Cantu

Southern District of Texas

. ENTERED

July 28, 2026

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NS □□□

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

HOUSTON DIVISION

HEROS CHRISTOPHER CANTU, = §

(SPN # 02491967), §

§

Plaintiff, § .

§

Vs. § CIVIL ACTION NO. H-25-2109

§

CITY OF HOUSTON, et al., §

§ .

Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

The plaintiff, Heros Christopher Cantu, (SPN #02491967), was previously

detained at the Harris County Jail.! Proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, he

filed a civil-rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Dkt. 1). Broadly speaking,

he alleges that he was illegally detained on March 21, 2025, by Officer Ayala of the

City of Houston Police Department, that Ayala was deliberately indifferent to his

need for medical assistance, and that the City of Houston and City ofHouston Police

Chief Noe Diaz should be held responsible. (/d.). At the Court’s request, Cantu also

filed a supplemental statement of his claims. (Dkt. 17).

‘Cantu filed this action while he was detained at the Jail. Mail sent to him in late □

May was returned as undeliverable, with notation that he had been released from custody.

(Dkt. 26). Cantu has not provided the Court with an updated address since his release, as

required by Southern District of Texas Local Rule 83.4.

After the screening required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court dismissed

Cantu’s claims against the City of Houston and Chief Diaz and ordered service of

process on Ayala. (Dkt. 18). Ayala responded with a motion to dismiss. (Dkt. 20).

Because the motion relied on exhibits outside of the complaint, the Court converted

it to a motion for summary judgment and ordered the parties to submit any other

evidence relevant to Cantu’s claims. (Dkt. 23). Ayala submitted additional

evidence. (Dkts.24, 25). Cantu has not responded to either the motion or the Court’s

order, and his time to do so has now expired. Based on the Court’s review of the

motion, the pleadings and evidence, the record, and the law, the Court grants Ayala’s

motion for summary judgment and dismisses this action with prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

Cantu’s complaintis somewhat hard to follow. But in general, he alleges that

on March 21, 2025, he was at a Whataburger in Houston when he began suffering

chest pains “due to possible accidental ingestion of fentanyl.” (Dkt. 1, p. 4). Both

City of Houston Fire Department officers and City of Houston Police Department

officers arrived at the scene. (/d.). Cantu alleges that instead of dealing with his

medical issues, officers arrested him and put him in the back of Ayala’s patrol car.

(Id.). Ayala then tumed on the car’s heater and refused to provide Cantu with water.

(Id. at 5). Ayala then also “wasted time” checking for warrants. (/d.). Cantu alleges

that this went on for some time despite him “exhibiting obvious signs of

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intoxication” and being “in an extremely disturbed mental state,” and despite the

existence of “an open stab wound” on his side. (Ud. at 4-5). After a time, Cantu

began yelling. (/d. at 5). Ayala opened the car door, told Cantu to “shut up,” and □

then closed the door again. (/d.). Cantu alleges that Ayala did this “several times”

before driving Cantu to a psychiatric hospital twenty-five minutes away. (/d.).

Cantu alleges that these actions show that Ayala was deliberately indifferent

to his need for medical care by refusing to have a “competent medical person”

examinehim. (/d. at 4). He also alleges that Ayala ignored him “for several hours”

before dropping him off at the psychiatric center. (/d. at 5).

In his More Definite Statement, Cantu alleges that he had ingested either

cocaine or fentanyl in the parking lot of Whataburger. (Dkt. 17, p. 2-3). He went

inside to get something to eat to helphim calm down, and themanager called 9-1-1.

(Id. at 3-4). Cantu states that he had a stab wound on his left side that had occurred

the day before when he was robbed leaving work. (d. at 3).

Cantu alleges that fire department officers arrived at Whataburger in response .

to the 9-1-1 call, but no EMTs were on board. (/d. at 4). He asserts that no one,

whether from the fire department or the police department, assessed his medical

condition at Whataburger. (Jd.). Instead, he was handcuffed and placed in the back

of Ayala’s car. (Id. at 4-5). He contends that this was a “false arrest” because he

had not committed any crime. (/d. at 5).

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Cantu alleges that he was in the back of Ayala’s patrol car for fifteen to twenty

minutes before they left for the hospital. (/d. at 6). During that time, Cantu alleges

that he begged for medical attention, but he asserts that no one would provide it to

him. (U/d.). Instead, Ayala kept asking him for his name and date of birth, wasting

time while Cantu’s life was at risk. (/d. at 7).

Finally, Ayala drove him to a psychiatric hospital that was the furthest one

from Whataburger. (/d. at 8-9). Once there, Cantu alleges that Ayala would not let

him out of the car. (/d. at 9). Instead, Cantu was left in the back of the patrol car,

screaming for help. (/d.). Ultimately, Cantu was admitted to the psychiatric

hospital, where he stayed for three days. (/d. at 10). He alleges that he was treated

for the stab wound as well as other conditions while there. (/d. at 10-11).

As relief, Cantu seeks money damages. (Dkt. 1, p. 4). Healso states that he

would like Ayala to stop working as a police officer because “it would be safer.”

(Dkt. 17, p. 17).

In his motion to dismiss, Ayala contends that Cantu has failed to allege facts

demonstrating that any of Ayala’s actions resulted in an injury. (Dkt. 20, p, 6). He

maintains that Cantu’s allegations, even taken as true, do not show that Ayala

violated Cantu’s Fourth Amendment rights. (/d. at 9-14). And he contends that the

facts do not show that he was deliberately indifferent to any serious medical need.

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(Id. at 14-16). In making these assertions, Ayala relies in part on the police report

from the night in question. (Dkt. 20-1).

Given Ayala’s reliance on documents outside of the complaint and its

attachments, the Court notified the parties that under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(d), it intended to treat Ayala’s motion to dismiss as a moron for summary

judgment. (Dkt.23). The Court gave both Cantu and Ayala time to submit any

additional arguments and documents in support of the motion now characterized as

one for summary judgment. (/d. at 3).

Ayala filed additional documents, including records from the Houston Police

Department and Houston Fire Department, an emergency detention order issued for

Cantu, and body camera footage from all the officers who were at the scene. (Dkts.

24, 25).

The Houston Police Department report shows that officers were called to the

Whataburger for a welfare check on a person who was “in the street talking to

himself’ and “possibly under the influence of something.” (Dkt. 24-1, p. 4). When

the police arrived, Cantu ran into oncoming traffic, and he was physically combative.

(Id. at 5). He also stated that he was a sergeant in a drug cartel and that “Mexicans

are trying to kill him.” (Dkt 24-2, p. 2). He was detained for his own safety, and

identifying information was requested. (Dkt. 24-1, p. 5). When EMTs from the

Houston Fire Department asked about taking his vital signs, Cantu replied, “You can

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take my vitals when I die.” (/d.). However, he later permitted EMTs to take his vital

signs, which were normal. (Dkt. 24-3, p. 3).

Ayala asked Cantu the qualifying questions for an Emergency Detention

Order under Texas Health & Safety Code § 573.001(a) based on Cantu appearing to

be a danger to himself. (Dkt. 24-2, p. 2). Ayala then called for authorization to

transport Cantu to a mental health facility. (Dkt 24-1, p. 5). On the way to the

hospital, Cantu was kicking and hitting his head on the inside of the patrol car. (Jd).

Once at the hospital, he was given a shot tohelp calm him and left in the custody of

hospital staff. (/d.).

The body camera footage shows that City of Houston Police Officers Elliott

and Fuentes were the first officers to arrive on the scene. (Dkts. 24-6, 24-7). As

they pulledinto the parking lot, Cantu ran barefoot through the parking lot and into

heavy traffic on the highway frontage road. (/d. at 15:47). Officer Elliott caught

Cantu on the far side of the frontage road, detained him for his safety, and brought

him back across to the Whataburger parking lot. (/d. at 15:49). Ayala arrived at the

scene as Elliott and Fuentes were walking Cantu back to the parking lot. (/d.).

Ayala approached Cantu, who was yelling incoherently. (Dkt. 24-4 at 15:49).

As other officers searched Cantu for weapons, they lifted his shirt, and no stab

wounds were visible anywhere on his torso. (/d.). After the search, Cantu was

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placed into the back of Ayala’s patrol car. (/d. at 15:50). Ayala’s partner opened

the door on the other side of the patrol car to allow for air flow. (/d.).

Ayala then questioned Cantu, trying to get his name, date ofbirth, and address.

(id. at 15:50-15:54). Cantu generally responded, although the responses were

somewhat garbled and were interspersed with incoherent yelling. Ud.). When Ayala

asked Cantu whether he was suicidal, Cantu stopped yelling, closed his eyes, and

seemed to consider the question before saying that he was not. (/d.). It is clear from

the body camera footage that Cantu could not safely be releneed at the Whataburger.

After obtaining identifying information, Ayala asked Houston Fire

Department EMTs tocheck Cantu. (/d. at 15:56). Cantu agreed, and EMTs checked

his pulse, blood pressure, and respiration. (/d.). Those vital signs were stable. (id).

While his vital were being checked, Cantu told the EMTs that he had not used any

drugs or illegal substances that day. (/d. at 15:58).

After that, Ayala and his partner made the calls necessary to place Cantu under

an Emergency Detention Order for his safety. (/d. at 16:00). During that process,

Officer Fuentes told Ayala that the Whataburger manager had reported that Cantu

came into therestaurant and asked for acup of water. (/d. at 16:01). She gave him

an empty cup and pointed him to the soda fountain, but Cantu did not get any water;

instead, he began yelling and making a scene. (/d.). That was when the manager

called 9-1-1. (Id.).

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Shortly after that conversation, Ayala and his partner received authorization

to transport Cantu to Memorial Herman Southeast Hospital. (/d. at 16:04). As they

drove, Cantu was hitting his head on the divider between the front and rear seats.

(Id. at 16:21). Once they arrived, Ayala called inside to start the transfer process.

(Id.). Shortly thereafter, they were given permission to bring Cantu inside for

admission. (/d. at 16:39).

Cantu did not respond to the motion to dismiss, did not respond to the Court’s

order converting the motion to amotion for summary judgment, and did not submit

any evidence in opposition to Ayala’s motion. His time to do so has now expired.

I. LEGAL PRINCIPLES

A. Actions Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Cantu brings his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 does not

create any substantive rights, but instead was designed to provide a remedy for

violations of statutory and constitutional rights.” Lafleur v. Texas Dep ’t of Health,

126 F.3d 758, 759 (Sth Cir. 1997) (per curiam); see also Baker v. McCollan, 443

U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979). To state a valid claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must

(1) allege a violation of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United -

States, and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person

acting under color of state law. See Westv. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Gomez

v Galman, 18 F.4th 769, 775 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam). The first element

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recognizes that “state tort claims are not actionable under federal law; a plaintiff

under [§] 1983 must show deprivation of a federal right.” Nesmith v. Taylor, 715

F.2d 194, 195 (5th Cir. 1983) (percuriam). The second element means that generally

only state actors—not private parties—can be liable for violations of civil rights.

See Frazier v. Bd. of Tr. of Nw. Miss. Reg’! Med. Ctr., 765 F.2d 1278, 1283 (Sth Cir.

1985).

B. The Summary-Judgment Standard

The Court converted the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment.

“Summary judgment is appropriate only if ‘the movant shows that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter oflaw.’” Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656-57 (2014) (per curiam) (quoting

FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). “The movant bears the burden of identifying those portions

of the record it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”

Triple Tee Golf, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 485 F.3d 253, 261 (Sth Cir. 2007) (citing Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-25 (1986)). “A fact is material if its resolution

could affect the outcome of the action.” Dyer v. Houston, 964 F.3d 374, 379 (Sth

Cir. 2020) (quoting Sierra Club, Inc. v. Sandy Creek Energy Assocs., L.P., 627 F.3d

134, 134 (Sth Cir. 2010)). “A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Westfall v. Luna,

903 F.3d 534, 546 (Sth Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (cleaned up).

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When considering a motion for summary judgment, the district court must

view all evidence “in the light most favorable to the [nonmoving] party.” T olan,

572 U.S. at 657 (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970));

see also Dyer, 964 F.3d at 380. All reasonable inferences must also be drawn in the

light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Carter v. Dupuy, 173 F.4th 561, 565

(Sth Cir. 2026) (citing Griggs v. Brewer, 841 F.3d 308, 312 (Sth Cir. 2016)). But

courts will not consider the nonmoving party’s conclusory allegations and

unsubstantiated assertions as.evidence. See Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069,

1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc).

Further, ifrecord evidence clearly contradicts a party’s version of events, the

Court “should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes ruling on a motion

for summary judgment.” Waddleton v. Rodriguez, 750 F. App’x 248, 253-54 (Sth

Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)). This is

particularly true for video evidence. When video evidence exists, the Court will

“view| | the factsin the light depicted by the videotape.” Salazar v. Molina, 37 F Ath

278, 280 (Sth Cir. 2022) (quoting Scott, 550 U.S. at 381); see also Betts v. Brennan,

22 F.4th 577, 582 (Sth Cir. 2022) (“[W]eassign greater eiene even at the summary

judgment stage, to the video recording taken at the scene.”); Carnaby v. City of

Houston, 636 F.3d 183, 187 (Sth Cir. 2011) (“A court of appeals need not rely on

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the plaintiffs description of the facts where the record discredits that description but

should instead consider the facts in the light depicted by the videotape.”).

If the moving party satisfies its initial burden to show the absence of any

factual disputes, the burden shifts to the opposing party to point to evidence that

shows that genuine disputes of material fact do, in fact, exist. See Little, 37 F.3d at

1075. This burden cannot be satisfied with conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated

assertions. Jd. (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 US.

574, 586 (1986)). Instead, the nonmoving party must identify specific facts in the

record that show that thereis a genuine issue fortrial. Jd. (citing Celotex, 477 US.

at 325). “Ifthe nonmoving party fails to meet this burden, the motion for summary

judgment must be granted.” Jd. at 1076.

C. Pro Se Pleadings

Cantu is proceeding pro se in this action. Pleadings filed by pro se litigants

are not held to the same stringent and rigorous standards as pleadings filed by

lawyers and instead must be liberally construed. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 US.

519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); Bledsue v. Johnson, 188 F.3d 250, 255 (Sth Cir. 1999).

But even under a liberal construction, pro se plaintiffs “must properly plead

sufficient facts that, when liberally construed, state a plausible claim to relief, serve

defendants, obey discovery orders, present summary judgment evidence, file a

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notice of appeal, and brief arguments on appeal.” E.E.O.C. v. Simbaki, Ltd., 767

F.3d 475, 484 (Sth Cir. 2014) (footnotes omitted).

III. DISCUSSION ©

The only claims remaining in this action are Cantu’s claims against Ayala.

Cantu alleges that Ayala violated his constitutional rights by falsely arresting him

and by being deliberately indifferent to his need for medical care. Ayala responds

that the undisputed evidence shows no constitutional violations. He also contends

that he is protected by qualified immunity.

A. Fourth Amendment Claim

Cantu first alleges that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated because

he was subject to a “false arrest.” (Dkt. 1, p.4). In his More Definite Statement, he

admits that he was not arrested but instead only detained. (Dkt. 17, pp. 4—5).

Nevertheless, he asserts that he should not have been either detained or handcuffed.

(Id. at 5).

The Supreme Court has held that an officer may detain a person ifthe officer

has reasonable grounds to believe that the person presents a dan ger to the officer, to

third parties, orto himself. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1968). Ifduring

that detention the officer develops probable causeto believe that the person presents

a danger to himself, the officer may seize the person and transport him for mental

examination and treatment. See, e.g., Holloway v. Purvis, 680 F. App’x 282, 285

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(5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (“[O]fficers may constitutionally seize a person without

a warrant when the officers have probable cause to believe the person, whom they

believe to be suicidal, isa danger to himself or others.” (citing Cantrell v. Murphy,

666 F.3d 911, 923 (Sth Cir. 2012))); Sullivan v. County of Hunt, Tex., 106 F. App’x

215, 218 (Sth Cir. 2004). Probable cause in this context exists when “the facts and

circumstances within the officer’s knowledge at the time ofthe seizure are sufficient

for a reasonable person to conclude that an individual is mentally ill and poses a

_ substantial risk of serious harm.” Cantrell, 666 F.3d at 923. In addition, Texas law

“authorizes a peace officer to take a person into custody without a warrant if the

officer reasonably believes that (i) a ‘person is mentally ill,’ (ii) there is a ‘substantial

risk of serious harm to the person . . . unless the person is immediately restrained,’

and (iii) there is insufficient time to obtain a warrant.” Martinez v. Smith, 200 F.3d

816, 1999 WL 1095667, *2 (Sth Cir. Nov. 4, 1999) (per curiam) (quoting TEX.

HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §573.001(a)). Whether under Terry or Texas law, the

person may be handcuffed for his own safety as well as that of the officers during

such a detention. See United States v. Sanders, 994 F.2d 200, 209-10 (Sth Cir.

1993).

In this case, the summary judgment evidence shows that Cantu showed signs

of being impaired while at the Whataburger and made a scene sufficient to raise the

manager’s concerns for Cantu’s safety and the safety of others. When officers

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arrived, Cantu ran barefoot into Houston rush hour traffic. He yelled incoherently _

at several of the officers, including Ayala, and the statements he made that could be

understood were completely fanciful. Body camera footage shows him aleererine

between cooperation, hostility, and incoherence. This evidence is sufficient to give

a reasonable officer in Ayala’s position probable cause to believe that Cantu was a

risk to himself others ifreleased. This, in turn, was sufficient to justify Cantu’s

seizure for transport to the hospital for mental examination and treatment.

Cantu has offered no evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material

fact as to whether he was seized in violation of his constitutionalrights. Instead, the

undisputed summary judgment evidence shows that he was lawfully detained and

seized. Ayala’s motion for summary judgment on Cantu’s Fourth Amendment claim

will be granted, and this claim will be dismissed with prejudice.

B. Deliberate Indifference Claim

Cantu also claims that Ayala violated his constitutional rights by being

deliberately indifferent to his need for medical care. Ayala maintains that there is

no evidence to support this claim.

The Fourteenth Amendment protects an arrestee’s right “not to have their

serious medical needs met with deliberate indifference on the part of. . . officials.”

Brooks v. Taylor County, 592 F. Supp. 3d 550, 556 (N.D. Tex. 2022) (citing

Thompson v. Upshur County, 245 F.3d 447, 457 (Sth Cir. 2001)). A “serious medical

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need” is one for which treatment has been recommended or that is so apparent that

even laymen would recognize that care is required. Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d

339, 345 n12 (Sth Cir. 2006). An official displays “deliberate indifference” when

(1) the official is aware of facts giving rise to an inference that a substantial risk of

serious harm exists, and (2) the official draws the inference but disregards the risk.

See Dyer, 964 F.3d at 380 (citing Domino v Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just. , 239 F.3d 752,

755 (Sth Cir. 2001)). This same standard applies to encounters bet ween individuals

and police officers even if the person is not formally arrested or taken into police

custody. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, No. 10-cr-284, 2012 WL 1118599, *7

(E.D. La. Apr. 3, 2012) (collecting cases), aff'd, 538 F. App’x 369 (Sth Cir. 2013).

But in all contexts, the standard for deliberate indifference is “extremely

high.” Domino, 239 F.3d at 756. To meet it, the plaintiff must allege facts showing

that despite knowing of a substantial risk, the defendant “refused to treat him,

ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any

similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical

needs.” Jd. at 756 (quoting Johnsonv. Treen, 759 F.2d 1236, 1238 (Sth Cir. 1985)).

Actions and decisions by officials that are “merely inept, erroneous, ineffective, or

negligent” do not amountto deliberate indifference. Doe v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist.,

153 F.3d 211, 219 (Sth Cir. 1998); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 US 825, 835

(1994). Further, “an officer’s failure to immediately recognize ambiguous

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symptoms as a medical emergency does not amount of deliberate indifference.”

Trevino v. Hinz, 751 F. App’x 551, 555 (Sth Cir. 2018) (per curiam).

Cantu does not allege facts or offer evidence to satisfy this extremely high

standard. He alleges that Ayala delayed for fifteen to twenty minutes before

transporting him to the psychiatric hospital. While true, the summary judgment

evidence. does not showthat Cantuneeded emergency medical treatment during that

time or that he suffered any injury as aresult of the short delay. EMTs had assessed

him and had determined that his vital signs were stable. No stab wound was visible

on his torso when he was searched. And while Cantu was obviously in need of

mental health treatment, there were no obvious signs of any physical health issues.

This relatively brief delay is insufficient to show that Ayala was deliberately

indifferent to Cantu’s need for medical care.

Cantu also alleges that Ayala displayed deliberate indifference by driving him

toa hospital otherthan the nearest one. But Cantu offers no evidence showing that

space was available at a closer facility or that Ayala deliberately ignored a closer

facility. Indeed, the body camera footage captured Ayala asking for approval to

transport Cantu to Memorial Herman Hospital Southeast because it would be the

quickest hospital to get to considering the late afternoon traffic. Further, the

summary judgment evidence shows that Ayala and Cantu arrived at the hospital

approximately fifteen minutes after leaving the Whataburger. This evidence

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contradicts Cantu’s allegations that Ayala unreasonably delayed transporting him or

that he was deliberately indifferent to Cantu’s need for medical care.

In short, the video evidence conclusively contradicts Cantu’s factual

allegations and shows that Ayala did not display deliberate indifference to either

Cantu’s physical or mental health needs. Cantu has offered no evidence to raise any

disputed issues of material fact sufficient to avoid summary judgment. Ayala’s

motion for summary judgment on this claim will be granted, and Cantu’s claims _

based on deliberate indifference will be dismissed with prejudice.

C. Qualified Immunity Defense

Ayala also raises the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. “Qualified

immunity protects officers from suit unless their conduct violates a clearly

established right.” Austin v. City of Pasadena, Tex., 74 F.4th 312, 322 (Sth Cir.

2023) (quoting Mace v. City of Palestine, 333 F.3d 621, 623 (Sth Cir. 2003)); see

also Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011). Determining whether qualified

immunity protects an official in a particular situation involves two steps: “first we

ask whether the officer’s alleged conduct has violated a federalright;...secondwe □ |

ask whether the right in question was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the alleged

violation, such that the officer was on notice of the unlawfulness of his or her

conduct.” Solis v. Serrett, 31 F 4th 975, 981 (Sth Cir. 2022) (quoting Cole v. Carson,

935 F.3d 444, 451 (Sth Cir. 2019) (en banc)).

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As explained above, Cantu has not met his burden to show that Ayala violated

his constitutional rights. Without a constitutional violation, consideration of the

second question is thus unnecessary. Ayala’s motion for summary judgment on the

basis of qualified immunity will therefore be oranted.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS as follows:

1. The motion to dismiss by Officer V.H. Ayala, (Dkt. 20), is converted to a

motion for summary judgment.and is GRANTED.

2. The civil-rights action by Plaintiff Heros Christopher Cantu is DISMISSED

with prejudice.

3. Any other pending motions are DENIED as moot.

4. Final judgment will be separately entered.

The Clerk will provide a copy of this Order to the parties.

SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on Looky 2g , 2026.

Pa

DAVID HITTNER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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