Tawose

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

ADEWALE ENIOLA TAWOSE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. ) Case No. CIV-25-1421-R

)

MATTHEW L. WINTON, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

Before the Court are the following Motions, each of which is now at issue:

(1) Defendant Andrew Welch’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 38],

(2) Defendant Welch’s Amended Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 44], to which

Plaintiff responded [Doc. No. 46] and Welch replied [Doc. No. 49],

(3) the Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint [Doc. No.

43] filed by Defendants Matthew L. Winton PLLC, Matt Adams Thomas,

and Matthew L. Winton, to which Plaintiff responded [Doc. No. 47] and the

Winton Defendants did not reply,

(4) the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Denver Acosta, Brian Phillip

Bowman, Aaron Ellis, Mark Richard Grant, Amanda Lunsford, Bhupender

Pal, and Silverhawk Homeowners Association [Doc. No. 45], to which

Plaintiff responded [Doc. No. 50] and Defendants replied [Doc. No. 55],

(5) the Winton Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions [Doc. No. 51], to which

Plaintiff responded [Doc. No. 54] and Defendants replied [Doc. No. 56],

(6) Plaintiff’s Motions to Authorize Alternative Service and to Extend the

Time for Service on Defendant Denver Acosta [Doc. Nos. 53, 57], and

(7) the Winton Defendants’ Objection to and Motion to Strike [Doc. No. 67]

Plaintiff’s Notice of Supplemental Evidence [Doc. No. 58], to which Plaintiff

responded [Doc. No. 68].

BACKGROUND

This is the fourth action1 arising from the following factual background: Plaintiff

owns a home in the Silverhawk Neighborhood in Oklahoma City [Am. Compl., Doc. No.

42, at p. 1 & ¶ 12]. Board Members of Silverhawk Homeowners’ Association include or

included Defendants Mark Grant, Brian Bowman, Aaron Ellis, Denver Acosta, Bhupender

Pal, Amanda Lunsford, and Andrew Welch (“the Silverhawk Defendants”). Id. ¶ 2.

Defendants Matthew L. Winton and Matt Adam Thomas are attorneys at Matthew L.

Winton, PLLC (“the Winton Defendants”), which represented Silverhawk HOA in the

below-detailed enforcement and litigation actions against Plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 3-4.

In or around 2019, Plaintiff asked the Silverhawk Board whether Silverhawk

residents were permitted to use their homes for short-term rentals. Id. ¶ 12. Lunsford

allegedly told Plaintiff rentals were not restricted in the Silverhawk Neighborhood. Id. ¶ 13.

In 2020, Grant informed Plaintiff that rentals were prohibited and threatened legal action.

Id. ¶ 15. In or around February of 2021, Plaintiff received a violation notice imposing fines

1 “[F]ederal courts, in appropriate circumstances, may take notice of proceedings in other

courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a

direct relation to matters at issue.” St. Louis Baptist Temple v. FDIC, 605 F.2d 1169, 1172

(10th Cir. 1979), abrogated on other grounds by McGregor v. Gibson, 248 F.3d 946 (10th

Cir. 2001). Because of the direct relation of the three prior actions to matters currently at

issue, the Court properly takes judicial notice of the following proceedings: Silverhawk

Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Adewale Eniola Tawose, Dist. Ct. of Okla. Cnty., Okla.,

Case No. CJ-2021-4778, Adewale Eniola Tawose v. Silverhawk Homeowners Association,

Inc., et al., Dist. Ct. of Okla. Cnty., Okla., Case No. CJ-2024-3118, and Adewale Eniola

Tawose v. Silverhawk Homeowners Association, Inc., U.S. Bankr. Ct., N.D. Tex., Fort

Worth Div., Case No. 25-04043-elm. The Court will also take judicial notice of the related

proceedings in In re Adewale Eniola Tawose, U.S. Bankr. Ct., N.D. Tex., Case No. 24-

43275-elm13.

for using his property for rentals and informing him he had received a warning in June of

2020 for such activity. Id. ¶ 16. After requesting a hearing on the issue on March 3, 2021,

but receiving no response, Plaintiff attended a March 9, 2021, board meeting, where he

renewed his request for a formal hearing. Id. ¶ 18. Plaintiff alleges that despite Welch’s

assurance that a hearing would be scheduled, Grant instructed Bowman to rescind the

hearing. Id. ¶ 19. A new hearing occurred on July 6, 2021, but the Board failed to provide

the results or to afford Plaintiff an opportunity to appeal its decision. Id. ¶¶ 22-24.

In November of 2021, Silverhawk filed a breach of contract action against Plaintiff

(“Tawose I”). Silverhawk Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Tawose, Dist. Ct. of Okla.

Cnty., Okla., Case No. CJ-2021-4778; Am. Compl. ¶ 24. According to Plaintiff, during the

discovery phase of Tawose I, the Winton Defendants and some of the Silverhawk

Defendants informed him there was no evidence related to Silverhawk’s claim that the use

of Plaintiff’s property was a nuisance. Id. ¶ 26. But at a bench trial conducted from January

29th to February 2nd, 2024, Defendants presented Lunsford’s “surprise testimony” that

Plaintiff’s use of his property violated Silverhawk’s governing documents. Id. ¶¶ 26, 34,

36. Silverhawk prevailed after the state court found Plaintiff’s property use was both a

nuisance and a violation of the HOA’s rules. Id. ¶ 36. The Tawose I Court entered its

Journal Entry of Judgment [“Judgment I”] for Silverhawk on April 1, 2024, awarding

$8,258 in assessments. Id. ¶ 37. Silverhawk, through the Winton Defendants, thereafter

recorded the judgment in violation of, according to Plaintiff, Oklahoma statutory law’s ten-

day stay on such filings. Id. ¶ 38.

Plaintiff also alleges that in June of 2023, Bowman filed a complaint with the City

of Oklahoma City Board of Adjustment alleging Plaintiff lacked a rental license. Id. ¶ 27.

The city later concluded Plaintiff had an active rental license. Id. Bowman and the Winton

Defendants sent more letters to the Board in September of 2023 seeking the denial of

Plaintiff’s rental license, complete with affidavits from Bowman and Ellis claiming

Plaintiff’s rental was a nuisance. Id. ¶ 30. The Board nevertheless granted Plaintiff’s

license. Id. ¶ 32.

In May of 2024, Plaintiff filed an action in state court against Silverhawk, its Board

Members, and the Winton Defendants (“Tawose II”). Tawose v. Silverhawk Homeowners

Association, et al., Dist. Ct. of Okla. Cnty., Okla., Case No. CJ-2024-3118. Plaintiff

asserted claims such as constructive fraud, gross negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty

against the Tawose II Defendants, all related to the underlying dispute over the use of his

Silverhawk Property for short-term rentals.

On June 13, 2024, the Tawose I court announced an attorney-fee award of over

$152,000 in favor of Silverhawk, and an Amended Statement of Judgment [“Judgment II”]

was entered. Am. Compl. ¶ 41. Silverhawk, through the Winton Defendants, recorded the

amended judgment. Id. Plaintiff asserts this occurred in violation of various Oklahoma laws

because it was done without a signature and in violation of the ten-day stay. Id. He also

asserts the recording of the judgments immediately impaired his ability to refinance, sell,

or bond the property. Id. n.5.

In September of 2024, Plaintiff filed a bankruptcy proceeding in Texas, triggering

an automatic stay of the enforcement of judgments obtained prior to the commencement of

that case. Id. ¶ 43; In re Adewale Eniola Tawose, U.S. Bankr. Ct., N.D. Tex., Fort Worth

Div., Case No. 24-43275-elm13. Plaintiff alleges that despite this stay, Silverhawk

continued to take enforcement actions pursuant to the Judgments. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 44-47.

The Bankruptcy Court later sustained Plaintiff’s objection to Silverhawk’s Proof of Claim

related to those Judgments. Id. ¶ 48.

Plaintiff filed an adversary proceeding (“Tawose III”) in his bankruptcy action

against the Silverhawk and Winton Defendants. Adewale Eniola Tawose v. Silverhawk

Homeowners Association, Inc., U.S. Bankr. Ct., N.D. Tex., Fort Worth Div., Case No. 25-

04043-elm. In April of 2025, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed all claims against the Tawose

II Defendants. See Tawose, No. CJ-2024-3118. In October of 2025, Tawose III was

dismissed on abstention grounds. Am. Compl. ¶ 54.

Plaintiff commenced this action (“Tawose IV”) in November of 2025, asserting

claims against the Defendants related to the underlying HOA dispute and subsequent

litigation. In February of 2026, this Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against the Winton

Defendants [Doc. No. 36], but gave Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his pleadings, which

Plaintiff did. A deluge of motions followed, and the Court will take each in turn.

I. The Winton Defendants’ Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint

Defendants ask this Court to strike Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint pursuant to

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 12(f), arguing Plaintiff has merely repleaded claims

this Court previously dismissed. They rely heavily upon this Court’s February Dismissal

Order, in which it stated it would not tolerate a mere restatement of Plaintiff’s claims.

Defendants further assert Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is much more than the “short and

plain statement” contemplated by Rule 8.

Rule 8(a)(2) requires a pleading to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” This requirement “establishes a ceiling (the

complaint must be no more than ‘a short and plain statement’) and not a floor (the

complaint must at least be a ‘short and plain statement’).” Toevs v. Reid, 267 F. App’x 817,

818-19 (10th Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

“Something labeled a complaint but written more as a press release, prolix in evidentiary

detail, yet without simplicity, conciseness and clarity as to whom plaintiffs are suing for

what wrongs, fails to perform the essential functions of a complaint.” Mann v. Boatright,

477 F.3d 1140, 1148 (10th Cir. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

In a motion to strike “[t]he court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense

or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f).

The motion’s purpose is to “save the time and money that would be spent litigating issues

that will not affect the outcome of the case.” Purzel Video GmbH v. Smoak, No. 13-cv-

001167-WYD-MEH, 11 F. Supp. 3d 1020, 1029 (D. Colo. Jan. 6, 2014) (quotation

omitted). “[M]otions to strike are generally a disfavored, drastic remedy and are rarely

granted.” Knighten v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. CIV-17-683-D, 2018 WL 718533, at *2 (W.D.

Okla. Feb. 5, 2018) (citing United States v. Hardage, 116 F.R.D. 460, 463-64 (W.D. Okla.

1987)); see also Tavasci v. Cambron, No. CIV-16-0461 JB/LF, 2016 WL 6405896, at *7

(D.N.M. Oct. 25, 2016) (quotation omitted) (noting motions to strike “tend to be busywork,

and crowd the docket”); Lane v. Page, 272 F.R.D. 581, 587, 599 (D.N.M. 2011)

(quotations omitted) (citing courts that describe the motion to strike as “a dilatory tactic,”

“purely cosmetic,” and a “time waster[ ]”). Moreover, the Court “possesses considerable

discretion in disposing of a Rule 12(f) Motion to Strike . . . .” SFF–TIR, LLC v. Stephenson,

250 F. Supp. 3d 856, 978 (N.D. Okla. 2017) (quotation omitted).

The Court disagrees with Defendants’ characterization of the Amended Complaint

as a mere restatement of Plaintiff’s previously dismissed claims. Plaintiff has made a

meaningful effort to amend his pleadings; he shortened the Complaint by seventy pages,

arranged it in a much more straightforward and concise manner, and added factual

allegations in an attempt to correct the deficiencies in his previous Complaint.2

Accordingly, and taking into account Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court declines to strike

his Amended Complaint.

Defendants perfunctorily argue that this Court’s previous Order has a “preclusive

effect” on the Amended Complaint, and because the claims in Plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint all arise from the same events of the previous Complaint, those claims are

barred. See Watkins v. Genesh, Inc., 135 F.4th 1224, 1230 (10th Cir. 2025) (quotation

omitted) (“[A] party cannot avoid preclusion by repackaging precluded claims under the

rubric of slightly different legal theories where the ‘new’ and precluded claims stem from

the same transaction or occurrence.”). But “for claim preclusion to attach,” there must be

a “final judgment on the merits in a prior action.” Id. at 1229. As the “proponent[s] of

preclusion,” Defendants “bear[] the burden to show” its satisfaction. Id. at 1230. But

2 It is another matter entirely whether Plaintiff’s attempts to correct such deficiencies are

successful such that his claims have any merit.

Defendants do not meaningfully argue that this Court’s prior dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims

constitutes a final judgment on the merits. The Tenth Circuit has stated that dismissals

without prejudice can sometimes constitute final judgments because “no ‘further

proceedings’ in the case are anticipated.” Hogan v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 73 F.4th 1150,

1159 (10th Cir. 2023) (citing Amazon, Inc. v. Dirt Camp, Inc., 273 F.3d 1271, 1275 (10th

Cir. 2001)). But “‘[w]hen the dismissal order expressly grants the plaintiff leave to amend,

that conclusively shows that the district court intended only to dismiss the complaint [rather

than the action]; the dismissal is thus not a final decision.’” Id. at 1160 (quoting Moya v.

Schollenbarger, 465 F.3d 444, 451 (10th Cir. 2006)). This Court dismissed Plaintiff’s

claims against the Winton Defendants and indeed warned Plaintiff of the consequences of

a mere restatement of such claims. But the Court clearly anticipated further proceedings in

the case, giving Plaintiff leave to amend his Complaint and declining to preclude him from

amending his claims against the Winton Defendants. The Winton Defendants have failed

to meet their burden of establishing claim preclusion. In the absence of persuasive

argument or authority to the contrary from the Winton Defendants, their Motion to Strike

[Doc. No. 43] Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is DENIED.

II. The Winton Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions

The Winton Defendants have also moved for sanctions against Plaintiff pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. Rule 11(b)(1)-(3) states:

By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper—

whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it—an attorney or

unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person’s knowledge,

information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the

circumstances: (1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such

as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of

litigation; (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted

by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or

reversing existing law or for establishing new law; [and] (3) the factual

contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will

likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further

investigation or discovery.

The “central purpose of Rule 11[,]” which applies to attorneys and pro se litigants

alike, “is to deter baseless filings in district court.” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496

U.S. 384, 393 (1990). “In order to comply with Rule 11 and avoid sanctions thereunder, a

pro se party’s actions must be objectively reasonable.” Clements v. Chapman, 189 F. App’x

688, 692-93 (10th Cir. 2006) (unpublished). However, “[a] litigant’s pro se status may

certainly be considered when determining whether to impose Rule 11 sanctions.”

McCormick v. City of Lawrence, 218 F.R.D. 687, 690 (D. Kan. 2003).

Defendants assert sanctions are warranted because the legal defects of Plaintiff’s

previously dismissed claims have not been rectified by Plaintiff’s mere re-packaging of

them in his Amended Complaint. But this Court’s examination of the Amended Complaint,

as well as a review of the arguments Plaintiff has presented in support of his amended

claims, leads it to conclude that Plaintiff has made a meaningful effort to fix the

deficiencies, both factual and in some cases legal, which led to the previous dismissal. The

Court is also hesitant to address the parties’ arguments regarding the viability of Plaintiff’s

amended claims as they pertain to the Winton Defendants in the context of either a Motion

for Sanctions or Motion to Strike, particularly with the limited briefing on the issues

currently before it.

“Courts are typically inclined to sanction pro se litigants under Rule 11 only when

the litigant has been repeatedly warned that his or her legal theories are meritless or his or

her improper purpose is clear from the record.” Rasmussen v. Burnett, No. 24-CV-01727-

SKC-KAS, 2025 WL 808364, at *3 (D. Colo. Mar. 12, 2025). Plaintiff’s conduct, at least

at this point, has not risen to that level. Although the Court reminds Plaintiff (now for the

second time) that he must comply with Rule 11 and all other procedural and local rules,

sanctions are not appropriate at this time. The Court simply cannot conclude that Plaintiff’s

Amended Complaint is “baseless”—just as it cannot conclude, with the briefing now before

it, whether Plaintiff’s amended claims against the Winton Defendants are viable.

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions [Doc. No. 51] is DENIED without

prejudice to resubmission, if appropriate.

III. Defendant Welch’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Original Complaint

The filing of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint “supersedes the original and renders it

of no legal effect.” Davis v. TXO Prod. Corp., 929 F.2d 1515, 1517 (10th Cir. 1991)

(internal quotation omitted). Because Welch’s first Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 38] was

filed prior to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, it is DENIED AS MOOT.

IV. Defendant Welch’s Amended Motion and the Other Silverhawk Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint3

Both Defendant Welch and the other Silverhawk Defendants seek dismissal of

Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to the Oklahoma Citizens Participation Act, OKLA. STAT. tit.

3 Plaintiff asserts the Silverhawk Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss was improperly served

via email and seeks to have the Motion stricken. Counsel has represented this mistake was

inadvertent and promised to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 moving

12, § 1430, et seq., which is “designed to reduce the frequency of what are called SLAPP

[Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation] lawsuits.” Barnett v. Hall, Estill,

Hardwick, Gable, Golden & Nelson, P.C., 956 F.3d 1228, 1233 (10th Cir. 2020). “The

stated purpose of the act is to encourage and safeguard the constitutional rights of persons

to ‘petition, speak freely, associate freely and otherwise participate in government to the

maximum extent permitted by law and, at the same time, protect the rights of a person to

file a meritorious lawsuit for a demonstrable injury.’” Anagnost v. Tomecek, 390 P.3d 707,

709-10 (Okla. 2017) (quoting OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1430).

In an OCPA proceeding, the initial burden is on the defendant seeking

dismissal to show that the plaintiff’s claim “is based on, relates to, or is in

response to the [defendant’s] exercise of the right of free speech, the right to

petition, or the right of association.” OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1434(B). The

burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show “by clear and specific evidence a

prima facie case for each essential element of the claim in question.”

§ 1434(C). If § 1434(C) is satisfied, the burden shifts back to the defendant

to show “by a preponderance of the evidence” a defense to the plaintiff’s

claims. § 1434(D). If the plaintiff’s prima facie case fails, or the defendant

shows a defense by a preponderance of the evidence, the suit is dismissed.

Krimbill v. Talarico, 417 P.3d 1240, 1245 (Okla. Civ. App. 2017) (citations modified).

Welch argues the OCPA applies because Plaintiff’s claims arise from Welch’s role

as a Board Member in connection with Silverhawk HOA’s resort to judicial processes to

forward. Given that Plaintiff had actual notice of the Motion, responded to it in a timely

manner, and does not represent that he has been prejudiced by Defendants’ failing in any

way, Plaintiff’s request that this Court strike the Motion is DENIED. See Hanson v. Fenn,

No. 1:19-cv-1124-WJ/KK, 2020 WL 3083985, at *3 (D.N.M. June 10, 2020) (“[E]ven to

the extent that Plaintiff is arguing that although he received the filings electronically, he

was entitled to copies via U.S. Mail, he does not explain what possible prejudice he could

have suffered.”). See also LCvR7.1(c) (“A response to a motion may not also include a

motion or a cross-motion made by the responding party.”). The Court will, however, warn

Defendants against any future failings of this kind.

enforce its governing documents, thus implicating Welch’s rights both to association and

to petition. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1431(2), (4).4 The other Silverhawk Defendants argue

similarly, though they assert Plaintiff’s claims implicate only their rights to petition.

Plaintiff argues that because the OCPA answers the same question as Federal Rule

of Procedure 12(b)(6)—the standard for pre-trial dismissal—application of the OCPA in

federal court violates the Erie doctrine. Under the OCPA, the showing required is indeed

“somewhat more specific than that required to resist a traditional motion to dismiss, in that

something more than formulaic recitals of elements and a simple claim of damages is

necessary.” Candler v. James, 588 P.3d 933, 937 (Okla. Civ. App. 2026). But whether the

OCPA applies or not, Plaintiff’s claims do not rise even to the level of 12(b)(6) plausibility,

much less to what the OCPA may require. Thus, because the Court finds Plaintiff has failed

to state any plausible claims, it need not address the parties’ OCPA arguments.5

4 Plaintiff argues Defendant Welch’s Motion to Dismiss is unresponsive to his Second

Amended Complaint because it is a cut-and-paste of his previous Motion to Dismiss.

Defendant Welch filed a new Motion to Dismiss after the filing of the Second Amended

Complaint. The Court will consider Welch’s arguments as they pertain to the Second

Amended Complaint and declines to deny the Motion on these grounds.

5 See Westwin Elements, Inc. v. CVMR Corp., No. CIV-25-19-D, 2025 WL 3473300, at *3

n.3 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 3, 2025) (declining to address the parties’ OCPA argument where

the plaintiff failed to state a plausible claim for abuse of process). The Court notes another

court in this district has indicated that even where a complaint fails pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6), it does not moot the OCPA arguments because the OCPA provides for relief such

as the recovery of attorney’s fees where dismissal occurs. KLX Energy Servs., LLC v.

Magnesium Mach., LLC, 521 F. Supp. 3d 1124, 1130 n.4 (W.D. Okla. 2021) (citations

omitted). But even after the KLX Energy Court determined the OCPA applied in both

federal court and that particular case, it denied “an award because the OCPA motion was

only successful in part . . . and because the motion achieved nothing beyond what was

achieved under Rule 12(b)(6).” Id. at 1134. Given that Defendants’ OCPA Motions here

also achieve nothing beyond what is achieved under Rule 12(b)(6), this Court would

decline to award fees and costs at this juncture anyway. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12,

a. Plaintiff’s Slander of Title Claims Against Silverhawk, Bowman, Ellis, and Pal

and his Quiet Title Claim Against Silverhawk

To state a claim for slander of title, Plaintiff must allege: “1) [the] publication of a

statement; 2) the published statement was false; 3) the publication was maliciously made;

4) the publication caused [him] to incur special damages resulting therefrom; and 5) [he]

owns or possesses an interest in the subject property.” Bays Expl., Inc. v. PenSa, Inc., No.

CIV-07-754-D, 2012 WL 4128120, at *19 (W.D. Okla. Sep. 18, 2012) (citing Zehner v.

Post Oak Oil Co., 640 P.2d 991, 994 (Okla. Civ. App. 1981)). Plaintiff claims the

Defendants knowingly published false claims against his title by recording Judgments I

and II earlier than permitted by law. He claims Judgment II is void for several reasons. He

further argues Defendants slandered his title by failing to release either judgment after they

were (1) satisfied by Plaintiff, (2) disallowed by the Bankruptcy Court, or (3) reversed by

the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals in Tawose I.

Plaintiff also brings a quiet title claim against Silverhawk, asserting that although

Judgments I and II are invalid and/or have been eliminated by other judicial determinations,

Silverhawk has refused to release either Judgment, thus impairing the marketability of

Plaintiff’s title.

Plaintiff’s slander of title and quiet title claims both hinge on whether the Tawose I

Judgments are valid and enforceable. At this time, however, there is an appeal of Tawose

§ 1438(A)(1) (“If the court orders dismissal . . . under the [OCPA], the court shall award

to the moving party[ ] [c]ourt costs, reasonable attorney fees and other expenses incurred

in defending against the legal action as justice and equity may require.”) (emphasis added).

I pending before the Oklahoma Supreme Court. See Silverhawk Homeowners Ass’n, Inc.

v. Adewale Eniola Tawose, No. DF-122129 (Okla. Apr. 1, 2024).

The Rooker-Feldman6 doctrine prevents federal district courts from entertaining

actions brought by “‘state-court losers’” challenging “‘state-court judgments rendered

before the district court proceedings commenced.’” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 460

(2006) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)).

To determine if Rooker-Feldman applies, courts consider whether “the state court

judgment caused, actually and proximately, the injury for which the federal court plaintiff

seeks redress.” Kanth v. Lubeck, 123 F. App’x 921, 924 (10th Cir. 2005) (unpublished)

(quotation and emphases omitted). “If it did, Rooker-Feldman deprives the federal court of

jurisdiction.” Id. (quotation omitted). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies both to

“claims actually decided by a state court, and claims inextricably intertwined with a prior

state-court judgment.” Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1256 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotation and

alterations omitted). At bottom, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine instructs that “errors in state

cases should be reviewed and settled through the state appellate process.” Id. at 1256 n.11.

Plaintiff filed this lawsuit after the state court judgments were rendered. For Plaintiff

to succeed on his slander of title claim, this Court would have to determine whether the

Judgments filed and maintained by Defendants were “false.” To do so, even while the

6 Though Defendants do not explicitly raise Rooker-Feldman as a reason for dismissal,

“because the issue is jurisdictional, [the Court] may address it sua sponte.” Cory v.

Fahlstrom, 143 F. App’x 84, 87 n.1 (10th Cir. 2005) (unpublished).

underlying state court action is still pending,7 would require this Court to “review, reverse,

or invalidate a [] state-court decision”—something it cannot do. Burr v. Robinson, 162 F.3d

1172 (Table), at *1 (10th Cir. 1998) (unpublished). The same can be said for Plaintiff’s

quiet title claim, which asks this Court to declare Judgments I and II void and of no force

or effect and to quiet title in Plaintiff’s favor.

Rooker-Feldman operates to prevent parties from seeking to have state-court

judgments declared void on the basis of alleged errors or mistakes. Even if the state-court

erred “that [does] not make the judgment void, but merely [leaves] it open to reversal or

modification in an appropriate and timely appellate proceeding.” Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co.,

263 U.S. 413, 415 (1923)). This Court will not interfere with the validity of the state court

judgments. It thus declines to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s slander of title and quiet

title claims.8

7 “[A]llowing federal district courts to review state-court judgments while they are on

appeal in the state-court system would undermine the ‘[c]ooperation and comity’ on which

our federal system is built.” T.M. v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 146 S. Ct. 1739, 1751

(2026) (quoting Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil. Co., 526 U.S. 574, 586 (1999)) (rejecting

the theory that Rooker-Feldman bars only those federal suits which seek review of final

judgments of the state’s highest court). “Federalism principles are thus best served by

continuing to apply Rooker-Feldman to federal cases in which plaintiffs seek review of

state-court judgments, regardless of whether those judgments are final trial-court

judgments or those of a State’s highest court.” Id. at 1752.

8 Though Plaintiff’s claims are partially based on Defendants’ alleged failure to release the

judgments after they were satisfied, the Court finds it cannot rule on this issue either

without inappropriately stepping into the ongoing state proceedings. As the validity of the

judgments are still pending, the Court cannot issue a ruling upon whether those same

judgments were satisfied and/or should have been released. Furthermore, the Court doubts

the propriety of its becoming involved in the enforcement of the state court judgment. See,

e.g., Montgomery v. Okla. ex rel. Okla. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, No. 10-CV-743-GKF-PJC,

2012 WL 826932, at *4 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 9, 2012) (“Issues of enforcement of the state

court’s order should be brought before the state courts.”). See also Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco,

b. Plaintiff’s Fair Debt Collection Practices Act Claims Against Silverhawk

Plaintiff’s FDCPA claim asserts Defendant improperly filed a proof of claim in

Plaintiff’s bankruptcy case based on the underlying state court judgments. He argues that

each day Defendant refuses to release the Judgments, it engages in a new violation of the

FDCPA by falsely representing that Silverhawk holds a valid secured interest in Plaintiff’s

property. His FDCPA claims, like his slander of title and quiet title claims, would thus

require this Court to adjudicate whether the state court judgments are valid and

enforceable—something this Court cannot do without violating Rooker-Feldman.

Moreover, Plaintiff’s FDCPA claims against Silverhawk fail for other reasons.

“The FDCPA regulates ‘debt collector[s],’ defined as persons who ‘regularly

collect[ ] or attempt[ ] to collect’ someone else’s debts.” Pinson v. JPMorgan

Chase Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 942 F.3d 1200, 1209 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting 15

U.S.C. § 1692a(6)). Given this statutory definition, the FDCPA typically

“does not apply to creditors trying to collect their own debt.” Id. There are,

however, “instances in which creditors collecting their own debt are deemed

debt collectors under the statute.” Id. In particular, “[t]he FDCPA applies to

‘any creditor who, in the process of collecting his own debts, uses any name

other than his own which would indicate that a third person is collecting or

attempting to collect such debts.’” Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)). This

is known “as the false-name exception.” Id.

The Tenth Circuit has not determined the controlling standard for when the

false-name exception applies. Some circuits “hold that the false-name

exception applies when the ‘least sophisticated consumer’ would believe a

third party was involved in collecting a debt.” Id. (citing cases). In other

FDCPA contexts, however, we have rejected the “least sophisticated

consumer” standard in favor of “the ‘reasonable consumer’ standard.”

Tavernaro v. Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc., 43 F.4th 1062, 1071-72 (10th

Cir. 2022) (discussing standard for assessing materiality of misleading,

deceptive, or false statements).

Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 14 (1987) (indicating Younger abstention is appropriate in cases asking

federal courts to “interfere with the execution of state judgments”).

Heidelberger v. Ill. River Ranch Recreational Vehicle Park Prop. Owners Ass’n, Inc., No.

24-7056, 2025 WL 573824, at *3 (10th Cir. 2025) (unpublished).

But this Court need not determine which standard applies because Plaintiff’s

complaint is deficient under both. Id. Plaintiff does not allege that Silverhawk used a name

other than its own when collecting its debt. His theory is that Silverhawk’s reliance on the

Judgments, suggesting a judicial entity validated the debt, is a “classic example” of using

a name other than the creditor’s. Lacking from this theory is any allegation that relying on

the Judgments would lead a consumer to believe that a third person (here, it seems, the

state court) was collecting the debt rather than Silverhawk through its lawyers. Based on

the pleadings, “neither a sophisticated nor a reasonable consumer could have been confused

that it was [Silverhawk], and not any other entity, that was attempting to collect” on the

Tawose I judgments. Id.

c. Plaintiff’s Claim Against Welch for Willful Violation of Automatic Stay

Plaintiff asserts Welch violated the automatic stay imposed by virtue of the filing of

his bankruptcy action by continuing to seek enforcement of the Judgments against Plaintiff.

“In general, actions for violations of the automatic stay should be brought in the bankruptcy

court. The bankruptcy court is charged with enforcing the automatic stay.” In re Denton,

No. 23-80938-PRT, No. 24-8011-PRT, 2024 WL 5251904, at *3 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. Dec.

30, 2024) (footnote omitted); World Enters. v. Aquila, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-00021-DN, 2013

WL 4592204, at *9 (D. Utah Aug. 28, 2013) (“[O]ther courts have held that the proper

forum for a claim for damages arising out of an alleged breach of the automatic stay

provision is the bankruptcy court, not the district court.”) (quotation omitted). The

Bankruptcy Court is currently adjudicating Plaintiff’s claim that the Defendants violated

the automatic stay. In re Tawose, Case No. 24-43275-elm13, Doc. No. 259 (Bankr. N.D.

Tex. July 24, 2026) (setting September 2026 evidentiary hearing on Plaintiff’s stay

violation motion). In the absence of persuasive argument or authority to the contrary from

Plaintiff, this Court concludes that it would be more appropriate for Plaintiff to pursue his

willful violation claim before the Bankruptcy Court—something Plaintiff is already doing.

d. Plaintiff’s Actual and/or Constructive Fraud Claims Against Silverhawk,

Lunsford, Grant, Bowman, Acosta, Welch, Ellis, and Pal

Plaintiff alleges that in 2019, Lunsford falsely represented that the Silverhawk HOA

permitted rental properties. Plaintiff also alleges that in 2021, Grant falsely informed him

that daycares were allowed in Silverhawk, and that Bowman represented the same at the

July 2021 hearing (at which Welch and Pal were present) and his August 2023 deposition.

There is a two-year statute of limitations in Oklahoma for tort claims such as fraud.

See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 95(A)(3). Plaintiff first brought a claim for fraud against the

same Defendants in Tawose II in May of 2024—well over two years after his 2019 and

2021 fraud allegations. And Plaintiff’s arguments that the Oklahoma Savings Statute,

OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 100, which allows a party a one-year grace period for refiling a

timely-commenced action if it fails otherwise than on the merits, are unavailing here;

although Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his Tawose II claims in April of 2025 and brought

this action in November of 2025, it appears as though his tort claims were already barred

when he initiated Tawose II in 2024.

Plaintiff argues he did not discover the fraud until the Tawose I trial in January of

2024, and that Defendants fraudulently concealed their misrepresentations until then. “[I]n

suits based on fraud, the statute of limitations [ ] begins to run from the time of discovery

of the fraud or from such time as the victim by the exercise of ordinary diligence might

have discovered [the] same.” Baker v. Massey, 569 P.2d 987, 991 (Okla. 1977); see also

Lewis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 02CV0944CVE-FHM, 2005 WL 3263377, at *8 (N.D.

Okla. Dec. 1, 2005) (quoting Tice v. Pennington, 30 P.3d 1164, 1171 (Okla. Civ. App.

2001)) (“[T]olling resulting from fraudulent concealment ends ‘when the plaintiff knows,

or reasonably should know, of enough critical facts about the injury and its cause to protect

himself or herself by seeking legal assistance.’”). Plaintiff admits he learned Lunsford’s

representations were false as early as June of 2020. Am. Compl. ¶ 15. He further states he

attempted to raise many of his current claims before the Tawose I Court in 2023. Indeed,

the Tawose I docket reveals Plaintiff sought leave to amend his counterclaim to bring a

claim for constructive fraud, and the docket reflects Plaintiff had access to the Silverhawk

covenants and restrictions (including the provisions related to in-home daycares) as early

as July 11, 2023, when he filed his motion. See Silverhawk v. Tawose, No. CJ-2021-4778,

Doc. No. 1056087656 (July 11, 2023). This completely undermines any of Plaintiff’s

assertions that he did not discover his fraud claims until January of 2024 or could not have

promptly discovered the truth by his own ordinary diligence.

With respect to Plaintiff’s allegations that Bowman made fraudulent representations

at his August 2023 deposition, Plaintiff is barred from recovery as a matter of law. There

is no civil remedy for litigation-related misconduct under Oklahoma law. Patel v. OMHS

Med. Ctr., Inc., 987 P.2d 1185, 1201-02 (Okla. 1999) (finding no civil remedy for

plaintiff’s allegations that opposing counsel committed fraud, deceit, perjury, and

spoliation of evidence during an earlier, separate trial). “Oklahoma offers ‘participants in

judicial proceedings an absolute immunity against later civil suits grounded in litigation

conduct.’” Tyler v. United States, No. CIV-19-01102-JD, 2024 WL 1862324, at *11 (W.D.

Okla. Apr. 29, 2024) (quoting Knight v. Mooring Cap. Fund, LLC, 749 F.3d 1180, 1185

(10th Cir. 2014)). “[R]emedies for ‘litigation-related misconduct’ are to be pursued in the

litigated case.” Id. (quoting Patel, 987 P.2d at 1202-03). See also Anderson v. Pollard, No.

21-5019, 2021 WL 3503418, at *1 n.2 (10th Cir. 2021) (unpublished) (citing Cooper v.

Parker-Hughey, 894 P.2d 1096, 1100 (Okla. 1995)) (“[N]o cause of action for perjury

exists under either federal or Oklahoma law.”). “Oklahoma also ‘recognize[s] an absolute

privilege for communications made preliminary to proposed judicial or quasi-judicial

proceedings in favor of attorneys, parties and witnesses.’” Id. (quotation omitted).

Accordingly, this Court cannot provide Plaintiff a remedy for Bowman’s alleged

deposition misrepresentations.

e. Plaintiff’s Abuse of Process Claims Against Silverhawk, Bowman, Ellis, Acosta,

Pal, and Welch

Plaintiff argues Defendants abused multiple legal processes for the improper

purpose of coercing him from his home, extracting unwarranted payments, and punishing

him for exercising his rights. Those legal processes allegedly include (1) the municipal

complaints asserting Plaintiff lacked a rental license and seeking the denial of such a

license, (2) the premature recording of Judgment I, (3) the filing of and other enforcement

actions related to Judgment II, (4) the failure to release the Judgments after other judicial

determinations, and (5) multiple improper actions related to the bankruptcy case.

To state a claim for abuse of process, Plaintiff must plead “‘(1) the improper use of

the court’s process (2) primarily for an ulterior or improper purpose (3) with resulting

damage to the plaintiff asserting the misuse.’” Schlottman v. Unit Drilling Co., No. CIV-

08-1275-C, 2009 WL 1657988, at *2 (W.D. Okla. June 11, 2009) (quoting Greenberg v.

Wolfberg, 890 P.2d 895, 905 (Okla. 1994)). “The key issue in any abuse of process claim

is whether a party has attempted to use the legal system ‘to obtain a result not lawfully

warranted or properly attainable.’” FLSmidth A/S v. Jeffco, LLC, No. 08-CV-0215-CVE-

SAJ, 2008 WL 4426992, at *6 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 25, 2008) (quoting Neil v. Penn. Life Ins.

Co., 474 P.2d 961, 965 (Okla. 1970)). Even if the predicate action was motivated by

malicious intentions, if the predicate action was used for an authorized purpose, there is no

abuse of process. Greenberg, 890 P.2d at 905. There “must be some ‘definite act or threat

not authorized by the process.’” Gore v. Taylor, 792 P.2d 432, 435 (Okla. Civ. App. 1990)

(quoting W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 121 (4th ed. 1971)).

Even if the Defendants’ actions were motivated by the malicious intentions of

forcing Plaintiff out of his home, most of the actions taken by Defendants are all valid uses

of process in order to obtain the lawful outcome of enforcing the HOA’s covenants.

Moreover, to the extent Defendants took any improper actions, these actions are once again

litigation-related misconduct for which Oklahoma law provides no civil remedy. See Patel,

987 P.2d at 1201-02. To the extent Plaintiff seeks to sanction the Defendants for their

alleged misconduct in any of the state or bankruptcy court forums, he should seek to do so

in those actions instead. Moreover, many of Plaintiff’s claims, were this Court to adjudicate

them, would require it to inquire into the validity of the state court judgments, something

it cannot do without violating Rooker-Feldman.

f. Plaintiff’s Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims against Lunsford, Grant, Ellis,

Bowman, Acosta, Welch, and Pal

Plaintiff argues Defendants breached their fiduciary duties when they (1)

represented rentals were permitted in 2019, (2) treated Plaintiff’s rental as prohibited while

permitting in-home daycares, (3) failed to provide written results of the July 2021 hearing

and denied Plaintiff an appeal, (4) approved litigation and concealed Lunsford as a witness,

(5) authorized unlawful collection actions in connection with the Judgments and

bankruptcy case, (6) failed to respond to accounting requests, (7) submitted false affidavits

to the Bankruptcy Court, (8) maintained the liens/Judgments despite having no lawful basis

for them, and (9) filed the municipal complaints against Plaintiff.

Once again: Plaintiff’s claims related to Lunsford and the 2021 hearing are time-

barred.9 Plaintiff’s arguments related to concealing witnesses, approving litigation, and

misconduct in the bankruptcy case are complaints of Defendants’ litigation-related

misconduct for which this Court can provide no remedy. And to the extent Plaintiff’s

claims rely on this Court to determine the enforceability of Judgments I and II, Rooker-

Feldman bars this Court from doing so.

9 In the absence of persuasive argument or authority to the contrary, it appears that the

statute of limitations period for breach of fiduciary duty claims is also two years. See FDIC

v. UMIC, Inc., 136 F.3d 1375, 1380 (10th Cir. 1998) (applying Oklahoma law to a breach

of fiduciary duty claim).

g. Plaintiff’s Claims for Gross Negligence Against Lunsford, Grant, Ellis,

Bowman, Acosta, Welch, Pal, and Silverhawk

Plaintiff raises essentially the same factual allegations as those previously

mentioned in asserting that Defendants breached duties owed to Plaintiff and acted with

gross negligence: (1) Lunsford lying in 2019, (2) denying Plaintiff a hearing in March of

2021, (3) depriving Plaintiff of results or an appeal of his July 2021 hearing before filing

suit, (4) concealing Lunsford as a witness during discovery, (5) collecting and recording

the Judgments, and (6) misconduct related to the bankruptcy proceeding. Once again—

these claims are either time-barred and/or for litigation-related misconduct for which this

Court provides no remedy. Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that many of

these actions, taken pursuant to normal litigation and enforcement procedures, amount to

gross negligence or indeed negligence at all.

h. Plaintiff’s Civil Conspiracy Claims Against All Defendants

Plaintiff asserts multiple civil conspiracy claims against the Silverhawk Defendants,

asserting they were in conspiracy with each other and/or the Winton Defendants. The first

conspiracy claim asserts Defendants conspired to enforce the void and unauthorized

Judgement II against Plaintiff’s property through unlawful means. Rooker-Feldman bars

this Court’s review of such a claim because it would require this Court to determine the

validity of the underlying state court Judgments. Furthermore, much of this claim reiterates

Plaintiff’s allegations of Defendants’ litigation-related misconduct, for which this Court

cannot provide a remedy.

The second conspiracy claim asserts Defendants conspired to violate the automatic

stay imposed by virtue of Plaintiff’s bankruptcy action. The third conspiracy claim

regurgitates the same allegations related to the 2021 hearings, enforcement of covenants

against Plaintiff, concealment of Lunsford, discovery-related misconduct, bankruptcy case

misconduct, and maintenance of the liens. Both claims fail for the same reasons as many

of Plaintiff’s others—they are either time-barred and/or seek relief for litigation-related

misconduct. Furthermore, the Court has already found the Bankruptcy Court is the more

appropriate forum for Plaintiff to present allegations related to Defendants’ alleged

violation of the automatic stay.

i. Plaintiff’s Claims for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Against the

Silverhawk Defendants

Plaintiff asserts Defendants committed IIED by failing to accord him the proper

process during pre-litigation enforcement of the HOA’s covenants, filing municipal

complaints against him, enforcing and/or failing to release the Judgments, violating the

automatic stay, and committing other misconduct in the bankruptcy action. Once again—

many of these claims are time-barred and most are for litigation-related misconduct for

which this Court cannot provide a remedy. Moreover, as this Court stated in its February

Order, Plaintiff’s IIED claim is largely based on Defendants’ conduct related to exercising

their legal rights through litigation and enforcement activities. To establish an IIED claim,

Plaintiff must plead (1) that Defendants’ conduct was “so outrageous in character and so

extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and that such conduct

is regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community,” and (2) that the

resulting emotional distress was “so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to

endure it.” Comput. Publ’ns, Inc. v. Welton, 49 P.3d 732, 735-36 (Okla. 2002) (citations

and quotations omitted). Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that Defendants’ conduct

was either outrageous and extreme and/or that it caused him the type of emotional distress

contemplated by an IIED claim.

j. Plaintiff’s Breach of Contract Claim Against Silverhawk

Plaintiff asserts Silverhawk breached its governing documents by denying Plaintiff

a hearing, failing to provide written results of a hearing once he received one, filing suit

prior to completing the required hearing process, levying fines on Plaintiff without proper

notice and a hearing, failing to provide an accounting upon Plaintiff’s written requests,

refusing access to books and records, and breaching the implied duty of good faith and fair

dealing by, among other actions, selectively enforcing covenants, concealing a material

witness, recording a defective lien, etc., etc. This claim is another regurgitation of the

factual allegations and arguments which this Court has already found (1) seek review of

the state-court Judgments, something the Court cannot do under Rooker-Feldman and/or

(2) complain of litigation-related misconduct, for which this Court cannot provide a

remedy.

The only allegations potentially not barred by either of the above doctrines are

Plaintiff’s claims that Silverhawk failed to provide him with an accounting and access to

corporate books and records. These allegations are largely duplicative of his claim for

denial of access to books and records, which this Court more properly discusses below.

k. Plaintiff’s Claim for Denial of Access to Books and Records Against

Silverhawk

Defendants largely ignore Plaintiff’s allegations that he has both statutory and

contractual rights to inspect the books and records of the HOA.10 See Am. Compl. ¶ 11

(quoting from Section 6.4(l) of the HOA’s governing document: the Board “shall” make

available the books of account and financial records “at any reasonable time and for a

purpose reasonably related to [the Member’s] interest in a Lot”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 18,

§ 1065 (“Any shareholder . . . upon written demand . . . shall have the right . . . to inspect

for any proper purpose . . . [t]he corporation’s stock ledger, . . . and its other books and

records.”). Plaintiff asserts he has requested access to the corporation’s records for a

reasonable purpose but has been denied by Silverhawk. Silverhawk argues Plaintiff is

improperly substituting a limited statutory inspection right as a substitute for discovery in

ongoing litigation. But Plaintiff asserts the denial of access to the books and records

occurred in 2025, after both Tawose I and Tawose II had terminated—though Tawose I is

still pending appeal and Plaintiff’s bankruptcy case is ongoing.

“The proper purpose required by [§ 1065 ] . . . is one wherein a stockholder seeks

information bearing upon the protection of his interest and that of other stockholders in the

10 Though Plaintiff asserts Silverhawk failed to provide him with an accounting and access

to the corporate books and records, the Amended Complaint indicates that what he seeks

is access to Silverhawk’s financial records. See Am. Compl. ¶ 45 (“On January 21, 2025,

Plaintiff demanded . . . an accounting . . . . Silverhawk did not respond. On February 18,

2025, Plaintiff again requested access to financial records under 18 O.S. § 1065.”)

(emphasis added). Accordingly, the Court will examine this claim in the context of

Plaintiff’s claimed contractual and/or statutory right to access Silverhawk’s books and

records.

corporation.” Fears v. Cattlemen’s Inv. Co., 483 P.2d 724, 727 (Okla. 1971). A proper

purpose is a “purpose lawful in character, wherein a stockholder in good faith seeks

information . . . not contrary to the interests of the corporation, as distinguished from one

seeking to gratify his curiosity or proceeding for speculative or vexation purposes.”

Wolozyn v. Begarek, 378 P.2d 1007, 1011 (Okla. 1963). Proper purposes can, it seems,

include investigation of improper transactions or mismanagement and clarification of

unexplained discrepancies in a corporation’s financial statements. 5A Fletcher Cyclopedia

of the Law of Corporations § 2222 (2009).

Though the Court finds the issue is close, given the complete lack of authority or

persuasive argument from Defendant on this point it cannot conclude Plaintiff has failed to

state a claim (even under OCPA standards)11 for Silverhawk’s denial of his access to books

and records. Plaintiff asserts in his Amended Complaint that Silverhawk has failed to

release liens which he has allegedly satisfied. Taking into account his pro se status, the

Court can infer Plaintiff seeks to examine certain of Silverhawk’s books and records to

clarify any discrepancies in their financial records.

11 Even if the Court were to apply the OCPA in general, it remains unsure whether the

OCPA would apply to this particular claim by Plaintiff, as he is asserting a statutory and/or

contractual right to access corporate books and records. See Terry v. Ely, No. 19-CV-

00990-PRW, 2020 WL 9074888 (W.D. Okla. Sep. 8, 2020) (applying OCPA dismissal

standards to some of the plaintiff’s claims and not others). The Court is unconvinced such

a claim is in response to Silverhawk’s free speech, petitioning, or association rights. Under

plain 12(b)(6) standards, the Court is even more confident Plaintiff has stated a claim,

however tenuous, for violation of his rights to access Silverhawk’s books and records.

Whether such a claim will succeed at a later stage is, of course, another matter.

Perhaps the breadth of Plaintiff’s request is not reasonably related to his interest in

the Lot or Plaintiff seeks protected information Silverhawk cannot divulge. But the Court

finds Plaintiff has, at least at this stage, plausibly asserted that he attempted to exercise his

statutory and/or contractual right to access Silverhawk’s records and was entirely rebuffed.

Defendant’s cursory and overbroad arguments that Plaintiff’s purposes are improper do

little to convince this Court otherwise. Thus, in light of the total lack of persuasive

argument or authority to the contrary from Defendant, this claim will not be dismissed.

V. Plaintiff’s Motions to Authorize Alternative Service and Extend Time for

Service on Defendant Denver Acosta

Counsel has entered an appearance [Doc. No. 61] and filed a Motion to Dismiss

[Doc. No. 45] on behalf of Defendant Acosta. That Motion to Dismiss “does not raise the

defenses of insufficient process or insufficient service of process.” McGann v. Jagow, No.

1:24-cv-00727-SBP, 2024 WL 3340091, at *4 (D. Colo. June 20, 2025) (citing FED. R.

CIV. P. 12(b)(4) and (5)). “By doing so, Defendant[] [Acosta] waived service.” Id. (quoting

FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(1)) (“‘A party waives any defense listed in Rule 12(b)(2)-(5) by . . .

omitting it from a motion in the circumstances described in Rule 12(g)(2)[.]’”). Rule

12(g)(2) states: “Except as provided in Rule 12(h)(2) or (3), a party that makes a motion

under this rule must not make another motion under this rule raising a defense or objection

that was available to the party but omitted from its earlier motion.” See also Fed. Deposit

Ins. Corp v. Oaklawn Apartments, 959 F.2d 170, 175 (10th Cir. 1992) (“If a party files a

pre-answer motion and fails to assert the defense[] of . . . insufficiency of service, he waives

these defenses.”). Furthermore, the instant Order dismisses Acosta from the case entirely.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motions to Authorize Alternative Service and Extend Time for

Service on Defendant Denver Acosta [Doc. Nos. 53, 57] are DENIED as moot.

VI. The Winton Defendants’ Motion to Strike

Plaintiff has filed a Notice of Supplemental Evidence [Doc. No. 58], which he

indicates is directly relevant to the motions this Court ruled upon above. The Winton

Defendants ask the Court to either strike the Notice and its exhibits or decline to consider

them in deciding the pending motions [Doc. No. 67]. The Court has examined Plaintiff’s

Notice and the exhibits and finds that, whether it considered them or not, they would not

affect its above rulings. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Strike [Doc. No. 67]

Plaintiff’s Notice is DENIED AS MOOT.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Winton Defendants’ Motion to Strike [Doc. No. 43] and the

Winton Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions [Doc. No. 51] are DENIED. Plaintiff’s Motion

to Authorize Alternative Service [Doc. No. 53] and Motion to Extend Time for Service

[Doc. No. 57], as well as Defendant Welch’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 38] and the

Winton Defendants’ Motion to Strike [Doc. No. 67] are DENIED AS MOOT. Defendant

Welch’s Amended Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 44] is GRANTED. The other Silverhawk

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 45] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN

PART; Claim XIV against Silverhawk alone survives. The rest of the claims, to the extent

they are asserted against the Silverhawk Defendants, including Defendant Welch, are

DISMISSED. Thus the only remaining Defendants in this action are (1) the Winton

Defendants and (2) Silverhawk.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 29" day of July, 2026.

DAVID L. RUSSELL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

30