Blue

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

Anthony Blue , ) CASE NO. 1:26 CV 1084

)

)

Plaintiff, ) JUDGE PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN

)

vs. )

)

Jared Adkins, et al., )

) Memorandum Opinion and Order

)

Defendants. )

INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the Court upon Plaintiffs’[sic] Motion for Partical[sic] Summary

Judgment (Doc. 1-4) and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Civ. R. 12(b)(6) (Doc. 6).

This is a Section 1983 case. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiffs’[sic] Motion for Partical[sic]

Summary Judgment is DENIED and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Civ. R. 12(b)(6) is

GRANTED.

FACTS

The following facts come from plaintiff’s complaint filed in this case. (Doc. 1.) On or about

September 6, 2024, Officer Jared Adkins (“Officer Adkins”) and Officer John Doe (“Officer Doe”)

of the City of Lorain Police Department were conducting surveillance outside plaintiff Anthony

Blue’s (“Plaintiff” or “Blue”) residence after receiving anonymous complaints of drug activity

occurring there. Around the same time, Plaintiff returned home carrying a bag. He walked to the

back of the home and placed the bag in an enclosed porch. Plaintiff then encountered Officer

Adkins in the driveway, who placed Plaintiff under arrest for an outstanding child support warrant.

After Officer Adkins handcuffed Plaintiff and placed him in the back of a patrol car, Officer

Adkins and several other officers entered Plaintiff’s enclosed porch, recovered the bag Plaintiff had

been carrying when he arrived home, and searched the bag. As a result of that search, Plaintiff was

charged with three drug-related felonies in the Lorain County Common Pleas Court (“Common

Pleas Court”), Case No. 24CR12380.

Plaintiff spent approximately 13 months incarcerated after being indicted for the drug

charges. He was released when the case was dismissed after the Common Pleas Court ruled that the

officers’ search of the bag violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable

searches and seizures.

Plaintiff has now brought suit against Officer Adkins, Officer Joe Doe, and the City of

Lorain (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for trespass,

invasion of privacy, and intentional and/or negligence infliction of emotional distress. Attached to

Plaintiff’s complaint was Plaintiffs’[sic] Motion for Partical[sic] Summary Judgment (“Plaintiff’s

Motion”). (Doc. 1-4.) Defendants opposed Plaintiff’s motion and filed their Motion to Dismiss

Pursuant to Civ. R. 12(b)(6) (“Defendants’ Motion”). Plaintiff opposed Defendants’ motion.

Neither party filed a reply in support of their respective motion during the time afforded by the

Local Rules. LR 7.1(e).

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DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s Motion asks this Court to enter judgment in Plaintiff’s favor as to all claims

except his claim for intentional and/or negligence infliction of emotional distress. Defendants’

motion asks this Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s Monell1 claims against the City of Lorain and his claim

for intentional and/or negligence infliction of emotional distress. The Court will address each

motion in turn.

A. Plaintiff’s Motion

Plaintiff argues that summary judgment is appropriate as to most of his claims because

Defendants are precluded from relitigating issues determined by the Common Pleas Court.

Plaintiff’s position is not well taken.

Under Ohio law,2 “issue preclusion precludes the relitigation of an issue that has been

actually and necessarily litigated and determined in a prior action.” MetroHealth Med. Ctr. v.

Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 685 N.E.2d 529, 533 (Ohio 1997) (citation and internal quotations

omitted). According to the Ohio Supreme Court, issue preclusion applies when a fact or issue “(1)

was actually and directly litigated in the prior action, (2) was passed upon and determined by a

court of competent jurisdiction, and (3) when the party against whom [issue preclusion] is asserted

was a party in privity with a party to the prior action.” Thompson v. Wing, 637 N.E.2d 917, 923

(Ohio 1994). To determine whether privity between parties exist, Ohio courts “‘look behind the

1 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

2 “[F]ederal court[s] must apply the law of the state in which the prior judgment was rendered in

determining whether and to what extent the prior judgment should be given preclusive effect in a

federal action.” In re Fordu, 201 F.3d 693, 703 (6th Cir. 1999).

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nominal parties to the substance of the cause to determine the real parties in interest.’” Fort Frye

Teachers Ass’n v. State Employment Relations Bd., 692 N.E.2d 140, 144 (Ohio 1998) (quoting

Trautwein v. Sorgenfrei, 391 N.E.2d 326, 331 (1979)).

The Ohio Supreme Court has observed that “the qualitative differences between civil and

criminal proceedings [including the differing standards of proof, rules of discovery, and rules of

evidence] militate against giving criminal judgments preclusive effect in civil or quasi-civil

litigation.” State ex rel. Ferguson v. Court of Claims of Ohio, Victims of Crime Div., 786 N.E.2d 43,

48 (Ohio 2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Applying Ohio law, the Sixth

Circuit has held that “a § 1983 plaintiff cannot use issue preclusion against his arresting officers in

evaluating the constitutionality of the arrest even if the state court that acquitted the plaintiff found

that a constitutional violation took place.” Potts v. Hill, 77 F. App’x 330, 335 (6th Cir. 2003); see

also Thomas v. Plummer, 489 F. App’x 116, 122–23 (6th Cir. 2012) (“[W]e do not allow a plaintiff

to use issue preclusion offensively to prevent an officer from arguing that a search held

unconstitutional in a state suppression proceeding was, in fact, constitutional in a later § 1983

suit.”).

Here, Blue and the State of Ohio were the only parties in Blue’s state criminal case. Neither

Officer Adkins, nor Officer Doe, nor the City of Lorain was a party to Blue’s criminal prosecution.

The prosecutor did not represent Defendants and Defendants had no opportunity to litigate defenses

they raise here, such as qualified immunity. It follows that none of the Defendants were a party or

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in privity with a party involved in Blue’s state criminal case and the doctrine of issue preclusion is

inapplicable here.3 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED.

B. Defendants’ Motion

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Monell and intentional/negligent infliction of

emotional distress claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, the factual allegations of the complaint must be taken as true and construed in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff. Comtide Holdings, LLC v. Booth Creek Mgmt. Corp., 335 F.

App’x 587, 588 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 430

(6th Cir. 2008)). That said, the complaint must set forth “more than the bare assertion of legal

conclusions.” In Re DeLorean Motor Co., 991 F.2d 1236, 1240 (6th Cir. 1993) (citing Scheid v.

Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 1988)). The Court is not required to

accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences. In re Sofamor Danek Group,

Inc., 123 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing Morgan v. Church’s Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12

(6th Cir. 1987)).

3 In Plaintiff’s Motion, he submits that “Mr. Blue and the named Defendants are in privity and are

the same parties as in [Blue’s state criminal case].” (Doc. 1-4, at 4.) Not only is this factually

incorrect (Defendants were not parties in the criminal prosecution) but, for the reasons explained

above, it lacks legal precedent. To be sure, Plaintiff has not cited any case law to the contrary.

But even if there was privity between the Defendants and the parties in Blue’s criminal prosecution,

this Court seriously questions whether Blue’s present claims were actually and directly litigated in

the criminal prosecution. Blue seemingly concedes as much by casting the Common Pleas Court’s

order as merely “indicating” that Defendants are liable for each of his claims here, instead of

pointing to any specific holdings in the order. In fact, the Common Pleas Court’s order makes no

reference to any training or supervision, trespass, or invasion or privacy. Rather, the order was

limited to whether the search violated Blue’s Fourth Amendment rights under criminal standards.

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A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it lacks

“plausibility in [the] complaint.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007). A pleading

must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009). The factual allegations in the pleading must be

sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the

allegations in the complaint are true. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The plaintiff is not required to

include detailed factual allegations, but must provide more than “an unadorned, the-defendant-

unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A

complaint that merely offers legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of

action will not meet this pleading standard. Id.

1. Monell Claim

A municipality can be liable under Section 1983 when an official “policy or custom” caused

a violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Monell, 436 U.S. at 695. A municipality cannot be

held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor. Id. at 691. Rather, an identified policy or custom

must be the “moving force” behind the constitutional violation. Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d

282, 287 (6th Cir. 2006). The plaintiff must “identify the policy, connect the policy to the city itself

and show that the particular injury was incurred because of the execution of that policy.” Id.

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

To maintain a Monell claim, a plaintiff must allege an illegal policy or custom by pleading

facts suggesting one of the following: (1) the existence of an illegal official policy or legislative

enactment; (2) that an official with final decision-making authority ratified illegal actions; (3) the

existence of a policy of inadequate training or supervision; or (4) the existence of a custom of

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tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights violations. Thomas v. City of Chattanooga, 398 F.3d

426, 429 (6th Cir. 2005).

Here, Plaintiff contends that the City of Lorain failed to properly train and/or supervise its

officers and tolerated a custom of unlawful Fourth Amendment violations. The Court will address

each theory in turn.

a) Policy of Inadequate Training or Supervision

To maintain a Monell claim against a municipality based on inadequate training or

supervision, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) the city’s training program was inadequate for the

tasks that officers must perform; (2) the inadequacy was the result of the city’s deliberate

indifference; and (3) the inadequacy was closely related to or actually caused the injury. Ciminillo

v. Streicher, 434 F.3d 461, 469 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 1036,

1046 (6th Cir. 1992)). The Sixth Circuit has described the second and third elements as

“demanding.” Gambrel v. Knox Cnty., 25 F.4th 391, 408 (6th Cir. 2022).

To establish that a municipality acted with “deliberate indifference” to the fact that its

inadequate training or supervision would lead its agents to violate constitutional rights, a plaintiff

must prove that the violation of a clearly established right was a “known or obvious consequence”

of the lack of training or supervision. Id. (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011)

(quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 410)). “This standard usually requires proof that a municipality’s

employees engaged in a ‘pattern of similar constitutional violations’ separate from the conduct that

harmed the plaintiff.” Id. (quoting Connick, 563 U.S. at 62).4

4 The Supreme Court has left open the possibility that, in a “narrow range of circumstances,” a

plaintiff might prove deliberate indifference using only the single instance of unconstitutional

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Further, establishing that the inadequate training was closely related to or actually caused

the injury, “requires proof of the two types of causation from the common law of torts: but-for (or

factual) causation and proximate causation.” Id. (citing Powers v. Hamilton Cnty. Pub. Def.

Comm’n, 501 F.3d 592, 608–11 (6th Cir. 2007)).

Here, Plaintiff pleads only conclusory allegations that the City of Lorain failed to train its

officers on Fourth Amendment conduct and that “[t]he Lorain Police Department has a history of

Fourth Amendment unlawful search violations dating back to 1990” (Doc. 1 ¶ 32, 35–38.) These

conclusory allegations are insufficient to plead a plausible claim. See Wright v. Louisville Metro

Gov’t, 144 F.4th 817, 827 (6th Cir. 2025) (“When stripped of the legal conclusions, the Complaint

contains no factual allegations indicating what the training policies were, why they were

inadequate, how the city was deliberately indifferent, or how the failures related to the [plaintiffs’]

injuries.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

At most, Plaintiff alleges that “[t]he City of Lorain and the Lorain Police Department ha[ve]

been placed on notice of Lorain Police Officers[’] past Fourth Amendment unlawful search

violations” through prior cases. Plaintiff then cites two cases: a criminal case from 1990 and a

criminal came from 2006—but fails to explain how two decades-old criminal cases suggest the City

of Lorain’s deliberate indifference to a lack of training on Fourth Amendment conduct in the year

conduct against the plaintiff. Connick, 563 U.S. at 63–64. Plaintiff cites this general “single

incident” principle but does not explain how it applies here. In fact, after citing the principle,

Plaintiff reiterates that there are “several instances in which the Lorain Police Department’s Fourth

Amendment training and supervision has come under scrutiny by Ohio courts.” (Doc. 9, at 4.)

Nevertheless, to the extent Plaintiff intended to advance a single-incident theory, he has failed to

plead any factual allegations suggesting the City of Lorain did not train its officers on Fourth

Amendment conduct.

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2024. Such scant allegations are insufficient to raise Plaintiff’s right to relief above the speculative

level, even assuming this allegation is true. See Wright, 144 F.4th at 827–28 (“[Plaintiffs] argue that

we should take judicial notice of a 2023 Department of Justice report condemning various

Louisville police department policies and training as inadequate. But even if we did that, the DOJ

report would not rectify the [plaintiffs’] failure to connect the supposed inadequate training and

unconstitutional customs and policies to their specific constitutional injuries.”).

Even more, Plaintiff has completely failed to allege a causal connection between any

inadequate training and the violation of his constitutional rights. Confusingly, Plaintiff alleges that

“[t]here is no indication that Officer Adkins or the several other Lorain Police officers have

received proper Fourth Amendment training or supervision since September 6, 2024”—the day of

the alleged unconstitutional search of his bag. (Doc. 1 ¶ 37.) Simply put, training that did or did not

occur after the search of his property cannot be the but-for or proximate cause of any harms caused

by the search.

For these reasons, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently state a Monell claim based on a policy

of inadequate training or supervision.

b) Custom of Tolerance

“To sustain a Monell claim and hold a municipal entity liable for a custom of tolerance or

acquiescence, a plaintiff must show: (1) the existence of a clear and persistent pattern of illegal

activity; (2) notice or constructive notice on the part of the defendant; (3) the defendant’s tacit

approval of the unconstitutional conduct, such that their deliberate indifference in their failure to act

can be said to amount to an official policy of inaction; and (4) that the defendant’s custom was the

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‘moving force’ or direct causal link in the constitutional deprivation.” Wallace v. Coffee Cnty., 852

F. App’x 871, 876 (6th Cir. 2021).

Again, Plaintiff has failed to plead any factual allegations in support of his theory. Instead,

he includes only conclusory allegations that “Officer Adkins and the several other Lorain Police

officers’ conduct on September 6, 2024, proves that the City of Lorain and the Lorain Police

Department tolerate a custom of unlawful Fourth Amendment violations” and that “[t]his conduct

by the City of Lorain and the Lorain Police Department Defendants has ca[u]sed Mr. Blue to suffer

harm. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 38–39.) Further, as mentioned above, his unexplained reference to two, decades-

old criminal cases does not save his claim. See Wright, 144 F.4th at 827–28.

Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently state a Monell claim based on a custom of

tolerance. And, for all the aforementioned reasons, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED and

Plaintiff’s Monell claims (Counts Two and Three) are DISMISSED.

2. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must allege: (1)

the defendant intended to cause, or knew or should have known that his actions would result in

serious emotional distress; (2) the defendant’s conduct was so extreme and outrageous that it went

beyond all possible bounds of decency and can be considered completely intolerable in a civilized

community; (3) the defendant’s actions proximately caused psychological injury to the plaintiff;

and (4) the plaintiff suffered serious mental anguish of a nature no reasonable person could be

expected to endure. Woods v. Sharkin, 192 N.E.3d 1174, 1200 (Ohio Ct. App. 2022) (citation

omitted).

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“Ohio courts define extreme and outrageous conduct exceedingly narrow.” Wolfe v. Thermo

Fisher Scientific, Inc., 2009 WL 1255023, *2 (S.D. Ohio, 2009) (citing Godfredson v. Hess &

Clark, Inc., 173 F.3d 365, 376 (6th Cir. 1999)) “[T]o say that Ohio courts narrowly define ‘extreme

and outrageous’ conduct would be something of an understatement.” Baab v. AMR Servs. Corp.,

811 F. Supp. 1246, 1269 (N.D. Ohio 1993). Ohio law does not consider conduct to be “extreme and

outrageous” merely because it is tortious or criminal or because the defendant intended to inflict

emotional distress or acted with malice. Yeager v. Local Union 20, 6 Ohio St.3d 369, 374–375, 453

N.E.2d 666 (1983) (quoting Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts 73, Section 46, comment d (1965)).

To reach the requisite level of “extreme and outrageous,” the conduct must “go beyond all possible

bounds of decency, such as to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized

community.” It must be a case in which “the recitation of the facts to an average member of the

community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, ‘Outrageous!’”

Id. at 375.

Further, “serious” emotional distress must be “severe and debilitating.” Kovac v. Superior

Dairy, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 2d 857, 870 (N.D. Ohio 2013) (quoting Paugh v. Hanks, 451 N.E.2d 759

(Ohio 1983)). Examples “include traumatically induced neurosis, psychosis, chronic depression, or

phobia.” 180 Indus., LLC v. Brunner Firm Co. LPA, 2021 WL 4955268, at *2 (6th Cir. July 13,

2021) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Paugh, 451 N.E.2d at 765).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that he was incarcerated on drug charges for 13 months after the

officers’ search of his bag. During his incarceration, his sister died. He contends that missing the

passing of his sister caused him to “suffer severe emotional distress.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 58.)

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While missing the death of a relative is, of course, upsetting, Plaintiff’s allegations do not

meet the exacting standard of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Ohio law.

First, Plaintiff does not allege that any defendant intended to cause him serious emotional distress.

Further, Plaintiff does not allege that he suffered any sufficiently serious mental anguish, such as

traumatically induced neurosis, psychosis, chronic depression, or phobia. Finally, he fails to allege

any conduct sufficiently “outrageous” under Ohio law.

For these reasons, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s claim for Intentional

Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count Six) is DISMISSED.

3. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

Ohio law recognizes a cause of action for negligent infliction of serious emotional distress,

which “allows a plaintiff to recover for purely emotional injuries without proof of a

contemporaneous physical injury when the plaintiff is directly involved in an accident.” Ingram v.

Progressive Motors, Inc., 254 N.E.3d 265, 269 (Ohio Ct. App. 2024) (citing Heiner v. Moretuzzo,

652 N.E.2d 664 (Ohio 1995)). Accordingly, “Ohio courts have limited recovery for claims alleging

negligent infliction of emotional distress to situations such as where the plaintiff was a bystander to

an accident or was in fear of physical consequences to his own person.” Gearing v. Nationwide Ins.

Co., 665 N.E.2d 1115, 1120 (Ohio 1996).

Here, Plaintiff makes no allegations that he was bystander to an accident or was in fear of

physical consequences to his own person. As such, Plaintiff has failed to plead a claim for negligent

infliction of emotional distress under Ohio law. Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s

claim for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count Six) is DISMISSED.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’[sic] Motion for Partical[sic] Summary Judgment (Doc.

1-4) is DENIED and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Civ. R. 12(b)(6) (Doc. 6) is

GRANTED. Counts Two, Three, and Six are DISMISSED. This case will proceed as to Count One,

Count Four, and Count Five only.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN

United States District Judge

Date: August 5, 2026

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