Opinion

Reyna

Court: District Court, N.D. California
Filed: Jul 14, 2026
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 44.1%

The opinion

7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

8 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH ANTHONY REYNA,

10 Case No. 26-cv-03137-RS

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

12 DISMISS SECOND AMENDED

APPLE INC., COMPLAINT

Defendant.

15 I. INTRODUCTION

16 Apple, Inc. (“Apple”) moves to dismiss the wide-ranging complaint brought against it by

17 pro se Plaintiff Joseph Reyna. This is Plaintiff’s third version of the complaint, and for the reasons

18 discussed below, each claim suffers dispositive defects. Accordingly, each count is dismissed, and

19 Defendant’s motion is granted. Plaintiff is granted leave to amend as to Counts 3–9, excluding his

20 claim under the Stored Communications Act. Despite opportunities to amend, Reyna has failed to

21 advance cognizable claims and therefore this will be his final opportunity to amend.1

22 II. BACKGROUND2

23 Reyna filed his original complaint against Apple on April 13, 2026 and his first amended

1 Early this morning on July 14, 2026, Reyna moved for leave to file a third amended complaint,

Dkt. 71. Reyna may file an amended complaint consistent with this order. However, Reyna is

advised that the Court takes no position at this time regarding whether the proposed third amended

complaint filed with the recent motion, Dkt. 71-2, is consistent with this order.

2 Unless otherwise stated, this order accepts well-pled factual allegations made in the complaint as

1 complaint a week later on April 21, 2026. On May 16, 2026, before a motion to dismiss was filed

2 and with Apple’s consent, Reyna obtained leave to file the second amended complaint (“SAC”).

3 The SAC is the operative complaint.

4 Reyna’s claims stem from his alleged roles as an Apple Card holder, musical artist whose

music is available on Apple’s streaming service, layman with product ideas relevant to Apple, and

consumer of Apple hardware and software products. He brings nine claims under federal and

California law for consumer credit regulation violations, anti-competitive arrangements, false and

deceptive advertising, intellectual property infringement, and product liability.

On June 11, 2026, Apple moved to dismiss each of Reyna’s claims. Reyna filed an

opposition, as well as numerous procedurally improper filings addressed in this Court’s prior

order, Dkt. 65. The hearing date for the present motion was vacated previously pursuant to Local

Rule 7-1(b).

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 12(b)(6) governs motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Pursuant to the

pleading standards set out in Rule (8)(a), a complaint must contain a short and plain statement of

the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), and “giv[ing] the defendant

fair notice of what the… claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While “detailed

factual allegations” are not required, a complaint must have sufficient factual allegations to “state

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

20 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on

21 either the “lack of a cognizable legal theory” or on “the absence of sufficient facts alleged” under

22 a cognizable legal theory. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006,

23 1014 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Except for “[t]hreadbare

24 recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” Iqbal, 556

25 U.S. at 678, and “conclusory allegations… contradicted by documents referred to in the

26 complaint,” Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1295-96 (9th Cir. 1998), courts

27 “accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most

1 favorable to the nonmoving party,” Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005).

2 Pursuant to these standards, a plaintiff also may not “file pleadings that do not tie factual

3 averments against specific parties to individual causes of action,” i.e., shotgun pleadings. Gibson

4 v. City of Portland, 165 F.4th 1265, 1290 (9th Cir. 2026). “[D]istrict courts do not have to accept”

such pleadings. Id. at 1289. “It is not the job of the district courts to make sense of the pleading, to

supply facts to support the claim, or to imagine the claims that might fit the facts.” Id. at 1289.

When a party lodges allegations of fraud or mistake, that party “must state with

particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). In this setting,

a plaintiff must plead “the who, what, when, where, and how that would suggest fraud.” Cooper v.

Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 627 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). While more

exacting than the burden imposed by Rule 8(a), this standard is not insurmountable. Instead, where

plaintiffs have “placed [d]efendants on sufficient notice to respond to the alleged fraud,” “their

allegations meet Rule 9(b).” Moore v. Mars Petcare US, Inc., 966 F.3d 1007, 1020 (9th Cir.

2020).

In dismissing a complaint, leave to amend should be granted. However, dismissal without

leave to amend is appropriate when it is clear the complaint’s deficiencies cannot be cured by

amendment or the plaintiff has failed to cure the complaint’s deficiencies despite repeated

opportunities to do so. See Garmon v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 828 F.3d 837, 842 (9th Cir. 2016).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Count 1: Equal Credit Opportunity Act Violation

Plaintiff’s first count is based on Apple’s alleged failure to comply with adverse action

notification requirements mandated by the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”). See 15

U.S.C. § 1691(d). Apple argues it is not a creditor under ECOA, which defines “creditor” as “any

person who regularly extends, renews, or continues credit; any person who regularly arranges for

the extension, renewal, or continuation of credit; or any assignee of an original creditor who

participates in the decision to extend, renew, or continue credit.” Id. § 1691a(e). See also 12

C.F.R. § 1002.2(l) (“[T]he term creditor… includes a person who, in the ordinary course of

1 hand, argues his allegations sufficiently establish at this stage that Apple is a creditor under

2 ECOA. He alleges that, while Goldman Sachs is the “issuing bank” for the Apple Card, Apple

3 “controls the Apple Card enrollment interface, the applicant data environment, the credit criteria

4 communicated to applicants, and the adverse-action notification channel”. Dkt. 35-1, SAC, ¶ 8.

5 The question is a matter of first impression: whether a party’s control over the user

6 interfaces for credit card enrollment and management makes the party a creditor for adverse action

7 notification purposes under ECOA. Other cases dealing with whether a defendant qualifies as a

8 creditor under ECOA address more traditional players in the credit issuance ecosystem such as car

dealerships. See e.g., Salvagne v. Fairfield Ford, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 2d 826 (S.D. Ohio 2010);

Henry v. Westchester Foreign Autos, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 2d 610 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).

The Salvagne court noted that the “the regulation and comment [for ECOA’s adverse

action notification requirements] explicitly contemplate a continuum of credit functions and note

that some functions require compliance with requirements that other functions do not.” 794 F.

Supp. 2d at 836. The defendant automobile dealership in Salvagne was indisputably a creditor for

purposes of the Truth and Lending Act and identified as a creditor in the parties’ retail installment

contract, and yet it was not a creditor for notification purposes under ECOA because “when a

dealership acts as a liaison between consumers and lenders, referring credit applications to lenders,

the dealership in that capacity is a creditor under the ECOA only with respect to the

antidiscrimination and anti-discouragement provisions.” Id. (citing 12 C.F.R. Pt. 202, Supp. I)

(emphases added). The Salvagne plaintiffs “ha[d] not pointed… to any facts in the record that

would indicate that [the defendant] itself set the terms of the loan or otherwise placed itself in a

position on the creditor continuum that would subject it to the notification requirements,” and so

defendant was entitled to summary judgment on the ECOA claim. Id.

23 In Westchester Foreign Autos, it was defendant’s “regular course of business to review

24 credit applicants’ credit reports to assess the situation and send it to the bank” which defendant

25 thought would approve the loan, but it was “not clear whether [defendant] regularly participate[d]

26 in the actual decision to grant or deny credit to a particular applicant.” 522 F. Supp. 2d at 615.

27 Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the ECOA claim was denied, in part, because

1 factual questions remained regarding “whether [defendant] regularly arrange[d] or participate[d] in

2 credit decisions in the ordinary course of its business.” Id.

3 Here, Plaintiff alleges Apple “controls the Apple Card enrollment interface, the applicant

4 data environment, the credit criteria communicated to applicants, and the adverse-action

notification channel.” Dkt. 35-1, SAC, ¶ 8. He does not allege that Apple set the terms of the loan

or participated in credit decisions. On the “creditor continuum,” Plaintiff’s allegations regarding

control over the interface, environment, and notification channel do not place Apple in “a

position… that would subject [Apple] to the notification requirements.” Salvagne, 794 F. Supp. 2d

at 836. Count 1 is dismissed without leave to amend because amendment would be futile in

turning Apple into a creditor for purposes of ECOA adverse action notification.

B. Count 2: Unjust Enrichment

Under California law, “the elements for a claim of unjust enrichment [are] receipt of a

benefit and unjust retention of the benefit at the expense of another.” Lectrodryer v. SeoulBank, 77

Cal. App. 4th 723, 726 (2000). The SAC’s unjust enrichment claim is based on allegations that

Reyna voluntarily shared a product idea on Twitter in September 2022, and Apple released a

similar feature a year later. This claim fails as a matter of law. The allegations do not indicate

Apple even saw the tweet—let alone that Apple received any benefit. More importantly, even if

Apple had seen the tweet and used Reyna’s idea, Reyna shared it voluntarily. There is nothing

unjust at play. Finally, the unjust enrichment claim as based on the 2023 product release is time-

barred with a two-year statute of limitations.

In his opposition, Reyna argues his unjust enrichment claim is based also on Apple’s

alleged exploitation of listener behavioral data for the development of other commercial products.

Even if these facts had been alleged in relation to Reyna’s unjust enrichment claim rather than

scattershot, the claim would fail because Reyna does not allege unjust retention, such as failure to

pay royalties, and his allegations that royalties are depressed based on other misconduct—i.e.,

false advertising or unfair competition—fail for the reasons discussed below.

In short, Reyna’s unjust enrichment claim fails. Moreover, amendment would be futile in

light of the statute of limitations. Count 2 is dismissed, therefore, without leave to amend.

2 C. Count 3: Section 2 of the Sherman Act

3 Reyna alleges Apple is liable under Section 2 of the Sherman Act for its actions as (1) a

4 distributor in an “output market” for “premium digital music streaming on iOS-powered devices in

5 the United States” and (2) a buyer in an “input market” for “independent artists recorded music

6 distributed through iOS streaming platforms.” Dkt. 35-1, SAC, ¶¶ 19, 48, 50. Section 2 of the

7 Sherman Act prohibits anticompetitive conduct that monopolizes or threatens actual

8 monopolization. 15 U.S.C. § 2. To make out a claim, Reyna must show: “ ‘(a) the possession of

9 monopoly power in the relevant market; (b) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power;

10 and (c) causal antitrust injury.’ ” Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Qualcomm Inc., 969 F.3d 974, 990 (9th

11 Cir. 2020) (quoting Somers v. Apple, Inc., 729 F.3d 953, 963 (9th Cir. 2013)). “[T]o demonstrate

12 attempted monopolization a plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant has engaged in predatory or

13 anticompetitive conduct with (2) a specific intent to monopolize and (3) a dangerous probability of

14 achieving monopoly power.” Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993).

15 First, the threshold step in any antitrust case requires that a plaintiff “accurately define the

16 relevant market, which refers to the area of effective competition.” See Qualcomm, 969 F.3d at

17 992. The relevant market “must encompass the product at issue as well as all economic substitutes

18 for the product.” Hicks v. PGA Tour, Inc., 897 F.3d 1109, 1120 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Newcal

19 Indus., Inc. v. Ikon Office Solution, 513 F.3d 1038, 1045 (9th Cir. 2008)). “Economic substitutes

20 have a ‘reasonable interchangeability of use’ or sufficient ‘cross-elasticity of demand’ with the

21 relevant product.” Id. (citations omitted). A properly defined relevant market must include all

22 products “reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same purposes.” United States v. E.I.

23 du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956).

24 Reyna defines the “output” market for “premium digital music streaming” as that on “iOS-

25 powered devices.” SAC ¶ 19. He asserts as justification for the iOS limit that a “5-10% increase in

26 Apple Music subscription prices would not cause iOS users to migrate to non-iOS platforms

27 because switching causes are prohibitive.” Id. This reflects the Small but Significant Non-

1 by purchasing the product from outside the proposed geographic market, making the SSNIP

2 unprofitable, the proposed market definition is too narrow. See Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa

3 Inc. v. St. Luke's Health Sys., 778 F.3d 775, 784 (9th Cir. 2015). “Market definition does not

4 necessarily require a SSNIP test at the pleading stage – but if Plaintiffs choose to rely on one, it

must be plausible.” Gamboa v. Apple Inc., 808 F. Supp. 3d 951, 967 (N.D. Cal. 2025). A plaintiff

must allege a profitable price increase relative to other products in the market. See id. Reyna does

not, rendering his SSNIP test allegation for the output market deficient. Reyna also supports the

iOS limit by listing a series of features available to those who use Apple Music via an iOS-device.

A difference in some features, however, does not establish a lack of substitutability.

Reyna defines the “input” market as “independent artist recorded music distributed through

iOS streaming platforms.” Dkt. 35-1, SAC, ¶ 19. He does not define an independent artist or

provide any other market contours. These allegations are insufficient to establish a relevant

market. See hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 485 F. Supp. 3d 1137, 1148-49 (N.D. Cal. 2020)

(finding “antitrust claims deficient for failure to adequately allege a product market” where “the

parameters of the [proposed] market–as pled–are vague”).

In his opposition, Reyna again and impermissibly introduces new allegations outside of the

SAC. He argues he has alleged an aftermarket theory of monopolization. “[T]o establish a single-

brand aftermarket, a plaintiff must show: (1) the challenged aftermarket restrictions are not

generally known when consumers make their foremarket purchase; (2) significant information

costs prevent accurate life-cycle pricing; (3) significant monetary or non-monetary switching costs

exist; and (4) general market-definition principles regarding cross-elasticity of demand do not

undermine the proposed single-brand market.” Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 67 F.4th 946, 977

(9th Cir. 2023). Even if Reyna had alleged an aftermarket theory of monopolization, it would fail

for failure to satisfy the additional requirements to establish a single-brand aftermarket.

In short, failure to allege adequately a product market renders Reyna’s antitrust claims

25 insufficient.3 Count 3 is dismissed.

3 Because of deficiencies in the allegations of a relevant market, Apple’s additional arguments that

1 D. Count 4: Lanham Act False Advertising

2 To establish a false advertising claim under the Lanham Act, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) a

3 false statement of fact by the defendant in a commercial advertisement about its own or another’s

4 product; (2) the statement actually deceived or has the tendency to deceive a substantial segment

5 of its audience; (3) the deception is material, in that it is likely to influence the purchasing

6 decision; (4) the defendant caused its false statement to enter interstate commerce; and (5) the

7 plaintiff has been or is likely to be injured as a result of the false statement[.]” Southland Sod

8 Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir.1997). With regard to the making of a

9 false statement, “ ‘district courts in the Ninth Circuit have held that the heightened pleading

10 standard of Rule 9(b) applies... [and] requires the plaintiff to plead the “time, place, and specific

11 content of the false representations,” the identities of the parties to the misrepresentation, and what

12 about the statement is claimed to be misleading.’ ” Corsair Gaming, Inc. v. Choice Elecs. Inc., No.

13 5:25-CV-00045-BLF, 2025 WL 2822691, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2025) (citations omitted)

14 According to Reyna, Apple misrepresents its music chart rankings by suggesting they are

15 determined by streaming activity and not disclosing they are impacted by “commercial

16 arrangements.” Dkt. 35-1, SAC, ¶ 51. However, Reyna fails to identify any specific

17 representations to that effect. Even if Reyna had alleged specific representations by Apple

18 regarding its chart methodology, he fails to allege materiality. Reyna alleges that “chart position is

19 a factor on which listeners make streaming decisions, booking agents make engagement decisions,

20 and sync supervisors make licensing decisions” and also that “the music industry treats Apple

21 Music chart positions as commercial credentials.” Id. However, Reyna does not allege that “merit-

22 based” representations about the rankings, rather than the rankings themselves, influence listener

23 streaming decisions.4

not be addressed.

4 Confusingly, Reyna emphasizes that it is an alleged “structural information asymmetry”—where

27 some “management team[s] understand[] Apple Music’s chart architecture” and others do not—

that “makes Apple’s chart methodology representations materially false.” See Dkt. 35-1, SAC,

1 The only specifically identified representations are alleged statements by Apple VP Oliver

2 Schusser. Instead of representing chart methodology, Schusser’s alleged statements represent that

3 Apple validates every play and removes stream counts and returns royalties to the distribution

4 pool when fraud is discovered. According to Reyna, these statements are false because “per-play

5 validation cannot function during an infrastructure failure.” Dkt. 35-1, SAC, ¶ 51. Yet, in Reyna’s

6 own words, “chart data for [a] disruption window [might be] reconstructed,” such that Schusser’s

7 alleged statements are not false or misleading. Id. In other words, Reyna fails to show a likelihood

8 of deception. Moreover, again, Reyna has failed to allege that Schusser’s statements influence or

9 are likely to influence listener streaming decisions. Without such allegations, Reyna fails to show

10 either materiality or a likelihood of injury to himself, an artist competing for streams and the

11 royalties and bookings that follow.

12 Again, Reyna also introduces new arguments in his opposition, pulling from the

13 allegations associated with his UCL claim according to the SAC. This is improper gunshot

14 pleading. Even if it were not, Reyna does not allege commercial injury, e.g., that he purchased

15 music videos via the “Buy” button expecting permanent ownership. See Dkt. 35-1, SAC, ¶¶ 42–

16 42.

17 For at least the foregoing reasons, Reyna fails to establish a claim for false advertising

18 under the Lanham Act. Count 4, therefore, is dismissed.5

19 E. Count 5: Unfair Competition Law

20 California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) provides a cause of action for “any

21 unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof Code § 17200. A claim

22 under the unlawful prong requires a predicate violation, a business act or practice that is

23 “forbidden by law, be it civil or criminal, federal, state, or municipal, statutory, regulatory, or

court-made.” Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1044 (9th Cir. 2010)

26 asymmetry among savvy industry players but rather likely deception of reasonable consumers.

27 5 Reyna again introduces new allegations in his opposition. The newly alleged podcast interviews

are improperly introduced and thus cannot be considered.

1 (quoting Saunders v. Superior Ct., 27 Cal. App. 4th 832, 838–39 (1994)). Since each of Reyna’s

2 other claims fails, as discussed herein, there can be no claim under the unlawful prong of the

3 UCL.6

4 A claim under the unfair prong of the UCL requires a business practice that “violates

established public policy or [that] is immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous and causes

injury to consumers which outweighs its benefits.” McKell v. Washington Mut., Inc., 142

Cal.App.4th 1457, 1473 (2006) (quoting Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 97

Cal.App.4th 1282, 1298–90, (2002)). California courts apply a variety of tests to determine

whether conduct is unfair. See, e.g., Doe v. CVS Pharm., Inc., 982 F.3d 1204, 1214–15 (9th Cir.

2020). Reyna focuses on the “tethering” test, which asks “whether the challenged conduct is

tethered to an[ ] underlying constitutional, statutory or regulatory provision.” Id. at 1214. He

argues that the alleged conduct is tethered to federal antitrust laws and “federal payola statutes, ”

Dkt. 42, Opp., at 16 (citing 47 U.S.C. §§317, 507). Reyna cannot make out a claim under the

unfair prong of the UCL based on federal antitrust violations because his antitrust claims fail.

As to his “payola” argument, Reyna references throughout the SAC “undisclosed

commercial arrangements” that “distort[] chart rankings.” See e.g., Dkt. 35-1, SAC ¶¶ 34, 48, 51.

The allegations describe commercial arrangements by which certain management teams

“understand[] Apple Music’s chart architecture from the inside” and other, “independent artist[s]

competing for chart placement” do not. Id. ¶ 20.h. However, such arrangements do not reflect

19 undisclosed, i.e., unlawful, “ ‘payola’— payments/bribes to officials at local radio stations” or

20 other music broadcasters. See United States v. Isgro, 974 F.2d 1091, 1092 (9th Cir. 1992), as

21 amended on denial of reh'g (Nov. 25, 1992). Apple is not a “radio station” as identified in

22 47 U.S.C. § 317 and § 508. See 47 U.S.C. § 317(a) (“All matter broadcast by any radio station for

6 As Defendant points out, Reyna’s Cartwright Act claim, pled “in the alternative” to his Sherman

25 Act claim, fail for the same reason his Sherman Act claim fails and for the additional reason that

Reyna has not pled agreements to restrain trade but only single firm monopolization, which is not

26 cognizable under the Cartwright Act. See Asahi Kasei Pharma Corp. v. CoTherix, Inc., 204 Cal.

App. 4th 1, 8 (2012). The “multiparty arrangements” discussed by Reyna in his opposition are

27 vertical agreements; they do nothing to reveal cognizable multi-firm monopolization. Dkt. 42,

Opp. at 17.

1 which any money, service or other valuable consideration is directly or indirectly paid… shall, at

2 the time the same is so broadcast, be announced as paid for or furnished.” (emphasis added)); 47

3 U.S.C. § 508(a) (“[A]ny employee of a radio station who accepts … any money, service or other

4 valuable consideration for the broadcast of any matter over such station shall, in advance of such

broadcast, disclose th[at] fact.” (emphasis added)).

The only non-conclusory allegations regarding commercial arrangements and chart

rankings are that Drake and Apple Music partnered to promote both Drake’s music and Apple

Music through, inter alia, Apple Music (formerly Beats 1) radio programming. See Dkt. 35-1,

SAC ¶ 48. Yet, Reyna admits the commercial arrangement between Drake and Apple Music was

reported. See id. ¶ 20h. Moreover, Reyna’s allegation that “Drake’s [chart] prominence” must

have been “purchased” because, if not, “Apple wasted $19 million on a partnership with zero

platform impact… Apple’s own financial decision is the proof… Apple set the amount” is

implausible. Id. ¶ 48. Reyna has not alleged adequately a commercial arrangement that violates

public policy and would support a claim under the unlawful prong.

Finally, a claim under the fraudulent prong of the UCL requires establishing that a business

made a representation that has the likely effect of misleading or deceiving the public. McKell, 142

Cal.App.4th at 1471. These claims are also subject to the heightened pleading requirements

of Rule 9(b). Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2009). A plaintiff must

plead the circumstances of the alleged fraud with particularity, including the “who, what, when,

19 where, and how” of the misconduct charged. Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1106

20 (9th Cir. 2003). For the same reasons as discussed with regard to his Lanham Act claim, Reyna

21 has not made out a claim of fraud or deceit.

22 F. Count 6: Electronic Communications Privacy Act Violations

23 i. Wiretap Act

24 To establish a claim for unlawful interception under the Wiretap Act, Reyna must allege

25 Apple “intentionally intercept[ed]… wire, oral, or electronic communication”7 or “intentionally

27 7 “[O]ral communication” must be “uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such

communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation,” 18

1 disclose[d]” or “use[d]” the contents of any such communication, while “knowing or having

2 reason to know that the information was obtained through [unlawful] interception.”

3 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(1)(a), (c)–(d). Notably, to comply with Article III’s standing requirements, he

4 cannot allege that Apple intercepted, used, or disclosed just anyone’s communication. He must

allege Apple intercepted, used, or disclosed his communications because “the ‘injury in fact’ test

requires more than an injury to a cognizable interest”; “ ‘[i]t requires that the party seeking review

be himself among the injured.’ ” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 563 (1992) (quoting

Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972)). See also Mass. v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 517

(2007) (“ ‘[T]he gist of the question of standing’ is whether [plaintiffs] have ‘such a personal stake

in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the

presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination.’ ” (quoting Baker

v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).

In Lopez v. Apple, Inc., the amended class action complaint asserted the same interception

violations as here, and it was dismissed for lack of standing because “Plaintiffs allege[d] no facts

to suggest that their own private communications were intercepted by accidental [Siri] triggers.”

519 F. Supp. 3d 672, 681, 683 (N.D. Cal. 2021). The Lopez plaintiffs’ claims “rest[ed] solely on

[a] Guardian article that reports the privacy harms of other class members that may not have

affected [the] [p]laintiffs at all.” Id. at 683. Reyna’s ECPA claim rests entirely on the Apple

interceptions alleged in the Lopez class action. However, Reyna alleges no facts indicating that he

19 was eligible to be part of the Lopez class or that his communications were intercepted. Instead, he

20 alleges he opted out of the Lopez class. See e.g., Dkt. 35-1, SAC, ¶ 26. This, however, is

21 insufficient to establish standing.8 His ECPA claim must be dismissed.

22 ii. Stored Communications Act

23 The Stored Communications Act (“SCA”) provides a private right of action against anyone

F.2d 1221, 1223 (9th Cir. 1978).

8 Plaintiff discusses Apple’s deletion of Siri processing records. Yet, even if true, this does not

27 excuse the absence of allegations indicating his communications were intercepted, disclosed, or

used.

1 who: “(1) intentionally accesses without authorization a facility through which an electronic

2 communication service is provided; or (2) intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that

3 facility… while it is in electronic storage in such system.” 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a). The SCA also

4 prohibits a person or entity providing an electronic communication service from “knowingly

divulg[ing] to any person or entity the contents of a communication while in electronic storage by

that service.” 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1). The SCA’s “1986 enactment was driven by congressional

desire to protect third-party entities that stored information on behalf of users.” In re Facebook,

Inc. Internet Tracking Litig., 956 F.3d 589, 609 (9th Cir. 2020) (citations omitted). “Since then,

the SCA has typically only been found to apply in cases involving a centralized data-management

entity[.]” Id.

Here, Reyna alleges his SCA claims “arise from the same category of iOS behavioral data

collection” as in Lopez. Dkt 35-1, SAC, ¶ 9b. However, in Lopez, the SCA claim was dismissed

because Siri did not qualify as a “facility” or an “electronic communication service” under the

SCA. 519 F. Supp. 3d at 686. The same reasoning applies here. “[T]he SCA protects stored

communications, whether in temporary or backup storage, not contemporaneous communications

in transit from sender to recipient.” Backhaut v. Apple, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 3d 1033, 1042 (N.D. Cal.

2014) (emphasis in original). Here, Reyna has failed to allege that Apple “accesses” any “facility”

and thereby “ ‘obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access’ ” to communications “ ‘in electronic

storage.’ ” See id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a)). See also Lopez, 519 F. Supp. 3d at 686; In re

19 iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (dismissing SCA claim

20 because iPhones are not “facilit[ies] through which an electronic communication service is

21 provided”). Reyna’s SCA claim is dismissed, and, in light of the definitional deficiencies with

22 regard to “facility,” amendment would be futile. The SCA claim is dismissed without further leave

23 to amend.

24 G. Count 7: Digital Millenium Copyright Act Violation

25 A claim under Section 1202(b) of the Digital Millenium Copyright Act (“DCMA”)

26 requires a showing of (1) intentional removal or alteration of copyright management material and

27 (2) “the mental state of knowing, or having a reasonable basis to know, that [the removal or

1 alteration] actions ‘will induce, enable, facilitate, or conceal’ infringement.” Stevens v. Corelogic,

2 Inc., 899 F.3d 666, 673 (9th Cir. 2018); 17 U.S.C. § 1202(b)(1). As for the latter, Plaintiff’s

3 allegations are conclusory. He alleges that “Apple Music’s file-processing systems remove

4 Plaintiff’s ISRC codes, artist attribution fields, and copyright ownership information form

5 distributed JOECAT files,” see Dkt 35-1, SAC, ¶ 59, without including any supporting facts. Even

6 if these allegations were sufficient to show intentional removal or alteration of copyright material,

7 Reyna does not adequately allege scienter.

8 Reyna’s only allegations as to scienter are that “Apple knew it was removing CMI” and

9 “had reasonable grounds to know that removing Plaintiff’s [copyright management information

10 (“CMI”)] would facilitate infringement[.]” Id. ¶ 59. Yet, the Ninth Circuit made clear in Stevens v.

11 Corelogic, Inc. that “the mental state requirement in Section 1202(b) [has] a more specific

application than the universal possibility of encouraging infringement; specific allegations as to

how identifiable infringements ‘will’ be affected” such as “a past ‘pattern of conduct’ or ‘modus

operandi’ ” “are necessary.” 899 F.3d 666, 674 (9th Cir. 2018).

Reyna relies on, but mischaracterizes, Kadrey v. Meta Platforms, Inc. in his opposition.

No. 23-CV-03417-VC, 2025 WL 744032 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2025). He erroneously characterizes

that decision as binding on this court (which, as an opinion of another district court, it is not) and,

more importantly, fails to engage with the inapposite details of its holding as to scienter. The

Kadrey court found Section 1202(b) scienter adequately alleged because the plaintiffs there

averred that (1) the defendant knew its artificial intelligence model “was especially prone to

memorizing and generating outputs of CMI unless CMI was removed from its training data,” and

“voluntarily revealed that an early… model was trained on… copyrighted material,” and (2) the

defendant “took… steps to reduce the likelihood that the [model] would generate outputs that

would reveal or indicate that copyrighted material was included in training datasets.” Id. at *2

(internal quotation marks omitted). “Taken together, these allegations raise[d] a ‘reasonable, if not

particularly strong, inference’ that [defendant] removed CMI to try to prevent [its model] from

26 outputting CMI and thus revealing that it was trained on copyrighted material.” Id. (citing

27 Friedman v. Live Nation Merchandise, Inc., 833 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 2016)). By contrast

1 here, Reyna does not allege that Apple has any pattern of itself misusing copyrighted material,9

2 which would show a motivation for stripping CMI, nor does he allege specific steps taken to

3 reduce the likelihood of being found out.

4 In sum, Reyna has not alleged intentional removal or alteration of CMI nor the requisite

scienter for a violation of Section 1202(b) of the DCMA. Count 7 is dismissed.

H. Count 8: Right of Publicity

A right of publicity claim under the common law requires defendant (1) used plaintiff’s

name or likeness (2) to defendant’s advantage, commercially or otherwise, (3) without consent and

(4) resulting injury. Cohen v. Facebook, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1093-94 (N.D. Cal. 2011). A

statutory claim under § 3344 additionally requires defendant (1) knowingly used plaintiff’s name

or likeness (2) for purposes of advertising with (3) a direct connection between the use and the

commercial purpose. Id. (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 3344).

Reyna’s right of publicity claim in the SAC focuses entirely on behavioral data

exploitation. He asserts that Apple’s use of listening behavior to train “commercial models,” serve

recommendations, and sell advertising violates Reyna’s right of publicity. SAC ¶¶ 61–61a.

Defendant correctly points out numerous flaws with Reyna’s claim. First, use of listener

behavioral data does not constitute use of Reyna’s name or likeness. Second, there is no right of

publicity claim where the alleged material is used “in a place where [it is] not visible to the

public,” such as in model training data. Davis v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. 10-CV-03328-RS, 2017 WL

8948083, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2017). Third, Reyna has not alleged any injury.

In his opposition, Reyna raises a new argument that does not appear in the SAC. He argues

that his name and likeness are misappropriated via Shazam, an application that, upon request,

displays the song currently being played so that users can identify a song they hear and like on the

radio, at a coffee shop, at a party, or otherwise. This argument fails because the underlying facts

26 9 Reyna alleges that “removing Plaintiff's CMI would facilitate infringement by preventing

downstream platforms, licensees, and users from accurately identifying the rights-holder, thereby

27 enabling unlicensed use without attribution” but does not allege that Apple misuses copyrighted

artist material for its own gain as was alleged in Kadrey. See id.

1 were not alleged in the SAC. For at least these reasons, Reyna’s right of publicity claims fail.

2 I. Count 9: Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act Violation

3 The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (“MMWA”) provides a cause of action for express or

4 implied warranties under state law. Under the MMWA, “implied warranties may be limited in

5 duration to the duration of a written warranty of reasonable duration.” 15 U.S.C. § 2308. Here,

Apple limited the express and implied warranties for Reyna’s iPhone purchase to one year.10

Reyna concedes he did not file a claim to Apple but rather filed one with Verizon. Whatever the

source of Reyna’s confusion, the expiry with Apple has run. Reyna also suggests in his opposition

that an exception based on latent defects applies, but his allegations fail to include any facts

suggesting the alleged defect was latent. The claim fails based on the expiry of the warranties.

Moreover, amendment would be futile since the statute of limitations has passed. Count 9 is

accordingly dismissed without leave to amend.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Apple’s motion is granted. Each of Reyna’s claims is dismissed

with leave to amend except for his claims for violations of ECOA, SCA, and MMWA and for

unjust enrichment, which are dismissed without further leave to amend. Should Plaintiff seek to

amend his complaint a third time, he must do so by July 25, 2026.

As previously advised, before any future filings, Plaintiff should seek assistance from the

Federal Pro Bono Project’s Legal Help Center, which may be able to provide basic legal help, but

not legal representation. The Center may be reached by calling (415) 782-8982 or emailing

FedPro@sfbar.org.

23 10 See “Apple One (1) Year Limited Warranty,” Apple Inc., https://tinyurl.com/5fh7cse2 (noting a

one-year warranty for iPhone purchases). The SAC incorporates by reference the terms of the

24 warranty, see SAC ¶ 63, and the terms “forms the basis” for Reyna’s MMWA claim. Accordingly,

the terms can be considered on this motion. See United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th

25 Cir. 2003) (“Even if a document is not attached to a complaint, it may be incorporated by

reference into a complaint if the plaintiff refers extensively to the document or the document

26 forms the basis of the plaintiff's claim…. The doctrine of incorporation by reference may apply,

for example, when a plaintiff's claim about insurance coverage is based on the contents of a

27 coverage plan or when a plaintiff's claim about stock fraud is based on the contents of SEC

filings.” (internal citations omitted)).

2 || ITISSO ORDERED.

4 || Dated: July 14, 2026

CHARD SEEBORG

6 United States District Judge

a 12

Z 18

CASE No. 26-cv-03137-RS

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