Patterson

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

STEPHEN PATTERSON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 2:26-cv-212-RAH

)

JIMMIE L. BRAYBOY, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action to allege certain violations of his

civil rights, and the Court has now screened the Complaint under 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A.1 Upon review, and for the reasons explained below,

the Court will dismiss two of the named defendants and serve the Complaint upon

the remaining three.

The Complaint alleges that, while incarcerated at Easterling Correctional

Facility on June 2, 2024, Plaintiff was threatened by a mob of inmates. (Doc. 1-1 at

1.) Plaintiff sought help from Defendant Brayboy, but Defendant Brayboy did not

want to help him. (Id.) Plaintiff then showed Defendant Brayboy a knife he kept on

his person “to protect [himself] with,” and Defendant Brayboy ordered Plaintiff to

give him the knife. (Id.) Plaintiff, frustrated that Defendant Brayboy “continued to

disregard [his] problem,” “went bababas” and refused to turn over the knife. (Id.)

The two “had a Mexican standoff for about three to four hours” until Plaintiff “got

very stressed and gave in.” (Id.) At that point, “instead of handcuffing [Plaintiff] and

1 Under these statutes, the Court is required to dismiss a complaint or any portion thereof if it is

frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

locking [him] up,” Defendants Brayboy, Thompson, and Love started “beating

[Plaintiff] up.” (Id. at 1–2.) They broke his fingers, busted his head, and “basically

just beat on [him] for a good five-six minutes.” (Id.) Based on these allegations,

Plaintiff brings suit against the above three Defendants as well as Warden Antonio

McClain for “allow[ing] his officers to have a Mexican standoff with [Plaintiff]” and

former Alabama Department of Corrections Commissioner John Hamm for “not

put[ting] in measures” to protect Plaintiff.2 (Id. at 2.)

Plaintiff has failed to state a viable failure to protect claim against either

Defendant McClain or Defendant Hamm. A prison official’s “deliberate[]

indifferen[ce] to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate who suffers injury”

gives rise to an Eighth Amendment violation. Marbury v. Warden III, 180 F.4th

1349, 1356 (11th Cir. 2026) (quoting Lane v. Philbin, 835 F.3d 1302, 1307 (11th

Cir. 2016)). “To establish a § 1983 claim for deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must

show ‘(1) a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendants’ deliberate

indifference to that risk; and (3) causation.’” Marbury, 180 F.4th at 1356 (quoting

Marbury v. Warden, 936 F.3d 1227, 1233 (11th Cir. 2019)). To establish deliberate

indifference, a plaintiff must demonstrate “that the defendant acted with ‘subjective

recklessness as used in the criminal law,’ … and to do so he must show that the

defendant was actually, subjectively aware that his own conduct caused a substantial

risk of serious harm to the plaintiff.” Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1262 (11th

Cir. 2024) (internal citation omitted).3 The Complaint fails to assert any allegations

2 Although they are not named in the caption of the Complaint, the body of the Complaint also

seeks to name “the depity Warden” and Deputy Commissioner Wendy Williams for their failure

to assist in protecting Plaintiff. (See doc. 1-1 at 2.) Plaintiff’s claims against these individuals fail

for the same reasons as Defendants McClain and Hamm.

3 “[C]ivil law generally calls a person reckless who acts or (if the person has a duty to act) fails to

act in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that it should

be known.” Wade, 106 F.4th at 1256 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994)). By

sufficient to demonstrate that Defendants McClain and Hamm acted with subjective

recklessness as used in the criminal law, see Wade, 106 F.4th at 1262, or were the

cause of Plaintiff’s injuries.

Additionally, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendants McClain and

Hamm responsible for the actions of their subordinates under a theory of supervisory

liability, he cannot do so. See Keith v. DeKalb Cnty., Georgia, 749 F.3d 1034, 1047

(11th Cir. 2014) (“[S]upervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the

unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior or

vicarious liability.”); Case v. Riley, 270 F. App’x 908, 911 (11th Cir. 2008)

(“[C]laims against supervisory personnel who did not personally participate in the

acts complained of are not actionable under section 1983.”). Rather, to state a viable

§ 1983 claim against a defendant in his role as a supervisor, a plaintiff must

demonstrate either (1) the supervisor’s personal participation in the unconstitutional

conduct or (2) a causal connection between the supervisor’s actions and the alleged

constitutional violation. Magwood v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 652 F. App’x 841,

844 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990)).

The Complaint fails to state allegations sufficient to make either of these showings.

Thus, Plaintiff’s claims against these defendants are due to be dismissed for failure

to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows:

(1) Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Antonio McClain and John

Hamm are DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim on which relief

may be granted, and the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to terminate these defendants

from the electronic docket.

(2) The Clerk of Court is further DIRECTED to (a) send a copy of this

contrast, “criminal law … generally permits a finding of recklessness only when a person

disregards a risk of harm of which he is aware.” Id. (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836–37).

Order to the Plaintiff and (b) serve a copy of this Order and the Summons and

Complaint via certified mail on each of the remaining Defendants.

(3) It is the Plaintiff’s responsibility to provide the Clerk’s Office with an

accurate address for each Defendant. Without an accurate address, service of process

cannot be perfected. It is also the Plaintiff’s responsibility to monitor proceedings

and make sure that service has been completed. Except in very unusual

circumstances, a person not properly served will not be deemed a party to this case.

(4) If a service recipient will not accept service for a named Defendant, the

service recipient is DIRECTED to so advise the Court and provide the Court with

the Defendant’s last known address and phone number. This information may be

filed with the Clerk of Court in response to this Order and may be filed under seal.

(5) Defendants Brayboy, Thompson, and Love are ordered to answer or

otherwise respond by motion, in accordance with Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, within 21 days of being served.

Finally, this Order provides notice that the Court has discontinued the

use of the special report process in cases brought by pro se inmates under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. In its place, the Court has adopted an Initial Scheduling Order,

which sets deadlines and governs discovery in accordance with the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. This change is intended to streamline case

management, promote uniformity, and ensure consistency with federal

procedural standards. All parties are expected to comply fully with the

obligations established in the Initial Scheduling Order, which will be entered

after the filing of the Defendants’ answer(s).

DONE, on this the 11th day of August 2026.

R. hn JR.

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE