Peeples

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION AT COLUMBUS

KAVIN LEE PEEPLES,

Petitioner, : Case No. 2:26-cv-00116

-vs - District Judge Algenon L. Marbley

Magistrate Judge Michael R. Merz

TIMOTHY SHOOP, WARDEN,

Ross Correctional Institution,

:

Respondent.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This is a habeas corpus case brought pro se by Petitioner Kavin Peeples to obtain relief from

his sentence upon conviction for aggravated murder in the Pickaway County Court of Common

Pleas (Petition, ECF No. 1). The case is ripe for decision on the Petition, the State Court Record

(ECF No. 14), the Return of Writ (ECF No. 15) and Petitioner’s Reply (ECF No. 18).

Litigation History

On June 15, 1990, the Pickaway County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Peeples

charging him with the aggravated murder of Ronald L. McCaman, in violation of Ohio Revised

Code § 2903.01(A) with the specification1, pursuant to R.C. 2929.04, that Peeples was under

1 The specification, if proved beyond a reasonable doubt, made Peeples eligible for being sentenced to death.

detention at the time (Indictment, State Court Record 14, Ex. 1). Peeples was tried and convicted

by a three-judge panel which sentenced him to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole

for thirty years. Id. at Ex. 2. Peeples appealed to the Ohio Fourth District Court of Appeals which

affirmed. State v. Peeples, 94 Ohio App.3d 34 (Ohio App. 4th Dist. Mr. 23, 1994). The Ohio

Supreme Court declined to exercise jurisdiction over a subsequent appeal. State v. Peeples, 70

Ohio St.3d 1445 (1994).

Peeples filed a prior habeas corpus petition in the Northern District of Ohio which was

transferred to this Court under the Case No. 2:99-cv-1291. On March 13, 2001, District Judge

Sargus of this Court on recommendation of Magistrate Judge Mark Abel, dismissed the case.

Peeples filed a second habeas corpus petition in this Court on October 8, 2021 in Case No.

2:21-cv-4998. Upon transfer to the Sixth Circuit, that Court held the petition was not second or

successive and therefore did not require permission to proceed. The Court wrote:

Peeples seeks to raise the following claims: (1) his untreatable

immune disorder, along with his conditions of confinement, creates

a certainty that he will acquire COVID-19 and die, in violation of

his constitutional rights; (2) the State of Ohio has failed to provide

an environment preventing exposure to COVID-19 or to provide

medical treatment meeting his medical needs, ensuring that he will

acquire COVID-19 and die; and (3) the State of Ohio has failed to

maintain proper medical records, thereby obstructing his needed

medical care and creating a threat to his life by denying him required

medical expert diagnosis.

* * *

We have recognized that a state prisoner who seeks release from

confinement due to COVID-19, claiming that no other set of

conditions would remedy the alleged constitutional violation, raises

a cognizable claim for habeas relief under § 2241. Wilson v.

Williams, 961 F.3d 829, 837–38 (6th Cir. 2020).

* * *

Because Peeples’s claims relating to the COVID-19 pandemic arose

well after the filing of his original habeas petition, his § 2241 habeas

petition is not second or successive and does not require our

authorization to proceed in the district court.

Order, In re Kavin Lee Peeples, Case No. 21-3933 (6th Cir. Feb. 15, 2022)(copy at

State Court Record , ECF No. 14, Ex. 21).

Peeples then filed an Amended Petition in this Court which District Judge Graham

dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust state court remedies. Peeples v. Warden, Case

No. 2:21-cv-4998, Order of June 12, 2023 (copy at State Court Record, ECF No. 14, Ex. 28).

Peeples then attempted to obtain relief by filing a motion for relief from judgment under Ohio R.

Civ. P. 60. After that motion was denied by the trial court, he appealed to the Fourth District Court

of Appeals which affirmed October 15, 2025 (Decision, State Court Record, ECF No. 14, Ex. 55).

The Ohio Supreme Court declined to exercise jurisdiction on January 6, 2026. Id. at Ex. 58. The

Petition is postmarked February 4, 2026. See PageID 181. Respondent, however, credits

Petitioner with filing as of January 29, 2026, by complying with the mailbox rule of Houston v.

Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988).

Petitioner filed this federal petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in

this Court on January 29, 2026. Peeples alleges the following two grounds:

Ground One: Continuation of the Method of Punishment (Penal

Confinement) Without a Legitimate Penological Justification Is

Disproportionate to the offense and violates United States

Constitutional Prohibition of Cruel and Unusual Punishment. (8th

Amendment.).

Ground Two: The Method of Punishment Effectively Obstructs the

Delivery of Necessary Medical Treatment, where there is Not

Possible Condition of Penal Confinement in Which the Necessary

Medical Treatment can Be Obtained. Violates the United States

Constitutional Prohibition of Cruel and Unusual Punishment. (8th

Amendment.).

(Petition, ECF 2, PageID 12-16).

Analysis

Procedural Default

Respondent asserts Petitioner’s two Eighth Amendment claims are procedurally defaulted

because they were untimely presented to the Ohio courts.

When Judge Graham dismissed Peeples’ prior habeas corpus case, he expressly found that

an Ohio state habeas corpus action was an available state court remedy (Order, State Court Record,

ECF No. 14, Ex. 28, PageID 680). Although Peeples claims he did exactly what this Court told

him to do, he instead filed an “Amended Motion for Releif [sic] from (Sentencing) Order (of

1992)” under Ohio R. Civ. P. 60(B)(State Court Record, ECF No. 14, Ex. 29).

The trial court decided Peeples’ Eighth Amendment claim on the merits, concluding that

because his sentence was within the maximum sentence prescribed by statute, it was not cruel and

unusual. Id. at Ex. 48, PageID 1033. Noting that motions under Ohio R. Civ. P. 60(B) were proper

in criminal cases, the judge nonetheless took the option allowed by Ohio law of reclassifying the

motion as a petition for post-conviction relief but noted that Peeples had shown no reason for late

filing. Id.

On appeal the Fourth District found Peeples was making constitutional claims parallel to the

ones he makes here, to wit, that his probable genetic immune-deficiency disease could not be

properly treated in prison and that, in any event, he had served enough time to fulfill the

penological purposes of the criminal statute in question (Decision and Judgment Entry, State Court

Record, ECF No. 14, Ex. 55, PageID 1106-07). It held Peeples’ claims were not properly brought

under Civ. R. 60(B) or in a petition for post-conviction relief, and modified the trial court’s

judgment to make it a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. It noted, however, that Peeples had

previously had notice from the Ohio Supreme Court of an available state court remedy by action

for injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at PageID 1119, citing State ex rel. Peeples v.

Anderson, 73 Ohio St.3d 559 (1995). Although § 1983 is a federal statute creating a remedy for

deprivation of federal constitutional rights, state courts have concurrent subject matter jurisdiction

with federal courts to hear § 1983 cases. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990). Of course a person

cannot obtain release from custody in a § 1983 action. Preiser v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973).

However a court considering a § 1983 case can order medical treatment by injunction.

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals requires a four-part analysis when the State alleges a

habeas claim is precluded by procedural default. Barton v. Warden, S. Ohio Corr. Facility, 786

F.3d 450, 464 (6th Cir. 2015), Guilmette v. Howes, 624 F.3d 286, 290 (6th Cir. 2010)(en banc);

Eley v. Bagley, 604 F.3d 958, 965 (6th Cir. 2010); Reynolds v. Berry, 146 F.3d 345, 347-48 (6th

Cir. 1998), citing Maupin v. Smith, 785 F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir. 1986); accord Lott v. Coyle, 261

F.3d 594, 601-02 (6th Cir. 2001); Jacobs v. Mohr, 265 F.3d 407, 417 (6th Cir. 2001).

First the court must determine that there is a state procedural rule

that is applicable to the petitioner's claim and that the petitioner

failed to comply with the rule.

. . . .

Second, the court must decide whether the state courts actually

enforced the state procedural sanction, citing County Court of Ulster

County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 149, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 60 L.Ed.2d 777

(1979).

Third, the court must decide whether the state procedural forfeiture

is an "adequate and independent" state ground on which the state

can rely to foreclose review of a federal constitutional claim.

Once the court determines that a state procedural rule was not

complied with and that the rule was an adequate and independent

state ground, then the petitioner must demonstrate under Sykes that

there was "cause" for him to not follow the procedural rule and that

he was actually prejudiced by the alleged constitutional error.

Maupin v. Smith, 785 F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir. 1986); accord, Hartman v. Bagley, 492 F.3d 347, 357

(6th Cir. 2007), quoting Monzo v. Edwards, 281 F.3d 568, 576 (6th Cir. 2002).

Ohio has a procedural rule that requires claims to be brought in courts that have subject

matter jurisdiction over the case. Ohio enforced that rule in this case by dismissing Peeples

constitutional claims because they were brought in a proceeding over which the Common Pleas

Court, given the nature of the claims, lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Certainly the limitation

of claims to courts with subject matter jurisdiction is an adequate and independent state ground of

decision. Peeples has offered no excusing cause and prejudice. His claim that he did what Judge

Graham told him to do is belied by the record. Nor can he blame his choice on bad legal advice

because he had no lawyer at that stage of the proceedings and was not entitled to appointed counsel

post-conviction. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600

(1974).

In sum, he Petition should be dismissed with prejudice as barred by Peeples’ procedural

default in presenting his claims to the Ohio courts.

The Merits

Although the case should be dismissed on procedural grounds, the Magistrate Judge offers

the following merits analysis in the event the District Judge disagrees with that recommendation.

Petitioner is serving a life sentence for the aggravated murder of a fellow inmate. He makes

no claim that sentence violated the Cruel and Unusual Clause when it was imposed. Instead he

claims that he (1) has developed an illness – immunodeficiency disease – which cannot be properly

treated in prison and/or he has been sufficiently rehabilitated that his continued imprisonment no

longer served the penological purposes of punishment.

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (Pub. L. No 104-132,

110 Stat. 1214)(the "AEDPA"), federal courts are authorized to grant habeas corpus relief only if

a petitioner shows his or her conviction or sentence violated clearly established federal law as set

forth in holdings of the United States Supreme Court.

“One governing legal principle emerges as "clearly established" under § 2254(d)(1): A

gross disproportionality principle is applicable to sentences for terms of years.” Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003).

The Court's cases addressing the proportionality of sentences fall

within two general classifications. The first involves challenges to

the length of term-of-years sentences given all the circumstances in

a particular case. The second comprises cases in which the Court

implements the proportionality standard by certain categorical

restrictions on the death penalty.

In the first classification the Court considers all of the circumstances

of the case to determine whether the sentence is unconstitutionally

excessive. Under this approach, the Court has held unconstitutional

a life without parole sentence for the defendant's seventh nonviolent

felony, the crime of passing a worthless check. Solem v. Helm, 463

U.S. 277, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1983). In other cases,

however, it has been difficult for the challenger to establish a lack

of proportionality. A leading case is Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S.

957, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836 (1991), in which the

offender was sentenced under state law to life without parole for

possessing a large quantity of cocaine. A closely divided Court

upheld the sentence. The controlling opinion concluded that the

Eighth Amendment contains a “narrow proportionality principle,”

that “does not require strict proportionality between crime and

sentence” but rather “forbids only extreme sentences that are

'grossly disproportionate' to the crime.” Id., at 997, 1000-1001, 111

S. Ct. 2680, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836 (Kennedy J., concurring in part and

concurring in judgment). Again closely divided, the Court rejected

a challenge to a sentence of 25 years to life for the theft of a few golf

clubs under California's so-called three-strikes recidivist sentencing

scheme. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 123 S. Ct. 1179, 155 L.

Ed. 2d 108 (2003); see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 123

S. Ct. 1166, 155 L. Ed. 2d 144 (2003). The Court has also upheld a

sentence of life with the possibility of parole for a defendant's third

nonviolent felony, the crime of obtaining money by false pretenses,

Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 100 S. Ct. 1133, 63 L. Ed. 2d 382

(1980), and a sentence of forty years for possession of marijuana

with intent to distribute and distribution of marijuana, Hutto v.

Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 102 S. Ct. 703, 70 L. Ed. 2d 556 (1982) (per

curiam).

The controlling opinion in Harmelin explained its approach for

determining whether a sentence for a term of years is grossly

disproportionate for a particular defendant's crime. A court must

begin by comparing the gravity of the offense and the severity of the

sentence. 501 U.S., at 1005, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836

(opinion of Kennedy J.). “[I]n the rare case in which [this] threshold

comparison . . . leads to an inference of gross disproportionality” the

court should then compare the defendant's sentence with the

sentences received by other offenders in the same jurisdiction and

with the sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions.

Ibid. If this comparative analysis “validate[s] an initial judgment

that [the] sentence is grossly disproportionate,” the sentence is cruel

and unusual. Ibid.

Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59-60 (2010). As the examples cited by the Court in Graham

show, the Court has upheld sentence of life imprisonment without parole for crimes far less serious

than aggravated murder of a fellow inmate. And the Court has never held that a habeas court may

re-examine proportionality as the execution of the sentence progresses.

Peeples’ claims also fail on the merits and should be dismissed on that basis if the Court

reaches the merits.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing analysis, the Magistrate Judge respectfully recommends that the

Petition be dismissed with prejudice. Because reasonable jurists would not disagree with this

conclusion, it is also recommended that Petitioner be denied a certificate of appealability and that

the Court certify to the Sixth Circuit that any appeal would be objectively frivolous and should not

be permitted to proceed in forma pauperis.

July 23, 2026.

s/ Michael R. Merz

United States Magistrate Judge

NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written objections to the

proposed findings and recommendations within fourteen days after being served with this Report

and Recommendations. Because this document is being served by mail, three days are added under

Fed.R.Civ.P. 6, but service is complete when the document is mailed, not when it is received. Such

objections shall specify the portions of the Report objected to and shall be accompanied by a

memorandum of law in support of the objections. A party may respond to another party’s

objections within fourteen days after being served with a copy thereof. Failure to make objections

in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal.