Rosero

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOHN C. ROSERO, : NO. 1:23-CV-01898

Plaintiff, :

:

v. :

: (CAMONI, M.J.)

TROOPER JACOB :

PENHORWOOD, et al., :

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In this civil rights action, pro se Plaintiff John Rosero sued the

Defendants, eight Pennsylvania State Troopers, for violations of his

constitutional rights after Defendant Penhorwood pulled him over for

driving with an invalid license plate and arrested him for driving under

the influence of amphetamines. See Complaint, doc. 1. After the Court

granted the Defendants’ motion to dismiss in part, seven federal claims

and two state claims remain. See doc. 25 at 4-5.

Before the Court is the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment

on the remaining claims. Doc. 31. Because no genuine issues of material

fact exist, and because the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment

as a matter of law, the Court will grant the Defendant’s motion as to the

federal claims and decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the

remaining state claims.

I. BACKGROUND

In 2021, Rosero was driving on a Pennsylvania highway at

nighttime, when Defendant Penhorwood, a state trooper, pulled him over

for driving with an invalid license plate. Defs.’ Statement of Facts, doc.

32 ¶¶ 1-4.1 As part of the traffic stop, Penhorwood asked Rosero several

questions.

First, he asked about the invalid license plate, to which Rosero

answered that he had bought the car from a Virginia seller the previous

day and that a Pennsylvania dealer put the plate on the vehicle. Id. ¶¶ 5-

6. Upon further questioning, however, Rosero could not provide the

1 Rosero failed to file a statement of material facts responding to the

statement filed by Defendants, as required by Local Rule 56.1. The Court,

therefore, deems the Defendants’ statement of facts admitted for the

purpose of summary judgment. See L.R. 56.1 (“All material facts set forth

in the statement required to be served by the moving party will be

deemed to be admitted unless controverted by the statement required to

be served by the opposing party.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2) (“If a party

. . . fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact . . . the court

may . . . consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion”); Beard

v. Helman, 722 F. Supp. 3d 521, 527-28 (M.D. Pa. 2024) (“Where

nonmovants fail to support denials with record citations, a common

sanction is to deem these allegations admitted.”).

dealer’s name nor identify the city in which the dealer operated. Id. ¶ 7.

Second, Penhorwood asked Rosero for his license and proof of insurance.

Id. ¶ 8. Although he eventually provided a valid driver’s license, Rosero

admitted that the vehicle was not insured. Id. ¶ 10. During this

interaction, Rosero exposed, and Penhorwood saw in plain view, a

prescription pill bottle in the car. Id. ¶ 9. Penhorwood asked what

medication Rosero was taking, and Rosero answered that he took

prescription medication for anxiety. Id. ¶¶ 13-14. When Penhorwood

continued asking about the pills, Rosero became defensive, failing to

confirm whether the pill bottle contained the prescription pills for

anxiety. Id. ¶¶ 15-16.

Because Penhorwood determined that Rosero lacked insurance and

the vehicle was parked at nighttime along the shoulder of a highway,

Penhorwood requested that Rosero’s car be towed. Id. ¶ 17. Next,

Penhorwood conducted an inventory search of the car. Id. ¶ 18. During

that search, he observed that the pill bottle purported to contain

amphetamines. Id. ¶ 19. Penhorwood then asked Rosero to complete

Standardized Field Sobriety Tests. Id. ¶ 20.

The tests revealed many signs Penhorwood saw as indicators of

impairment. Rosero was uncooperative and unable to follow instructions

and exhibited, among other things, bloodshot eyes and constricted pupils,

unsure footing, and slurred speech. Id. ¶¶ 21-22. Believing that Rosero

was driving under the influence (DUI) of a drug or combination of drugs,

Penhorwood arrested Rosero. Id. ¶¶ 23-25. At the police station, Rosero’s

blood was taken, and sent to a laboratory that reported his blood tested

positive for amphetamines at twice the level of the mean driver arrested

for DUI. Id. ¶¶ 26-29.

A month later, Penhorwood filed a criminal complaint charging

Rosero with two counts of DUI under 75 Pa. C.S. §§ 3802(d)(1)(ii) and

(d)(2), illegal use of a license plate under 75 Pa. C.S. § 1372, and failure

to carry registration under 75 Pa. C.S. § 1311. Id. ¶ 31; see doc. 32-3 at

24. Several months later, when Rosero submitted a letter from a medical

professional confirming he had a lawful prescription and that the level of

amphetamines detected in his blood at the time of the arrest were

consistent with his therapeutic treatment, the prosecution dropped

Rosero’s DUI charges. Id. ¶¶ 32-33.

On November 15, 2023, Rosero, proceeding pro se, sued Penhorwood

and seven other Defendants, alleging fifteen different state and federal

claims. See Complaint, doc. 1 at 24-58. After the Defendants moved to

dismiss the Complaint, the Court granted the motion in part but retained

seven federal and two state claims. See June 6, 2025, Order, doc. 25 at 4-

5. The Court issued a case management order, providing six months for

the parties to conduct fact discovery. Doc. 26. After close of the discovery

period, the Defendants moved for summary judgment on the surviving

claims. Docs. 26, 31. The parties filed their respective briefs, and the

motion is ripe for disposition. Docs. 33-35. The parties have consented to

the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge to conduct all

proceedings in this case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 73, including entry of final judgment. Doc. 12.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute is “genuine” when “a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is

“material” only if it can “affect the outcome of the suit under governing

law.” Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006), citing

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts

will not preclude a grant of summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at

248.

The moving party bears the burden of showing that no genuine

dispute exists such that summary judgment is warranted. See Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). Once the movant

adequately supports its motion, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party

to “go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324.

“In considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court

may not make credibility determinations or engage in any weighing of

the evidence.” Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir.

2004), citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Rather, “[a]ll facts and inferences

are construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Boyle

v. County of Allegheny, 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998). Credibility

determinations are “the province of the factfinder.” Big Apple BMW, Inc.

v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992). The court’s

role, at the summary judgment stage, is “to determine whether there is

a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. There can be “no

genuine issue as to any material fact,” however, if a party “fails to make

a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to

that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof

at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

III. ANALYSIS

The Court will grant the Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment because there are no genuine issues to be tried. Before turning

to the merits analysis, the Court will first address Rosero’s request for

additional discovery under Rule 56(d). See Pl.’s Br., doc. 34 at 1, 4; Pl.’s

Aff., doc. 34-1 ¶ 2.

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d)

Rosero argues that summary judgment is premature because

additional discovery is required under Rule 56(d). Doc. 34 at 1.

Specifically, Rosero contends that the “Defendants have filed a motion for

summary judgment without conducting any discovery in this case. As a

result, I have been denied the opportunity to obtain evidence that is

essential to opposing their motion and proving my claims.” Doc. 34-1 ¶ 3.

Rosero is wrong.

Rule 56(d) allows a non-moving party to file a discovery request if

the party believes that additional discovery is required to oppose

summary judgment. See Shelton v. Bledsoe, 775 F.3d 554, 568 (3d Cir.

2015) (noting that “nothing precludes a party from requesting an

opportunity for discovery under Rule 56(d) by simply attaching an

appropriate affidavit or declaration to that party’s response to a motion

for summary judgment”). An adequate Rule 56(d) discovery request

“specifies what particular information is sought; how, if disclosed, it

would preclude summary judgment; and why it has not been previously

obtained.” Id. (citation modified), citing Dowling v. City of Philadelphia,

855 F.2d 136, 140 (3d Cir. 1988).

Here, Rosero provides no reason for why the discovery he now seeks

has not been previously obtained. The Court gave Rosero six months to

conduct discovery. June 9, 2025, Case Mgmt. Order, doc. 26. Rosero has

not identified, and the Court is otherwise unaware of, any reasons Rosero

could not obtain discovery from the Defendants during that allotted time.

Indeed, it is apparent from the record that Rosero has failed to serve a

single discovery request on the Defendants. Rosero claims, “I have not

had the opportunity to obtain these records through discovery, depose the

officers about the MDT results, or retain an expert to analyze the MDT

data.” But that is simply not true; he had six months in which to

accomplish all of those ends. He chose not to.

Neither can the Defendants’ own choice not to conduct any

discovery foreclose summary judgment. After all, whether to request

discovery is the each party’s own choice, requesting discovery from the

opposing party is not compulsory. Compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)

(emphasis added) (“Parties may obtain discovery”), with Fed. R. Civ. P.

26(a)(1) (emphasis added) (“[A] party must, without awaiting a discovery

request, provide to the other parties”). And the Defendants complied with

Rule 26(a)(1) by producing their mandatory initial disclosures. See Defs.’

Reply Br., doc. 35 at 1-2; Email Correspondence, doc. 35-1 at 2.

Strikingly, Rosero previously opposed a motion by the Defendants

for an extension of time to file dispositive motions, acknowledging he was

well aware of the Court’s case management order and the impending end

of the discovery period. In his opposition brief, filed three days before the

close of fact discovery, Rosero pointed out that the Court had provided

“all parties nearly six months to conduct discovery and prepare for the

dispositive motions deadline.” Doc. 29 at 2 (emphasis in original). Rosero

argued that the Defendants did not need to conduct discovery because,

given the nature of the events underlying the case, the Defendants

“already possess the relevant evidence.” Id. at 3. Rosero did not ask the

Court for additional time for discovery then; he, instead, actively opposed

an extension, complaining that the case had been pending for two years.

Id. at 1. Given that Rosero called the Defendants’ abstention from

discovery activity “a clear lack of diligence” on their part (id. at 2)

meriting no extension of time, his current request rings all the hollower.

Because Rosero was given sufficient time to conduct discovery and

chose not to, the equities weigh against granting him additional time

now. He has failed to meet his burden under Rule 56(d) to provide

“specified reasons” why he cannot present facts essential to justify his

opposition, and so the Court will deny his request. See Williams v. Gavin,

640 F. App’x 152, 158 (3d Cir. 2016) (citation modified) (“Williams argues

only generally that he was denied valuable discovery and that he was

hindered in his ability to gather known evidence; this is insufficient to

support a finding that the grant of summary judgment was premature.”);

Abulkhair v. Citibank & Assocs., 434 F. App'x 58, 62 (3d Cir. 2011)

(“Abulkhair still could have acquired relevant information by taking

advantage of that discovery tool. His failure to do so makes it difficult to

conclude that he should have been entitled to additional time for

discovery.”).2

B. Federal Claims

Returning to the merits of the case, the Court begins with Rosero’s

two main federal claims: (1) Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution;

and (2) Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure. Because the

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to the malicious

prosecution claim, and Rosero has failed to establish the unreasonable

seizure claim, the Court will grant summary judgment.

2 In support of his Rule 56(d) request, Rosero also argues that granting

summary judgment on the Defendants’ records would violate his rights

based on the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. See doc. 34-

1 ¶ 18. But the Confrontation Clause applies to criminal defendants. See

U.S. Const. amend. VI (emphasis added) (“In all criminal prosecutions,

the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses

against him”). Rosero is not a criminal defendant in this civil rights

action. See also Lambert v. Warden Greene SCI, 861 F.3d 459, 469 (3d

Cir. 2017) (emphasis added) (“The Sixth Amendment guarantees a

criminal defendant the right ‘to be confronted with the witnesses against

him.’”).

1. The Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on

Rosero’s malicious prosecution claim.

The Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity

on Rosero’s malicious prosecution claim based on the Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit’s decision in Rivera-Guadalupe v. City of

Harrisburg, 124 F.4th 295 (3d Cir. 2024). They are correct.

Qualified immunity shields government officials, including law

enforcement, from liability unless their conduct violates a clearly

established right. Evans v. Newark City, 152 F.4th 537, 544 (3d Cir.

2025). When assessing qualified immunity, the Court inquires: (1)

whether the plaintiff sufficiently alleged a right had been violated; and

(2) whether that right was clearly established when it was allegedly

violated to the extent that it would have been clear to a reasonable person

that his or her conduct was unlawful. See id. The right at issue must be

defined at the appropriate level of specificity. Rivera-Guadalupe, 124

F.4th at 299, citing Peroza-Benitez v. Smith, 994 F.3d 157, 165 (3d Cir.

2021).

Here, Rivera-Guadalupe applies, so the Defendants are entitled to

qualified immunity. See 124 F.4th at 303. In that case, the right at issue,

as it is here, was the right to be prosecuted only for charges that are each

supported by probable cause. See doc. 1 ¶¶ 130-134; Rivera-Guadalupe,

124 F.4th at 299. Because the prosecution dismissed his DUI charges,

but proceeded on other charges, Rosero brought a Fourth Amendment

malicious prosecution claim premised on the DUI charges alone. Rosero

does not contend that the remaining charges, to which he pleaded guilty,

lacked probable cause.

The Third Circuit held that before the Supreme Court’s decision in

Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, 602 U.S. 556, 561 (2024), the right to be

prosecuted only for charges that are each supported by probable cause,

was not clearly established. Rivera-Guadalupe, 124 F.4th at 299, 303

(reversing district court’s denial of qualified immunity based on

Chiaverini). Applying Rivera-Guadalupe, this Court finds that as of

December 2021 when the Defendants charged Rosero with DUI, the right

at issue was not clearly established. See doc. 32 ¶ 31; Rivera-Guadalupe,

124 F.4th at 303 (finding that the right to be prosecuted only for charges

that are each supported by probable cause was not clearly established

until 2024). Here, Rosero does not deny that there was probable cause for

some of the charges for which he was prosecuted. The Court, therefore,

finds that the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as a matter

of law on Rosero’s Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim.3

2. Rosero has failed to establish a Fourth Amendment

unreasonable seizure claim.

The Defendants next argue that they are entitled to qualified

immunity on Rosero’s Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure claim

because Defendant Penhorwood’s seizure of Rosero’s car was not

unreasonable, and therefore did not violate any of his rights. See doc. 33

at 4. A seizure is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if, under the

totality of the circumstances, “the officer’s actions are objectively

reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them,

3 Even if qualified immunity did not bar suit, Rosero’s malicious

prosecution claim fails, because, as established by the undisputed factual

record, Penhorwood had probable cause for all of the charges at the

outset. See doc. 33 at 9-11 (summarizing record evidence of probable

cause); see also Lozano v. New Jersey, 9 F.4th 239, 247 (3d Cir. 2021)

(malicious prosecution claim requires that “the proceeding was initiated

without probable cause”) (emphasis added). Defendants raised this

argument only in the context of Rosero’s state law malicious prosecution

claim, but lack of probable cause is an essential element of the federal

claim as well. Rosero presents nothing to controvert the Defendants’

evidence that the charges were brought with probable cause, and, as

plaintiff, would have the burden of proof on that element at trial. “While

the charges against [Rosero] were later dropped, there can be no

malicious prosecution where there was probable cause to charge the

defendant at the outset.” Laws v. Borough of Lansdale, No. 24-1562, 2025

U.S. App. LEXIS 10079, at *8 (3d Cir. Apr. 28, 2025).

without regard to their underlying intent or motivations.” Kokinda v.

Breiner, 557 F. Supp. 2d 581, 589 (M.D. Pa. 2008), quoting Graham v.

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). The Third Circuit has held that under

the community caretaking exception, removing and impounding a vehicle

from an area in which a stopped vehicle is subject to being damaged,

vandalized, or stolen, is not an unreasonable seizure. See United States

v. Smith, 522 F.3d 305, 314 (3d Cir. 2008); Honda Lease Tr. v. Malanga’s

Auto., 152 F.4th 477, 489 (3d Cir. 2025).

Here, Penhorwood towed Rosero’s car because Rosero lacked valid

registration and insurance, and the vehicle—which Rosero could not

lawfully drive—was parked at nighttime along the shoulder of a highway.

Doc. 32 ¶ 17. The Court, therefore, finds that under the community

caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment, Penhorwood’s towing of

the car was not unreasonable. See Smith, 522 F.3d at 314 (“[T]he

community caretaking function encompasses law enforcement’s

authority to remove vehicles that impede traffic or threaten public safety

and convenience”); Malanga’s Auto, 152 F.4th at 489 (holding that under

the caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment, a city may

reasonably seize a vehicle whose operator cannot lawfully remove it

because he lacks insurance). As a result, the claim fails on its merits and

the Defendants are immune.

C. Dependent Claims

Because the Court will grant summary judgment as to Rosero’s

constitutional claims, and because the uncontested factual record does

not raise any dispute of fact that might show any violation of Rosero’s

rights, the Court will also enter summary judgment as to all the

derivative claims, which require, at minimum, that Rosero establish an

underlying constitutional violation. Accordingly, the Court will grant

summary judgment as to Counts IV (§ 1983 conspiracy), V (§ 1983

supervisory liability), VII (§ 1983 failure to intervene), X (§ 1985

conspiracy), and XI (§§ 1985 and 1986 failure to prevent claims). See

Harvard v. Cesnalis, 973 F.3d 190, 207 (3d Cir. 2020) (noting that a

§ 1983 conspiracy claim requires an actual underlying constitutional

violation of the plaintiff’s right); Santiago v. Warminster Township, 629

F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (explaining that a required element of a

§ 1983 supervisory liability claim is an actual violation of a constitutional

right by a subordinate); Milligan v. Jacobs, 826 F. App’x 256, 257 (3d Cir.

2020) (same as to § 1983 failure to intervene); Brown v. Philip Morris

Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 805 (3d Cir. 2001) (same as to § 1985 conspiracy);

Foskey v. Rendell, 261 F. App’x 428, 430 (3d Cir. 2008) (same as to §§ 1985

and 1986 failure to prevent claims).4

D. State Law Claims

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), “district courts may decline to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction . . . [if] the district court has dismissed

all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” See Byrd v. Shannon,

715 F.3d 117, 128 (3d Cir. 2013), citing United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,

383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (holding that when federal claims are dismissed

before trial, federal courts should not separately entertain pendent state

claims). Having granted summary judgment as to Rosero’s federal

claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his

remaining state law claims. See Byrd, 715 F.3d at 128 (“Because we will

affirm the District Court’s order granting summary judgment, . . . we will

also affirm the District Court’s decision to decline supplemental

jurisdiction over [the plaintiff’s] state law [ ] claims.”); Bruton v. Paesani,

4 Additionally, with respect to all of his federal claims, Rosero has failed

to establish any disputes of fact, as he has failed to present any evidence

in support of the elements for which he would have the burden of proof

at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

162 F. App’x 151, 154 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Once the District Court granted

summary judgment on [the plaintiff’s] two federal claims, it was not

required to adjudicate his claims under state law.”); Patel v. Meridian

Health Sys., Inc., 666 F. App’x 133, 136 (3d Cir. 2016) (finding that a

district court may sua sponte decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction).

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment will be

granted. An appropriate order shall follow.

Date: July 27, 2026 s/ Sean A. Camoni

Sean A. Camoni

United States Magistrate Judge