The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
ABDUMADZHITKHON ZIIADULLAEV, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) Case No. CIV-26-1237-D
)
TODD LYONS, et al., )
)
Respondents. )
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Abdumadzhitkhon Ziiadullaev, a citizen of Russia proceeding with
counsel, filed an amended petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241
(“amended Petition”) challenging his detention by the U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”).1 (Doc. 12).2 United States District Judge Timothy D. DeGiusti
referred the matter to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for initial proceedings consistent
with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C). (Doc. 6). In accordance with the expedited briefing
schedule, (Doc. 13), Respondents timely filed a Response. (Doc. 14). Petitioner timely
filed a Reply. (Doc. 15). As fully set forth below, the undersigned recommends that the
amended Petition be GRANTED in part because Petitioner’s detention without a bond
hearing violates the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). The Court should order an
1 Petitioner is housed at Diamondback Correctional Facility in Watonga, Oklahoma. (Doc.
12, at 3).
2 Citations to the parties’ filings and attached exhibits will refer to this Court’s CM/ECF
pagination.
individualized bond hearing before a neutral Immigration Judge within 7 days of the
judgment in this matter, or else release him from custody.
I. Factual Background
Petitioner is a citizen of Russia who “entered the US/applied for asylum on or about
May 25, 2023.” (Doc. 12, at 3). Upon his arrival to the United States, ICE detained
Petitioner but released him shortly thereafter. (Id.) On June 21, 2025, ICE re-detained
Petitioner during a traffic stop. (Id.) Petitioner asserts he “was re-detained without an
individualized bond hearing.” (Id. at 7). Respondents assert that Petitioner is subject to
mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). (Doc. 14, at 1-2). Petitioner’s immigration
proceedings remain ongoing. (Id.)
II. Petitioner’s Claims and Respondents’ Responses
Petitioner makes the following claims in support of his amended Petition:
1. His detention without an individualized custody hearing violates due process.
(Doc. 12, at 5-10).
2. His detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not § 1225(b). (Id. at 6-7).
3. His re-detention without an “individualized determination prior to revoking
Petitioner’s parole” that revocation was warranted, “written notice of the
specific reasons for revocation of his release” or “a prompt informal
interview upon his return to custody” violates the statute governing his parole
and regulations governing his re-detention. (Id. at 10-13).
As relief Petitioner requests (1) immediate release from custody; (2) that this Court
“conduct its own bond hearing, at which Respondents shall bear the burden of proving by
clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner’s continued detention is justified by flight
risk or danger to the community;” or (3) that this Court “order Respondents to provide
Petitioner with a bond hearing before an immigration judge” where “the Government shall
bear the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner’s continued
detention is justified by flight risk or danger to the community,” the Court “retain[s]
jurisdiction to review the immigration judge’s bond determination to ensure compliance
with this Court’s order and due process, and “Respondents [are] prohibited from invoking
the automatic stay provisions under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(2).” (Id. at 26-27). Further,
Petitioner requests that the Court prohibit his removal3 or transfer4 during the pendency of
3 Federal law strips federal district courts of jurisdiction to consider “any cause or claim by
or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by [the Department of
Homeland Security (“DHS”)] to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute
removal orders against any alien under this chapter.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). In the Tenth
Circuit, a court must review whether a habeas petitioner’s claims are “connected directly
and immediately with a decision or action by the Attorney General” to commence
proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders. Tsering v. U.S. Immigr. &
Customs Enf’t, 403 F. App’x 339, 343 (10th Cir. 2010). An order by this Court prohibiting
Petitioner’s removal would directly relate to a decision to execute removal orders. See
Olola v. U.S. Att’y Gen., No. 18-CV-00058, 2018 WL 11446892, at *3 (D. Colo. Feb. 22,
2018) (“Federal law unambiguously strips federal district courts of jurisdiction to stay or
enjoin an alien’s removal.”) (citation modified); see also, e.g., Makuey v. Scott, No. 2:26-
CV-00632, 2026 WL 925647, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 6, 2026) (holding the court lacks
jurisdiction to stay petitioner’s removal under § 1252(g)); Hernandez Llanes v. Warden,
Fla. Soft Side Det. Ctr., No. 2:26-CV-1030, 2026 WL 925615, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 6,
2026) (same). Accordingly, § 1252(g) strips the Court of jurisdiction to consider
Petitioner’s request to prohibit his removal.
4 Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), “no court shall have jurisdiction to review any other
decision or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security the
authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney
General or the Secretary of Homeland Security.” Id. (citation modified). The decision
regarding where to detain noncitizens awaiting removal proceedings is a discretionary
power of the Secretary of DHS. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(g)(1), ICE “shall arrange for
appropriate places of detention for aliens detained pending removal or a decision on
removal.” The Tenth Circuit has confirmed “the Attorney General is mandated to arrange
for appropriate places of detention for [persons] detained pending removal.” Van Dinh v.
Reno, 197 F.3d 427, 433 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding in a civil rights lawsuit “a district court
this action. (Id. at 27; Doc. 9). Petitioner requests the Court enjoin Respondents from re-
detaining Petitioner without prior written notice of the grounds for detention and an
individualized determination that Petitioner poses a flight risk or is a danger to the
community. (Doc. 12, at 27). Petitioner requests that Respondents “promptly return to
Petitioner all personal documents and property in their possession or control.” (Id.)
Petitioner requests an award of attorney fees and costs authorized by law.5 (Id. at 28).
Respondents contend that Petitioner is held under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and is
not entitled to a bond hearing. (Doc. 14, at 1). Respondents state that if “the Court adopt[s]
its prior reasoning and rule[s] against the Respondents on the § 1225(b)(2)(A) issue, it
should not rule further. There is no reason to consider additional arguments for a bond
hearing if the Court is ordering a hearing based on the statutory arguments.” (Id. at 2).
has no jurisdiction to restrain the Attorney General’s power to transfer [ICE detainees] to
appropriate facilities by granting injunctive relief”). Accordingly, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) also
bars judicial review of any decision by Respondents to transfer Petitioner to another ICE
facility. See, e.g., Lway Mu v. Whitaker, 18-cv-06924, 2019 WL 2373883, at *5 (W.D.N.Y.
June 4, 2019) (citing § 1231(g)(1) and concluding “it does not have the authority to dictate
to DHS where Petitioner should be housed”); Olola, 2018 WL 11446892, at *4 (finding §
1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1231(g) preclude judicial review of respondents’ decision to
transfer a noncitizen and “decisions to transfer an alien from one location to another are
within the discretion of the Attorney General and therefore may not be reviewed or
enjoined by the federal district courts”). Therefore, the undersigned concludes the Court
does not have jurisdiction to prohibit Petitioner’s transfer to another ICE facility.
5 To the extent Petitioner may be entitled to EAJA fees and costs as a prevailing party, he
must seek those separately after a final judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B); see also
Daley v. Ceja, 158 F.4th 1152, 1166 (10th Cir. 2025) (interpreting “EAJA’s broad language
to unambiguously authorize fees in habeas actions challenging immigration detention”).
Accordingly, the Court need not address this request at this juncture.
III. Standard of Review
To obtain habeas corpus relief, Petitioner must show that he is “in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §
2241(c)(3). “Challenges to immigration detention are properly brought directly through
habeas.” Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d 1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687-88 (2001)).
IV. Analysis
A. Under Santillan Quiroz v. Mullin, Petitioner Is Entitled To a Bond
Hearing.
In order for the Court to determine whether Petitioner’s current detention without a
bond hearing violates the law, the Court must first determine what statute controls his
detention. Under the INA, detention of aliens who are “applicants for admission”6 and
“seeking admission” is mandatory under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). By contrast, § 1226(a)
provides for the arrest of aliens on a warrant and grants ICE the discretion to continue
detention of the alien or to release the alien on bond.7
6 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1) describes an “applicant for admission” as “an alien present in the
United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.” The statute
defines “admission” and “admitted” as “the lawful entry of the alien into the United States
after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” Id. § 1101(a)(13).
7 The regulations accompanying the statute explain the various levels of review for a bond
determination. An ICE officer makes the initial detention or release determination, and the
alien bears the burden of “demonstrat[ing] to the satisfaction of the officer that . . . release
would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that the alien is likely to appear for
any future proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8). If the officer determines the alien should
be detained, the alien can seek review of that decision at a bond hearing before an
immigration judge. Id. § 236.1(d)(1). An immigration judge’s decision to detain may be
further appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). Id. § 236.1(d)(3).
On June 30, 2026, the Tenth Circuit decided Santillan Quiroz v. Mullin, 180 F.4th
1226 (10th Cir. 2026), holding “that noncitizens who entered the United States and were
thereafter detained in the interior of the country are usually subject to § 1226(a) (and thus
eligible for bond), not § 1225(b)(2)(A).” Id. at 1237. The court reasoned based on the
statutory text and context that
once a noncitizen has entered unlawfully, no amount of legal maneuvering
allows him to go back in time and make his initial entry lawful. The only
time a noncitizen can be said to be seeking admission is when he is seeking
to enter the United States at the border. Since § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only
to those seeking admission, § 1225(b)(2)(A) is likewise limited to the border.
Id. at 1239. This statutory interpretation is binding on this Court and applicable to
Petitioner’s factual circumstances.
That Petitioner has made an application for asylum does not render him “seeking
admission” and thereby subject to § 1225(b)(2)(A). This is because “a noncitizen is
‘seeking admission’ when he takes some kind of ongoing action to request lawful entry
into the United States.” Id. at 1238. But “those who entered the United States without
admission and who have lived here since are categorically unable to seek admission while
they remain in the country” because “a person cannot make a present request for permission
to enter the United States, lawfully or otherwise, once he or she has already entered.” Id.
at 1239 (citation modified). And while “a noncitizen can request legal status even after he
has entered the United States unlawfully,” “he cannot request admission after the fact.” Id.
Thus, Petitioner’s post-entry attempt to seek legal status does not make detention proper
under § 1225(b)(2)(A).
Based on the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Santillan Quiroz, the undersigned
concludes that Petitioner, who was detained in the interior of the United States after
entering without admission, is subject to detention under § 1226(a). However, he has not
been granted the bond hearing provided in that statute. Thus, Petitioner has shown that he
is in custody in violation of the laws of the United States, and he is entitled to habeas relief.
28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). A bond hearing is the appropriate remedy. Santillan Quiroz, 180
F.4th at 1251 n.13.
B. The Court Should Decline to Reach Due Process or Burden Shifting.
Petitioner asserts that his detention without a bond hearing violates due process as
well as the INA, and also argues that the government should be required to bear the burden
of proof at a bond hearing. (Doc. 12, at 9-10, 27). “[U]nder current BIA precedent, a
noncitizen detained under section 1226(a) must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the
Immigration Judge that he or she merits release on bond, even though section 1226(a) does
not explicitly contain such a requirement. To do so, the noncitizen must prove that he or
she is neither a danger to the community nor a flight risk.” Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10
F.4th 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2021) (citation modified). The majority of Judges in this District have
either (a) declined to reach the issue of whether due process requires the government, rather
than the non-citizen, to carry the burden of proving dangerousness or flight risk at a §
1226(a) bond hearing8 and/or (b) determined that due process does not require the burden
8 See e.g., Velazquez v. Johnson, No. CIV-26-1111-J, 2026 WL 1999247, at *1 (W.D. Okla.
July 10, 2026) (Judge Jones declining to address petitioner’s due process claim and finding
that the burden-shifting issue “is premature and not fit for adjudication at this stage”);
Karimov v. Grant, No. CIV-26-639-J, 2026 WL 1493969, at *1 (W.D. Okla. May 28, 2026)
to shift to the government.9 Acknowledging these decisions and in the interests of judicial
economy, the undersigned recommends that the Court decline to address the issue.10
(same where no party objected to the recommendation for burden shifting); Tabares
Martinez v. Grant, No. CIV-26-545-SLP, 2026 WL 1908094, at *2 (W.D. Okla. July 2,
2026) (Chief Judge Palk declining, without comment, to adopt the recommendation for
burden shifting); Rangel v. Mullin, No. CIV-26-568-D, 2026 WL 1625653, at *2 n.2 (W.D.
Okla. June 5, 2026) (Judge DeGiusti “declin[ing] to place the burden on the government
to justify Petitioner’s detention pending removal proceedings.”); Singh v. Figueroa, No.
CIV-26-600-R, 2026 WL 1181699, at *1 n.2 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 30, 2026) (Judge Russell
“declin[ing] to specify or alter the burden of proof at this stage.”) (citation omitted);
9 See e.g., Adediran v. Figueroa, No. CIV-26-801-J, Doc. 15, at 5 (W.D. Okla. July 24,
2026) (“Absent binding authority resolving this issue, and because Petitioner’s request
would substantially alter the existing framework, the Court declines to hold on this limited
record that due process requires a different procedure.”); Singh v. Mullin, CIV 26-712-HE,
Doc. 13, at 6 (W.D. Okla. June 18, 2026) (“[T]he court concludes petitioner is not entitled,
as a matter of Fifth Amendment Due Process, to a hearing at which the burden of proof is
on the government.”); Toro v. Mullin, CIV-26-315-JD, Doc. 19, at 18 (W.D. Okla. May
12, 2026) (“Balancing all three factors, the Court agrees with the Fourth and Ninth Circuits
in concluding that, at least on the facts of this case, § 1226(a)’s existing bond procedures
supply adequate process.”).
10 The undersigned has routinely recommended reaching the issue of due process and
ordering a bond hearing that requires the government to prove dangerousness or risk of
flight by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., Velazquez v. Johnson, No. CIV-26-
1111-J, Doc. 11, at 6-19 (W.D. Okla. July 2, 2026). In the absence of authority from the
Supreme Court or the Tenth Circuit, the undersigned continues to find the First and Second
Circuit’s rulings on the issue persuasive. See Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 39-
40 (1st Cir. 2021) (holding that at a § 1226(a) bond hearing, due process requires the
government to bear the burden of proving the alien’s dangerousness by clear and
convincing evidence or flight risk by a preponderance of the evidence); Velasco Lopez v.
Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 855-57 (2d Cir. 2020) (holding that when an alien is subject to
prolonged incarceration under § 1226(a), the appropriate remedy is a bond hearing at which
the government bears the burden of proving dangerousness or flight risk by clear and
convincing evidence).
The undersigned additionally determines it is unnecessary to address Petitioner’s
remaining claims given the recommendation that his INA claim be granted.
V. Recommendation and Notice of Right to Object
For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned recommends that the Amended
Petition (Doc. 12) be GRANTED in part. The undersigned recommends that the Court
order Respondents to provide Petitioner an individualized bond hearing before a neutral
Immigration Judge within 7 days of the judgment in this matter, or else release him from
custody. The undersigned further recommends that Petitioner’s motion for a temporary
restraining order (Doc. 9) prohibiting his removal or transfer be DENIED. See supra,
notes 3 & 4.
The Court advises the parties of their right to object to this Report and
Recommendation by August 6, 2026, under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b)(2).11 The Court advises the parties that failure to make timely objection to this report
and recommendation waives their right to appellate review of both factual and legal issues
contained herein. See Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).
11 Given the expedited nature of these proceedings, the undersigned has reduced the typical
objection time to Report and Recommendations. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2) advisory
committee’s note to 1983 addition (noting that rule establishing 14-day response time
“does not extend to habeas corpus petitions, which are covered by the specific rules relating
to proceedings under Sections 2254 and 2255 of Title 28.”); see also Whitmore v. Parker,
484 F. App’x 227, 231, 231 n.2 (10th Cir. 2012) (“The Rules Governing § 2254 Cases may
be applied discretionarily to habeas petitions under § 2241” and that “while the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure may be applied in habeas proceedings, they need not be in every
instance – particularly where strict application would undermine the habeas review
process.”).
This Report and Recommendation disposes of all issues referred to the undersigned
Magistrate Judge and terminates the referral unless and until the matter is re-referred.
ENTERED this 30th day of July, 2026.
AMANDA L. MAXFIELD ,
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
10