Chavez

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EMILIO CHAVEZ,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 25-cv-1616-NJR

WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC.,

WARDEN WILLS, DIRECTOR

HUGHES, ADA COORDINATOR

LAWRENCE, ASSISTANT ADA

COORDINATOR KUHNERT, NURSE

PRACTITIONER MOLDENHAUER,

NURSE PRACTITIONER DEARMOND,

NURSE PRACTITIONER CRANE,

JANE DOE #’s 1-5, DR. BROPHY, and

JOHN DOE #1 MAJOR,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:

Plaintiff Emilio Chavez, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections who

is currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center, brings this action for

deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Chavez’s Complaint

(Doc. 1) was dismissed without prejudice for violating both Rule 8 and the rules of joinder

(Doc. 16, pp. 3-7), but he was granted leave to file an amended pleading. In his First

Amended Complaint, Chavez alleges that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his

knee injury.

The case is now before the Court for preliminary review of the First Amended

Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to

screen prisoner complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).

Any portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law

is immune from such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

The First Amended Complaint

Prior to his incarceration, Chavez suffered an injury to his left knee that required

the reconstruction of his ACL and a partial meniscectomy (Doc. 20, p. 5). He had surgery

on August 29, 2022. After the surgery, he was prescribed physical therapy, and follow-

up appointments for future surgeries to repair his injury were recommended (Id.).

On October 20, 2022, he transferred into the custody of IDOC; he arrived at Menard on

December 1, 2022 (Id. at pp. 5-6).

Upon arriving at Menard, Chavez immediately began submitting sick call requests

indicating his pain levels, need for physical therapy, and difficulty walking due to his

injury (Doc. 20, p. 6). On January 26, 2023, he informed Jane Doe #1 nurse during the

med-line that he was in extreme pain (Id.). She directed him to file a sick call request, but

he had already filed three requests by that time (Id.). She merely stated “whatever” and

walked away. The next day, Jane Doe #1 called him to the sick call line (Id. at p. 7).

He explained his surgery and his need for follow-up care (Id.). She noted that because

there was a lack of adequate medical staff, it would be hard to help him (Id.). Chavez was

sent back to his cell without care (Id.).

Chavez continued to submit nurse sick call requests throughout February 2023

(Doc. 20, p. 7). Chavez grew frustrated with the lack of response, and on February 15,

2023, he told an officer that he was declaring a hunger strike because of his extreme knee

pain (Id.).1 Chavez spoke to John Doe #1 major who informed Chavez that he would meet

with medical staff on either February 16 or 17 (Id. at p. 8). The major explained that delays

in his care were due to Wexford not having enough physicians at the prison (Id.). But

Chavez was not called to the nurse sick call line as the major promised. Chavez alleges

that delays in his care were caused by understaffing of the healthcare unit (Id.). He noted

that Wexford only had three nurse practitioners and one or two medical doctors to treat

all of the inmates at Menard (Id.).

On February 27, 2023, Chavez finally saw Nurse Practitioner Moldenhauer

(Doc. 20, p. 8). Chavez stated that he had severe pain while walking and his knee would

give out (Id.). He requested additional care for his knee due to its instability. Moldenhauer

informed Chavez that he was unsure as to when Chavez would be sent out for care

because there was not enough staff at the prison (Id.). Despite being in significant pain,

Moldenhauer failed to prescribe any pain medication, nor did he seek to expedite a

referral for a follow-up appointment outside of the prison (Id. at p. 9).

On April 4, 2023, Chavez spoke with Jane Doe #2 nurse during the sick call line

(Doc. 20, p. 9). He explained that he could not walk without severe pain and needed

follow-up care (Id.). Jane Doe #2 noted that the prison did not have access to Chavez’s

1 Chavez at first indicates that he declared a hunger strike on February 5, 2023, but he notes in the

next paragraph that “[a] few minutes later on 2/15/23” he spoke to the major about his concerns

(Doc. 20, p. 7). His subsequent allegations suggest that he declared his hunger strike on February

15 rather than February 5.

pre-incarceration medical files and she did not know of his condition. She also informed

Chavez that inmates were required to submit at least three requests for the sick call line

before being seen in the healthcare unit (Id.). She reiterated that Wexford did not have

enough qualified medical professionals and sent him back to his cell (Id.).

On April 27, 2023, Chavez saw Dr. Beyer at Heartland Regional Medical Center

regarding his knee (Doc. 20, p. 10). Dr. Beyer noted that Wexford did not have his

previous medical records, but he ordered physical therapy (Id.). Afterwards, Chavez was

scheduled for physical therapy, but the therapy was often canceled due to lack of staffing

or lockdowns at the prison (Id.). On June 5, 2023, Chavez spoke to Jane Doe #3 nurse

about his inability to obtain physical therapy despite Dr. Beyer’s orders (Id.). She merely

told him that he should not have come to jail and his pain was not her problem (Id.).

Similarly, on June 13, he spoke to Jane Doe #4 about his pain and she merely responded

“so what” and walked away (Id. at p. 11).

On July 5, 2023, Chavez met with either Nurse Practitioner Dearmond or Nurse

Practitioner Crane (Doc. 20, p. 11). He asked about delays in accessing the healthcare unit

and physical therapy appointments and she told him that there are no appointments

during lockdowns (Id.). Chavez alleges that he should have been moved to a prison that

did not cancel appointments during lockdowns (Id.).

On July 14, 2023, Chavez had another surgery, this time for a meniscus repair on

the same knee (Doc. 20, p. 11). After the surgery, Dr. Beyer informed Chavez that he

would still suffer from MCL insufficiency and he would need another surgery to fully

repair his knee (Id. at pp. 11-12). Dr. Beyer prescribed crutches and a brace and

recommended Chavez for additional surgery (Id.).

In September 2023, Chavez was referred to Dr. Brophy (Doc. 20, pp. 12-13).

Dr. Brophy drained fluid from his knee but did not conduct an instability test (Id. at p. 13).

Chavez explained his injury and two previous surgeries. He informed Dr. Brophy of

Dr. Beyer’s diagnosis of MCL insufficiency and his need for an additional surgery (Id.).

He also informed Dr. Brophy that he was in significant pain and suffered from instability

when trying to walk (Id.). Dr. Brophy noted that Chavez would be fine.

On October 17, 2023, Chavez had a follow-up appointment with Dr. Beyer who

inquired about the referral for additional surgery (Doc. 20, p. 13). Chavez told him that

Dr. Brophy only drained fluid from his knee. Dr. Beyer noted that he needed surgery or

his knee would not properly heal. He prescribed a different brace to provide more

stability and again recommended the additional surgery to repair Chavez’s knee (Id.).

On November 14, 2023, Chavez saw Nurse Practitioner Crane. She told him to

submit a request for an extension of the knee brace. He showed Crane how unstable his

knee was without the brace (Doc. 20, p. 13). He was again referred to Dr. Brophy based

on Dr. Beyer’s recommendation and again informed Dr. Brophy of his severe pain and

instability (Id. at pp. 13-14). Dr. Brophy refused to remove the brace to conduct an

instability test (Id.). Chavez alleges that the proper standard of care required that

Dr. Brophy conduct the instability test without the brace in order to clearly test the

stability of his knee (Id. at p. 14).

On December 20, 2023, Chavez requested the cancellation of his bottom bunk

permit because of his placement on a bottom gallery and use of his prescribed brace

(Doc. 20, p. 14). He felt that with the brace and being housed in the ADA unit, he no

longer needed a bottom bunk (Id.). But he did submit additional requests to Nurse

Practitioner Crane requesting an extension of his knee brace prescription (Id.). Chavez

attended physical therapy at the prison. During one appointment, the physical therapist

noted that the instability in his knee was severe, and she placed him on an urgent list to

see the doctor (Id.). Although still housed in the ADA unit, he was eventually forced to

give up his knee brace in March 2024 (Id. at p. 16).

On March 28, 2024, Chavez was approached by Sergeant Davis and told that he

“messed up” by writing a grievance in February (Doc. 20, p. 16). On April 6, 2024, Davis

and Officer Cross wrote disciplinary tickets that Chavez alleged were falsified in

retaliation for filing grievances. He was subsequently placed on a floor away from the

showers, requiring him to traverse several flights of stairs to attend the showers (Id.).

At that point, Chavez lacked a bottom gallery and a brace permit, and walking to the

showers caused him severe pain (Id.). Chavez alleges that he was unable to access the

showers from April through September 2024 due to the significant pain he experienced

walking to the showers (Id. at p. 18).

A scheduled August 2024 appointment with the nurse practitioner was canceled

due to inadequate staffing (Doc. 20, p. 17). His appointment with the nurse practitioner

was allegedly delayed due to the lack of proper staffing by Wexford. On July 24, 2024, he

met with Jane Doe #5 nurse about the instability in his knee (Id.). She told him that she

did not know when he would be seen due to understaffing and sent him back to his cell

(Id.). On September 11, 2024, Chavez saw Jane Doe #5. She informed him that the

previous pass to see the doctor was canceled because there was only one doctor at the

prison (Id. at pp. 17-18). On October 17, 2024, he finally met with Nurse Practitioner

Dearmond about his continued pain and instability (Id. at p. 19). He noted that he was

unable to access the shower and his medications were not enough to handle the pain (Id.).

She contended that his gallery was considered a low gallery, despite the showers being

on the bottom gallery (Id.). And, despite his request for a follow-up appointment with an

outside specialist and complaints regarding his access to a brace, she merely sent him

back to his cell (Id.). Chavez alleges that he remained on the gallery and was not moved

back to the ADA unit until January 2025 (Id.). He had an MRI in May 2025 but still

continues to suffer from instability in his knee, trouble walking, and significant pain

(Id. at p. 21).

Chavez wrote numerous grievances about his condition and need for physical

therapy and medical care. Warden Anthony Wills deemed some of those grievances an

emergency (Doc. 20, pp. 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 15, 16, 18, 20). Several grievances were sent to ADA

Coordinator Lawrence and/or ADA Assistant Coordinator Kuhnert but the grievances

were denied either because the issues, such as Chavez’s access to physical therapy, did

not involve ADA requests or it was understood that he no longer needed the

accomodation (Id. at pp. 8, 9, 15-17). For instance, in response to Chavez’s grievance

regarding his access to a knee brace, ADA Coordinator Kuhnert responded that she called

the clinic and was informed that Chavez no longer needed the brace (Id. at p. 15). Latoya

Hughes denied his grievances (Id. at p. 12, 15-16, 19). Chavez further alleges that his

September 2024 grievance was never returned after Wills denied the grievance as being

an emergency (Id. at p. 18). Chavez alleges that Wills intentionally mishandled the

grievance as an act of retaliation for naming Wills in the grievance (Id.). The grievance

claimed that Wills failed to conduct investigations into prisoner complaints regarding

healthcare (Id.). He alleges that Wills continued to retaliate against Chavez by deeming

his grievances not an emergency (Id. at pp. 19-21).

Preliminary Dismissals

Chavez refers to a Nurse Beth whom he saw on several occasions for medical care.

He also alleges that Sergeant Davis and Officer Cross retaliated against him for filing

grievances by issuing false disciplinary tickets. But none of these individuals are

identified as defendants in the case caption. In order to be a party in the case, a plaintiff

must identify them in the case caption. See FED. R. CIV. P. 10(a); Myles v. United States, 416

F.3d 551, 551–52 (7th Cir. 2005). Because Chavez failed to identify these individuals as

defendants, any potential claim against them is DISMISSED without prejudice.

Chavez also alleges that Warden Wills, Director Hughes, and ADA Coordinators

Lawrence and Kuhnert were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs when

they denied his grievances or failed to properly investigate his grievances. But the simple

denial or mishandling of a grievance fails to state a claim. Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950,

953 (7th Cir. 2011); Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2009) (there is no “free-

floating obligation to put things to rights”). Although he alleges that Lawrence and

Kuhnert responded to his grievances regarding previous requests for a brace and low

gallery permit, there are no allegations to suggest that he actually made these requests

for accommodations to the coordinators themselves. The allegations merely suggest that

they responded to his grievances (Doc. 20-1, p. 3, 23, 27). Thus, he fails to state a claim

against any of the grievance officials for their denial of his grievances.

Chavez also alleges that Warden Wills sought to retaliate against him by

mishandling several of his grievances. He alleges Wills mishandled at least two

grievances by labeling them not an emergency and failed to return them. In order to state

a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must allege that he engaged in protected activity, “suffered

a deprivation likely to deter such activity,” and the “First Amendment activity was at

least a motivating factor in the decision to impose the deprivation.” Hawkins v. Mitchell,

756 F.3d 983, 996 (7th Cir. 2014). “The ‘motivating factor’ amounts to a causal link

between the activity and the unlawful retaliation.” Manuel v. Nalley, 966 F.3d 678, 680 (7th

Cir. 2020). But Chavez merely alleges in conclusory fashion that Wills sought to retaliate

against him by labeling his grievances not an emergency. Without more, he fails to state

a viable retaliation claim.

Finally, Chavez alleges that John Doe #1 turned a blind eye to the delays in his

care when he informed Chavez that he would be seen in the next few days. Chavez alleges

that he was not seen by medical providers over those two days. But the allegations only

suggest that he saw the unknown major on one occasion, when the major indicated he

would be seen by medical staff. There are no allegations to suggest that he spoke to the

major at any other time. Nothing in the pleading suggests that the major was aware that

Chavez was not seen by medical staff in the relevant timeframe or that he acted with

deliberate indifference. Thus, any claim against John Doe #1 is DISMISSED without

prejudice.

Discussion

Based on the allegations in the First Amended Complaint, the Court designates

the following counts:

Count 1: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against

Nurse Practitioner Moldenhauer, Nurse Practitioner Crane,

and Nurse Practitioner Dearmond for denying and delaying

medical care for Chavez’s injured knee.

Count 2: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against

Jane Doe #1, Jane Doe #2, Jane Doe #3, Jane Doe #4, and

Jane Doe #5 for denying and delaying medical care for

Chavez’s injured knee.

Count 3: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against

Dr. Brophy for providing inadequate medical care for

Chavez’s injured knee.

Count 4: ADA claim for denying Chavez an accessible shower and

brace for his knee.

Count 5: Monell claim against Wexford Health Sources, Inc. for

having a practice of understaffing the healthcare unit,

causing delays in Chavez’s medical treatment.

Count 6: Illinois state law claim for negligence against Nurse

Practitioner Moldenhauer, Nurse Practitioner Crane, and

Nurse Practitioner Dearmond for denying and delaying

medical care for Chavez’s injured knee.

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders,

unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any other claim that is

mentioned in the First Amended Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be

considered dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled under the Twombly

pleading standard.2

Counts 1, 2, and 6

At this stage, Chavez states viable claims for deliberate indifference against the

nurse practitioners and Jane Doe nurses. He alleges that he spoke with each one and they

denied him care and caused delays in his care. He alleges that he was denied pain

medication, a low gallery permit, and a brace for his knee. Thus, Count 1 shall proceed

against Nurse Practitioner Dearmond, Nurse Practitioner Moldenhauer, and Nurse

Practitioner Crane. Count 2 shall proceed against Jane Doe Nurses #’s 1-5. Warden

Matthew Plummer is ADDED to the case (in his official capacity only) to respond to

discovery aimed at identifying the unknown nurses.

Chavez also states a negligence claim against the nurse practitioners under Illinois

state law. Thus, the Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the related state

law claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Chavez has not provided the affidavit and medical report

required by 735 ILCS § 5/2-622, but the omission of these documents is not dispositive of

his claim at screening. Chavez must, however, submit the required documents in order

to survive summary judgment. See Young v. United States, 942 F.3d 349, 351-52 (7th Cir.

2019).

2 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face”).

Count 3

Chavez fails to state a claim against Dr. Brophy. In order to state a claim of

deliberate indifference to medical needs, a plaintiff must plead that he suffered from “an

objectively serious medical condition” and that a “state official was deliberately…

indifferent” to that condition. See Giles v. Godinez, 914 F. 3d 1040, 1049 (7th Cir. 2019).

A plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendants’ actions were more than negligent,

something approaching intentional wrongdoing or recklessness. Holloway v. Delaware

Cnty. Sheriff, 700 F.3d 1063, 1073 (7th Cir. 2012). Chavez alleges that Dr. Brophy only

removed fluid from his knee, and at the first appointment he failed to conduct a stability

test. He alleges that at a follow-up appointment Dr. Brophy conducted a stability test but

with a brace, which Chavez believes to be improper. But the allegations suggest that

Dr. Brophy provided him with care. An attached grievance from the healthcare unit

administrator notes that Dr. Brophy explained to Chavez that he recommended

aspiration and cortisone injections, but was hesitant on surgery (Doc. 20-1, p. 30). He also

directed Chavez to follow up as needed. The allegations do not suggest deliberate

indifference. Although Chavez disagrees with the course of treatment provided by

Dr. Brophy, his mere disagreement does not amount to deliberate indifference. Greeno v.

Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005). And to the extent Chavez alleges that Dr. Beyer

also disagreed with Dr. Brophy’s course of treatment, the allegations, at most, amount to

negligence—which does not equate to deliberate indifference. Dr. Brophy examined

Chavez and provided him with treatment. Nothing in his amended pleading rises to the

level of deliberate indifference. Thus, Count 3 is DISMISSED without prejudice.3

Count 4

Chavez also alleges that he was denied a low gallery permit and brace. He alleges

that Dearmond denied his request for a low gallery permit and his brace was taken from

him despite his requests to extend the permit.4 Chavez states a viable claim under the

ADA and/or RA, but the claim cannot proceed against the individual defendants,

because individual employees of IDOC cannot be sued under the ADA and RA. Jaros v.

Illinois Dep’t of Corr., 684 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2012). The proper defendant is the relevant

state department or agency. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(b); Jaros, 684 F.3d at 670, n. 2

(individual capacity claims are not available; the proper defendant is the agency or its

director (in his official capacity)). As such, Latoya Hughes, the current IDOC Director,

will remain in the case, in her official capacity only, as the proper defendant for Chavez’s

ADA and/or RA claims.

3 Because Chavez fails to state a claim against Dr. Brophy under Section 1983, to the extent that

Chavez also alleges that Dr. Brophy’s actions amounted to negligence under Illinois state law, the

Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(c)(3). Thus, any potential claim against Dr. Brophy under Illinois law is DISMISSED

without prejudice.

4 Chavez also alleges that ADA Coordinators Lawrence and Kuhnert responded to his grievances,

noting that some of his complained of issues did not require an ADA accommodation. But they

merely responded to his grievances. There are no allegations to suggest that Chavez submitted

requests specifically to the coordinators or that either coordinator actually denied a requested

accommodation.

Count 5

As to Wexford, the company can only be liable for deliberate indifference if it had

a policy or practice that caused the constitutional violation. Iskander v. Vill. of Forest Park,

690 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 1982) (applying municipal liability to private corporations

performing governmental functions); McCormick v. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d 319, 324 (7th

Cir. 2000). Here, Chavez has alleged that Wexford had a policy of understaffing the

healthcare unit which led to delays in his care. Thus, Chavez may proceed against

Wexford as to this practice.

Chavez also alleges that Wexford had poor record keeping and a practice of

delaying specialty care. He fails, however, to provide any allegations regarding

Wexford’s record keeping process, and he has not alleged that any practice of Wexford’s,

other than the understaffing, delayed specialty care. Chavez notes that he was seen by

outside providers on several occasions and had surgery on his knee while incarcerated at

Menard. Thus, Chavez may only proceed on the claim against Wexford as it pertains to

its alleged practice of understaffing the healthcare unit.

Motion for Emergency Relief

Chavez recently filed a motion for emergency relief, alleging that three

correctional officers, who are not parties in this case, threatened him to stop filing

grievances and pursuing this case (Doc. 29). On July 29, 2026, the officers allegedly

removed him from his cell and were walking with him when his knee gave out and he

landed on the ground (Id. at p. 2). The officers then used excessive force on him, slamming

his face into the bars, dragging him to the showers, and then beating him (Id.). They then

directed him to stop his grievances and lawsuit (Id.). He alleges that his knee injury is

now worse than when he original filed his lawsuit, but he has been unable to obtain

medical care (Id. at p. 4).

To the extent that Chavez alleges that he is now being retaliated against by non-

parties for filing grievances and this lawsuit, these are new claims against individuals

who are not parties in this lawsuit. Chavez would need to file a new lawsuit and seek

injunctive relief in that case as it relates to his protection from these individuals. But to

the extent that Chavez alleges that his knee is still injured and he is continuing to be

denied medical care after reinjuring it, the Court ADDS the current Warden of Menard,

Matthew Plummer, to the case to implement any injunctive relief that may be awarded.

The Court DEFERS ruling on the motion, and Plummer is DIRECTED to respond to

Chavez’s motion within 14 days of service. Plummer should indicate Chavez’s current

condition and the medical care he has received since July 29, 2026. Chavez’s motion for

status (Doc. 28) requesting the status of his pleading and request for injunctive relief is

MOOT.

Disposition

For the reasons stated above, Count 1 shall proceed against Nurse Practitioner

Moldenhauer, Nurse Practitioner Crane, and Nurse Practitioner Dearmond. Count 2 shall

proceed against Jane Doe #’s 1-5. Count 4 shall proceed against Latoya Hughes (official

capacity only). Count 5 shall proceed against Wexford Health Sources, Inc. Count 6 shall

proceed against Nurse Practitioner Moldenhauer, Nurse Practitioner Crane, and Nurse

Practitioner Dearmond. Warden Matthew Plummer is ADDED in his official capacity for

purposes of identifying the unknown nurses and implementing any injunctive relief that

may be awarded in this case. All other claims and defendants are DISMISSED without

prejudice.

The Clerk of Court shall prepare for Nurse Practitioner Moldenhauer, Nurse

Practitioner Crane, Nurse Practitioner Dearmond, Latoya Hughes (official capacity),

Wexford Health Sources, Inc., and Matthew Plummer (official capacity only): (1) Form 5

(Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons) and (2) Form 6 (Waiver

of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the First

Amended Complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to each defendant’s place of

employment as identified by Chavez. If a defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver

of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were

sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on that defendant, and

the Court will require that defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent

authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

If a defendant can no longer be found at the work address provided by Chavez,

the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the defendant’s current work address, or, if not

known, defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending

the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the

address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained

in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.

Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to

the Amended Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997e(g). Pursuant to Local Rule 8.2, Defendants need only respond to the issues

stated in this Merit Review Order.

Because Chavez's claims involve his medical care, the Clerk of Court is

DIRECTED to enter the Court’s standard HIPAA Qualified Protective Order.

If judgment is rendered against Chavez, and the judgment includes the payment

of costs under Section 1915, he will be required to pay the full amount of the costs,

regardless of whether his application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(£)(2)(A).

Finally, Chavez is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the

Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court

will not independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not

later than 14 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply

with this order will cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result

in dismissal of this action for want of prosecution. See FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 12, 2026 Tl

NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL

United States District Judge

17

Notice to Plaintiff

The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of

your lawsuit and serve them with a copy of your Amended Complaint. After service has

been achieved, the defendants will enter their appearance and file an Answer to your

Amended Complaint. It will likely take at least 60 days from the date of this Order to

receive the defendants’ Answer, but it is entirely possible that it will take 90 days or more.

When all the defendants have filed Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling Order

containing important information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is

advised to wait until counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions,

to give the defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions

filed before defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as

premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the Court at this time, unless

specifically directed to do so.