Sandoval

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

ANTONIO TAVERA SANDOVAL, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) Case No. CIV-26-1249-SLP

)

FRED FIGUEROA, et al., )

)

Respondents. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Antonio Tavera Sandoval, a citizen of Mexico proceeding with counsel,

filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”) challenging

his detention by the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”).1 (Doc. 1).2

Chief United States District Judge Scott L. Palk referred the matter to the undersigned

Magistrate Judge for initial proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C).

(Doc. 4). In accordance with the expedited briefing schedule, (Doc. 9), Respondents timely

filed a Response. (Doc. 11). Petitioner timely filed a Reply. (Doc. 12). As fully set forth

below, the undersigned recommends that the Petition be GRANTED in part because

Petitioner’s detention without a bond hearing violates the Immigration and Nationality Act

(“INA”). The Court should order an individualized bond hearing before a neutral

1 Petitioner is housed at Diamondback Correctional Facility in Watonga, Oklahoma. (Doc.

1, at 2).

2 Citations to the parties’ filings and attached exhibits will refer to this Court’s CM/ECF

pagination.

Immigration Judge within 7 days of the judgment in this matter, or else release him from

custody.

I. Factual Background

Petitioner “is a citizen of Mexico who entered the United States without inspection

approximately twenty-five years ago.” (Doc. 1, at 2). “On May 15, 2026, Petitioner was

arrested during a traffic stop” and was subsequently issued a Notice to Appear (“NTA”)

allegedly charging him with inadmissibility based on his entry without inspection. (Id. at

5). Petitioner states “[n]o bond hearing has been conducted” and “no individualized

custody determination has been made” by an immigration judge in his case because

“Respondents treat Petitioner as subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) with

no eligibility for bond.” (Id.)

Respondents assert that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under §

1225(b)(2)(A). (Doc. 11, at 1). Petitioner’s immigration proceedings are ongoing. (Doc.

1, at 5).

II. Petitioner’s Claims and Respondents’ Responses

Petitioner makes the following claims in support of his Petition:

1. His detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not § 1225(b). (Doc. 1, at

8-9).

2. His continued detention without an individualized custody hearing violates

due process. (Id. at 9).

As relief Petitioner requests “an immediate individualized bond hearing” where “the

government bears the burden of demonstrating that continued detention is justified.” (Id.

at 9-10). Petitioner also requests an award of attorney fees and costs authorized by law.3

(Id. at 10).

Respondents contend that Petitioner is held under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and is

not entitled to a bond hearing. (Doc. 11, at 1). Respondents state that if “the Court adopt[s]

its prior reasoning and rule[s] against the Respondents on the § 1225(b)(2)(A) issue, it

should not rule further. There is no reason to consider additional arguments for a bond

hearing if the Court is ordering a hearing based on the statutory arguments.” (Id. at 1-2).

III. Standard of Review

To obtain habeas corpus relief, Petitioner must show that he is “in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §

2241(c)(3). “Challenges to immigration detention are properly brought directly through

habeas.” Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d 1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Zadvydas v.

Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687-88 (2001)).

IV. Analysis

A. Under Santillan Quiroz v. Mullin, Petitioner Is Entitled To a Bond

Hearing.

In order for the Court to determine whether Petitioner’s current detention without a

bond hearing violates the law, the Court must first determine what statute controls his

3 To the extent Petitioner may be entitled to EAJA fees and costs as a prevailing party, he

must seek those separately after a final judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B); see also

Daley v. Ceja, 158 F.4th 1152, 1166 (10th Cir. 2025) (interpreting “EAJA’s broad language

to unambiguously authorize fees in habeas actions challenging immigration detention”).

Accordingly, the Court need not address this request at this juncture.

detention. Under the INA, detention of aliens who are “applicants for admission”4 and

“seeking admission” is mandatory under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). By contrast, § 1226(a)

provides for the arrest of aliens on a warrant and grants ICE the discretion to continue

detention of the alien or to release the alien on bond.5

On June 30, 2026, the Tenth Circuit decided Santillan Quiroz v. Mullin, --- F.4th ---,

2026 WL 1876709 (10th Cir. Jun. 30, 2026), holding “that noncitizens who entered the

United States and were thereafter detained in the interior of the country are usually subject

to § 1226(a) (and thus eligible for bond), not § 1225(b)(2)(A).” Id. at *5. The court

reasoned based on the statutory text and context that

once a noncitizen has entered unlawfully, no amount of legal maneuvering

allows him to go back in time and make his initial entry lawful. The only

time a noncitizen can be said to be seeking admission is when he is seeking

to enter the United States at the border. Since § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only

to those seeking admission, § 1225(b)(2)(A) is likewise limited to the border.

Id. at *7. This statutory interpretation is binding on this Court and applicable to Petitioner’s

factual circumstances.

4 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1) describes an “applicant for admission” as “an alien present in the

United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.” The statute

defines “admission” and “admitted” as “the lawful entry of the alien into the United States

after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” Id. § 1101(a)(13).

5 The regulations accompanying the statute explain the various levels of review for a bond

determination. An ICE officer makes the initial detention or release determination, and the

alien bears the burden of “demonstrat[ing] to the satisfaction of the officer that . . . release

would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that the alien is likely to appear for

any future proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8). If the officer determines the alien should

be detained, the alien can seek review of that decision at a bond hearing before an

immigration judge. Id. § 236.1(d)(1). An immigration judge’s decision to detain may be

further appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). Id. § 236.1(d)(3).

Based on the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Santillan Quiroz, the undersigned

concludes that Petitioner, who was detained in the interior of the United States after

entering without admission, is subject to detention under § 1226(a). However, he has not

been granted the bond hearing provided in that statute. Thus, Petitioner has shown that he

is in custody in violation of the laws of the United States, and he is entitled to habeas relief.

28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). A bond hearing is the appropriate remedy. Santillan Quiroz, 2026

WL 1876709 at *17 n.13.

B. The Court Should Decline to Reach Due Process or Burden Shifting.

Petitioner asserts that his detention without a bond hearing violates due process as

well as the INA, and also argues that the government should be required to bear the burden

of proof at a bond hearing. (Doc. 1, at 9). “[U]nder current BIA precedent, a noncitizen

detained under section 1226(a) must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Immigration

Judge that he or she merits release on bond, even though section 1226(a) does not explicitly

contain such a requirement. To do so, the noncitizen must prove that he or she is neither a

danger to the community nor a flight risk.” Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 27 (1st

Cir. 2021) (citation modified). The majority of Judges in this District have either (a)

declined to reach the issue of whether due process requires the government, rather than the

non-citizen, to carry the burden of proving dangerousness or flight risk at a § 1226(a) bond

hearing6 and/or (b) determined that due process does not require the burden to shift to the

6 See e.g., Velazquez v. Johnson, No. CIV-26-1111-J, 2026 WL 1999247, at *1 (W.D. Okla.

July 10, 2026) (Judge Jones declining to address petitioner’s due process claim and finding

that the burden-shifting issue “is premature and not fit for adjudication at this stage”);

Karimov v. Grant, No. CIV-26-639-J, 2026 WL 1493969, at *1 (W.D. Okla. May 28, 2026)

government.7 Acknowledging these decisions and in the interests of judicial economy, the

undersigned recommends that the Court decline to address the issue.8

(same where no party objected to the recommendation for burden shifting); Tabares

Martinez v. Grant, No. CIV-26-545-SLP, 2026 WL 1908094, at *2 (W.D. Okla. July 2,

2026) (Chief Judge Palk declining, without comment, to adopt the recommendation for

burden shifting); Rangel v. Mullin, No. CIV-26-568-D, 2026 WL 1625653, at *2 n.2 (W.D.

Okla. June 5, 2026) (Judge DeGiusti “declin[ing] to place the burden on the government

to justify Petitioner’s detention pending removal proceedings.”); Singh v. Figueroa, No.

CIV-26-600-R, 2026 WL 1181699, at *1 n.2 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 30, 2026) (Judge Russell

“declin[ing] to specify or alter the burden of proof at this stage.”) (citation omitted);

7 See e.g., Adediran v. Figueroa, No. CIV-26-801-J, Doc. 15, at 5 (W.D. Okla. July 24,

2026) (“Absent binding authority resolving this issue, and because Petitioner’s request

would substantially alter the existing framework, the Court declines to hold on this limited

record that due process requires a different procedure.”); Singh v. Mullin, CIV 26-712-HE,

Doc. 13, at 6 (W.D. Okla. June 18, 2026) (“[T]he court concludes petitioner is not entitled,

as a matter of Fifth Amendment Due Process, to a hearing at which the burden of proof is

on the government.”); Toro v. Mullin, CIV-26-315-JD, Doc. 19, at 18 (W.D. Okla. May

12, 2026) (“Balancing all three factors, the Court agrees with the Fourth and Ninth Circuits

in concluding that, at least on the facts of this case, § 1226(a)’s existing bond procedures

supply adequate process.”).

8 The undersigned has routinely recommended reaching the issue of due process and

ordering a bond hearing that requires the government to prove dangerousness or risk of

flight by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., Velazquez v. Johnson, No. CIV-26-

1111-J, Doc. 11, at 6-19 (W.D. Okla. July 2, 2026). In the absence of authority from the

Supreme Court or the Tenth Circuit, the undersigned continues to find the First and Second

Circuit’s rulings on the issue persuasive. See Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 39-

40 (1st Cir. 2021) (holding that at a § 1226(a) bond hearing, due process requires the

government to bear the burden of proving the alien’s dangerousness by clear and

convincing evidence or flight risk by a preponderance of the evidence); Velasco Lopez v.

Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 855-57 (2d Cir. 2020) (holding that when an alien is subject to

prolonged incarceration under § 1226(a), the appropriate remedy is a bond hearing at which

the government bears the burden of proving dangerousness or flight risk by clear and

convincing evidence).

V. Recommendation and Notice of Right to Object

For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned recommends that the Petition

(Doc. 1) be GRANTED in part. The undersigned recommends that the Court order

Respondents to provide Petitioner an individualized bond hearing before a neutral

Immigration Judge within 7 days of the judgment in this matter, or else release him from

custody.

The Court advises the parties of their right to object to this Report and

Recommendation by August 6, 2026, under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P.

72(b)(2).? The Court advises the parties that failure to make timely objection to this report

and recommendation waives their right to appellate review of both factual and legal issues

contained herein. See Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).

This Report and Recommendation disposes of all issues referred to the undersigned

Magistrate Judge and terminates the referral unless and until the matter is re-referred.

ENTERED this 30th day of July, 2026.

AMANDA L. MAXFIELD i

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

? Given the expedited nature of these proceedings, the undersigned has reduced the typical

objection time to Report and Recommendations. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2) advisory

committee’s note to 1983 addition (noting that rule establishing 14-day response time

“does not extend to habeas corpus petitions, which are covered by the specific rules relating

to proceedings under Sections 2254 and 2255 of Title 28.”); see also Whitmore v. Parker,

484 F. App’x 227, 231, 231 n.2 (10th Cir. 2012) (“The Rules Governing § 2254 Cases may

be applied discretionarily to habeas petitions under § 2241” and that “while the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure may be applied in habeas proceedings, they need not be in every

instance — particularly where strict application would undermine the habeas review

process.”).