The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
JOSHUA DAVIS CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS CASE NO. 24-784
JANTRAN, INC. SECTION: “G”
ORDER AND REASONS
This litigation involves alleged injuries suffered by Plaintiff Joshua Davis (“Plaintiff”)
upon a vessel.1 Before the Court is Defendant Jantran, Inc.’s (“Defendant”) Motion in Limine.2
In the motion, Defendant seeks to exclude certain opinions and anticipated trial testimony of
Captain John R. Sutton (“Captain Sutton”), Plaintiff’s marine operations and liability expert.3
Plaintiff opposes the motion.4 Considering the motion, the opposition, the reply memorandum,
the record, and the applicable law the Court grants the motion in part and denies the motion in part.
The Court excludes Captain Sutton’s opinions to the extent he offers legal conclusions concerning
Defendant’s compliance with 46 C.F.R. § 144.720, negligence, or breach of the duty to provide
Plaintiff with a reasonably safe place to work. The motion is denied in all other respects.
I. Background
On or about October 20, 2021, Plaintiff was serving as a crewmember of Defendant aboard
the vessel, M/V Lucy Janoush.5 The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff suffered an injury while
1 Rec. Doc. 1.
2 Rec. Doc. 28.
3 Id.
4 Rec. Doc. 38.
5 Rec. Doc. 1 at 1.
running out a racket.6 The Complaint states that the alleged injury was caused due to Defendant’s
failure to provide safe workplace and seaworthy vessel.7
On March 28, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this Court.8 On February 16, 2026,
Defendant filed the instant motion.9 On April 7, 2026, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion.10
On April 13, 2026, Defendant filed a reply memorandum in further response to the motion.11
II. Parties’ Arguments
A. Defendant’s Arguments in Support of the Motion
Defendant seeks to exclude certain opinions and anticipated trial testimony of Captain
Sutton.12 Defendant argues that Captain Sutton’s opinion that Plaintiff, who was a deckhand at
the time of the incident, would have eventually obtained a U.S. Coast Guard issued pilot’s license
sometime in the future but for the subject incident is speculative and is not based on reliable
principles and methodology.13 Defendant takes issue with Captain Sutton’s opinion that the watch
rotation and banking assignments aboard the vessel violated a U.S. Coast Guard (“USCG”)
regulation, arguing that this is question of law for the Court.14 Defendant further argues that
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Rec. Doc. 28.
10 Rec. Doc. 38.
11 Rec. Doc. 39.
12 Rec. Doc. 28-1 at 1.
13 Id.
14 Id.
2
Captain Sutton’s opinion that fatigue contributed to Plaintiff’s injuries will not assist the jury
because it is within the jurors’ common experience and knowledge.15 Defendant asserts that these
opinions should be struck.16
B. Plaintiff’s Arguments in Opposition to the Motion
In opposition, Plaintiff argues that Captain Sutton’s opinions are based upon his specialized
knowledge derived from his 44 years of training and experience as a Master of Towing and an
active captain and a U.S. Coast Goard Licensed Master Mariner.17 Plaintiff contends that Captain
Sutton’s opinion regarding Plaintiff obtaining his pilot’s license was based upon Plaintiff’s
deposition testimony.18 According to Plaintiff, Defendant’s concerns are not grounds for
exclusion, rather they are grounds for cross-examination.19
Plaintiff argues Captain Sutton has sufficient qualifications to render an opinion concerning
the watch rotation instituted by Captain “Bubba” Mitchell and the requirements of Subchapter M.20
Plaintiff contends that Captain Sutton has sufficient qualifications and experience to opine as to
whether a marine condition is USCG compliant.21 Plaintiff avers Captain Sutton’s opinion
concerning a Subchapter M violation is a reasonable conclusion based upon the evidence.22
15 Id. at 7–8.
16 Id. at 8.
17 Rec. Doc. 38 at 1.
18 Id. at 8.
19 Id. at 9.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 10.
22 Id.
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Plaintiff argues Defendant has failed to establish that 46 C.F.R. § 144.720 is not
applicable.23 Plaintiff contends that Captain Sutton has “extensive backgrounds on both USCG
high density passenger vessels and inspected towing vessels” and “USCG Subchapter M
regulations” at 46 C.F.R., which includes the regulations concerning crew accommodations.24
Plaintiff asserts Captain Sutton is qualified to give his opinion concerning Subchapter M
requirements.25
According to Plaintiff, towboat work is not within the common knowledge of an average
juror, and Captain Sutton’s opinions will assist the jury.26 Plaintiff avers Captain Sutton’s
testimony concerning the fatigue generated by failure to comply with safety rules and best practices
in the industry will help the jury resolve what policies should have been implemented.27 Plaintiff
disputes Defendant’s contention that fatigue is “common knowledge.”28 Plaintiff contends that
maritime fatigue in the context of this case is technical and industry-specific, and these are not
matters of every experience.29 Plaintiff asserts that the motion should be denied.30
23 Id.
24 Id. at 10–11.
25 Id. at 11.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 12.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 13.
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C. Defendant’s Arguments in Further Support of the Motion
In further support of the motion, Defendant maintains that Captain Sutton’s opinions
regarding Plaintiff obtaining a pilot’s license are speculative.31 Defendant explains that 46 C.F.R.
§ 144.720 enumerates considerations for crew accommodations in the design and construction of
a vessel, and there are no allegations that the vessel was faulty in design and construction.32
Defendant contends that Captain Sutton’s opinion that the vessel’s watch rotation violated 46
C.F.R. § 144.720 is unfounded and should be stricken.33
Defendant reiterates that courts have found that a marine liability expert’s opinion
regarding fatigue playing a role in a plaintiff’s injuries would not assist the jury and is commonly
understood.34 Defendant asserts that Captain Sutton’s opinion that fatigue played a role in the
incident should be stricken.35
III. Legal Standard
The district court has considerable discretion to admit or exclude expert testimony under
Federal Rule of Evidence 702.36 Rule 702 states that a witness “qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,” may provide expert testimony when
“scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the
31 Rec. Doc. 39 at 1.
32 Id. at 1–2.
33 Id. at 2.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 138–39 (1997); Seatrax, Inc. v. Sonbeck Int’l, Inc., 200 F.3d
358, 371 (5th Cir. 2000).
5
evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”37 For the testimony to be admissible, Rule 702 establishes
the following requirements:
(1) the testimony must be based upon sufficient facts or data,
(2) the testimony must be the product of reliable principles and methods, and
(3) the expert must reliably apply the principles and methods to the facts of the case.38
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Supreme Court explained that Rule
702 requires the district court to act as a “gatekeeper” to ensure that “any and all scientific
testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.”39 The court’s gatekeeping
function mostly involves a two-part inquiry.
First, the court must determine whether the expert testimony is reliable, which requires an
assessment of whether the expert testimony’s underlying reasoning or methodology is valid.40 The
court’s inquiry into the reliability of expert testimony is flexible and fact-specific.41 The aim is to
exclude expert testimony based merely on subjective belief or unsupported speculation.42 In
analyzing reliability, Daubert instructs courts to consider (1) whether the theory has been tested;
(2) whether the theory has been subject to peer review and publication; (3) any evaluation of known
rates of error; (4) whether standards and controls exist and have been maintained with respect to
37 Fed. R. Evid. 702; see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
38 Fed. R. Evid. 702.
39 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589; see also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (clarifying that
the court’s gatekeeping function applies to all forms of expert testimony).
40 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589. The party offering the testimony has the burden to establish reliability by a
preponderance of the evidence. See Moore v. Ashland Chem. Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 276 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing In re Paoli
R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994)).
41 Seatrax, 200 F.3d at 372.
42 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.
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the technique; and (5) general acceptance within the scientific community.43
Second, the court must determine whether the expert’s reasoning or methodology “fits” the
facts of the case and whether it will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence.44 The
second inquiry primarily analyzes whether the expert testimony is relevant.45
Yet a court’s role as a gatekeeper does not replace the traditional adversary system.46 A
“review of the caselaw after Daubert shows that the rejection of expert testimony is the exception
rather than the rule.”47 “Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and
careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking
shaky but admissible evidence.”48 “As a general rule, questions relating to the bases and sources
of an expert’s opinion affect the weight to be assigned that opinion rather than its admissibility
and should be left to the jury’s consideration.”49
Federal Rule of Evidence 704(a) provides that “[a]n opinion is not objectionable just
because it embraces an ultimate issue.”50 “The rule was enacted to change the old view that []
43 Id. at 592–94. In Kumho Tire, the Supreme Court emphasized that the test of reliability is “flexible” and
that Daubert’s list of specific factors does not necessarily nor exclusively apply to every expert in every case. Kumho
Tire, 526 U.S. at 141. The overarching goal “is to make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon
professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that
characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.” Id. at 152.
44 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591; Fed. R. Evid. 702.
45 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591; Fed. R. Evid. 702.
46 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596.
47 Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee’s note, “2000 Amendments.”
48 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596 (citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987)).
49 United States v. 14.38 Acres of Land, More or Less Sit. in Leflore Cnty., 80 F.3d 1074, 1077 (5th Cir.1996)
(quoting Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co., 826 F.2d 420, 422 (5th Cir. 1987)).
50 Fed. R. Evid. 704(a).
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giving an opinion on an ultimate issue would ‘usurp the function’ or ‘invade the province’ of the
jury.”51 The rule, however, “does not open the door to all opinions.”52 Witnesses may not “tell the
jury what result to reach,” nor may they “give legal conclusions.”53 The Fifth Circuit has
explained that “the task of separating impermissible question which call for overbroad or legal
responses from permissible questions is not a facile one,” but one that requires courts to exclude
questions or answers from experts that “would supply the jury with no information other than the
expert’s view of how its verdict should read.”54
IV. Analysis
Defendant seeks to exclude the following opinions of Captain Sutton: (1) Captain Sutton’s
opinion that plaintiff, who was a deckhand at the time of the incident, would have eventually
obtained a U.S. Coast Guard issued pilot’s license sometime in the future but for the subject
incident; and (2) Captain Sutton’s opinion that the watch rotation and bunking assignments aboard
the subject vessel violated a U.S. Coast Guard regulation and caused plaintiff to become fatigued
which contributed to the incident in question. The Court addresses each argument in turn.
A. Opinion Regarding Plaintiff Obtaining a Pilot’s License
Captain Sutton opines that it is “highly likely” Plaintiff would have obtained his pilot’s
license had he not been injured. Specifically, in Captain Sutton’s expert report, he concluded:
Given that Mr. Davis was previously in his earlier life a USCG licensed towing
vessel officer and now is required by the USCG additional recent maritime service
in his personal work history / “sea service” for the United States Coast Guard to re-
51 Owen v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 698 F.2d 236, 240 (5th Cir. 1983).
52 Id.
53 Id. (citing United States v. Fogg, 652 F.2d 551, 557 (5th Cir. 1981).
54 Id.
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issue his previously acquired mariner document. It’s highly likely Mr. Davis would
have achieved this personal goal had he not injured himself in the course of his
employment.55
Defendant argues that Captain Sutton fails to explain how Plaintiff might satisfy the
requirements set forth in 46 C.F.R § 10.227(i) “Re-issuance of expired credentials.” Specifically,
46 C.F.R § 10.227(i) requires that a person whose license has been expired for more than twelve
months “demonstrate professional knowledge by completing a course approved for this purpose”
and “complete the practical demonstration of maneuvering and handling a towing vessel” before
the license can be re-issued.56 Defendant contends that this opinion is impermissible speculation
and will confuse and mislead the jury.
In opposition, Plaintiff argues that Captain Sutton’s opinion is not speculative, rather, it is
based upon his experience as a USCG licensed Master Mariner, Plaintiff’s prior Coast Guard
licensure, industry promotion pathways, and Plaintiff’s deposition testimony wherein he identifies
the steps he was taking towards re-obtaining his pilot’s license.
The Court finds that Defendant has not shown that exclusion of Captain Sutton’s opinion
is warranted. Defendant correctly notes that reissuance of Plaintiff’s expired credentials was not
automatic, and Captain Sutton’s report does not expressly address each of the regulatory
requirements set forth in 42 C.F.R. § 10.227(i). Nevertheless, this omission does not render his
opinion wholly speculative.
Captain Sutton’s opinion is based on more than the mere possibility that Plaintiff might
have obtained the credentials. In reaching his conclusion, Captain Sutton considered Plaintiff’s
55 Rec. Doc. 28-2 at 7–8.
56 46 C.F.R. § 10.227(i).
9
prior experience as a Coast Guard-licensed towing vessel officer, the additional sea service
necessary for reissuance, Plaintiff’s work history, and Plaintiff’s own deposition testimony. Taken
together, this evidence provides a factual basis from which Captain Sutton, relying on his
experience as a licensed Master Mariner and familiarity with Coast Guard credentialing
requirements, could offer an opinion concerning Plaintiff’s prospects of obtaining the credentials
absent his injury.
To the extent Defendant argues that Captain Sutton failed to account adequately for the
requirements imposed by 42 C.F.R. § 10.227(i), this criticism bears on the weight of the opinion
rather than its admissibility. Defendant may explore on cross examination whether Plaintiff has
completed, or could complete, the required courses and practical requirements. Captain Sutton,
however, is not permitted to testify with certainty that the Coast Guard would have reissued
Plaintiff’s credential or offer a legal conclusion concerning Plaintiff’s eligibility under the
regulation.
B. Opinion Regarding Fatigue and Failure to Train
Captain Sutton also opines that the M/V Lucy Janoush’s watch rotation was a violation of
U.S. Coast Guard regulations and caused fatigue on the part of Plaintiff. In Captain Sutton’s expert
report, he concluded:
Jantran failed to properly train Captain Mitchell and Captain Crone to follow the
towing vessel inspection regulations known industry wide as “Sub-Chapter M” at
46 CFR [§] 144.720 and therefore The Captain failed to clearly understand that it
was his responsibility as Master to follow the Federal regulations over his personal
preferences.57
The expert report further explains that:
57 Rec. Doc. 28-2 at 7.
10
With the more recent implementation of 46 CFR [§] 144.720 with the
implementation of towing vessel inspection, Jantran still allowed its employee,
Captain Mitchell to implement a watch rotation and subsequent room assignments
onboard its vessel that prevented deckhand Joshua Davis and other crew members
of the M/V Lucy Janoush from obtaining the much needed and proper rest during
his assigned rest periods. Either way this issue is viewed, Jantran was unaware of
the watch system setup by Captain Mitchell, or Jantran knowingly failed to correct
their Captain Mitchell, or Jantran as a maritime employer was simply ignorant of
the topic of mariner fatigue. Either way, Jantran, Inc. was negligent and failed to
provide a reasonably safe place of employment for deckhand Joshua Davis. Failing
to provide Joshua Davis with proper uninterrupted rest periods that maximized his
ability to prevent worker fatigue.58
Defendant argues that Captain Sutton’s reliance on 46 C.F.R. § 144.720 is erroneous, and
his opinion will not assist the jury. In opposition, Plaintiff contends that 46 C.F.R. § 144.720 is
applicable and towboat work is not within the common knowledge of the average juror.
With respect to the proper scope of expert testimony, “[a]n opinion is not objectionable
just because it embraces an ultimate issue.”59 Nevertheless, an expert may never render
conclusions of law.60 Nor, may an expert go beyond the scope of his expertise in giving his
opinion.61
As an initial matter, Defendant argues that 42 C.F.R. § 144.720 is inapplicable here because
the statute does not concern vessel operations, manning, or watch rotations. The Court agrees. Part
144 concerns the “Construction and Arrangement” of vessels. Section 144.720 provides that “[t]he
condition of the crew accommodations must consider the importance of crew rest” and identifies
58 Id. at 4.
59 Fed. R. Evid. 704(a).
60 Snap–Drape, Inc. v. Comm'r, 98 F.3d 194, 198 (5th Cir. 1996).
61 First United Fin. Corp. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 96 F.3d 135, 136 (5th Cir.1996) (noting that expert
testimony was properly rejected by the court because the “opinion of dishonesty goes beyond the scope of expertise.”)
11
“vibration, ambient light, noise levels, and general comfort” as relevant considerations. The
regulation further requires that “[e]very effort…be made to ensure that quarters help provide a
suitable environment for sleep and off-duty rest.” This language addresses whether the physical
condition of crew quarters provides an environment conductive to rest. It does not prescribe
particular watch rotations or regulate the assignment of crewmembers. Captain Sutton’s opinion
extends beyond the language of Section 144.720. Accordingly, Section 144.720 does not support
Sutton’s opinion that the challenged watch rotations or room assignments violated federal
regulations.
Further, Captain Sutton’s opinion is a conclusion of law. Captain Sutton’s opinion
interprets 46 C.F.R. § 144.720 and applies that regulation directly to the conduct of Defendant and
Captain Mitchell. Specifically, Sutton opines that: (1) Defendant “failed to properly train”; (2)
Captain Mitchell “failed” to follow federal regulations;(3) Defendant “knowingly failed to correct”
Captain Mitchell; and (4) Defendant was “ignorant of the topic of mariner fatigue.” Sutton then
concludes that Defendant “was negligent and failed to provide a reasonably safe place of
employment.” These opinions constitute impermissible legal conclusions because they apply the
governing legal standards to the facts and effectively instruct the jury that Defendant breached
duties owed to Plaintiff.
As such, the Court excludes Captain Sutton’s opinions to the extent he offers legal
conclusions concerning Defendant’s compliance with 46 C.F.R. § 144.720, negligence, or breach
of the duty to provide Plaintiff with a reasonably safe place to work. Captain Sutton is permitted
to offer admissible testimony regarding maritime industry practices, watch rotations, crew rest, or
12
other matters within his specialized knowledge, provided that he does not couch his opinions in
legal conclusions or instruct the jury how the governing law should be applied.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s motion” is GRANTED IN PART AND
DENIED IN PART. The motion is GRANTED as to Captain Sutton’s opinions concerning
Defendant’s compliance with 46 C.F.R. § 144.720, negligence, or breach of the duty to provide
Plaintiff with a reasonably safe place to work. The motion is DENIED in all other respects.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court excludes Captain Sutton’s opinions to the
extent he offers legal conclusions concerning Defendant’s compliance with 46 C.F.R. § 144.720,
negligence, or breach of the duty to provide Plaintiff with a reasonably safe place to work.
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, this 12th day of August, 2026.
D esrctte )oburitte IB
NANNETTE JQUAVETTE BROWN (ou
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
6 Rec. Doc. 28.
13