Shorts

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

RODRIC JUAVON SHORTS CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 24-2759-EJD

ST. CHARLES PARISH SHERIFF’S OFFICE,

ET AL.

ORDER AND REASONS

Plaintiff, Rodric Juavon Shorts, a former state prisoner, filed this pro se and in

forma pauperis complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging claims arising from

his arrest on December 12, 2023.1 In a prior ruling, the Court allowed the individual-

capacity claims of excessive force against Defendants Detective Paul Quick, Detective

Harold Kingsmill, Detective Kenny Latour, Detective Allan Tabora, Detective Barrett

Pearse, Detective Philip Ibbitson, and Detective Christopher Waguespack to proceed

and dismissed all other claims.2 Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment.3

Shorts did not file a response to the motion despite being ordered to do so.4

Having considered the record and the applicable law, the motion for summary

judgment is granted for the following reasons.

I. Background

At approximately 11:45 a.m. on December 12, 2023, police arrived at a

residential area of New Sarpy, Louisiana to execute a search warrant.5 Shorts was

1 R. Doc. 4.

2 R. Doc. 20.

3 R. Doc. 46.

4 See R. Doc. 48.

5 R. Doc. 46-7, ¶ 3.

the primary suspect in the underlying investigation.6 Police arrested him after he

exited the residence.7

Shorts claims that, during the course of his arrest, the defendants used

excessive force, including brandishing assault rifles, slamming him onto vehicles,

striking him in the head, and repeatedly spraying him with pepper spray to the point

that he vomited and lost consciousness.8 Specifically, Shorts claims that Detectives

Quick, Kingsmill, Tabora, Pearse, Ibbitson, and Waguespack dragged him down the

street and slammed him on an unmarked police vehicle.9 He claims someone punched

him in the back of the head and the right side of the face.10 He claims that Detective

Quick sprayed pepper spray in his face without need or provocation.11 He further

claims he was thrown into the police vehicle, causing his right side of his face to hit

the floor and his head to hit something.12 Shorts additionally claims that, after he

was taken out of the vehicle, Detective Latour sprayed him with a hose.13 He claims

that, for about 15 to 20 minutes, he drifted in and out of consciousness while waiting

for an ambulance and with a K-9 unit dog in his face.14 Shorts claims that he had to

undergo four eye surgeries and wears glasses as a result of the use of force.15 As set

6 Id.

7 Id.

8 R. Doc. 45 and R. Doc. 4 at 2, 5–6, 8, 13

9 R. Doc. 18 at 3–4, 6, 20

10 Id. at 4.

11 Id. at 4, 6, 19–20.

12 Id. at 4.

13 Id. at 4, 6, 20.

14 Id. at 4.

15 Id. at 5.

forth below, the uncontroverted evidence does not support Shorts’s allegations of

excessive force.

II. Standard of Review

A. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate if a movant shows “that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” when its resolution might affect the

case’s outcome under governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

248 (1986). “A genuine dispute of material fact exists ‘if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” S. Ins. Co. v.

Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 830 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S.

at 248). Courts resolve factual controversies in favor of the nonmoving party. An

actual controversy, however, exists only “when both parties have submitted evidence

of contradictory facts.” Guillot ex rel. T.A.G. v. Russell, 59 F.4th 743, 750 (5th Cir.

2023) (quotation omitted). “‘If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly

probative,’ summary judgment is appropriate.” Cutting Underwater Techs. USA, Inc.

v. Eni U.S. Operating Co., 671 F.3d 512, 517 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Anderson, 477

U.S. at 248).

Summary judgment is proper when “a party [ ] fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and

on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). “In such a situation, there can be ‘no genuine issue as to

any material fact,’ since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element

of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at

322–23. Once the moving party shows “that there is an absence of evidence to support

the non-moving party’s cause,” the nonmoving party must come forward with “specific

facts” showing a genuine factual issue for trial. TIG Ins. Co. v. Sedgwick James of

Washington, 276 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 2002)(citing Celotex, 477 U.S. 317 at 325).

As noted, Shorts did not file a response to the motion for summary judgment.

Shorts’s “pro se status d[oes] not excuse him from following the local rules.” Thorn v.

RaceTrac Petroleum, Inc., No. 21-30492, 2022 WL 965095, at *1 (5th Cir. Mar. 30,

2022) (per curiam) (citing Hulsey v. Tex., 929 F.2d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 1991)). While

the Court may not grant defendants’ motion “simply because there is no opposition,”

Hibernia Nat. Bank v. Administracion Cent. Sociedad Anonima, 776 F.2d 1277, 1279

(5th Cir. 1985), the Court may “accept[ ] as undisputed the facts so listed in support

of [the] motion for summary judgment.” Eversley v. MBank Dall., 843 F.2d 172, 174

(5th Cir. 1988); accord White v. Coffield Med. Staff, No. 21-40211, 2022 WL 1056103,

at *2 (5th Cir. Apr. 8, 2022) (per curiam) (“Where, as here, a plaintiff does not file an

opposition to a defendant’s motion for summary judgment, a district court may

properly take the facts put forward by defendant in support of his motion for

summary judgment to be undisputed.”); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(3) (“If a party ...

fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c),

the court may ... grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials--

including the facts considered undisputed--show that the movant is entitled to it”).

B. Section 1983

Section 1983 authorizes claims against a person who, acting under color of

state law, deprived the claimant of any rights secured by the Constitution and the

laws of the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute is not itself a source of

substantive rights; it merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights

conferred elsewhere. Olabisiomotosho v. City of Hous., 185 F.3d 521, 525 n.3 (5th Cir.

1999). A plaintiff must satisfy three elements to establish § 1983 liability: (1)

deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; (2)

occurrence under color of state law; and (3) causation by a state actor. Victoria W. v.

Larpenter, 369 F. 3d 475, 482 (5th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).

C. Qualified Immunity

Defendants have urged qualified immunity as a basis for summary judgment.

A state official sued in his personal capacity under § 1983 is entitled to qualified

immunity from damages, which protects the official from liability for any act that was

not objectively unreasonable at the time of the act. Waller v. Hanlon, 922 F.3d 590,

599 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Lincoln v. Turner, 874 F.3d 833, 847 (5th Cir. 2017)).

Qualified immunity functions as an immunity from suit, rather than a mere

defense to liability. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 237 (2009). Qualified

immunity adjusts “the nature of the summary-judgment burden, how and when the

burden shifts, and what it takes to satisfy the burden. Tuttle v. Gallegos, 180 F.4th

209, 217 (5th Cir. 2026) (quoting Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 329 (5th Cir. 2020)).

Given Defendants’ good-faith invocation of qualified immunity, Shorts has the burden

of proof to show that the defense is unavailable. Scott v. City of Mandeville, 69 F.4th

249, 254–55 (5th Cir. 2023). To carry his burden to overcome defendants’ qualified

immunity defense here, Shorts “must show: (1) that the [defendants] violated a

statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly established at the

time of the challenged conduct.” Crandel v. Hall, 75 F.4th 537, 543 (5th Cir. 2023)

(internal citation and quotation marks omitted). He need not present “absolute proof”

but must offer more than “mere allegations.” Tuttle, 180 F.4th at 217–18 (citations

omitted). These steps may be evaluated in any order and defendants are entitled to

qualified immunity if Shorts fails to show either one. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 242;

Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 371 (5th Cir. 2011).

III. Analysis

Defendants assert that the video evidence contradicts Shorts’s claims that he

was dragged down the street, picked up off the ground, slammed on a vehicle, and

asked for an ambulance for 15 to 20 minutes while he drifted in and out of

consciousness.16 Detectives Ibbitson, Pearse, and Waguespack assert that they did

not touch or come into physical contact with Shorts at any time.17 Detectives Quick,

Latour, Tabora, and Kingsmill assert that the force they utilized, if any, was

reasonable and necessary under the circumstances and, even if a constitutional

violation is found, they are nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity.18

16 R. Doc. 46-1 at 9.

17 Id. at 10, 19–20.

18 R. Doc. 46-1 at 10–26.

A. Detectives Pearse, Ibbitson, and Waguespack

There is no evidence supporting Shorts’s excessive force claims against

Detectives Pearse, Ibbitson, and Waguespack. Rather, the undisputed evidence

reflects that Detective Pearse, while present at the scene of Shorts’s arrest for

purposes of providing back-up assistance, did not have an active role in Shorts’s

arrest and did not physically touch Shorts at any time.19 Detective Ibbitson was not

involved in the execution of the warrant or the search and arrest of Shorts.20 He did

not arrive at the scene until after the pepper spray was deployed and did not touch

or come into physical contact with Shorts.21 Detective Waguespack was not present

at the scene of Shorts’s arrest and simply stood guard outside Shorts’s hospital room

while he underwent medical evaluation.22 Thus, there is no basis for liability as to

these defendants.

B. Detectives Quick, Tabora, Kingsmill, & Latour

Detective Quick asserts that his use of pepper spray, while Detective Tabora

restrained Shorts, was necessary to force Shorts to spit out potentially lethal drugs

and to gain his compliance.23 Detective Kingsmill asserts that, after pepper spray was

deployed, he merely gripped Shorts’s jacket to prevent him from moving around.24

19 R. Doc. 46-9 at 2, ¶¶ 11–13.

20 R. Doc. 46-10 at 1, ¶¶ 4–5.

21 Id. at ¶¶ 6–7.

22 R. Doc. 46-11 at 1, ¶¶ 4–6.

23 R. Doc. 46-1 at 16–17, 21–23.

24 Id. at 19–20.

Detective Latour asserts that, after the deployment of pepper spray, he used a garden

hose to flush the pepper spray from Shorts’s eyes and face.25

Detective Tabora’s body camera video depicts Tabora securing Shorts while

Detective Quick searched him.26 Quick and Tabora then accompany Shorts down the

street towards a vehicle; they did not drag him or throw him onto a vehicle.27 They

notice Shorts’s jaw moving as if he is chewing on illicit narcotics such as crack cocaine

or fentanyl; they question him multiple times about the contents of his mouth.28

When Shorts does not respond, Quick and Tabora move towards the vehicle and place

Shorts’s upper torso on the hood of the vehicle.29 Quick verbally instructs Shorts at

least twenty times to open his mouth while Shorts refuses and chews faster.30 During

this time, Quick attempts to open Shorts’ mouth, but Shorts resists by refusing to

open his mouth and by turning his head away.31 Quick then delivers three flat open-

hand blows to Shorts’s head and shakes him, but Shorts continued to resist.32

Ultimately, when Shorts continues to refuse to open is mouth, Quick requests and is

given pepper spray and deploys two one-second bursts that strike Shorts’s face.33 Due

to the effects of the pepper spray, Shorts opened his mouth and spit out two plastic

25 Id. at 17–18.

26 R. Doc. 47 at Exhibit 8; R. Doc. 46-5 at 2, ¶ 9, 14; R. Doc. 46-8 at 2, ¶ 9.

27 Id.; R. Doc. 46-8 at 3, ¶ 3.

28 Id.; R. Doc. 46-5 at 2, ¶ 9; R. Doc. 46-8 at 2, ¶ 9.

29 Id.

30 Id.; R. Doc. 46-5 at 2, ¶ 10; R. Doc. 46-8 at 2, ¶ 10.

31 Id.; R. Doc. 46-5 at 2, ¶ 11; R. Doc. 46-8 at 2, ¶ 11.

32 Id.; R. Doc. 46-5 at 2, ¶ 11; R. Doc. 46-8 at 2, ¶ 11.

33 Id.; R. Doc. 46-5 at 2, ¶ 11; R. Doc. 46-8 at 2, ¶ 11.

baggies and 19 white rocks that later tested positive for cocaine.34

A second video depicts Detective Kingsmill arriving on scene after Quick’s

deployment of pepper spray and shows him place his hand on Shorts’s jacket in an

effort to assist Tabora in securing Shorts.35 Thereafter, Tabora and Kingsmill escort

Shorts and place him inside the vehicle.36 Shorts did not hit his face or head when he

was placed in the vehicle.37 Approximately one minute later, Shorts is allowed to exit

the vehicle and Detective Latour places a hand on Shorts’s shoulder and, in

compliance with his training, uses a hose to twice spray Shorts’s face in an attempt

to wash the pepper spray away.38

Emergency medical services arrived on the scene less than 15 minutes after

the incident.39 A leashed narcotics dog was at the scene, but remained a distance from

Shorts.40 At no time did Shorts lose consciousness; nor was the narcotics dog ever a

threat to Shorts.41 Additionally, no assault weapons appear to be present and no one

ever draws a firearm.42

“When a plaintiff alleges excessive force during an investigation or arrest, the

federal right at issue is the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures.”

Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 656 (2014). To prevail on an excessive-force claim, he must

34 Id.; R. Doc. 46-5 at 2, ¶ 12; R. Doc. 46-8 at 2, ¶ 12.

35 R. Doc. 47 at Exhibit 9; R. Doc. 46-6 at 2, ¶ 6–7.

36 Id.; R. Doc. 46-6 at 2, ¶ 7.

37 R. Doc. 47 at Exhibit 9.

38 Id.; R. Doc. 46-7 at 2–3, ¶¶ 13–14.

39 Id.

40 Id.

41 Id.

42 R. Doc. 47 at Exhibit 8; id. at Exhibit 9.

show “(1) injury, (2) which resulted directly and only from a use of force that was

clearly excessive, and (3) the excessiveness of which was clearly unreasonable.”

Cooper v. Brown, 844 F.3d 517, 522 (5th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). The

reasonableness of an officer’s conduct depends on the “facts and circumstances of each

particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses

an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively

resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.

386, 396 (1989). The Court must adopt “the perspective of a reasonable officer on the

scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. (citation omitted).

Even where force is excessive, qualified immunity will apply “when an official’s

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which

a reasonable person would have known.” Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 104 (2018)

(citation and quotation omitted). Although Supreme Court precedent “does not

require a case directly on point for a right to be clearly established, existing precedent

must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Id.

(citation and quotation omitted). “In other words, immunity protects all but the

plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Id. (citation and

quotation omitted).

The Court thus evaluates whether these uses of force were reasonable under

the Graham factors. The first factor, severity of the crime, weighs against Shorts.

Shorts was a suspect in a narcotics investigation.43 Darden v. City of Fort Worth, 880

F3d 722, 729 (5th Cir. 2018) (drug crimes are serious offenses (citation omitted)).

Further, Shorts, a known convicted felon, was found to be in possession of two

firearms at the time of his initial arrest and prior to being escorted down the street.44

See Peppar v. City of San Antonio, No. 5:16-cv-158, 2019 WL 13537727, at *8 (W.D.

Tex. Mar. 19, 2019) (explaining that the “severity of the crime Graham factor cuts in

favor of the force not being excessive where the suspect had ‘two outstanding

warrants . . . both which are serious crimes.’”).

The second factor, whether Shorts posed an immediate threat, is “generally the

most important factor.” Baker v. Coburn, 68 F.4th 240, 247–48 (5th Cir. 2023) (citing

Harmon v. City of Arlington, Tex., 16 F.4th 1159, 1167 (5th 2021)); see also Malbrough

v. Stelly, 814 F. App’x 798, 803 (5th Cir. 2020) (noting the “second factor is the most

important”). This factor also weighs against him. While Shorts did not physically

threaten the officers, he was attempting to swallow dangerous illicit narcotics, which

put himself at risk of significant harm. He refused to cooperate, ignored more than

20 verbal orders that he open his mouth, physically resisted despite Quick’s attempts

to get him to open his mouth, ignored warnings that his stomach would be pumped

at the hospital,45 and, finally, that pepper spray would be used if he continued to fail

to comply with orders. Ward v. Adkisson, No. 1:24-cv-00481-PAB, 2026 WL 1017733,

43 R. Doc. 46-5 at 1, ¶ 4; R. Doc. 46-7 at 1, ¶ 4; R. Doc. 46-7 at 1, ¶ 3; R. Doc. 46-8 at

1, ¶ 4; R. Doc. 46-9 at 1, ¶ 4.

44 R. Doc. 46-5 at 2, ¶ 6–8; R. Doc. 46-7 at 2, ¶ 5–7; R. Doc. 46-8 at 2, ¶ 6–8; R. Doc.

46-9 at 2, ¶ 6–8.

45 R. Doc. 47 at Exhibit 8; R. Doc. 46-7 at 2, ¶ 11.

at *13 (N.D. Ohio April 15, 2026) (finding the presence of narcotics and plaintiff’s

attempt to ingest them posed a significant potential threat).

The third factor, whether Shorts was resisting or attempting to flee “largely

folds into the second” as it implicates the same facts. Salazar v. Molina, 37 F.4th 278,

282 (5th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). “‘[A] suspect’s refusal to comply with

instructions’ may indicate that physical force is justified ....” Joseph ex rel. Est. of

Joseph Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 332 (5th Cir. 202) (citation omitted). Further,

“[r]esisting while being handcuffed constitutes active resistance and justifies the use

of at least some force.” Hutcheson v. Dallas Cnty., 994 F.3d 477, 480 (5th Cir. 2021).

“To stay within constitutional bounds, an officer must use force with measured and

ascending actions that correspond to a suspect’s escalating verbal and physical

resistance.” Joseph ex rel. Est. of Joseph Bartlett, 981 F.3d at 332–33 (cleaned up).

Here, the actions of Detectives Tabora, Kingsmill, and Latour were reasonable.

Tabora and Kingsmill simply used their hands to restrain Shorts while he was

physically resisting. Minutes after the deployment of the pepper spray, Latour

rendered aid to Shorts by using a hose to wash the pepper spray from Shorts’s face.

The Fifth Circuit has stated that pepper spray “‘[d]econtamination consists primarily

of flushing the eyes with water.’” Hoke v. Anderson, 799 F. App’x 224, 226 (5th Cir.

2020) (quoting Wagner v. Bay City, 227 F.3d 316, 319 n.1 (5th Cir. 2000)). Here,

Latour explained to Shorts that the purpose of the water was to wash out the effects

of the pepper spray. The water sprays were not high pressure and lasted a few

seconds each. Additionally, Shorts was not held down, but rather he was allowed to

raise and lower his head and take a break in between sprays. Wierzbic v. Howard,

331 F.R.D. 32, 62–63 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (finding use of garden hose to direct water into

plaintiff’s face and eyes to wash away pepper spray was reasonable under the

circumstances), aff’d, 836 F. App’x 31 (2d Cir. 2020); compare Glover v. Capt.

Camacho, 3:24-cv-1107-BJD-SJH, 2026 WL 2085188, at *6 (M.D. FL. July 20, 2026)

(finding prisoner stated an excessive force claim where he alleged that officials

directed a hose on top of his head and used hot water to flush from a hose to flush

chemical agent into his eyes and face to cause him pain). Thus, Detectives Tabora,

Kingsmill, and Latour are entitled to qualified immunity.

As to Detective Quick, his actions were also reasonable and commensurate to

the urgent situation’s need to prevent Shorts from harming himself. The evidence

demonstrates that Quick utilized increasing degrees of force to prevent Shorts from

ingesting the cocaine, including pinning him to the vehicle, attempting to open

Shorts’s mouth, giving three flat hand strikes to Shorts’s head, shaking Shorts by the

shoulders, and, finally, deploying two one second bursts of pepper spray. All the

while, Shorts refused to comply with Quick’s repeated verbal commands, ignored the

threats that his stomach would be pumped and that Quick would utilize pepper spray,

and continued to resist Quick’s efforts. Under these circumstances, Quick’s actions

did not constitute an unconstitutional use of force. Watson v. Dyersburg City Police

Dep’t., No. 08-2718-SHM-tmp, 2013 WL 5306683, at *37 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 20, 2013)

(concluding that the use of two bursts of pepper spray to make plaintiff spit out a

baggie of marijuana was reasonable); Love v. Rockford Ill. Mun. Police Dep’t., No. 08-

50254, 2013 WL 159246, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 15, 2013) (concluding that strike to the

mouth followed by several uses of taser on a low setting was not excessive where

detainee refused to comply with commands to spit out drug packets, as failing to use

force could have allowed the plaintiff to harm himself by swallowing the contraband),

appeal dismissed, No. 13-1599 (7th Cir. Aug. 12, 2013); Morris v. Tulsa Police Dep’t.,

No. 09-CV-797-JHP-TLW, 2011 WL 1542920, at *4–6 (N.D. Okla. Apr. 21, 2011)

(holding that the use of pepper spray followed by a taser was reasonable where

plaintiff resisted attempted by officers to remove cocaine from his mouth); Singleton

v. City of Newburg, 1 F.Supp.2d 306, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (concluding that use of

pepper spray was reasonable where officer believed plaintiff was going to swallow

contraband); see Espinoza v. United States, 278 F.2d 802, 803–04 (5th Cir. 1960)

(concluding that “‘no more force was used than was necessary under the

circumstances’” where officers grabbed defendant by throat, choked him, and

attempted to pry open his mouth to prevent him from swallowing a package of drugs

(citation omitted)); Thomas v Cagel, No. 4:21-CV-692-P, 2022 WL 17586547, at *6–7

(N.D. Tex. Oct. 17, 2022) (holding that the use of pepper spray was justified to stop

arrestee’s self-harming behavior with officer’s requests was reasonable when arrestee

banged his head on cage of police car and ignored commands to stop as well as an

instruction that pepper spray would be deployed if he did not stop his behavior). As

such, Detective Quick is also entitled to qualified immunity.

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, R. Doc.

46, is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Shorts’s individual-capacity claims of

excessive force against defendants Detective Paul Quick, Detective Harold Kingsmill,

Detective Kenneth Latour, Detective Allan Tabora, Detective Barrett Pearse,

Detective Philip Ibbitson, and Detective Christopher Waguespack are DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 10% day of August, 2026.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

15