undersigned has considered exhibits submitted by Mr. Chapman, a declaration from

BOP attorney Robert Jensen, and attachments thereto, which include Sentry records relating to administrative

remedy requests filed by Mr. Chapman. (Jensen Aff., pp. 2-4, ¶¶ 6-9; ECF Doc. 8-4.) Mr. Jensen avers that he has

access to and is familiar with records maintained in the BOP’s computerized database, Sentry. (Jensen Aff., p. 1, ¶

1.) “Sentry, . . . is designed to track information about federal prisoners, including but not limited to inmate data,

admission/release dates and the status of administrative remedy requests filed by federal prisoners.” (Id.)

CV 1622, 2007 WL 2231036, at *2 (N.D. Ohio July 31, 2007) (“Prisoners who seek relief under

28 U.S.C. § 2241 are ordinarily required to exhaust administrative remedies before filing a

habeas action in district court.”). When a petitioner fails to exhaust administrative remedies, a

procedural default occurs. See Engle v. United States, 26 F. App’x 394, 396 (6th Cir. 2001).

“[P]roper exhaustion of administrative remedies . . . means using all steps that the agency

holds out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits).”

Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006) (internal citation and quotations omitted) (emphasis

removed). “Exhaustion of administrative remedies serves two main purposes.” Id. at 89.

First, exhaustion protects “administrative agency authority.” Exhaustion gives an

agency “an opportunity to correct its own mistakes with respect to the programs it

administers before it is haled into federal court,” and it discourages “disregard of

[the agency’s] procedures.”

Second, exhaustion promotes efficiency. Claims generally can be resolved much

more quickly and economically in proceedings before an agency than in litigation

in federal court. In some cases, claims are settled at the administrative level, and in

others, the proceedings before the agency convince the losing party not to pursue

the matter in federal court. “And even where a controversy survives administrative

review, exhaustion of the administrative procedure may produce a useful record for

subsequent judicial consideration.”

Id. (internal citations omitted) (bracket in original).

Where a petitioner has procedurally defaulted claims due to a failure to exhaust

administrative remedies, the default may be excused if a petitioner “show[s] cause and prejudice

for the failure to exhaust.”5 Engle, 26 F. App’x at 396. “[A]n intentional decision not to exhaust

procedural remedies generally does not constitute cause, [but] official interference making

compliance impracticable will.” Id. (citing Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 221-22 (1988)).

5 Administrative exhaustion may be excused in § 2241 cases because it is not jurisdictional. See Purley v. Toledo

Fed. Ct., No. 3:24-CV-01211-JRK, 2025 WL 240737, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 17, 2025) (explaining “exhaustion of

administrative remedies is not a jurisdictional requirement” in a § 2241 case), report and recommendation adopted,

No. 3:24 CV 1211, 2025 WL 581090 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 21, 2025); see also Jackson, 2007 WL 2231036, at *2.

Administrative exhaustion may also be excused “when there has been a prior indication from the

agency that it does not have jurisdiction over the matter or it has evidenced a strong position on

the issue together with an unwillingness to reconsider that the resort to administrative remedies is

considered futile[,]” Jackson, 2007 WL 2231036, at *3 (internal quotation and citation omitted),

or where the issue raised is one of statutory construction, see Goodman v. Sage, No. 4:22-CV-

00981, 2022 WL 18028148, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 2022).

The BOP has an Administrative Remedy Program, the purpose of which “is to allow an

inmate to seek formal review of an issue relating to any aspect of his/her own confinement.” 28

C.F.R. § 542.10(a). There are four steps. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.13-542.15. Except for

exceptions set forth in 28 C.F.R. § 542.13(b), an inmate must first present the issue informally to

prison staff. 28 C.F.R. § 542.13(a). Second, if the inmate is dissatisfied with the informal

resolution and wants to pursue the issue, the inmate must then submit a formal Administrative

Remedy Request on the appropriate BP–9 form to the institution where he is confined. 28 C.F.R.

§§ 542.14(a), (c). “The deadline for completion of informal resolution and submission of a

formal written Administrative Remedy Request, on the appropriate form (BP–9), is 20 calendar

days following the date on which the basis for the Request occurred.” 28 C.F.R. § 542.14(a).

Third, if the inmate is not satisfied with the Warden’s response to the BP–9 submission, he may

submit an Appeal on the appropriate form, a BP–10, to the Regional Director within 20 days of

the date the Warden signed the response. 28 C.F.R. § 542.15(a). Finally, if the inmate is

dissatisfied with the Regional Director’s response, he may submit an Appeal on the appropriate

form, a BP–11, to the General Counsel within 30 calendar days from the date the Regional

Director signed the response. 28 C.F.R. § 542.15(a). “Appeal to the General Counsel is the final

administrative appeal.” 28 C.F.R. § 542.15(a).

There are a few exceptions to the steps outlined above. 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.13(a), (b). “An

informal resolution attempt may be waived in individual cases at the Warden or institution

Administrative Remedy Coordinator’s discretion when the inmate demonstrates an acceptable

reason for bypassing informal resolution.” 28 C.F.R. § 542.13(b) And if the matter pertains to a

“sensitive issue,” the inmate may bypass the first two steps and “submit the Request directly to

the appropriate Regional Director.” 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.13(b), 542.14(d)(1). The “sensitive

issues” exception applies “[i]f the inmate reasonably believes the issue is sensitive and the

inmate’s safety or well-being would be placed in danger if the Request became known at the

institution[.]” 28 C.F.R. § 542.14(d)(1). “If the Regional Administrative Remedy Coordinator

agrees that the Request is sensitive, the Request shall be accepted.” Id. “Otherwise, the Request

will not be accepted, and the inmate shall be advised in writing of that determination, without a

return of the Request.” Id. “The inmate may pursue the matter by submitting an Administrative

Remedy Request locally to the Warden . . . [and] [t]he Warden shall allow a reasonable

extension of time for such a resubmission.” Id.

3. Petitioner Did Not Exhaust His Administrative Remedies and Has Failed to

Show “Cause” to Excuse the Resulting Procedural Default

Respondent argues that the Petition should be dismissed because Mr. Chapman failed to

properly exhaust his administrative remedies. (ECF Doc. 8, pp. 3-7, 12-14.) Although Mr.

Chapman “filed BOP administrative remedy requests on five separate occasions,” Respondent

asserts that he consistently “failed to correct procedural errors, even after being instructed what

to do.” (ECF Doc. 8, p. 12; see also id. at pp. 3-7.) Rather than arguing that he appropriately

exhausted his administrative remedies, Petitioner instead asks this Court to waive the exhaustion

requirement. (ECF Doc. 1, pp. 11, 17; ECF Doc. 9, pp. 1-2.)

i. Petitioner Failed to Exhaust his Administrative Remedies

Respondent asserts that Mr. Chapman failed to exhaust his administrative remedies

because he ignored written instructions on how to remedy his rejected requests for relief, electing

to seek higher levels of review instead of following directions to fix and/or complete his lower-

level requests. (ECF Doc. 8, pp. 3-7, 13.) A review of the records bears out this assertion.

Mr. Chapman has submitted evidence suggesting he attempted to engage in the first level

of administrative review, addressing his disputes informally with prison staff. See 28 C.F.R. §

542.13(a). In an April 22, 2025 email, Mr. Chapman reported that he had handed three Request

for Administrative Remedy Informal Resolution Forms (BP–8s) to Mr. Zackasee, relating to:

denial of extra five days of earned time credit; SCA, FSA, and a delay in RCC/HC paperwork;

and the denial of programming days. (ECF Doc. 9-2, p. 1; see also ECF Doc. 1-2 (three

unsigned BP–8s dated April 22, 2025).) He wrote that he was sending the email to “serve[] as

[his] receipt of when handed over to prison authorities” because he was “having difficulty with

timely responses from staff[.]” (ECF Doc. 9-2, p. 1) About two weeks later, in an email dated

May 5, 2025, Mr. Chapman informed Warden Healy “of the delay of the 3 BP–8s that [he] . . .

submitted . . . on April 22, 2025,” again describing the topics in the BP–8s. (Id. at p. 2.) He

indicated he had “not received any response on the[] issues” and had “experienced delays or

mishandling of [his] BP–8s” in the past, and requested Warden Healy’s “assistance for a fast

resolution of [the] issues so . . . [he could] proceed to the next level[.]” (Id.)

Four days later, on May 9, 2025, Mr. Chapman advanced his disputes to the next level of

review by filing three written Administrative Remedy Requests (BP-9s) with the institution

where he was confined, addressing the same issues. (ECF Doc. 1-3, pp. 6, 13, 19); see 28 C.F.R.

§ 542.14(a), (c). Mr. Chapman wrote that he filed the BP–9s at “the specific request of the

Warden and Associate Warden per [their] discussion on Friday May 9, at approximately 9:30

am, pertaining to the undue delay in processing my BP–8 (Informal Resolution) requests.” (Id.)

However, on May 12, 2025, the evidence indicates that the BP-9 requests were rejected

by the Administrative Remedy Coordinator at FCI Elkton for the following stated reasons:

REJECT REASON 1: YOU MAY RESUBMIT YOUR REQUEST IN PROPER

FORM WITHIN 5 DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS REJECTION NOTICE.

REJECT REASON 2: YOU DID NOT ATTEMPT INFORMAL RESOLUTION

PRIOR TO SUBMISSION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY, OR YOU DID

NOT PROVIDE THE NECESSARY EVIDENCE OF YOUR ATTEMPT AT

INFORMAL RESOLUTION.

(ECF Doc. 1-4, pp. 1, 5; ECF Doc. 8-4, pp. 2-3.) Despite these instructions, Mr. Chapman has

neither argued nor provided evidence to show that he resubmitted his BP-9 requests “in proper

form” within five days of the relevant notice, or that he submitted or attempted to submit

additional “evidence of [his] attempt at informal resolution” as contemplated in the notice.

Instead of submitting corrected BP-9 requests and/or additional evidence to substantiate

his attempts at informal resolution to FCI Elkton as instructed, the evidentiary record indicates

that Mr. Chapman advanced his requests for relief to the next level of administrative review by

filing three Regional Administrative Remedy Appeal (BP-10) forms with the Regional Director

on May 14, 2025. (ECF Doc. 1-3, pp. 4-5, 11-12, 17-18); see 28 C.F.R. § 542.15(a). Mr.

Chapman’s regional appeals were received on May 20, 2025, and rejected on May 21, 2025.

(ECF Doc. 1-4, pp. 2-4; ECF Doc. 8-4, pp. 3-4.) The rejection notices from the Northeast

Regional Office relating to the regional appeals as to FSA eligibility and FSA time credits

provided the following reasons for the rejection of the appeals:

REJECT REASON 1: YOU MUST FIRST FILE A BP-9 REQUEST THROUGH

THE INSTITUTION FOR THE WARDEN’S REVIEW AND RESPONSE

BEFORE FILING AN APPEAL AT THIS LEVEL.

REJECT REASON 2: SEE REMARKS.

REMARKS: YOU WERE ADVISED BY THE WARDEN ON THE 5-12-25

NOTICE TO CORRECT AND RESUBMIT YOUR BP9. IT IS UNCLEAR WHY

YOU DID NOT FOLLOW THE INSTRUCTIONS YOU WERE GIVEN.

(ECF Doc. 1-4, pp. 2-3; ECF Doc. 8-4, p. 4.) The rejection notice relating to Mr. Chapman’s

regional appeal as to RRC referrals and FSA Time Credits provided the following reasons for

rejecting his appeal:

REJECT REASON 1: YOU MUST FIRST FILE A BP-9 REQUEST THROUGH

THE INSTITUTION FOR THE WARDEN’S REVIEW AND RESPONSE

BEFORE FILING AN APPEAL AT THIS LEVEL.

REJECT REASON 2: SEE REMARKS.

REMARKS: YOU MUST MAKE CORRECTIONS TO THE BP-9 AND

RESUBMIT FOR WARDEN’S RESPONSE. IF THE BP-8 WAS SUBMITTED,

YOU SHOULD HAVE DATE OF RECEIPT STAMP FROM INSTITUTION.

(ECF Doc. 1-4, p. 4; ECF Doc. 8-4, p. 3.) Despite these written instructions, Mr. Chapman has

neither argued nor provided evidence to show he corrected and resubmitted his BP-9 requests or

that he sought, obtained, or submitted copies of his BP-8s with a “date of receipt stamp.”

Instead of obtaining copies of his BP-8 forms with a date of receipt stamp and/or

correcting and resubmitting his BP-9 forms as instructed, the evidence indicates Mr. Chapman

again advanced his requests for relief to the next level of administrative review by filing three

Central Office Administrative Remedy Appeal (BP-11) forms with the Central Office, appealing

the rejection of his BP–10s. (ECF Doc. 1-3, pp. 2-3, 9-10, 15-16; ECF Doc. 1-4, pp. 2-4; ECF

Doc. 8-4, pp. 5-6); see 28 C.F.R. § 542.15(a). Mr. Chapman argued in the BP-11 relating to

RRC referrals that the BP-8 forms he had submitted were “never processed or responded to,”

further explaining that he was attaching (to the BP-11) copies of those BP-8 forms and the emails

he attached to his BP-9s “in attempt to demonstrate attempts to remedy, and staff failure to

respond.” (See ECF Doc. 1-3, p. 3.) In the other BP-11s, he argued that his BP-10s were

improperly rejected because it was impossible to obtain documents that were “not available” due

to “[s]taff destruction and failure to process my BP-8s,” and further asserted that “emails to

document attempts were submitted in BP-9, and BP-10.” (ECF Doc. 1-3, pp. 9, 15.)

In addition to his three BP–11 appeals, Mr. Chapman also filed a “Sensitive” BP–11

appeal asserting that staff’s failure to process his BP–8s had effectively made the administrative

process unavailable. (ECF Doc. 1-3, pp. 1, 8); see 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.13(b), 542.14(d)(1). He

argued that it was his “belief that Staff [we]re purposefully hindering [his] filings to keep [him]

incarcerated longer than necessary,” and he felt it was “a sensitive issue to prevent further

retaliatory issues.” (ECF Doc. 1-3, pp. 1, 8.) He requested that the Central Office accept all his

BP–11s and address and correct the failure to timely process his BP–8s. (Id.)

Mr. Chapman’s Central Office appeals and his Sensitive BP–11 appeal were received on

June 12, 2025, and rejected on June 24 and 25, 2025. (ECF Doc. 8-4, pp. 5-6.) The rejection

notice relating to Mr. Chapman’s appeal as to FSA time credits included the following remarks:

CORRECT ERRORS IDENTIFIED BY THE INSTITUTION AND RESUBMIT

BP-9 FOR WARDEN REVIEW AND RESPONSE.

(Id. at p. 5.) The rejection notice relating to Mr. Chapman’s appeal as to RRC placement

included the following remarks:

CORRECT ISSUES IDENTIFIED BY THE INSTITUTION, AND RESUBMIT

AGAIN FOR AN INFORMAL RESOLUTION. YOU MUST FOLLOW

PREVIOUS INSTRUCTIONS.

(Id. at p. 6.) The rejection notice relating to Mr. Chapman’s appeal as to FSA eligibility included

the following remarks:

YOU WERE ADVISED BY THE WARDEN ON THE 5/12/25 NOTICE TO

CORRECT AND RESUBMIT YOU BP9. IT IS UNCLEAR WHY YOU DID NOT

FOLLOW THE INSTRUCTIONS YOU WERE GIVEN.

(Id.) Finally, the rejection notice for Mr. Chapman’s Sensitive request, alleging staff misconduct

and failure to process administrative remedy requests, included the following remarks:

YOU MUST FILE YOUR REQUEST THROUGH YOUR INSTITUTION 1ST,

FOR THE WARDEN’S REVIEW AND RESPONSE. YOU MUST FOLLOW

INSTRUCTIONS WHEN FILLING REQUESTS.

(Id. at p. 5.) Despite these written instructions, Mr. Chapman has neither argued nor provided

evidence to show that he corrected and resubmitted his BP-9 requests as instructed or that he

resubmitted any of the disputes for an informal resolution at the BP-8 level.

Based on this history, Respondent argues that Mr. Chapman did not properly exhaust his

administrative remedies because he “refus[ed] to follow BOP administrative remedy

procedures,” and instead submitted improper remedy requests to the regional and central offices,

including a “sensitive request,” to circumvent the administrative process. (ECF Doc. 8, p. 13.)

The undersigned agrees that the evidence indicates Mr. Chapman did not exhaust his

administrative remedies as required by governing regulations. Even setting aside the question of

whether he complied with the first step of the administrative process—seeking informal

resolution pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 542.13(b)—the record clearly reflects that he did not follow

the instructions that were repeated to him at every other step of the process to: (1) complete the

BP-8 informal resolution process and/or provide evidence to the institution of his attempts at

informal resolution; and (2) resubmit corrected BP-9 forms to the institution. (See ECF Doc. 1-

4. pp. 1-5; ECF Doc. 8-4, pp. 2-6.) While he may have provided further evidence or arguments

relevant to his initial attempts at informal resolution following the rejection of his BP-9 appeals,

he did so only via higher level appeals to the Regional Director and Central Office. Despite

clear, repeated instructions to submit further information, evidence, and/or corrected BP-9 forms

to FCI Elkton instead, there is no evidence that Mr. Chapman made any attempt to do so.

ii. Petitioner Has Not Shown Cause to Excuse Administrative Exhaustion

To overcome his failure to exhaust his administrative remedies, Mr. Chapman “must

show cause and prejudice for [his] failure to exhaust.” Engle, 26 F. App’x at 396. Petitioner

argues that his failure should be excused because facility staff did not respond to his attempts at

informal resolution and Associate Warden Ramos told him he could “just move forward with

[his] issues” when he did not receive a reply from facility staff regarding informal resolution.6

(ECF Doc. 9, p. 1.) Mr. Chapman also asserts in his Petition that he filed a Sensitive BP–11,

alleging that staff had destroyed or failed to process his BP–8s. (ECF Doc. pp. 9, 12, 15.) In

essence, Mr. Chapman argues that his failure to exhaust his administrative remedies should be

excused because his attempts to exhaust his remedies were impeded by the misconduct of

institution staff and/or because he was told that he could bypass the informal process.

Beginning with Petitioner’s allegation that staff misconduct impeded the exhaustion of

his remedies, the Sixth Circuit has explained that “an intentional decision not to exhaust

procedural remedies generally does not constitute cause, [but] official interference making

compliance impracticable will.” Engle, 26 F. App’x at 396 (citing Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S.

214, 221-22 (1988)). Here, there is some evidence to suggest that actions (or inaction) by

facility staff impacted Mr. Chapman’s ability to seek administrative relief at the initial, informal

stage of administrative review. For example, records suggest that Mr. Chapman supplied three

BP-8 forms to Mr. Zackasee on April 22, 2025, then emailed the Warden to seek assistance

thirteen days later when no action had yet been taken to address the forms, and finally waited

another four days before filing his BP-9 appeals “at the specific request of the Warden and

Associate Warden.” (ECF Doc. 9-2, pp. 1, 2; ECF Doc. 1-3, pp. 6, 13, 19.) But the records do

not end there. After the BP-9 forms were submitted, Mr. Chapman was repeatedly instructed, at

three different levels of review, that he must provide further information and/or corrected BP-9

6 Although Mr. Chapman states in his reply that the Associate Warden told him he could move forward (ECF Doc.

9, p. 1), he asserted in his BP–9s that he spoke with both the Associate Warden and the Warden and was moving

forward at their request (ECF Doc. 1-3, pp. 6, 13, 19).

forms to the Warden before he could progress to any further level of administrative review.

(ECF Doc. 1-4. pp. 1-5; ECF Doc. 8-4, pp. 2-6.) Rather than follow those repeated instructions,

Mr. Chapman elevated his appeals to the next level of review while asserting generally that

documentation was “not available.” (See, e.g., ECF Doc. 1-3, pp. 3, 9, 15.) Given Mr.

Chapman’s apparent failure to comply, or even to attempt compliance, with the instructions

repeated in each of his rejection notices, the undersigned concludes that Mr. Chapman’s failure

to exhaust his administrative remedies was the result of “an intentional decision not to exhaust”

rather than “official interference making compliance impractical.” Engle, 26 F. App’x at 396.

Accordingly, Mr. Chapman has not shown that “official interference” warranted a finding of

“cause” sufficient to excuse the default resulting from his failure to exhaust his remedies.

Turning to the allegation that Mr. Chapman was told he could bypass the informal

resolution process, the Code of Federal Regulations does provide that “[a]n informal resolution

attempt may be waived in individual cases at the Warden or institution Administrative Remedy

Coordinator’s discretion when the inmate demonstrates an acceptable reason for bypassing

informal resolution.” 28 C.F.R. § 542.13(b). Mr. Chapman asserts in his reply memorandum

that Associate Warden Ramos told him he could “just move forward with [his] issues” given

staff delays in acting on his BP-8 forms (ECF Doc. 9, p. 1), and his BP-9 forms assert that he

filed the forms at “the specific request of the Warden and Associate Warden” because of the

“undue delay” in processing the BP-8 requests (ECF Doc. 1-3, pp. 6, 13, 19). But these self-

serving, unsworn statements are the only evidence suggesting that Mr. Chapman had permission

to bypass the informal resolution process. These assertions are outweighed by the repeated,

written instructions given to Mr. Chapman at every level of administrative review that he must

complete and/or provide further evidence relating to the BP-8 process and submit corrected BP-9

forms before progressing to any higher level of administrative review. (ECF Doc. 1-4. pp. 1-5;

ECF Doc. 8-4, pp. 2-6.) This evidence does not support a finding that “the Warden or institution

Administrative Remedy Coordinator[]” exercised their discretion to allow Mr. Chapman to

bypass the informal resolution stage of the administrative process. 28 C.F.R. § 542.13(b). Thus,

Mr. Chapman’s alleged conversations with the Warden and/or Associate Warden do not establish

cause to excuse his default in exhausting his administrative remedies.

For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned concludes that Mr. Chapman has failed

to properly exhaust his administrative remedies, and has also failed to show “cause” sufficient to

excuse his resulting procedural default. See Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90 (“[P]roper exhaustion of

administrative remedies . . . means using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so

properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits).”) (internal citation and

quotations omitted) (emphasis removed). Moreover, the undersigned observes that Mr.

Chapman’s refusal to reengage with the institution, as instructed, to complete the initial phases of

administrative review had the ultimate effect of precluding administrative findings on the merits

of the Petition. This conflicts with the “two main purposes” for exhaustion, as articulated by the

Supreme Court. See Woodford, 548 U.S. at 89. First, there is no protection for “administrative

agency authority” when an agency does not have an opportunity to take a position on the merits

of a dispute. Id. And second, the “efficiency” of both the agency and the judiciary suffers when

the agency does not have an opportunity to address the merits of the dispute prior to litigation

and the court consequently has no “useful record for subsequent judicial consideration.” Id.

Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the Court GRANT Respondent’s motion

to dismiss the Petition pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.7

IV. Recommendation

For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned recommends that the Court DENY

Respondent’s motion to dismiss the Petition pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), GRANT Respondent’s

motion to dismiss the Petition pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) (ECF Doc. 8), and DISMISS the

Petition (ECF Doc. 1) without prejudice.

August 10, 2026

/s/ Amanda M. Knapp

AMANDA M. KNAPP

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

OBJECTIONS

Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of

Courts within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this document. Failure to file

objections within the specified time may forfeit the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See

Berkshire v. Dahl, 928 F.3d 520, 530 (6th Cir. 2019); see also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106

S.Ct. 466, 88 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1985).

7 Because the undersigned recommends dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the merits of

Respondent’s additional motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and alternative

motion for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 need not be addressed herein.