Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

JOE HAND PROMOTIONS, INC., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. CIV-25-184-G

)

EDSEL’S CLUB, LLC d/b/a EDSEL’s )

CLUB et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

Now before the Court is Plaintiff Joe Hand Promotions, Inc.’s Motion for Default

Judgment (Doc. No. 10), in which Plaintiff seeks entry of a default judgment against

Defendants Edsel’s Club, LLC d/b/a Edsel’s Club (“Edsel’s”) and Karla Jennings pursuant

to Rule 55(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. No response to the Motion has

been filed within the time allowed. For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that a

default judgment should be entered.

I. Background

Plaintiff initiated this action on February 11, 2025, seeking damages from

Defendants for violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605. See Compl. (Doc. No. 1).1 Each Defendant

was served with a summons and the Complaint on or about April 17, 2025. See Doc. No.

7. On October 10, 2025, after Plaintiff showed that Defendants had failed to answer or

1 The Complaint alternatively alleges cable piracy in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 553. See

Compl. ¶¶ 1, 21-23. Plaintiff’s Motion only seeks damages pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 605,

however. See Pl.’s Mem. (Doc. No. 10-1) at 5.

otherwise defend themselves in this lawsuit, the Clerk entered Defendants’ default pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a). See Clerk’s Entry of Default (Doc. No. 9).

Plaintiff now seeks entry of a default judgment in the amount of $30,000.00. See

Pl.’s Mot. Default J. at 1-2; Pl.’s Mem. at 5-15; Pl.’s Mot. Default J. Ex. 6, Janis Aff. ¶ 14

(Doc. No. 10-6).

II. Relevant Standards

The entry of a default judgment “is committed to the sound discretion of the district

court.” Tripodi v. Welch, 810 F.3d 761, 764 (10th Cir. 2016). “Default judgments are

generally disfavored in light of the policy that cases should be tried upon their merits

whenever reasonably possible. Nonetheless, default judgment is viewed as a reasonable

remedy when the adversary process has been halted because of an essentially unresponsive

party.” Tabb v. Mentor Prot. Serv. LLC, No. CIV-17-1130-D, 2018 WL 3213622, at *1

(W.D. Okla. June 29, 2018) (citing In re Rains, 946 F.2d 731, 732 (10th Cir. 1991)).

Because a default has been entered, Plaintiff is “relieved . . . from having to prove

the complaint’s factual allegations.” Tripodi, 810 F.3d at 765; see also United States v.

Craighead, 176 F. App’x 922, 924 (10th Cir. 2006) (“The defendant, by his default, admits

the plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations of fact, is concluded on those facts by the judgment,

and is barred from contesting on appeal the facts thus established.” (internal quotation

marks omitted)). Even after default, however, “it remains for the court to consider whether

the unchallenged facts constitute a legitimate basis for the entry of a judgment since a party

in default does not admit conclusions of law.” Mathiason v. Aquinas Home Health Care,

Inc., 187 F. Supp. 3d 1269, 1274 (D. Kan. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).

III. Discussion

A. Procedural Requirements

The record reflects that Defendants have failed to answer or plead, that default was

entered by the Clerk, and that Plaintiff’s Motion complies with Local Civil Rule 55.1.

Accordingly, Plaintiff has satisfied the procedural requirements for entry of a default

judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b); LCvR 55.1; Tabb v. Mentor Prot. Serv. LLC, No.

CIV-17-1130-D, 2018 WL 3213622, at *1 (W.D. Okla. June 29, 2018); Doc. No. 12.

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff is a Pennsylvania corporation that “specializes

in distributing and licensing premier sporting events to commercial, non-residential

establishments including bars, restaurants, clubhouses, shops, and similar locations.”

Compl. ¶¶ 3, 6. Defendant Edsel’s is an Oklahoma limited liability company conducting

business in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma (the “Establishment”), and Defendant Jennings was

an owner, member, manager, officer, director, shareholder and/or principal of the entity

owning and operating the Establishment. Id. ¶¶ 4-5.

Plaintiff “held the exclusive commercial license to distribute and authorize the

public display of the Ultimate Fighting Championship® (“UFC”) pay-per-view broadcasts,

including all undercard bouts and commentary,” for UFC 284: Makhachev vs. Volkanovski

(telecast nationwide on February 11, 2023) and UFC 287: Pereira vs. Adesanya 2 (telecast

nationwide on April 8, 2023) (together, the “Programs”). Id. ¶ 3. The Programs were

legally available to Defendants for exhibition in the Establishment only after paying a

commercial sublicense fee for each of the Programs to Plaintiff, which fee was determined

by the capacity of the Establishment. Id. ¶ 9. Defendants, however, chose not to contract

with Plaintiff and pay the proper commercial sublicense fees to Plaintiff. Id. Instead,

Defendants, themselves and/or through their agents, servants, and/or employees, took

affirmative steps to circumvent the commercial sublicensing requirement and unlawfully

obtained each of the Programs via a satellite signal, whether by misuse of television

services, internet, or other devices. Id.; see also Pl.’s Mot. Default J. Ex. 2, Hand Aff. ¶¶

10-15 (Doc. No. 10-2); Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 5 (Doc. No. 10-5).

The broadcasts of the Programs at the Establishment on February 11, 2023, and

April 8, 2023, were not for private viewing and were not for residential, non-commercial

purposes. Compl. ¶ 13. The broadcasts of the Programs at the Establishment were

advertised on social media. Id.; see Pl.’s Mot Default J. Ex. 7 (Doc. No. 10-7). The

Establishment sold food and/or drinks on the dates and during the broadcasts of the

Programs. Compl. ¶ 13. The public display of the Programs at the Establishment were to

entice patrons to the Establishment to spend money while viewing the Programs. Id.

Defendants did not have license, authorization, permission, or consent from Plaintiff

to exhibit either of the Programs in the Establishment. Id. ¶ 15. Defendants knew, or

should have known, the interception and/or receipt and exhibition of the Programs at their

Establishment was not properly authorized. Id. ¶ 12. Defendants exhibited the Programs

for the commercial purposes of attracting paying customers, patrons, and guests, thereby

wrongfully benefiting financially by infringing upon Plaintiff’s rights. Id. ¶ 14.

By virtue of Defendant Jennings’ position as it relates to the Establishment,

Defendant Jennings had the right and ability to supervise and an obvious and direct

financial interest in the activities of the Establishment at all relevant times. Id. ¶ 16.

C. Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment

Plaintiff alleges, and the Court concludes, that subject-matter jurisdiction lies in this

matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See id. ¶ 1; Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Trotter’s

on the River, LLC, No. 25-2105, 2025 WL 3718338, at *3 (D. Kan. Dec. 23, 2025). The

Court further concludes that Plaintiff has adequately established that the Court may

exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendants. See Compl. ¶¶ 4-5; Trotter’s, 2025 WL

3718338, at *3-4.

To establish liability under 47 U.S.C. § 605, a plaintiff “must show: (1) interception

of a satellite transmission; (2) lack of authorization; and (3) publication to any person.”

J&J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Brady, 672 F. App’x 798, 801 (10th Cir. 2016). “Section 605

imposes strict liability,” and a court may rely on circumstantial evidence to “find[] that a

communication was intercepted.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Accepting the well-pleaded allegations in the Complaint as true, the Court finds that

they establish Defendants’ liability for satellite piracy through broadcast of the Programs

in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605. See id.; Trotter’s, 2025 WL 3718338, at *4-5; see also

Tabb, 2018 WL 3213622, at *2. Because Defendants have failed to respond to or defend

this action in any way, the Court finds that entry of a default judgment is appropriate.

D. Damages

Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 605, any person who, without authorization, receives and

publishes a communication, including a satellite broadcast, may be liable for statutory

damages. See 47 U.S.C. § 605(e). Plaintiff requests statutory damages in an amount

totaling $30,000.00. See Pl.’s Mem. at 6-13. “The amount of damages assessed pursuant

to [§ 605] rests within the sound discretion of the court.” Zuffa, LLC v. Gonzalez, No. 17-

CV-01805, 2017 WL 6016403, at *3 (D. Colo. Nov. 14, 2017) (internal quotation marks

omitted). “There needs to be some proportionality between the loss suffered and the

amount of statutory damages,” however. Id. (alteration and internal quotation marks

omitted).

Plaintiff first requests damages in the amount of $10,000 pursuant to §

605(e)(3)(C)(i)(II). See Pl.’s Mem. at 6-9; see also Compl. at 6. Under this subsection,

damages may be awarded in a sum of not less than $1000.00 and not more than $10,000.00

per violation. 47 U.S.C § 605(e)(3)(C)(i)(II); see Trotter’s, 2025 WL 3718338, at *5. The

record indicates that the required commercial sub-license fee for Defendants to broadcast

both Programs would have been $2540.00. See Pl.’s Mot. Default J. Ex. 4 (Doc. No. 10-

4); id. Ex. 2. The evidence presented shows there were approximately 20-25 patrons

present in the Establishment for the February 11, 2023 broadcast and that Defendants

showed UFC 284: Makhachev vs. Volkanovski on that date on approximately six

televisions in the establishment. See Pl.’s Mem. at 4, 6; Pl.’s Mot. Default J. Ex. 5. Plaintiff

has also provided evidence supporting that unauthorized exhibitions of both Programs were

advertised by Defendants on Facebook. See Pl.’s Mem. at 10; Pl.’s Mot. Default J. Ex. 7.

Upon consideration of the facts shown by Plaintiff’s Motion and evidence, the Court

finds that an award of statutory damages is proper and concludes that Plaintiff should

recover the requested award of $10,000.00 under § 605(e)(3)(C)(i)(II). “This amount is

sufficient to compensate Plaintiff for the cost of the commercial sub-license fee and to

disgorge Defendants of any financial benefits resulting from the unlawful broadcast.” J &

J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Spears, No. CIV-18-126-D, 2018 WL 4702173, at *2 (W.D. Okla.

Oct. 1, 2018). Further, this award is consistent with other statutory damages awarded for

similar violations. See id.; J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Garcia, No. CIV-14-806-D, 2015

WL 1800534, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 16, 2015).

Next, in the event the Court finds the satellite interception was willful and for direct

or indirect commercial advantage or private financial gain, additional damages may be

awarded in a sum of not more than $100,000.00. See 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(C)(ii); Joe

Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Brown, No. CIV-21-956-G, 2023 WL 6301659, at *3 (W.D.

Okla. Sept. 27, 2023). Plaintiff requests enhanced damages in the amount of $20,000.00

pursuant to § 605(e)(3)(C)(ii), as Plaintiff argues Defendants’ actions were willful and

committed for commercial advantage or private financial gain. See Pl.’s Mem. at 9-11; see

also Compl. at 6.

“[Defendants’] default and [their] decision not to defend against these allegations

are grounds for concluding that [their] actions were willful.” Christ Ctr. of Divine Phil.,

Inc. v. Elam, No. CIV-16-65-D, 2017 WL 564110, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 10, 2017),

modified on other grounds, 2017 WL 8790997 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 18, 2017); accord Brown,

2023 WL 6301659, at *3. And, as noted, Plaintiff has provided evidence reflecting that

Defendants advertised the Programs and took in money from paying patrons during the

broadcast of the Programs. See Pl.’s Mem. at 10-11; Pl.’s Mot. Default J. Ex. 5. Because

Defendants’ conduct was willful and committed for direct or indirect commercial

advantage or private financial gain, the Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to enhanced

damages under 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(C)(ii) in the requested amount of $20,000.00.

For the reasons explained above, the Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to statutory

damages in the total amount of $30,000.00.

E. Costs and Attorney’s Fees

Section 605 contemplates “the recovery of full costs,” including an award of

reasonable attorney’s fees “to an aggrieved party who prevails.” 47 U.S.C. §

605(e)(3)(B)(iii). The Court has “already determined that [Plaintiff] is an aggrieved party

under the statute,” “[a]nd securing a default judgment typically qualifies a plaintiff as the

prevailing party for purposes of costs and fee awards.” Trotter’s, 2025 WL 3718338, at

*8.

Plaintiff’s request for costs in the amount of $655.00 is well supported and is hereby

granted. See Pl.’s Mem. at 15; Janis Aff. ¶ 12; Pl.’s Mot. Default J. Ex. 12 (Doc. No. 10-

12); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1); Compl. at 7. Plaintiff is likewise entitled to a

reasonable attorney’s fee pursuant to § 605(e)(3)(B)(iii). See Trotter’s, 2025 WL 3718338,

at *8; see also Compl. at 7; Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2); LCvR 54.2.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. No.

10) is GRANTED pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2).

Plaintiff is awarded statutory damages of $30,000.00, plus costs of $655.00.

Plaintiff is directed to submit an affidavit to the Court supporting 1ts request for

reasonable attorney’s fees within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Order. A separate

default judgment shall be entered upon determination of the attorney’s fee award.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 30th day of July, 2026.

CHARLES B. GOODWIN

United States District Judge