Rich

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

BENJAMIN S. RICH,

Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:24-cv-02269

v. (SAPORITO, J.)

BRAD NEIDIG,

Defendant.

ORDER

Benjamin S. Rich, formerly incarcerated at SCI-Coal Township,

proceeds on an Eighth Amendment claim against defendant Brad Neidig,

a nurse at the prison. Rich claims that Neidig was deliberately indifferent

to his chest pain and related symptoms allegedly caused by mold in the

prison. Neidig now moves for summary judgment. (Doc. 25). Because the

record shows that Rich was treated by other providers during the

relevant time, and the record of Neidig’s prior treatment of Rich does not

show deliberate indifference, Neidig is entitled to summary judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

As relevant here, Rich’s complaint (Doc. 1) alleges that in July and

August 2024, at SCI-Coal Township, he experienced “severe respiratory

issues, chest pain, and headaches,” which he attributes to black mold at

the prison. Black mold was allegedly present on Rich’s mattress, cell

ceiling, windows, vent, and in the showers. On July 12, 2024, defendant

Neidig1 allegedly informed Rich that “black mold throughout the facility

was likely causing his symptoms.” Despite this warning, “no action was

taken to address the mold or [Rich’s] medical needs.”

Upon screening of this complaint (and several contemporaneously

filed complaints) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, several unrelated claims

and defendants were dismissed, and Rich was permitted to proceed on an

Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical

needs against Neidig. (Docs. 4, 5).

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary

judgment should be granted only if “there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” only if it might affect the outcome

of the case. , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A

dispute of material fact is “genuine” only if the evidence “is such that a

1 Neidig was identified in the complaint as “Nurse Brad.”

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.”

, 477 U.S. at 248. In deciding a summary judgment motion, all

inferences “should be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-

moving party, and where the non-moving party’s evidence contradicts the

movant’s, then the non-movant’s must be taken as true.”

, 24 F.3d 508, 512 (3d Cir. 1994). The party seeking

summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the

district court of the basis for its motion,” and demonstrating the absence

of a genuine dispute of material fact. , 477 U.S.

317, 323 (1986). If the movant makes such a showing, the non-movant

must set forth specific facts, supported by the record, demonstrating that

“the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to

the jury.” , 477 U.S. at 251-52.

In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court must first

determine if the moving party has made a showing that it is

entitled to summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); , 477 U.S.

at 331. Only once that prima facie showing has been made does the

burden shift to the nonmoving party to demonstrate the existence of a

genuine dispute of material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); , 477

U.S. at 331. Both parties may cite to “particular parts of materials in the

record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored

information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those

made for the purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory

answers or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).

III. MATERIAL FACTS

The summary judgment record indicates as follows: On September

20, 2023, at SCI-Coal Township, Neidig treated Rich2 after an

“unplanned use of force” in which correctional officers deployed OC spray

into Rich’s cell. Rich complained of a cough and difficulty breathing.

Neidig took Rich’s vital signs, “decontaminated” his eyes, and found his

lungs and chest to be normal on examination. Neidig instructed Rich to

follow up if his breathing worsened. (Doc. 26-8 at 1-9).

On October 8, 2023, Neidig treated Rich for a “new onset” complaint

of chest pain, with a severity of 4 out of 10. Neidig took Rich’s vitals, found

him in “no acute distress,” and directed that Rich be seen the next day

2 The record indicates (and the parties do not dispute) that during

the period at issue, Rich was known within the Department of

Corrections as Samuel Guillaume. For clarity, we refer to Rich by his

current name.

for a sick call. (Doc. 26-9). An ECG was “normal” except for “sinus rhythm

with occasional premature ventricular complexes.”3 (Doc. 26-10). At a

sick call the following day, a different nurse examined him, reviewed his

test results, and determined that his chest pain was likely “anxiety-

related.” (Doc. 26-11).

It is undisputed that Rich made respiratory complaints to medical

staff on July 12, 2024; however, the parties dispute whether Neidig was

involved. In a declaration, Rich attests that “on or about” that date,

Neidig “responded to [Rich’s] housing unit after [Rich] complained of

chest pain and shortness of breath and personally transported [Rich] to

the medical department.” Neidig discussed “possible environmental

causes, including mold exposure within the facility.” (Doc. 33-2 at 1).

Rich’s medical records indicate that on that date, Rich made similar

3 For context, we note that “premature ventricular complexes”

refers to a common type of irregular heartbeat: “Most people with

premature ventricular contractions . . . don’t have heart disease and won’t

need treatment.” Mayo Clinic, “Premature ventricular contractions

(PVCs),” https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/premature-

ventricular-contractions/diagnosis-treatment/drc-20376762 (last visited

July 27, 2026); National Library of Medicine, “Premature

Ventricular Complex,” https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK547713/

(last visited July 27, 2026). However, our analysis of Rich’s medical

treatment is limited to the record submitted by the parties.

complaints to nurse Amy Vereshack, who examined him, assessed

possible rhinitis, and scheduled him for a follow-up sick call. (Doc.

26-2).

At a follow-up sick call on July 16, nurse Youlanda Knight-Powell

examined Rich, assessed rhinitis and possible bronchitis, and prescribed

prednisone, Claritin, and a nasal spray. (Doc. 26-3). On July 28, Rich

reported to medical complaining of coughing and chest pain, and was

assessed to have a fever. The following day, nurse Brian Davis examined

Rich, finding that he had chest pain and coughing, but no fever. Davis

prescribed an “albuterol inhaler and Z-pack.” (Docs. 26-4, 26-5). Neither

party has presented evidence relating to medical care in August 2024;

Rich was ultimately released from DOC custody on September 13, 2024.

IV. DISCUSSION

A plaintiff can pursue an Eighth Amendment claim by showing that

he had a serious medical need, that the defendant was deliberately

indifferent to that need, and that the deliberate indifference caused

harm. , 82 F.4th 217, 229 (3d Cir. 2023). Courts have

found deliberate indifference “in a variety of circumstances, including

where the prison official (1) knows of a prisoner’s need for medical

treatment but intentionally refuses to provide it; (2) delays necessary

medical treatment based on a non-medical reason; or (3) prevents a

prisoner from receiving needed or recommended medical treatment.”

, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).

However, an Eighth Amendment medical care claim, like any other

claim under Section 1983, requires the defendant’s personal involvement

in the specific violation itself. , 845 F.2d 1195,

1207 (3d Cir. 1988). A prison medical defendant’s prior treatment of a

plaintiff does not establish that defendant’s personal involvement in later

care provided by other staff. , , , No. 2:23-CV-

1601, 2025 WL 1822675, at *6 (E.D. Pa. July 2, 2025); ,

No. 3:12-CV-1306, 2016 WL 6442254, at *13 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 1, 2016).

For purposes of this motion, we accept Rich’s attestations that he

was seen by Neidig on July 12, 20244; that he complained of chest pain

4 Rich attests that Neidig “personally treated [Rich] on multiple

occasions prior to July 12, 2024, including responding to complaints of

chest pain and breathing difficulty.” (Doc. 33-2, ¶ 4). Although Rich

believes that this creates a material dispute of fact, it is entirely

consistent with the medical records showing that Neidig treated him on

September 20, 2023, and October 8, 2023. To the extent these “multiple

occasions” were intended as a reference to interactions with Neidig prior

to July 12 that are undocumented in the records, Rich has not described

and shortness of breath to Neidig during this interaction; and that Neidig

described “possible environmental causes, including mold exposure.”

Regardless, the record does not support an inference of deliberate

indifference by Neidig.

Rich’s theory is that Neidig should have “escalated [Rich’s]

condition for further diagnostic testing or physician evaluation.”

(Doc. 33 at 2-5). However, the record shows that Rich was repeatedly

examined and treated by medical staff on July 12 and in the days that

followed. Even if Neidig made some unspecified error in addressing Rich’s

complaints on July 12, the treatment by other providers forecloses any

inference that Neidig was to blame for any issues that followed. Rich does

not describe any error in his treatment after July 12, and Neidig would

not have had personal involvement in any such error.

Given these conclusions, Rich’s factual disputes about other aspects

of the case are immaterial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); , 477 U.S.

at 248 (“Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit

. . . [preclude] summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant

those interactions or explained how Neidig’s conduct during those

interactions supports an inference of deliberate indifference.

or unnecessary will not be counted.”). For example, Rich objects to

Neidig’s deposition testimony that he “did not recall” treating Rich, which

Rich believes is “false,” but Neidig’s recollection is irrelevant given the

lack of evidence showing deliberate indifference. Rich’s evidence

indicates that he may have been prescribed more medication than

reflected in his medical records5, but he offers no evidence that any of

these medication decisions were attributable to Neidig.

Because Neidig is entitled to summary judgment on the merits, we

need not address his arguments regarding qualified immunity.

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. Neidig’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 25) is

GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to enter JUDGMENT in favor of Neidig

and against Rich.

2. The Clerk is directed to mark this case as CLOSED.

Dated: July 28, 2026

JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.

United States District Judge

5 (Doc. 33-2, ¶¶ 16-21; Docs. 33-4, 33-7) (Doc. 26-6).