The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
ANGELA PRYOR,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 8:26-cv-327-VMC-TGW
SGT. SARAH ROBINSON,
individually,
SHERIFF BOB GUALTIERI,
in his official capacity as
Sheriff of the Pinellas County
Sheriff’s Office,
Defendants.
______________________________/
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to
Defendants Sergeant Sarah Robinson’s and Sheriff Bob
Gualtieri’s Dispositive Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’
Complaint With Prejudice (Doc. # 22), filed on April 13, 2026.
Plaintiff Angela Pryor responded in opposition on May 15,
2026. (Doc. # 30). With the Court’s leave, Defendants filed
a reply on June 10, 2026. (Doc. # 33). For the reasons that
follow, the Motion is granted in part and denied in part.
I. Background
This case arises from events surrounding the related
action, State of Florida v. Angela Pryor, No. 22-01165-CF, in
the Circuit Court for Pinellas County, Florida. See (Doc. #
6). Ms. Pryor’s Complaint (Doc. # 1) provides the following
factual allegations:
“On February 2, 2022, Deputies with the Pinellas County
Sheriff’s Department went to Baby Dolls in reference to a
trespass investigation.” (Id. at 4).1 “When the Deputies
arrived, numerous individuals were engaging in a physical
affray.” (Id. at 4). At some point, “Sgt. Robinson reported
that she instructed Angela Pryor to leave the location and
Ms. Pryor proceeded to strike her in the left cheek with her
right hand and then disappeared within the crowd.” (Id.).
According to the Complaint, “[b]ody camera evidence
disputes this information and shows [Ms. Pryor] was nowhere
near [Sgt. Robinson] at the time she was struck.” (Id.).
Nonetheless, Ms. Pryor “was subsequently tackled by multiple
[deputies] and thrown on a table while being taken into
custody.” (Id.). Ms. Pryor contends that “[a]t no time did
[she] resist arrest or attempt to flee” and that she
“repeatedly advised the deputies that she did not strike Sgt.
Robinson.” (Id.).
1 According to Defendants, “Baby Dolls Lounge and Sports Room”
is “an adult entertainment nightclub.” (Doc. # 22 at 3).
Later, Ms. Pryor “was treated . . . for a head and neck
injury she sustained during the arrest as a result of the use
of force by the deputies.” (Id.). In addition, “[a]s a result
of Sgt. Robinson’s allegations, [Ms. Pryor] was charged with
battery on a law enforcement officer, resisting an officer
without violence, and simple battery.” (Id.). “On February
23, 2022, Sgt. Robinson was interviewed at the State
Attorney’s Office,” and during that interview, “she
maintained [her allegation that] she was struck by [Ms.
Pryor].” (Id. at 5). “On March 1, 2022, a Felony Information
was filed for battery on a law enforcement officer.” (Id.).
About one month later, “the State filed a No Information
on the resisting an officer without violence charge and the
simple battery charge.” (Id.). Subsequently, Ms. Pryor’s
counsel sent a letter to the state prosecutor “requesting a
Nolle Pross of the battery on a law enforcement charge.
Specifically, [counsel] provided evidence showing [Ms. Pryor]
did not batter Sgt. Robinson.” (Id.).
In May 2022, the state prosecutor “discussed the matter
with Sgt. Robinson. Sgt. Robinson contested the evidence
presented by [Ms. Pryor’s counsel] and maintained that it was
in fact Angela Pryor that struck her.” (Id.). Later, “in an
email to the prosecutor, Sgt. Robinson again falsely
identified Angela Pryor as the individual who battered her.”
(Id.). “On October 12, 2022, Sgt. Robinson continued to double
down on her false statements and provided sworn testimony to
a jury, which resulted in the wrongful conviction of Angela
Pryor. [Ms. Pryor] was sentenced to probation for 36 months.”
(Id. at 6).
“On October 13, 2022, [Ms. Pryor] went to the Sheriff’s
Office and filed an internal affairs [c]omplaint against the
Deputies involved in her arrest and prosecution.” (Id.). “On
November 9, 2022, Sgt. Robinson gave a statement to Internal
Affairs where she still maintained [Ms. Pryor] was the female
who struck her.” (Id.). “As a result of the Internal Affairs
Complaint, the agency reviewed the body camera videos which
clearly established that [Ms. Pryor] in fact did not strike
Sgt. Robinson.” (Id.). “On November 28, 2022, the State filed
a Motion to Vacate Judgment and Sentence and [] as a result
the charge was Nolle Prosequi.” (Id.). At some point, “Sheriff
Gualtieri admitted, ‘the Deputies messed up.’” (Id.).
Ms. Pryor initiated the instant action in this Court on
February 3, 2026, on the basis of federal question
jurisdiction. (Id. at 1). In Count I, she asserts a claim
against Sgt. Robinson, individually, for malicious
prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. at 7). In Count II,
she asserts a claim against Sheriff Gualtieri, in his official
capacity, for state law battery under Fla. Stat. § 768.28.
(Id. at 8-9).
Defendants filed the instant Motion on April 13, 2026.
(Doc. # 22). Ms. Pryor responded on May 15, 2026. (Doc. #
30). With the Court’s leave, Defendants replied on June 10,
2026. (Doc. # 33). The Motion is ripe for review.
II. Legal Standard
On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), this
Court accepts as true all the allegations in the complaint
and construes them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Jackson v. Bellsouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250,
1262 (11th Cir. 2004). Further, the Court favors the plaintiff
with all reasonable inferences from the allegations in the
complaint. Stephens v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 901
F.2d 1571, 1573 (11th Cir. 1990). But,
[w]hile a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual
allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide
the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal
citations omitted). Courts are not “bound to accept as true
a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan
v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). The Court must limit its
consideration to well-pleaded factual allegations, documents
central to or referenced in the complaint, and matters
judicially noticed. La Grasta v. First Union Sec., Inc., 358
F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004).
III. Analysis
Defendants seek dismissal of both Count I and Count II.
The Court addresses each separately.
A. Malicious prosecution claim under Section 1983
“Section 1983 is an ‘independent cause of action
designed’ to ‘allow for private enforcement’ of federal
rights ‘in courts.’ So plaintiffs may use it to sue state
officials who unreasonably seize them in violation of the
Fourth Amendment.” Gervin v. Florence, 139 F.4th 1236, 1246
(11th Cir. 2025) (citations omitted). The tort of “malicious
prosecution” is sometimes called “a claim for unreasonable
seizure pursuant to legal process” Id. at 1247. “In practice,
though, a malicious-prosecution claim’s common-law elements
meld with the Fourth Amendment’s textual components because
a ‘significant overlap’ exists between them.” Id. at 1248
(citation omitted). Accordingly, “to prove a Fourth Amendment
malicious-prosecution claim in [the Eleventh] Circuit, a
plaintiff must establish four elements: (1) the plaintiff was
seized under legal process; (2) the legal process justifying
the plaintiff’s seizure was constitutionally infirm; (3) the
suit or proceeding terminated in the plaintiff’s favor; and
(4) the seizure would not otherwise be justified without legal
process.” Id.
In the Motion, Defendants argue that Ms. Pryor “failed
to state a violation of her Fourth Amendment rights” and thus
“failed to sufficiently allege all required elements for
malicious prosecution.” (Doc. # 22 at 5-7). According to
Defendants, Count I must be dismissed because
[Ms. Pryor] was the subject of a warrantless arrest
by unnamed PCSO deputies. More specifically, per
[Ms. Pryor’s] own factual allegations, she was
arrested on February 5, 2022, by these unnamed PCSO
deputies for allegedly being the female who struck
Defendant Robinson in the face and disappeared into
the crowd in response to a lawful command to leave
[Baby Dolls] while Defendant Robinson was
attempting to stop a physical affray. [Ms. Pryor]
was taken to jail that same evening and was released
soon thereafter. Instead of being indicted, the
State filed a Felony Information against [Ms.
Pryor] for battery on a law enforcement officer on
March 1, 2022, almost a month after her warrantless
arrest and release from jail.
(Doc. # 22 at 5-6) (citing Doc. # 1).
The Court agrees. The Eleventh Circuit has held that
“the illegal seizure cannot be just any seizure: unlike the
torts of false arrest and false imprisonment, the tort of
malicious prosecution requires a seizure ‘pursuant to legal
process.’” Black v. Wigington, 811 F.3d 1259, 1267 (11th Cir.
2016) (citation omitted). Specifically, “a warrantless arrest
cannot serve as the predicate Fourth Amendment seizure for
purposes of [a Section] 1983 malicious prosecution claim.”
Donley v. City of Morrow, 601 F. App’x 805, 814 (11th Cir.
2015) (per curiam). Accordingly, Ms. Pryor may not premise
her malicious prosecution claim on her February 5, 2022
arrest, because that seizure was not made pursuant to legal
process. See Sullenberger v. City of Coral Gables, No. 22-
cv-21830, 2025 WL 101703, at *23-28 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 15, 2025)
(granting motion to dismiss a Section 1983 malicious
prosecution claim because the plaintiff did not allege “that
he suffered a seizure that was pursuant to some legal
process”); Douglas v. Judd, No. 8:24-cv-2569-VMC-AAS, 2025 WL
807466, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 2025) (granting motion to
dismiss where “the amended complaint only references a
warrantless arrest and does not allege that Plaintiffs
suffered a seizure pursuant to legal process”).
In response, Ms. Pryor contends that Defendants’
“argument is too narrow because the Complaint does not rest
solely on the initial arrest.” (Doc. # 30 at 5). She argues
that “a prosecutor’s filing of a Direct Information
constitutes a legal process for purposes of malicious
prosecution.” (Id. at 4) (citing Whiting v. Traylor, 85 F.3d
581, 585 n.5 (11th Cir. 1996)). According to Ms. Pryor, “a
felony information was filed against [her], she was
prosecuted and convicted by a jury, and was sentenced to 36
months of probation . . . These facts plainly establish a
seizure pursuant to legal process.” (Id.) (citing Doc. # 1).
Ms. Pryor invokes Justice Ginsburg’s concurring opinion that
“[a] defendant incarcerated until trial no doubt suffers
greater burdens. That [], however, should not lead to the
conclusion that a defendant released pretrial is not still
‘seized’ in the constitutionally relevant sense. Such a
defendant is scarcely at liberty . . . .” (Id. at 5) (quoting
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 279 (1994) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring)). Thus, Ms. Pryor argues that “[w]hile [she] was
not taken into custody after the Information was filed, she
was undoubtedly seized through means of pretrial restraint
and ultimately probation conditions.” (Id. at 6).
The Court is not persuaded. The Eleventh Circuit has
specifically expressed its “doubts about the viability of
[Justice Ginsburg’s ‘continuing seizure’] theory.” Kingsland
v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1236 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing
Whiting v. Traylor, 85 F.3d 581, 584 (11th Cir. 1996)).
Indeed, “[a] number of [] circuits have addressed the theory,
and none have been willing to conclude that normal conditions
of pretrial release constitute a ‘continuing seizure’ barring
some significant, ongoing deprivation of liberty, such as a
restriction on the defendant’s right to travel interstate.”
Id. Here, Ms. Pryor’s Complaint provides no factual
allegations as to her “pretrial restraint” or its conditions,
and thus her Complaint fails to allege a seizure pursuant to
legal process on that basis.
Nor is the Court convinced that Ms. Pryor’s “probation
conditions” could constitute a “seizure pursuant to legal
process.” Ms. Pryor has not identified a single case holding
that a judgment of probation could constitute a Fourth
Amendment seizure. To the contrary, the Eleventh Circuit has
indicated “probation revocations [] fall in that category.”
Clark v. Bell, No. 25-13645, 2026 WL 1162921, at *3 (11th
Cir. Apr. 29, 2026) (citations omitted). Moreover, “[t]he
‘seizure’ of a ‘person’ plainly refers to an arrest.” Torres
v. Madrid, 592 U.S. 306, 312 (2021) (citation omitted).
Indeed, the Supreme Court generally “interpret[s] the term
‘seizure’ by consulting the common law of arrest, the
quintessential seizure of the person under [] Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.” Id. at 311.
And as reflected in the cases cited by Ms. Pryor, a
“seizure pursuant to legal process” generally refers to a
situation where the defendant is detained or taken into
custody after the legal process is initiated. See Williams v.
Aguirre, 965 F.3d 1147, 1157-59 (11th Cir. 2020) (defendant
subjected to pretrial detention); Manuel v. City of Joliet,
580 U.S. 357, 364-70 (2017) (same); Williams v. Miami-Dade
Police Dept., 297 Fed. App’x 941, 949 (11th Cir. 2008)
(defendant released on bond and later his bond was revoked);
Whiting, 85 F.3d at 585 n.5 (defendant arrested pursuant to
warrant); Black, 811 F.3d at 1266-69) (same); Kelly v. Curtis,
21 F.3d 1544, 1554-55 (11th Cir. 1994) (same). The Court is
not persuaded by the decision in Blackshear v. City of Miami
Beach, 799 F. Supp. 2d 1338 (S.D. Fla. 2011), where the reason
provided for not dismissing the malicious prosecution claim
was merely that “supplying false information in arrest
affidavits violates the Fourth Amendment and can provide the
basis for a § 1983 claim.” Id. at 1349 (citing Jones v.
Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 1999) (a false arrest case,
not a malicious prosecution case)). Again, “unlike the torts
of false arrest and false imprisonment, the tort of malicious
prosecution requires a seizure ‘pursuant to legal process.’”
Black, 811 F.3d at 1267.
Here, because Ms. Pryor “was not taken into custody after
the Information was filed” (Doc. # 30 at 6), she was not
seized pursuant to that process. Thus, because her Complaint
does not allege a seizure pursuant to legal process, the
Complaint fails to state a claim for malicious prosecution
under Section 1983.
The Motion is granted in part. Count I is dismissed
without prejudice for failure to state a claim. Accordingly,
the Court need not and does not decide whether Sgt. Robinson
is entitled to qualified or absolute immunity as to Count I.
If she wishes to amend Count I, Ms. Pryor must file an amended
complaint within fourteen days of the date of this Order.
B. Battery claim under Florida law
Next, Defendants argue that Count II fails to state a
claim. (Doc. # 22 at 17). They argue “the Fourth Amendment
does not protect against the use of reasonably necessary force
by law enforcement” and that Ms. Pryor’s “allegations consist
of considerably less force than the Eleventh Circuit has held
to be de minimis in other cases.” (Id. at 20-21) (citations
omitted). Defendants also contend that “probable cause
existed for [Ms. Pryor’s] arrest” (Doc. # 33 at 8; Doc. # 22
at 19-20), and “‘[t]he Fourth Amendment is not violated by an
arrest based on probable cause, even though the wrong person
is arrested.’” (Doc. # 22 at 20) (quoting Graham v. Connor,
490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)).
As an initial matter, the Court addresses the standards
for evaluating Count II. Unlike Count I, Count II is not
brought under Section 1983. Instead, Count II asserts a state
law battery claim “against [Sheriff Gualtieri] in his
employer [i.e., official] capacity, pursuant to § 768.28,
Fla. Stat.” (Doc. # 1 at 8). In that statute, the Florida
Legislature enacted a limited “[w]aiver of sovereign immunity
in tort actions.” Fla. Stat. § 768.28. Relevant here, the
Florida statute provides that:
An officer, employee, or agent of the state or of
any of its subdivisions may not be held personally
liable in tort or named as a party defendant in any
action for any injury or damage suffered as a result
of any act, event, or omission of action in the
scope of her or his employment or function, unless
such officer, employee, or agent acted in bad faith
or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting
wanton and willful disregard of human rights,
safety, or property . . .
The exclusive remedy for injury or damage suffered
as a result of an act, event, or omission of an
officer, employee, or agent of the state or any of
its subdivisions or constitutional officers is by
action against the governmental entity, or the head
of such entity in her or his official capacity, or
the constitutional officer of which the officer,
employee, or agent is an employee, unless such act
or omission was committed in bad faith or with
malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton
and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or
property.
The state or its subdivisions are not liable in
tort for the acts or omissions of an officer,
employee, or agent committed while acting outside
the course and scope of her or his employment or
committed in bad faith or with malicious purpose or
in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard
of human rights, safety, or property.
Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a).
Thus, in order to assert her claim against Sheriff
Gualtieri in his official capacity, Ms. Pryor must
sufficiently allege facts establishing (1) the elements of
common law battery under Florida law, and (2) that the acts
of Sheriff Gualtieri’s deputy officers were not “committed
while acting outside the course and scope of [their]
employment or committed in bad faith or with malicious purpose
or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of
human rights, safety, or property.” Id.; see also Gregory v.
Miami-Dade Cnty., Florida, 719 Fed. App’x 859, 873 (11th Cir.
2017) (“The question here is thus whether the facts alleged
in the complaint plausibly state a claim that Officer Perez
committed an intentional and wholly unjustified battery
against Gregory but did not do so ‘in bad faith, with
malicious purpose, or in a manner exhibiting wanton and
willful disregard of the plaintiff’s rights.’ In other words,
plaintiffs may use alternative pleading to bring suit against
both a government entity and an individual employee, but, if
the factual allegations can occur only from bad faith or
malicious or wanton and willful conduct, then the claim
against the government entity fails under § 768.28.”).
Here, Defendants do not argue for dismissal of Count II
on the ground that Ms. Pryor’s injuries resulted from “bad
faith or malicious or wanton and willful conduct.” Id.; see
(Doc. # 22 at 17-21). Rather, Defendants argue that Count II
fails to state a claim because the deputies purportedly used
“reasonably necessary force.” (Id.). Accordingly, the Court
now turns to the elements of battery under Florida law.
“In Florida, battery has two elements: (1) intent to
cause a harmful or offensive contact, and (2) a resulting
offensive contact with the person of the other. In the arrest
context, a battery claim for excessive force is analyzed by
focusing upon whether the amount of force used was reasonable
under the circumstances. If excessive force is used in an
arrest, the ordinarily protected use of force by a police
officer is transformed into a battery. But ordinary incidents
of an arrest . . . do not give rise to an independent tort.”
Baxter v. Roberts, 54 F.4th 1241, 1272-73 (11th Cir. 2022)
(cleaned up) (citing City of Miami v. Sanders, 672 So. 2d 46,
47 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Lester v. City of Tavares, 603 So. 2d
18, 19–20 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)); see also Percival v.
Chronister, 796 F. Supp. 3d 1020, 1045 (M.D. Fla. 2025)
(noting “although ‘ordinary incidents of the arrest . . . do
not give rise’ to a battery claim . . . a ‘police officer may
be liable for the use of excessive force (i.e., battery) while
effectuating a lawful arrest’” (citations omitted)). Thus,
“[b]attery claims for excessive force under Florida law are
‘analyzed by focusing upon whether the amount of force used
was reasonable under the circumstances.’ [The Eleventh
Circuit] has applied the same Fourth Amendment excessive
force analysis to a battery claim against an officer under
Florida law.” Baxter v. Santiago-Miranda, 121 F.4th 873, 891-
92 (11th Cir. 2024) (citations omitted).
“The Fourth Amendment’s freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures encompasses the plain right to be free
from the use of excessive force in the course of an arrest.
Even when an officer has probable cause to arrest or detain
an individual, the individual may still pursue [an] excessive
force claim if the force used to effectuate that arrest or
detention was objectively unreasonable. [In this analysis,
the court] looks to the ‘totality of circumstances.’” Castro-
Reyes v. City of Opa-Locka, 166 F.4th 886, 899-900 (11th Cir.
2026) (cleaned up and citation omitted). Accordingly, the
Motion fails to the extent that Defendants seek dismissal of
Count II solely based on their argument that probable cause
existed to arrest Ms. Pryor. Rather, Defendants must show
that the Complaint fails to allege that the force used by the
deputies was objectively unreasonable.
When evaluating excessive force, “[t]he quantum of force
employed against an individual is weighed against (1) the
severity of the crime at issue; (2) whether the suspect posed
an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others;
(3) whether the suspect actively resisted arrest or attempted
to evade arrest by flight; (4) the need for the application
of force; (5) the relationship between the need and amount of
force used; and (6) the extent of the injury inflicted.” Id.
at 900. “In making this determination, [the court] must be
careful not to Monday-morning quarterback but instead to
judge the ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force from
the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene.” Patel
v. City of Madison, 959 F.3d 1330, 1339 (11th Cir. 2020).
“But in a case where an officer uses ‘gratuitous and excessive
force against a suspect who is under control, not resisting,
and obeying commands,’ . . . ‘[the Eleventh Circuit has]
repeatedly ruled that the officer violates the Fourth
Amendment and is denied qualified immunity.” Id. (cleaned up
and citations omitted).
Here, the Complaint alleges that, even though Ms. Pryor
“was nowhere near [Sgt. Robinson] at the time she was struck,”
Ms. Pryor was nonetheless “tackled by multiple Pinellas
County Sheriff’s Deputies and thrown on a table while being
taken into custody. At no time did Angela Pryor resist arrest
or attempt to flee. Angela Pryor repeatedly advised the
deputies that she did not strike Sgt. Robinson.” (Doc. # 1 at
4). “Upon release from jail, Angela Pryor was treated at
Bayfront Health for a head and neck injury she sustained
during the arrest as a result of the use of force by the
deputies.” (Id. at 4-5). According to the Complaint, “Sheriff
Gualtieri admitted, ‘the Deputies messed up.’” (Id. at 6).
Viewed in the light most favorable to Ms. Pryor, the
Complaint alleges that Sheriff Gualtieri’s deputies used
significant force (e.g., tackling, throwing on a table,
causing head and neck injuries) during Ms. Pryor’s arrest
while she was not an immediate threat or otherwise resisting
or attempting to flee. See, e.g., Patel, 959 F.3d at 1339-40
(“Because a jury could reasonably find that Patel was not
resisting, it could reasonably conclude that Parker had no
reason to use the force he did on Patel that resulted in
severe and permanent physical injuries.” (cleaned up and
citation omitted)); Stephens v. DeGiovanni, 852 F.3d 1298,
1326 (11th Cir. 2017) (excessive force where “forceful chest
blows” and “throwing [Stephens] against the car-door jamb”
were “unnecessary for a compliant, nonaggressive arrestee”);
Percival, 796 F. Supp. 3d at 1041-42 (“jury could find . . .
excessive force” where the deputies “[swept] Percival’s leg
out from under her, slamm[ed] her to the ground, and appl[ied]
force on her back and neck” and “the use of force was
untethered to ‘any law enforcement need to restrain or arrest
[her]’” (citations omitted)).
Contrary to Defendants’ argument, the Court finds that
the Complaint’s allegations of the deputies’ use of force
exceed those found by the Eleventh Circuit to be de minimis.
See, e.g., Nolin v. Isbell, 207 F.3d 1253, 1258 n.4 (11th
Cir. 2000) (de minimis force where officer “merely grabbed
Appellee and shoved him a few feet against a vehicle, [and]
pushed [a] knee into Appellee’s back and Appellee’s head
against the van”); Daniels v. Blakley, No. 24-12514, 2025 WL
1517068, at *3 (11th Cir. May 28, 2025) (de minimis force
where officers “applied pressure across Daniels’s upper legs
while [cuffing] him” and where “Daniels [] never identified
any specific injury”); Jones v. City of Dothan, 121 F.3d 1456,
1461 (11th Cir. 1997) (de minimis force where officers
“‘slammed’ Mr. Jones against the wall, kicked his legs apart,
[and] required him to raise his arms”; Durruthy v. Pastor,
351 F.3d 1080, 1085 (11th Cir. 2003) (de minimis force where
officers “pulled Durruthy onto the ground,” “kneed Durruthy
in the back,” and “held Durruthy down with her hands”). The
use of force alleged in the Complaint is not de minimis.
The Motion is denied in part as to Count II.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
(1) Defendants Sergeant Sarah Robinson’s and Sheriff Bob
Gualtieri’s Dispositive Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’
Complaint With Prejudice (Doc. # 22) is GRANTED in part
and DENIED in part. The Complaint is DISMISSED without
prejudice to the extent stated herein.
(2) If she wishes to amend the dismissed claims, Plaintiff
Angela Pryor must file an amended complaint within
fourteen days of the date of this Order.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this
16th day of July, 2026.
fan Ir. Husmehy (noish
VIR! IA M. HERNANDEZ’COVINGTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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