The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
MARQUIS ROBINSON,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 26-cv-496-NJR
ALAN VAREL, JOHNATHAN KEELER,
IDOC, JOHN DOE #1, and JOHN DOE
#2,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
Plaintiff Marquis Robinson, who at the time he filed his Complaint was an inmate
of the Illinois Department of Corrections incarcerated at Centralia Correctional Center,
brings this action for deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The case is now before the Court for preliminary review of the Complaint pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to screen prisoner
complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Any portion of
a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is immune
from such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
The Complaint
On August 1, 2025, Correctional Officer Alan Varel and Correctional Officer
Johnathan Keeler were transporting Robinson to Chicago on a medical furlough (Doc. 1,
p. 4). Robinson alleges that Varel was driving erratically by frequently switching lanes,
brake checking, texting while driving, and taking pictures of downtown Chicago while
driving (Id.). On the return trip to Centralia, the officers made an unauthorized stop at a
White Castle in Matteson, Illinois (Id.). Robinson noted that his handcuffs were not
double-locked. He informed the officers, who stopped and double locked the cuffs, telling
Robinson not to let anyone know of the mistake (Id.). Leaving the restaurant, Officer Varel
attempted to make an illegal U-turn from the outside lane across traffic, resulting in their
vehicle being struck by another car (Id.). Robinson was not wearing a seatbelt (and was
unable to secure his seatbelt on his own given his restraints), and he was knocked out of
his seat and lost consciousness (Id.).
Robinson was taken to the local emergency room but alleges that he still suffers
from neck and back pain, as well as migraines, anxiety, and depression (Doc. 1, pp. 4, 6).
Robinson alleges that Dr. Whealon failed to adequately treat his condition (Id. at p. 6).
Robinson has not received an adequate examination, nor has he been sent for outside
medical care. His chronic pain is not well managed nor has he received proper therapy
(Id.).
Preliminary Dismissals
Robinson identifies IDOC and two John Does in his case caption but fails to include
any allegations against the parties in his statement of claim. Further, IDOC is not a
“person” amendable to suit under Section 1983 and is immune from suit based on the
state’s sovereign immunity. See Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 592 (7th Cir. 2001);
Thomas v. Illinois, 697 F.3d 612, 613 (7th Cir. 2012); Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S.
58, 71 (1989) (“neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’
under [Section] 1983”). Thus, IDOC is DISMISSED with prejudice; John Doe #1, and
John Doe #2 are DISMISSED without prejudice.
In his statement of claim, Robinson refers to Dr. Whealon, whom he alleges failed
to provide him with adequate care for his injuries. But Robinson fails to identify
Dr. Whealon as a defendant in the case caption. In order to be considered a defendant, an
individual must be named in the case caption. See FED. R. CIV. P. 10(a); Myles v. United
States, 416 F.3d 551, 551–52 (7th Cir. 2005). Because Robinson fails to identify Dr. Whealon
as a defendant, any potential claim against him is DISMISSED without prejudice.
Discussion
Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Court designates the following
count:
Count 1: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against
Alan Varel and Johnathan Keeler for driving erratically and
failing to restrain Robinson during transport.
The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders,
unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any other claim that is
mentioned in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be considered
dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled under the Twombly pleading
standard.1
1 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face”).
Although, standing alone, the failure to provide a seatbelt to a prisoner during
transport does not violate the constitution, see Dale v. Agresta, 771 F. App’x 659, 661 (7th
Cir. 2019) (noting that “without reckless driving or other exacerbating circumstances” the
failure to seatbelt an inmate does not create a “substantial risk of serious harm”),
Robinson has alleged much more than the simple lack of a seatbelt. He alleges that officers
were driving erratically throughout his transport, ultimately making an illegal turn
across traffic resulting in a collision. Such actions, accompanied by the lack of adequate
restraints, could violate the Eighth Amendment. Brown v. Fortner, 518 F.3d 552, 559-60
(8th Cir. 2008). Thus, at this stage, Robinson states a viable claim against Officers Varel
and Keeler.
Motion for Counsel
In addition to his Complaint, Robinson also filed a motion for counsel (Doc. 4).
Robinson indicates that he has contacted numerous law firms who have declined to take
his case (Id.). He notes that he has some high school education but fails to indicate why
he believes counsel is necessary in this case. And given the early stage of the litigation
process, it is difficult to accurately evaluate the need for the assistance of counsel.
See Kadamovas v. Stevens, 706 F.3d 843, 845 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[U]ntil the defendants respond
to the complaint, the plaintiff’s need for assistance of counsel ... cannot be gauged.”).2
Further, there is nothing currently pending that would require counsel. Once Defendants
2 In evaluating the motion for counsel, the Court applies the factors discussed in Pruitt v. Mote,
503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007), and related authority.
have been served and file answers, the Court will enter a scheduling order setting forth
the next steps in the litigation process. If Robinson experiences difficulties in litigating
the case at that point, he may submit another request for counsel. At this time, his motion
is DENIED without prejudice.
Disposition
For the reasons stated above, Count 1 shall proceed against Alan Varel and
Johnathan Keeler. All other claims and defendants are DISMISSED without prejudice.
The Clerk of Court shall prepare for Alan Varel and Johnathan Keeler: (1) Form 5
(Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons) and (2) Form 6 (Waiver
of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the
Complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to each defendant’s place of employment
as identified by Robinson. If a defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of
Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the
Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on that defendant, and the
Court will require that defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent
authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
If a defendant can no longer be found at the work address provided by Robinson,
the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the defendant’s current work address, or, if not
known, defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending
the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the
address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained
in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to
the Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 8.2, Defendants need only respond to the issues stated in this
Merit Review Order.
Because Robinson’s claim involves his physical injuries, the Clerk of Court is
DIRECTED to enter the Court’s standard HIPAA Qualified Protective Order.
If judgment is rendered against Robinson, and the judgment includes the payment
of costs under Section 1915, he will be required to pay the full amount of the costs,
regardless of whether his application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(£)(2)(A).
Finally, Robinson is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep
the Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the
Court will not independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing
and not later than 14 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to
comply with this order will cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and
may result in dismissal of this action for want of prosecution. See FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: August 12, 2026
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge
Notice to Plaintiff
The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of
your lawsuit and serve them with a copy of your Complaint. After service has been
achieved, the defendants will enter their appearance and file an Answer to your
Complaint. It will likely take at least 60 days from the date of this Order to receive the
defendants’ Answer, but it is entirely possible that it will take 90 days or more. When all
the defendants have filed Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling Order containing
important information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is advised to
wait until counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions, to give the
defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before
defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature.
Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the Court at this time, unless specifically
directed to do so.